As prepared
I m very pleased to be here at the Hudson Institute among so many old friends.
Today I d like to speak about Iran, which has concealed a large-scale, covert
nuclear weapons program for over eighteen years, and which, therefore, is one
of our most fundamental proliferation challenges.
All of Iran s WMD [weapons of mass destruction] efforts -- chemical weapons,
biological weapons, nuclear weapons, and ballistic missiles -- pose grave
threats to international security. Iran s pursuit of these deadly weapons,
despite its signature on treaties that ban them, marks it as a rogue state,
and
it will remain so until it completely, verifiably and irreversibly dismantles
its WMD-related programs.
In response to recent criticism that the Bush Administration has not been
attentive enough to the nuclear threats emanating from Iran, let me just say
from the very start of his Administration , the President treated Iran as a
serious and growing threat to international security, as evidenced by his
famous "Axis of Evil" speech. This Administration was at the forefront
of
warning the international community about the seriousness of Iran s nuclear
weapons program. We have been using every diplomatic tool at our disposal --
working through multilateral channels such as the International Atomic Energy
Agency ("IAEA"), the G-8, and with our Russian, Chinese, British,
French and
German counterparts, and many others -- to apply pressure on Iran to halt its
illicit activities.
Iran s Nuclear Weapons Program
Let me start by describing several aspects of Iran s nuclear activities, and
why they trouble us so much. There is much we do not know about Iran s weapons
program, but much that we do know has been corroborated by a series of IAEA
reports over the past year. It is the accumulation of this public and
uncontradicted evidence, not just our own sensitive intelligence information,
that leads us to our conclusions about Iran s true objectives. To this moment,
Iran has never supplied coherent explanations for what it is up to, which is
yet another indication that we are watching a clandestine nuclear weapons
program in operation.
Iran is pursuing two separate paths to nuclear weapons, one that would use
highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons and one that would use plutonium.
As to the uranium route, Iran has tried to develop two different
uranium-enrichment methods in order to produce weapons-grade uranium. First,
it
has established a number of facilities for the manufacture and testing of
centrifuges (many of which are owned by military industrial organizations),
a
pilot enrichment facility designed for 1,000 centrifuges, and a large buried
facility intended to house up to 50,000 centrifuges. In parallel, Iran has
pursued another program to enrich uranium with lasers. Both of these programs
were successfully concealed from IAEA inspectors in Iran for years until an
Iranian opposition group disclosed their existence. As IAEA DG ElBaradei s
reports confirmed, Iran used both enrichment methods to secretly enrich
uranium, enriching to at least 1.2% using centrifuges, and up to 15% using
lasers.
Iran has also developed a program for the production of plutonium, an alternate
path to nuclear weapons. Covert construction of a large, heavy water production
plant was also disclosed by an Iranian opposition group. Its purpose is to
supply heavy water for a research reactor that Iran plans to begin constructing
this year. The technical characteristics of this heavy water moderated research
reactor are optimal for the production of weapons-grade plutonium. Iran claims
the purpose of the reactor is for isotope production for civil purposes, a
claim that belies Iran s confirmed past interest in building hot cells at the
heavy water reactor that appear to be designed for plutonium separation.
Another potential source of plutonium for weapons is the Bushehr light-water
power reactor, which is currently under construction. That reactor is under
IAEA safeguards. Russia has agreed to provide all fresh fuel for that reactor,
and Iran and Russia are discussing an agreement to return all spent fuel to
Russia. However, if Iran should withdraw from the Nonproliferation Treaty
("NPT") and renounce this agreement with Russia, the Bushehr reactor
would
produce enough plutonium each year for about 30 nuclear weapons.
The potential to produce plutonium is just one of several proliferation
concerns with the Bushehr reactor. This large nuclear project provides Iran
with access to nuclear technology as well as expertise and training in the
construction and operation of nuclear facilities. Bushehr can be used as a
cover and a pretext for other sensitive and troublesome nuclear fuel cycle
activities. For a variety of reasons, including the lack of agreement with Iran
on the return to Russia of the spent fuel containing plutonium, Russia has not
yet shipped fuel for initial operation of the Bushehr reactor.
The costly infrastructure to perform all of these activities goes well beyond
any conceivable peaceful nuclear program. No comparable oil-rich nation has
ever engaged, or would be engaged, in this set of activities -- or would pursue
them for nearly two decades behind a continuing cloud of secrecy and lies to
IAEA inspectors and the international community -- unless it was dead set on
building nuclear weapons.
Cover stories put forward by Iran for the development of a nuclear fuel cycle
and for individual facilities are simply not credible. For example, Iran is
making an enormous investment in facilities to mine, process, and enrich
uranium, and says it needs to make its own reactor fuel because it cannot count
on foreign supplies. But for at least the next decade Iran will have at most
a
single nuclear power reactor. In addition, Iran does not have enough indigenous
uranium resources to fuel even one power-generating reactor over its lifetime
-- though it has quite enough uranium to make several nuclear bombs. We are
being asked to believe that Iran is building uranium enrichment capacity to
make fuel for reactors that do not exist from uranium Iran does not have.
Iran would have us believe it is building a massive uranium enrichment facility
without having tested centrifuge machines, and building a heavy water
production plant with no evident legitimate use for the product. The more
credible explanation is that Iran is building the infrastructure to produce
highly enriched uranium in centrifuges and plutonium in a heavy-water-moderated
reactor.
Finally, there is Iran s claim that it is building massive and expensive
nuclear fuel cycle facilities to meet future electricity needs, while
preserving oil and gas for export. All of this strains credulity. Iran s
uranium reserves are miniscule, accounting for less than one percent of its
vast oil reserves and even larger gas reserves. Iran s gas reserves are the
second largest in the world, and the industry estimates that Iran flares enough
gas annually to generate electricity equivalent to the output of four Bushehr
reactors.
Over the past two years, the IAEA has reported many details about Iran s
nuclear program that leave no doubt of Iran s nuclear weapons intentions.
Consider, for example, the urgency of Iran s push to master centrifuge
technology in the face of calls by the international community to suspend
enrichment activities. On June 19, 2003, the Chairwoman of the IAEA Board
issued a statement of the Board urging Iran not to introduce nuclear material
into its centrifuge cascade, pending resolution of the issues that have been
raised about Iran s nuclear program. According to subsequent reporting by the
IAEA Director General, just six days later, on June 25, Iran introduced uranium
hexafluoride into its centrifuge cascade. Iran s stated purpose of producing
fuel for nuclear power reactors whose construction has not yet begun -- and
which will not be in operation for at least a decade -- hardly justifies this
need to press ahead quickly. But this urgency is quite consistent with a desire
to produce a nuclear weapon as soon as possible.
Consider also that the IAEA has discovered that Iran has produced Polonium
210
in the Tehran Research Reactor. The IAEA Director General s reports identify
two primary uses for Polonium 210: neutron initiators in certain designs of
nuclear weapons, and batteries for space satellites. Since Iran has no space
satellites or deep space program, the nuclear weapons application is obviously
of concern.
Another unmistakable indicator of Iran s intentions is the pattern of
repeatedly lying to and providing false reports to the IAEA. For example, Iran
denied testing centrifuges with uranium, denied the existence of a laser
enrichment program, denied producing enriched uranium, and denied receiving
any
foreign assistance in its centrifuge program. In each case, Iran confessed the
truth only when confronted with irrefutable technical evidence from IAEA
inspections. Iran s October 2003 submission to the IAEA, a declaration that
was
supposed to be the correct, complete, and final story of Iran s nuclear
program, omitted any mention of the development and testing of advanced P-2
centrifuges, which IAEA inspectors discovered in early 2004.
Iran s violations of its safeguards agreement with the IAEA include production
of plutonium by covertly introducing uranium targets into the Tehran research
reactor and reprocessing the irradiated targets to separate the plutonium, and
enrichment of uranium with centrifuges and lasers. The IAEA Director General
concluded in November 2003 that, "it is clear that Iran has failed in a
number
of instances over an extended period of time to meet its obligations under its
Safeguards Agreement."
There are press reports of Iranian attempts to purchase deuterium, with
speculation that this would be used for boosting the yield of nuclear weapons.
Such reports underscore how incomplete our information is on the Iranian
nuclear program. Why should Iran be seeking deuterium, when as I have said Iran
is building a production facility for heavy water, another name for deuterium,
to supply its heavy water reactor program? What other roles does deuterium play
in the Iranian nuclear program? There are also troubling press reports of Iran
s continued interest in procuring sensitive nuclear-related technologies from
abroad that could have nuclear weapons applications, like dual-use high speed
cameras and spark gaps. We hope the IAEA is investigating such procurement
attempts closely and will report on any findings in the upcoming report.
The impetus behind the Iranian quest for nuclear weapons is so great it has
caused Iran to renege on its commitments to the IAEA to ratify the Additional
Protocol and fully cooperate with inspectors, and renege on its commitment to
the Europeans to suspend uranium enrichment activities. If we permit Iran s
deception to go on much longer, it will be too late. Iran will have nuclear
weapons.
Isolation, Not Engagement
Since an Iranian opposition group provided public information on elements
of
Iran s nuclear program than had been hidden from the IAEA in August 2002, the
IAEA has conducted a series of inspections or Iranian facilities. This has
resulted in a series of five reports by the IAEA Director General, all of which
are posted on the IAEA web site. These reports document a great deal of
information on the Iranian nuclear program, and also make clear there are many
remaining unanswered questions, including the true scope and nature of Iran
advanced centrifuge enrichment program, the assistance Iran has received in
centrifugetechnology and in other areas, the involvement of the military in
the
centrifuge program and perhaps other aspects of Iran s nuclear efforts,plans
for hot cells that can be used for separation of plutonium, and many others.
A
sixth report of the Director General is expected at the end of August, which
is
not likely to put these questions to rest.
In response, the IAEA s 35-member Board of Governors has since June 2003 has
issued a statement of the Board and adopted four unanimous resolutions
expressing increasing concern about the Iranian nuclear program, deploring Iran
s failures and insufficient cooperation, and calling on Iran to cooperate
fully with the IAEA. The Board has repeatedly called on Iran to suspend all
enrichment related activities, something Iran steadfastly refuses to do.
Indeed, The most recent resolution in June 2004 "deplores" the fact
that "Iran
s cooperation has not been as full, timely and proactive as it should have
been," reiterates its call for Iran to suspend all enrichment related
activities, and specifically calls on Iran to refrain from production of
uranium hexafluoride and production of centrifuge components. Iran has made
clear it is going forward with the startup of its uranium conversion faciltiy
for production of uranium hexafluoride and other materials for the Iranian
nuclear program, and going forward with production of centrifuge components
and
assembly of centrifuges.
Iran s actions and statements do not bode well for the success of a negotiated
approach to dealing with this issue. In June, Iranian Foreign Ministry
spokesman Hamid Reza Assefi renounced a central part of the deal Iran made last
year with Britain, France and Germany to suspend its uranium enrichment
programs, saying, "Iran feels itself no longer obliged to its commitments
with
the European Union trio and will revise its policies on nuclear activities and
announce the new decisions within the coming days." And Iranian President
Mohamed Khatami declared that Iran was no longer bound by any "moral
commitment" to continue suspending uranium enrichment. Iran s decision
on July
29 to resume the construction and assembly of nuclear centrifuge parts
domestically and remove the seals on material sealed by the IAEA is further
cause for alarm
Iran s repudiation of a central element of its deal with the EU-3 is a
substantial setback for the European approach, and underlines why we continue
to believe that the Iranian nuclear weapons program must be taken up by the
UN
Security Council, falling as it does within the Council s mandate to address
threats to international peace and security.
There is, of course, a real irony here. Much of the pressure on Iran has come
not by the international community threatening the use of force against Iran,
but merely by the prosspect of Iran s nuclear program to be placed on the
agenda of the Security Council. Never has the Council been so feared! This is
quite an achievement for an Administration frequently criticized as
"unilateralist."
Clearly, the time to report this issue to the Security Council is long overdue.
To fail to do so would risk sending a signal to would-be proliferators that
there are not serious consequences for pursuing secret nuclear weapons
programs. As Condoleezza Rice told Fox News two weeks ago, "The Iranians
have
been trouble for a very long time. And it s one reason that this regime has
to
be isolated in its bad behavior, not quote-unquote, 'engaged."
Our Counterproliferation Strategy
While we work to bring this issue to the UN Security Council, we are
simultaneously pursuing other measures to bring a halt to Iran s pursuit of
nuclear weapons. We have focused special attention on Russia, the supplier of
Iran s Bushehr reactor. Following sustained high-level exchanges, initiated
by
President Bush, we believe that Russia now shares our concern about Iran s
nuclear activities. It joined us in supporting the IAEA s ongoing inspections
and backed language in the Sea Island Summit declaration in June deploring Iran
s failure to cooperate with the IAEA.
Additionally, Russia recently joined the core group of nations participating
in
the Proliferation Security Initiative ("PSI"), a robust new tool for
counter-proliferation launched one year ago by President Bush. PSI is designed
to stop the spread of WMD s, their delivery systems, and related materials to
non-state actors and rogue states such as Iran. The overwhelmingly positive
response and enhanced awareness that PSI has fostered globally about real,
practical steps that can be taken to defeat proliferators is a testament to
the
importance that countries attach to confronting the challenge of proliferation
and developing innovative tools to combat it. The PSI-coordinated interdiction
of the ship, BBC CHINA, en route to Libya with equipment for its nuclear
weapons program was an important element in the Libyan decision to renounce
and
dismantle its WMD programs.
In a speech at the National Defense University in February, President Bush
addressed weaknesses in the nuclear nonproliferation regime that allowed states
like Iran and Libya other states with covert nuclear programs to subvert their
NPT obligations. He detailed a number of proposals that made clear the
Administration s overarching approach: the frontlines in our nonproliferation
strategy must extend beyond the well-known rogue states to the trade routes
and
entities that are engaged in supplying the countries of greatest proliferation
concern. This is a "forward" policy, which can properly be described
not as
"nonproliferation," but as "counterproliferation." We are
employing a number of
tools to thwart WMD and missile programs, including sanctions, interdiction,
and credible export controls. Most aspiring proliferators are still dependent
on outside suppliers and technology. Thus, we can slow down and even stop their
weapons development plans by disrupting their procurement efforts.
Conclusion
Iran s pursuit of nuclear weapons capability is moving it further and further
down the path toward international isolation. We cannot let Iran, a leading
sponsor of international terrorism, acquire nuclear weapons and the means to
deliver them to Europe, most of central Asia and the Middle East, or beyond.
Without serious, concerted, immediate intervention by the international
community, Iran will be well on the road to doing so.
[End]
Released on August 17, 2004
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