Robert G. Joseph, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security,
"Countering The Iranian Nuclear Threat," Remarks at the Annual Dinner
Greater Washington Area Council for the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee,
Washington, DC, February 1, 2006
Late last year, the British Museum sponsored a major exhibit entitled "The
Forgotten Empire: The World of Ancient Persia." The exhibition underscored
the
greatness of the Persian nation founded over 2500 years ago. Greatness not just
in military might, but in wealth, architecture and engineering, and also in
art, culture and civilization.
One of the most striking items in the exhibit was the Cyrus Cylinder, a stone
cylinder covered with cuneiform writing, which describes Cyrus the Great's
conquest of Babylon and his edict that all religious sects be tolerated and all
deported peoples freed. As many in this room know better than I, Cyrus' edict
set in motion the process that led to the end of the Babylonian Captivity and
to the return of the Jews to Israel.
The Persian Empire disappeared over 2000 years ago, but the civilization and
pride of the Iranian people have remained. The Iranian nation has the potential
for a future as great as its past. It has a tremendous resource in its young
and dynamic population. It has a large and capable scientific and technical
community. And, of course, it has immense oil and gas reserves, which should be
more efficiently used for the benefit of the Iranian people. Tragically, Iran's
leadership today fails to reflect and to foster the potential of the Iranian
nation. Instead, it is backward-looking, defying the values that made Persia
great. It strives to create a much different legacy a legacy of intolerance
and threat.
The current regime in Teheran is the world's most active state sponsor of
terrorism, closely tied to the most notorious terrorist groups in the Middle
East, actively encouraging those dedicated to the violent disruption of peace
between Israel and the Palestinians. Iran provides weapons, funding and
guidance to Hezbollah, and significant support to Hamas and the Palestine
Islamic Jihad.
The regime in Teheran also deprives its people of fundamental human rights, and
its abysmal record is worsening. It uses its control of the security forces,
the judiciary, and other levers of power to thwart and suppress criticism and
reform.
The regime seeks great power status but in a form unrecognizable from
Persia's past glories. It seeks hegemony in the region and in the Islamic world
based on fanaticism. In doing so, it is working to foment discontent among Shi'
a in Iraq, seeking to thwart the ability of the Iraqi people to enjoy the
fruits of their liberation from Saddam Hussein. It is working to support the
repressive leaders in Damascus who are stifling the aspirations of the people
of Lebanon to determine their own destiny to establish a future of peace and
prosperity.
And, as you all are aware, the Ahmadi-Nejad regime ranks first in its hatred of
Israel. When the Iranian President makes a major speech calling for Israel "to
be wiped from the face of the earth," he might be saying exactly what he
means.
Not only has he repeatedly defended this statement and called for the United
States to be treated in a similar fashion but he has gone further
questioning the historical reality of the Holocaust.
And, of course, the regime in Teheran is actively pursuing a nuclear weapons
capability. Let me be clear about this. For almost 20 years, Iran
systematically violated its IAEA safeguards and NPT obligations by hiding its
nuclear fuel cycle efforts and conducting a covert program aimed at nuclear
weapons. Teheran has admitted some of those efforts -- but only after
clandestine work had been publicly exposed, first by an Iranian opposition
group, and subsequently through the investigations of the International Atomic
Energy Agency. But these admissions fall far short of acknowledging the true
purpose of its nuclear program. Iran continues to insist that the goal of the
program is peaceful; and that every step it takes that brings it closer to a
nuclear weapons capability is only done in furtherance of its legal right to
develop civil nuclear energy.
In fact, Iran has pursued numerous routes to provide it with the ability to
produce fissile material for weapons. We judge Iran is going down the plutonium
route through construction of a heavy water research reactor and a heavy water
plant. It has conducted experiments to separate and purify plutonium. Iran has
even more aggressively pursued the enrichment route, demonstrating its
commitment and determination to expend tremendous resources in defiance of the
international community by building facilities to convert and enrich uranium.
All of these efforts have involved a dizzying array of cover stories and false
statements over many years. And now Teheran has declared that it will actually
resume feeding UF6 into what it says will be a few centrifuges. The cover story
this time is that this is merely innocent "research and development"
one
Iranian official reportedly said this was the type of research that is
conducted at many universities. Not at my university or any other that I know.
The removal of IAEA seals three weeks ago, including at the large facility at
Natanz which Iran has said is intended to house tens of thousands of
centrifuges to enrich uranium -- is the next logical and necessary step to
proceed to enrichment on an industrial scale. Consistent with our assessment,
the IAEA recently discovered documents that indicate that Iran received
information on casting and machining hemispheres of enriched uranium. We know
of no application for such hemispheres other than nuclear weapons.
Iran is also pursuing the delivery systems that would allow it to threaten
nuclear strikes against its neighbors in the region and well beyond. It is
producing and deploying increasing numbers of the Shahab-3, a 1300-km range
ballistic missile, and has publicly acknowledged work on even longer-range
systems. We believe it aspires to this capability so that it can hold hostage
cities of our friends in the Middle East and Europe and perhaps in the future
even those in our own country. If Teheran can succeed in this effort, it may
believe that it could undertake its expansionist designs with less concern that
we would be willing to accept the risk of assisting our allies in the Gulf.
The President has made clear that a nuclear-armed Iran is unacceptable. Let me
be explicit why we cannot accept a nuclear-armed Iran:
" A nuclear-armed Iran could embolden the leadership in Teheran to advance
its
aggressive ambitions in and outside of the region, both directly and through
the terrorists it supports ambitions that gravely threaten stability and the
security of U.S. friends and allies.
" A nuclear-armed Iran would represent a direct threat to U.S. forces and
allies in the region, the greater Middle East, Europe and Asia, and eventually
to the United States itself. The likelihood of Iranian use of force, including
possibly chemical and biological weapons, could increase if Teheran believed
its nuclear capability protected it from retaliation. At a minimum, it could
seek to use nuclear weapons as a powerful tool of intimidation and blackmail.
" A nuclear-armed Iran could provide the fuse for further proliferation,
engendering a re-evaluation of security requirements across the region, and
undermining the nuclear nonproliferation regime. " A nuclear-armed Iran would
represent an existential threat to the state of Israel. Not content with his
efforts to destroy the peace process, Ahmadi-Nejad may believe that nuclear
weapons are the chosen instrument to achieve his stated goal of wiping Israel
"off the map." Despite the resulting apocalyptic costs for Iran itself,
the
regime could miscalculate, or accept those costs in the cause of martyrdom.
" And finally, Iran is at the nexus of weapons of mass destruction and
terrorism, pursuing nuclear, chemical and biological programs and actively
supporting terrorist movements. If Iran has fissile material or nuclear
weapons, the likelihood of their transfer to a third party would increase by
design or through diversion. Now I will turn to our approach for dealing with
Iran's nuclear challenge.
From the earliest days after his inauguration, President Bush has given the
highest priority to combating WMD and missile proliferation, and has adopted
new measures to counter this challenge.
The Administration began by fashioning the first truly national, comprehensive
strategy for preventing and protecting against the threat. Within this
strategy, the Administration readily acknowledged that the starting point, and
initial line of defense, is to prevent proliferation. However, we also knew
that prevention would not always succeed. Therefore, we have placed new
emphasis on protection from, and response to, the use of these weapons against
us or our friends and allies. We are building the counterproliferation
capabilities to deter, defend against, and defeat weapons of mass destruction
in the hands of our enemies. And we are acquiring the ability to contain and
reduce the potentially horrific effects if these weapons are used against us.
We must bring all elements of our strategy to bear in our targeted effort
against the Iranian WMD and missile threat. I would like to highlight two areas
in particular: the critical set of tools against proliferation that we call
"defensive measures," and determined diplomacy to end Iran's nuclear
weapons
program and prevent further nuclear proliferation.
As with diplomacy, to be successful in our defensive measures, we must work
with others who share our goals. Taking defensive measures to protect ourselves
from WMD proliferation and WMD-armed adversaries requires a broad array of
instruments, policies, and programs.
At one end of the spectrum are those measures that prevent Iran and other
proliferators from gaining access to sensitive technologies and materials that
could represent a short cut to nuclear weapons. Nunn-Lugar and other
nonproliferation programs are key in this effort, reinforcing other important
measures such as effective export controls by all states. As an Administration,
we have succeeded in expanding and accelerating these programs through not only
U.S. funding, but also through the President's Global Partnership initiative
which has added billions of dollars from others.
At the other end of the spectrum, one element of the solution set is missile
defense, as well as improved counterforce and passive defense capabilities. In
a number of these critical areas, we are working closely with our allies, such
as with Japan and Israel, on missile defenses to protect both our forces and
our populations. This capability adds not only another layer of defense to our
strategic posture against the threat we face, but also another reason to
persuade states like Iran not to acquire nuclear weapons in the first place.
Other defensive measures address the financial underpinnings of proliferation.
UN Security Council Resolution 1540 adopted at the President's urging
requires states to adopt and enforce effective controls on funds and services
related to export and transshipment that would contribute to WMD programs.
Consistent with Resolution 1540, G-8 Leaders have called for enhanced efforts
to combat proliferation through cooperation to identify, track and freeze
transactions and assets associated with proliferation activities.
President Bush augmented U.S. efforts in this field when he issued last June a
new Executive Order, which authorizes the U.S. Government to freeze assets and
block transactions of entities and persons, or their supporters, engaged in
proliferation activities, and to prohibit U.S. persons from engaging in
transactions with them. Currently 18 entities 6 from Iran, as well as 11 from
North Korea and one from Syria have been designated under the Order, and we
are actively considering designating additional ones.
Finally, one of the most important defensive measures undertaken by the Bush
Administration is the Proliferation Security Initiative, which shows the close
interaction among and the creative use of diplomatic, military, economic,
law enforcement, and intelligence tools to combat proliferation. PSI countries
have put all of these assets to work in a multinational, yet flexible, fashion.
The participating countries are applying laws already on the books in
innovative ways and cooperating as never before to interdict shipments, to
disrupt proliferation networks, and to hold accountable the front companies
that support them. PSI has now expanded to include support from more than 70
countries, and continues to grow. It is not a treaty-based approach, involving
long, ponderous negotiations that yield results only slowly, if at all.
Instead, it is an active -- and proactive -- partnership, to deter, disrupt and
prevent proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery.
And PSI is working including against Iran. PSI cooperation has stopped the
transshipment of material and equipment bound for Iran's ballistic missile
programs. PSI partners, working at times with others, have also prevented Iran
from procuring goods to support its WMD programs, including its nuclear
program. And, of course, it was PSI cooperation among the U.S., UK, and other
European partners that began the demise of the A.Q. Khan network, an action
that also contributed to the decision of the Libyan government to abandon its
nuclear weapons and longer-range missile programs. Additional diplomatic
initiatives address other elements of the problem. One clear lesson from the
Iran case is that some states will cynically manipulate the provisions of the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to acquire the sensitive technologies to enable
them to pursue nuclear weapons the very capability the Treaty is intended to
deny. To foreclose that proliferation avenue, President Bush has challenged the
international community to correct the greatest weakness in the nuclear
nonproliferation system: the ability of states like Iran to seek nuclear
weapons under the cover of peaceful energy programs.
To achieve this end, we are working with major supplier states, with the IAEA
and with industry to provide assurances that states will have reliable access
to nuclear fuel and that their best interest is not to invest in their own
fuel-cycle capabilities. If we can succeed, this will be a major gain for
proliferation security and help prevent future Irans.
As we work with partners to close the loophole in the NPT that Iran has sought
to exploit, we are also pursuing active diplomacy to prevent Iran from
succeeding. Last September, following Iran's resumption of uranium conversion,
the IAEA Board found Iran in formal noncompliance with its safeguards
obligations a finding which requires a report to the Security Council under
the IAEA statute and also found that Iran's nuclear activities raise
questions concerning international peace and security that are within the
competence of the UN Security Council. At the last IAEA Board meeting in
November, we decided to support the request of the United Kingdom, France and
Germany the so-called EU-3 to defer again, for a short period, the report
to the Security Council of Iranian noncompliance. While we believed that we had
a majority of the votes, we thought it best to seek an even broader
international grouping to pressure Iran to return to the negotiations on the
basis of the original terms. We also welcomed Russia's efforts to get Iran to
return to negotiations.
In response, Iran rejected negotiation and instead chose confrontation,
repeatedly and deliberately. Iran has now defied the international community by
deciding to remove international seals and resume uranium enrichment
activities. In so doing, it has shattered the basis for continued negotiations
with the EU-3. Its empty calls for negotiations after it destroyed the
framework for negotiations, and its on-again/off-again professions of possible
interest in the Russian proposal for enrichment on Russian territory, are
transparent efforts at stalling continuing its practice of smoke and salami
slicing that we have watched for three years.
The EU-3 have made very clear that Teheran's actions, unless reversed, have
brought their negotiating process to a dead end. The clear majority of states
know that the European effort, which had U.S. support, went the extra mile
and then some to achieve an outcome of substantial benefit to Iran, but
without including Iranian access to enrichment or reprocessing technologies.
This phase of the process is now over. We still believe the issue can be
resolved diplomatically. But to achieve this, we must stand together and press
Iran to make the strategic decision to end its nuclear weapons program.
There is no reasonable peaceful explanation for the Iranian regime to resume
uranium enrichment. The way ahead is shaped by Iran's long history of hiding
sensitive nuclear activities from the IAEA in violation of its obligations, its
refusal to cooperate fully with the IAEA's investigation, its rejection of
diplomatic initiatives offered by the EU and Russia, and now its dangerous
defiance of the entire international community.
The President and Secretary Rice have emphasized that the time is now for the
IAEA Board to report Iran to the Security Council and that this step does not
signal the end of diplomacy, but its next phase. The Iranian regime's
resumption of enrichment activity left no choice but to call an emergency
meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors to report Iran's noncompliance with its
safeguards obligations to the UN Security Council.
The five permanent members of the Security Council as well as Germany agreed in
London very early Tuesday morning that the IAEA Board should report Iran to the
Security Council at its special session opening tomorrow. They also agreed that
the Council will act on Iranian noncompliance after Director General
ElBaradei's report to the March 6 meeting of the IAEA Board.
The Security Council will not supplant the IAEA effort, but reinforce it for
example, by calling on Iran to cooperate with the Agency and to take steps the
IAEA Board has identified to restore confidence, and by giving the IAEA new,
needed authority to investigate all aspects of the Iranian nuclear effort. The
Council should make clear to the Iranian regime that there will be consequences
if it does not step away from its nuclear weapons ambitions. The United States
will encourage the Security Council to achieve this end. We will continue to
consult closely with the EU-3 and the EU, with Russia, China and many other
members of the international community in the coming days and weeks, as this
new diplomatic phase proceeds.
We have no illusion that reporting the Iran issue to the Security Council will
produce a quick resolution of the threat that Iran presents, including its
determined pursuit of nuclear weapons. When faced with a challenge like that
which we face from Iran a country that is able to bring to bear many of its
own tools diplomacy will never be easy, nor will its results be immediate.
But there is no panacea; there is no easy option.
Because we are realistic, the United States and our partners are pursuing
multiple avenues to prevent the emergence of a nuclear-armed Iran. Defensive
measures are essential and should be expanded. The President has repeatedly
emphasized that all options are on the table to deal with the threat from Iran,
but that our strong preference is to do so through effective diplomacy. A
peaceful diplomatic solution to this issue would spare the world from the
threat posed by a nuclear-armed Iran and would benefit the Iranian people with
the possibility of fuller integration with the international community.
Diplomacy remains essential and, despite the frustrations, is working. It has
taken time several years to forge an international consensus on Iran. But
this was necessary to convince others of the nature of the Iranian program and
to provide a rationale for action. Few today doubt Iran is pursuing a nuclear
weapons capability. A majority of the IAEA Board are now willing to vote to
report Iran to the Security Council. And the Council offers the best next step
for diplomacy to succeed.
Released on February 1, 2006