CHAPTER XXVI
PERSIA AND THE MIDDLE EAST
Summer and Autumn 1941
The need to pass munitions and supplies of all kinds to the Soviet Government and the extreme difficulties of the Arctic route, together with future strategic possibilities, made it eminently desirable to open the fullest communication with Russia through Persia. The Persian oilfields were a prime war factor. An active and numerous German mission had installed itself in Teheran, and German prestige stood high. The suppression of the revolt in Iraq and the Anglo-French occupation of Syria, achieved as they were by narrow margins, blotted out Hitler's Oriental plan. We welcomed the opportunity of joining hands with the Russians and proposed to them a joint campaign. I was not without some anxiety about embarking on a Persian war, but the arguments for it were compulsive. I was very glad that General Wavell should be in India to direct the military movements.
On July 11, 1941, the Chiefs of Staff were asked by a Cabinet Committee to consider the desirability of joint military action in conjunction with the Russians in Persia in the event of the Persian Government refusing to expel the German community at present employed in that country. On July 18 they recommended that we should adopt a firm attitude in dealing with the Persian Government. This view was also strongly held by General Wavell, who had telegraphed the War Office on the previous day in the following terms:
The complaisant attitude it is proposed to adopt over Iran appears to me incomprehensible. It is essential to the defence of India that Germans should be cleared out of Iran now. Failure to do so will lead to a repetition of events which in Iraq were only just countered in time. It is essential we should join hands with Russia through Iran, and if the present Government is not willing to facilitate this it must be made to give way to one which will. To this end the strongest possible pressure should be applied forthwith while issue of German-Russian struggle is in doubt....
On the 21st I replied to General Wavell:
Cabinet will consider Persian situation to-morrow. I am in general agreement with your view, and would like to give Persians an ultimatum from Britain and Russia to clear out the Germans without delay or take the consequences. Question is what forces we have available in case of refusal.
The Chiefs of Staff advised that action should be confined to the south, and that we should need at least one division, supported by a small air component, to secure the oilfields. This force would have to come from Iraq, where we had already insufficient troops even for internal security. They conduded that if a force had to be sent into Persia during the next three months it would have to be replaced from the Middle East.
In a minute of July 22 the Foreign Secretary sent me his view of the situation:
I have been giving further consideration this morning to the problem of pressure upon Iran. The more I examine the possibilities of doing this the clearer it becomes that all depends upon our ability to concentrate a sufficient force in Iraq to protect the Iranian oiluields. It would be highly dangerous even to begin economic pressure until we were militarily in a position to do this, for the Shah is fully conscious of the value of the oilfields to us, and if he sees trouble with us brewing he is likely to take the first step.
Reports, apparently reliable, have reached us of Iranian concentrations on the Russian frontier, on the Iraqi frontier, and in the area of the oiliields. I hope that every effort will be made to strengthen our forces in Iraq at the earliest moment. If we can do this before the Russians suffer a severe reverse in the South there is a reasonable chance of imposing our will on the Iranians without resort to force. But we must not move diplomatically ahead of our military strength or we shall court disaster.
There is a further factor which increases the need for the early reinforcement of Iraq. Should Russia be defeated we shall have to be ready to occupy the Iranian oilfields ourselves; for in such an eventuality German pressure on the Iranians to attempt to turn us out would be irresistible.
* * * * *
I was not satisfied that this Persian operation had received the co-ordinated planning essential to its eventual success. On July 31 therefore on the eve of my voyage to Placentia I gave instructions that a special committee should be set up under the Lord President for this purpose.
I cannot feel that this operation, involving war with Persia in the event of non-compliance, has been studied with the attention which its far-reaching character requires. While agreeing as to its necessity, I consider that the whole business requires exploring, concerting, and clamping together, as between the Foreign Office and the War Office, and between the Middle East Command and the Government of India. We must not take such grave steps without having clear-cut plans for the various eventualities. For instance, what happens if the Persian troops around and about the Ahwaz oilflelds seize all Anglo-Persian Oil Company employees and hold them as hostages? What attitude is expected from the Bakhtiari and the local inhabitants? What happens to British residents in Teheran? Is there any danger of the oil-wells being destroyed rather than that they should fall into our possession? We must be very careful not to commit an atrocity by bombing Teheran. Are our available forces strong enough to occupy the Ahwaz oilfields in the face of local and official Persian opposition? How far north do we propose to go? What aerodromes are available? How is the railway to be worked if the Persians refuse to help?
These and many other questions require to be thought out. It would be well if the Lord President with the Secretaries of State for Foreign Affaiirs, War, and India reviewed the whole matter and reported to the War Cabinet during the early part of next week. Meanwhile all necessary action of a preparatory character should proceed. I am in favour of the policy, but it is of a very serious character, and should not be undertaken until the possible consequences and alternative situations have been thoroughly surveyed and careful, detailed plans made and approved.
I was sure that the similarity of the names, Iran and Iraq, would lead to confusion.
Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Bridges, and General Ismay 2 Aug 41
In all correspondence, it would be more convenient to use the word "Persia" instead of "Iran", as otherwise dangerous mistakes may easily occur through the similarity of Iran and Iraq. In any cases where convenient, the word "Iran" may follow in brackets after Persia.Formal correspondence with the Persian Government should of course be conducted in the form they like.
And later:
Prime Minister to Minister of Information 29 Aug 41
Do try to blend in without causing trouble the word Persia instead of Iran.
I am indeed glad to learn that the Persian Government have now (1949) adopted officially this change.
During my absence at sea this committee reported to me by telegram the results of their work, which had meanwhile been approved by the War Cabinet. It was clear from their message of August 6 that the Persians would not meet our wishes regarding the expulsion of German agents and residents from their country, and that we should have to resort to force. The next stage was to co-ordinate our plans, diplomatic and military, with those of the Russians. On August 13 Mr. Eden received Mr. Maisky at the Foreign Office, and the terms of our respective Notes to Teheran were agreed. This diplomatic move was to be our final word. Mr. Maisky told the Foreign Secretary that "after the presentation of the memoranda the Soviet Government would be ready to take military action, but they would not take such action except in conjunction with us." On receiving this news I minuted (August 19), "I think the Russian view is reasonable, and we ought to move with them while there is time."
We were now committed to action. In the event of stronger Persian resistance than had been anticipated we had to consider the possibility of further reinforcement of the Middle East area. On August 24, on the eve of our planned advance into Persia. I sent the following minute to the Chiefs of Staff:
It is essential that more reinforcements should be set in motion eastwards at once. Is it true that the 10th Indian Division has not got a British battalion to each brigade? If so, three battalions of British troops should be sent to join General Quinan by the fastest possible route. As General Auchinleck proposes to remain inactive in the Western Desert for many weeks, he should be directed to move larger forces eastwards than are at present arranged. At least the equivalent of one extra division, including the three British battalions aforesaid, should be set in motion now. If all goes well they can easily be countermanded. Let me know what forces are likely to be available in Egypt. Where is the last brigade of the 50th Division? Surely Cyprus is in no immediate danger.
In view of the recalcitrance of the Persian Government, General Quinan, who
was commanding in Iraq, had been ordered on July 22 to be ready to occupy the
oil refinery at Abadan and the oilfields, together with those 250 miles farther
north near Khanaqin. The joint Anglo-Soviet Note of August 17 met with an unsatisfactory
reply, and the date for the entry of British and Russian forces into Persia
was fixed for the 25th. The Imperial forces in the Abadan sector, under General
Harvey, comprised the 8th Indian Infantry Division; in the Khanaqin sector,
under General Slim, the 9th Armoüred Brigade, one Indian regiment of tanks,
four British battalions, and one regiment of British artillery. The supporting
air forces consisted of one Army Co-operation, one fighter, and one bomber squadron.
The first objective was the capture of the oilfields; the second, to advance
into Persia and, with Russian co-operation, to control Persian communications
and secure a through route to the Caspian. Opposition on the southern front
could be expected from two Persian divisions, with sixteen light tanks, and
in the north from three divisions.
The capture of the Abadan refmery was made by an infantry brigade, which embarked in naval craft at Basra and landed at dawn on August 25. The majority of the Persian forces were surprised but escaped in lorries. Some street fighting took place and a few Persian naval craft were captured. At the same time other troops of the 8th Division captured the port of Khurramshahr from the landward side, and a force was sent north towards Ahwaz. As our troops were approaching Ahwaz news of the Shah's "Cease fire" order was received, and the Persian general ordered his troops back to barracks. In the north the oilfields were easily captured, and General Slim's force pushed thirty miles along the road towards Kermanshah. They were now faced however with the formidable Pai-tak Pass, which if held by determined troops would have been a definite obstacle. To deal with this a column was sent to turn the position from the south. After overcoming some opposition these troops reached Shahabad, behind the Persian defence, on August 27. This movement, combined with some bombing, proved too much for the defenders of the pass, who abandoned their positions hastily. The advance on Kermanshah was resumed, and on the 28th the enemy were found again to be drawn up on a position across the road. But just as the attack was about to be launched a Persian officer arrived with a white flag and the campaign was over. Our casualties were 22 killed and 42 wounded.
Thus ended this brief and fruitful exercise of overwhelming force against a weak and ancient state. Britain and Russia were fighting for their lives. Inter arma silent leges. We may be glad that in our victory the independence of Persia has been preserved.
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Persian resistance had collapsed so swiftly that our contacts with the Kremlin became again almost entirely political. Our main object in proposing the joint Anglo-Russian campaign in Persia had been to open up the communications from the Persian Gulf to the Caspian Sea. We hoped also, by this direct co-operation of British and Soviet forces, to establish more intimate and friendly relations with our new Ally. We were of course both agreed on the expulsion from Persia or capture of all Germans and the wiping out of German influence and intrigues in Teheran and elsewhere. The deep and delicate questions about oil, Communism, and the post-war future of Persia lay in the background, but need not, it seemed to me, impede comradeship and goodwill.
Prime Minister to General Ismay, for C.O.S. Committee 27 Aug 41
Now that it seems that the Persian opposition is not very serious, I wish to know what are the plans for pushing on and joining hands with the Russians and making sure we have the railway in working order in our hands. We do not simply want to squat on the oilfields, but to get through communication with Russia. We have made certain proposals to the Shah, but these may be rejected, or the Russians may not agree to them. What therefore are the plans to join hands with the Russians, and what are the troop movements foreseen in the next week by our different forces?Prime Minister to General Wavell 30 Aug 41
I am so glad the Persian adventure has prospered. There is now no reason why you should not return home as you proposed. I am deeply interested in your railway projects, which are being sedulously examined here.
Everyone here is delighted you have had another success.
General Wavell's visit to London was however shelved by the need for his presence in Teheran. I also hoped that, speaking Russian fluently as he did, he might become an important link with the Soviet High Command.
Prime Minister to General Wavell 1 Sept 41
I agree with Chiefs of Staff that your presence in Teheran at present would be helpful to Bullard [the British Minister] in dealing with military requirements and for ensuring that Russian influence is kept within reasonable bounds.Prime Minister to Sir R. Ballard (Teheran) 3 Sept 41
We cannot tell how the war in these regions will develop, but the best possible through route from the Persian Gulf to the Caspian will be developed at the utmost speed and at all costs in order to supply Russia. It is very likely that large British forces will be operating in and from Persia in 1942, and certainly a powerful Air Force will be installed.
We hope it will not be necessary, in the present phase at any rate, to have an Anglo-Russian occupation of Teheran, but the Persian Government will have to give us loyal and faithful help and show all proper alacrity if they wish to avoid it. At the present time we have not turned against the Shah, but unless good results are forthcoming his misgovernment of his people will be brought into the account. Although we should like to get what we want by agreement with the Persian Government and do not wish to drive them into, active hostility, our requirements must somehow be met, and it ought to be possible for you to obtain all the facilities we require, bit by bit, by using the leverage of a possible Russian occupation of Teheran. There is no need to fear undue Russian encroachments, as their one supreme wish will be to get the through route for American supplies.Prime Minister to Premier Stalin 16 Sept 41
I am most anxious to settle our alliance with Persia and to make an intimate efficient working arrangement with your forces in Persia. There are in Persia signs of serious disorder among tribesmen and of breakdown of Persian authority. Disorder, if it spreads, will mean wasting our divisions holding down these people, which again means burdening the road and railway communications with movements and supplies of aforesaid divisions, whereas we want to keep the lines clear and improved to the utmost in order to get supplies through to you. Our object should be to make the Persians keep each other quiet while we get on with the war. Your Excellency's decisive indications in this direction will speed forward the already favourable trend of our affairs in this minor theatre.* * * * *
Prime Minister to Lord Beaverbrook (on Mission to Russia) 21 Sept 41
General Wavell proposes to go to Tiflis via Baghdad on his return to India. He speaks Russian, and I contemplate his directing, or possibly, if the forces grow large enough, commanding, the right hand we shall give to the Russians in and about the Caspian basin in the forthcoming campaign. It is therefore important that he should confer with high Russian military authorities on the whole position of their southern flank and in Persia.
You may bring this into your discussions, and see that the most is made of it.Prime Minister to Premier Stalin 12 Oct 41
Our only interests in Persia are, first, as a barrier against German penetration eastward, and, secondly, as a through route for supplies to the Caspian basin. If you wish to withdraw the five or six Russian divisions for use on the battle-front we will take over the whole responsibility of keeping order and maintaining and improving the supply route. I pledge the faith of Britain that we will not seek any advantage for ourselves at the expense of any rightful Russian interest during the war or at the end. In any case, the signing of the Tripartite Treaty is urgent to avoid internal disorders growing, with consequent danger of choking the supply route. General Wavell will be at Tiflis on October 18, and will discuss with your generals any questions which you may instruct them to settle with him.
Words are useless to express what we feel about your vast heroic struggle. We hope presently to testify by action.* * * * *
All arrangements with the Russians were smoothly and swiftly agreed. The conditions imposed on the Persian Government were, principally, the cessation of all resistance, the ejection of Germans, neutrality in the war, and the Allied use of Persian communications for the transit of war supplies to Russia. The further occupation of Persia was peacefully accomplished. British and Russian forces met in amity, and Teheran was jointly occupied on September 17, the Shah having abdicated on the previous day in favour of his gifted twenty-two-year-old son. On September 20 the new Shah, under Allied advice, restored the Constitutional Monarchy, and his father shortly afterwards went into comfortable exile and died at Johannesburg in July 1944. Most of our forces withdrew from the country, leaving only detachments to guard the communications, and Teheran was evacuated by both British and Russian troops on October 18. Thereafter our forces, under General Quinan, were engaged in preparing defences against the possible incursion of German armies from Turkey or the Caucasus, and in making administrative preparations for the large reinforcements which would arrive if that incursion seemed imminent.
The creation of a major supply route to Russia through the Persian Gulf became our prime objective. With a friendly Government in Teheran ports were enlarged, river communications developed, roads built, and railways reconstructed. Starting in September 1941, this enterprise, begun and developed by the British Army, and presently to be adopted and completed by the United States, enabled us to send to Russia, over a period of four and a half years, five million tons of supplies.
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