After years of contentious debate, President Clinton is close to deciding whether to proceed with the deployment of a national missile defense (NMD) system. The proposed system—designed to defend the United States against limited intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) attacks—would consist of 100 interceptor missiles based in Alaska, supported by one acquisition radar and five early-warning radars. A possible second phase of the system would add 100 interceptors and a second acquisition radar (probably in Grand Forks, North Dakota), and would eventually network the radars with space-based infrared sensors. This system would be initially operational in 2005 and would reach full operational capability in 2008. Its deployment would either violate or require major changes to the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty between the United States and Russia.
The president has indicated that he will base his decision on four factors: the nature and projected timing of the threat (based in part on a new National Intelligence Estimate); the technical readiness of the system for deployment (determined in part by a test scheduled for June 26); the affordability of the system; and the impact of deployment on arms control treaties and relations with Russia, China, and U.S. allies.
We believe that an NMD system is critical to the United States' future homeland defense. However, the system under consideration is not the best approach for initial deployment and fails to address several threats that the United States now faces. We propose an alternative approach that builds on the theater missile defense (TMD) systems now under development for defense against intermediate-range ballistic missiles. We believe this approach is a more balanced way to address the varied missile threats facing the United States and that it has technical and cost advantages over the proposed NMD system. Moreover, our proposal should be more responsive to the concerns of Russia, China, and many of our allies and may therefore ease the process of modifying the ABM Treaty.
Every major defense deployment decision is important. Deployment consumes scarce defense dollars and represents a choice not only about which possible threats we intend to defend against but also those we do not. The NMD deployment decision is especially crucial for political and technical reasons. A poor choice made too early may harm our security in both political and military terms.
Our analysis is based on the four points set forth by the president:
Nature of the Threat
The threat of a ballistic missile attack on the United States is evolving. Although Russia's arsenal is shrinking, the United States remains vulnerable to a large Russian attack with ICBM and submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) strikes, employing multiple independent re-entry vehicles (MIRVS) and decoys. Meanwhile, China has a small, but growing, ICBM force capable of reaching the United States.
The ballistic missile capabilities of other countries are growing, albeit slowly, and with them, the threat to the United States from rogue countries. At present, only North Korea has a system (the Taepo-Dong) that could reach the United States. Iran could have a system as early as 2005, but it is more likely to acquire one in the 2010-2015 period. Other nations (India, Pakistan, Iraq, and Israel) that currently possess medium-range (1,000 to 5,000 km) ballistic missile capability may develop or acquire missiles that attain intercontinental range (over 5,500 km). The pace of this growth depends significantly on assistance from other countries (Russia and China) and on the growing accessibility of dual-use technologies. We expect countries with ballistic missiles to acquire countermeasures in so far as they can, when confronted by missile defense. We conclude that other than Russia and China, only North Korea and perhaps Iran are likely to have the ability to attack the United States with ICBMs before 2015.
However, ICBMs are hardly the only—or even the most likely—threat to U.S. security. The United States remains vulnerable to nuclear, chemical, and biological attacks delivered by various means. Potential attackers enjoy a wealth of options: cruise missiles, aircraft, short-range ballistic missiles launched from a ship or submarine, or surreptitious transfer by truck or suitcase. Not only are these alternatives credible and cheaper to develop than ICBMs, but they are easier to deploy covertly than ICBMs, which require long-range testing and are more identifiable by intelligence. Subnational terrorist groups, which many analysts consider more likely to attack the United States than rogue countries, are liable to use these alternative delivery means.
The United States requires a balanced defense against the range of possible attacks against its homeland. The deployment of an NMD system—which defends only against ICBMs—implies a judgment on the likelihood of alternative threats and our ability to meet them. Although ICBMs tend to garner significant media attention and seem to arouse special fear in the public, we question whether the United States should disregard a host of other possible threats that may meet attackers' needs with greater ease.
Theater ballistic missiles pose a particularly urgent threat. In contrast to the long-range ballistic missile threat, theater ballistic missiles have proliferated in the Middle East, South Asia, and elsewhere. Many of these systems evolved from scud missiles exported extensively by North Korea. Theater-range missiles can carry nuclear-, chemical-, or biological-weapon payloads and currently threaten U.S. forces stationed abroad and our allies. Theater-range missiles are also more likely to be used in conflict, as the Gulf War illustrated. Theater missile defense should therefore be a higher priority than NMD and should qualify for a greater share of scarce U.S. defense dollars.
Technical Readiness of the NMD System
Three problems have hampered the NMD program over the past decade: the pursuit of too many alternative systems given available resources, a development program driven by schedules rather than by events, and the artificial boundary between national and theater missile defense systems.
The United States has simultaneously pursued terminal, sea-based, and boost-phase NMD systems, stretching resources too thin and inhibiting the rapid development of any single system. Moreover, since NMD development has moved forward according to arbitrary schedules rather than demonstrated technical accomplishment, we cannot be confident that any of the systems will work to specification. Development programs run in this manner lead to cost overruns, schedule slips, and frequently to program cancellation. (The most recent review by the Defense Science Board of the U.S. Department of Defense highlights serious weaknesses in the NMD development program.) Similarly, rushed or truncated test programs often lead to failures. For instance, the integrated flight test program for the Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle has gone through four tests, only two of which attempted intercept. The latest intercept test last January failed; the June 2000 intercept test will provide crucial, though not sufficient, evidence of the system's readiness for deployment. We conclude that the development and testing of the NMD system is not mature enough for the United States to make a confident deployment decision this year.
The third problem involves the separation the ABM Treaty imposes between NMD systems (designed to intercept intercontinental ballistic missiles) and TMD systems (built to defend against intermediate-range ballistic missiles). The latter are permitted under the treaty. TMD systems—notably the Army's Theater High-Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) system and the Navy's Ship-Based Area and Theater Wide systems—have minimal defensive capability against ICBMs because of their limited TMD interceptor velocities, constrained engagement software and test protocols, and lack of cueing of target trajectory information from external sensors. Systems designed for TMD can possess ICBM defense capability if these design constraints are relaxed.
In reality, however, no technical bright line separates NMD and TMD systems. A TMD system, for example, can intercept either a medium-range missile in terminal defense or even an ICBM, if positioned sufficiently close to the launch point to permit an intercept in the boost phase. Boost-phase intercept has the advantage of destroying missiles before separation of multiple warheads, decoys, or submunitions that might contain biological or chemical agents. In general, a TMD system's capability against an ICBM depends upon the acceleration, agility, and range of its interceptors, its proximity to the ICBM launch point, and how early it receives information about the target ICBM's trajectory. If we are considering an NMD deployment that violates or requires revision of the ABM Treaty, there is no reason not to consider a TMD deployment that does the same. A national missile defense capability that evolves from TMD will probably be cheaper, better contribute to defense against both long- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, and allow for more effective growth in capability as the threat increases.
Affordability
The fiscal year 2001 budget for ballistic missile defense is $4.5 billion (approximately 1.5 percent of the total U.S. Department of Defense budget), with $1.9 billion allocated to NMD and $1.7 billion allocated to TMD. The projected cost of NMD deployment between 2001 and 2005 is $10.5 billion; estimates vary widely on the long-term costs. We believe the nation can certainly afford an annual outlay of $5 to $7 billion for missile defense.
But, in contrast to the variety of missile defense programs receiving budget support, there are few programs directed to defend the United States from cruise missile or aircraft attacks. Mounting a credible defense of the U.S. homeland against these threats would require enormous expenditures for procurement of defense systems and increased personnel, as well as support for training, operations, and maintenance. Such a program could easily cost between $10 and $20 billion per year. Moreover, there is little designated effort to defend the country against terrorist attacks by surreptitious means. The U.S. Department of Defense does not have an architecture or cost estimate for a balanced defense against all these threats to the U.S. homeland.
Political Impact of the Deployment Decision
If the United States decides to deploy the NMD system now under consideration, the impact on U.S. relations with Russia, China, and our European allies would likely prove severe.
First, NMD deployment requires modification of the ABM Treaty, which was intended to ensure that ballistic missile defenses would not undermine U.S.-Soviet nuclear deterrence. The United States believes it is possible to modify the treaty in a manner that preserves its original purpose but still permits defense against small ballistic missile attacks from rogue states. Russian authorities oppose such revisions because they fear that any change could impair their second-strike retaliatory capability against the United States. This concern is especially pressing at a time when Russia has few resources for defense and relies more heavily on nuclear forces.
If Russia and the United States cannot come to an understanding on the ABM Treaty, a U.S. decision to proceed with NMD deployment would worsen bilateral relations, even as Russia's progress toward democratization and a market economy is especially fragile. While Russia has agreed to discuss nuclear issues, authorities there remain unwilling to negotiate any modifications to the ABM Treaty. The proposed road map for NMD points to an eventual capability against "many complex" warheads—a capability which fuels Russian concerns about long-run U.S. intentions. Unilateral modification or abrogation of the treaty by the United States will result only in less cooperation from Russia on key issues, such as controlling nuclear and missile exports, and in Russia's strengthening its ICBM and slbm capability.
A defense architecture based on TMD systems, although still infringing on the ABM Treaty, may require less modification and thus might be of less concern to Russia. A TMD forward deployment clearly targeted against North Korea and Iran would not necessarily have any capability against ICBMs launched from sites inside Russia and therefore would prove less threatening to Russia's second-strike capability. Since the TMD system of the sort we propose does not provide nationwide defense of the United States, has no capability against attacks launched from Russia, and has less potential for rapid breakout to a larger defense system, it arguably would not violate the ABM Treaty. Moreover, TMD deployment could include some Russian participation, thus easing concerns about the purpose of U.S. ballistic missile defense programs. This approach might also mitigate worries by our European allies that NMD deployment by the United States would undermine global nuclear stability.
The ABM Treaty has been a remarkably successful arms control agreement. Its success has been due to agreement between the two superpowers that strategic stability was in their mutual interest, and that this stability was best achieved by limiting missile defenses. But it is difficult, if not impossible, to craft a treaty that anticipates technological and geopolitical changes over almost three decades. The end of the Cold War, the emergence of ballistic missile threats from rogue nations, and advances in technology (especially involving space-based sensors and networked defenses) all point to the wisdom of reconsidering the treaty. But this need not be done precipitously, at a time when U.S.-Russian relations are strained, and each country faces a change in national leadership.
Of course, Russia is not our only strategic concern; NMD deployment will almost certainly elicit strong reactions from China as well. The proposed Alaska-based NMD system threatens China's current force of about 20 CSS-4 ICBMs. A land-based terminal intercept system with bases in Alaska (and later, in North Dakota) suggests the intent to build a system that can negate a Chinese attack. While a 10-fold increase in the Chinese ICBM force may be inevitable, a rapid increase in response to United States NMD deployment is sure to strain bilateral relations and may well destabilize the region. Indeed, the Chinese response to NMD deployment by the United States could prove even more damaging than any potential reaction from Russia. Deployment of sea-based TMD to defend against North Korea could elicit Chinese concern about the proliferation of TMD in Northeast Asia (Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea) but land-based TMD deployment is as or more likely to occur in the region.
A Better Way
Based on military, technical, financial, and geopolitical considerations, we believe deployment of the present NMD system should be deferred. Instead, the United States should take the following steps toward deployment of a TMD-based system:
As soon as possible, forward-deploy current systems that are configured to provide some capability against North Korean ballistic missiles. Deployment of an aegis cruiser equipped with an existing missile and aerodynamic kill vehicle off the coast of North Korea can provide modest capability for a boost-phase intercept of the Taepo-Dong missile. This capability could be available well before the initial operational capability of the NMD system in 2005
Upgrade the forward-based, boost-phase-intercept naval system off North Korea with higher-acceleration boosters and maneuverable kill vehicles already under development. An early possibility is the THAAD; with adequate funding, it could be available between 2005 and 2007. Consideration should also be given to the use of the ground-based interceptor being developed for NMD in a forward theater deployment that permits boost-phase intercept. Deployed off the coast of North Korea, such a system could have significant capability against an attack by Pyongyang. Depending on its geographical deployment, the system could also provide defense against an Iranian threat.
Continue research and development, testing, and evaluation of the NMD system and air-launched boost-phase systems. Any future decisions for post-2005 deployment should depend on the nature of the threat, technical advances of the TMD and NMD systems, and progress on renegotiating the ABM Treaty with Russia.
Ultimately, we believe this alternative approach provides greater flexibility to meet theater and national ballistic missile threats as they evolve over time. The TMD proposal would be cheaper and technically less risky than the NMD system. Finally, it may prove more amenable to ABM Treaty changes and thus less likely to prompt adverse responses from Russia, China, or U.S. allies.
John Deutch is an institute professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, former U.S. deputy secretary of defense, and former director of central intelligence. Harold Brown is a senior partner at E.M. Warburg, Pincus & Co. and former U.S. secretary of defense. John P. White is a lecturer in public policy at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and former U.S. deputy secretary of defense.