(Remarks as Delivered)
Earlier this month the Bush Administration released the 2006 National Security
Strategy of the United States. The Strategy reiterates the President's determination
to continue focusing on the grave dangers posed by the proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction.
While the National Strategy highlights our noteworthy successes over the past
four years, such as elimination of Libya's nuclear weapons program and creation
of the Proliferation Security Initiative, it squarely confronts the difficult
challenges that remain. The National Strategy reiterates that the proliferation
of nuclear weapons poses the greatest threat to our national security because
of the unique capacity of these weapons "to inflict massive loss of life
on a massive scale." Consequently, it is imperative that we keep such weapons
out of the hands of rogue states and terrorists that aspire to threaten us with
such weapons.
To this end, the National Strategy highlights the Administration's robust diplomatic
efforts to combat the threat of nuclear proliferation. At the same time, it
reaffirms that all options remain on the table as we seek to protect ourselves
and our allies from the devastating consequences of WMD use. As the National
Strategy states:
Our strong preference and common practice is to address proliferation concerns
through international diplomacy, in concert with key allies and regional partners.
If necessary, however, under long-standing principles of self defense, we do
not rule out the use of force before attacks occur, even if uncertainty remains
as to the time and place of the enemy's attack. When the consequences of an
attack with WMD are potentially so devastating, we cannot afford to stand idly
by as grave dangers materialize. This is the principle and logic of preemption.
The National Strategy reaffirms that our nation faces no greater challenge than
that posed by Iran's pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability. President Bush
and Secretary Rice have reiterated that a nuclear-armed Iran is unacceptable,
including the possession by Iran of technologies that could give it a nuclear
weapons breakout capability. The United States is not alone in taking this position;
support for this view is virtually unanimous within the international community.
It is important to consider why there is such broad consensus on this issue.
For starters, Iran concealed key elements of its nuclear program from the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the world for almost 20 years. In late 2002,
the IAEA began an investigation of Iran's undeclared nuclear activities following
revelations by an Iranian opposition group of previously undisclosed uranium
enrichment and heavy water programs. In 2003, the IAEA confirmed that Iran was
pursuing a systematic effort over two decades to hide secret nuclear activities
involving undeclared uranium enrichment, undeclared plutonium separation, and
other safeguards breaches using undeclared materials at undeclared facilities.
These activities should have been disclosed to the IAEA. Over the course of
its investigation, the IAEA produced 10 written reports documenting Iran's hidden
nuclear activities.
Despite this history of concealment, Iran continues to deny that it is seeking
a nuclear weapons capability, and insists instead that it merely is seeking
to exercise its "right" as a party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty (NPT) to peacefully use nuclear energy. While the United States recognizes
and supports this "right" in the ordinary case where it is carried
out in conformity with the obligations of the NPT, Iran's case is not ordinary,
considering the overwhelming evidence that Iran's nuclear program is not in
fact peaceful.
There are two basic types of fissile material that can be used to make a nuclear
weapon: plutonium and highly enriched uranium. Iran's clandestine nuclear activities
have been aimed at producing both of these materials; in other words, acquiring
what they refer to in the industry as the "nuclear fuel cycle". The
IAEA's written reports document both undeclared uranium enrichment and undeclared
plutonium separation activities carried out in violation of Iran's safeguards
agreement with the IAEA.
At present, Iran is operating a small centrifuge cascade and conducting research
and development activities at a pilot enrichment facility at Natanz. We know
that this work is the beginning of a much larger effort to achieve an industrial
scale enrichment capability. In fact, Iran has notified the IAEA and stated
publicly that intends to begin installing the first 3,000 centrifuges in the
fall. That number could produce enough fissile material for one nuclear weapon
a year, but Iran wants to go even further. Its large-scale underground enrichment
facility now under construction could hold 50,000 centrifuges.
On the plutonium side, Iran is presently constructing a large, heavy water-moderated
reactor with technical specifications that are well-suited for the production
of weapons grade plutonium. This reactor complements the previously constructed
heavy water production plant.
If these dual uranium and plutonium efforts were not proof enough of Iran's
nefarious intentions, there is also the recently revealed fact that Iran received
information from a clandestine nuclear proliferation network on casting and
machining hemispheres of uranium metal. This revelation was alarming because
there are no known applications for such hemispheres other than the production
of nuclear weapons.
While the IAEA has patiently uncovered details of past Iranian nuclear activities
and in many cases forced the Iranian regime to reluctantly retract previous
false reports and deceptions, Iran still refuses to come clean with the IAEA
by truthfully answering the Agency's remaining questions and affording the IAEA
access to sites and personnel it has asked to see. The IAEA has accused Iran
of "numerous breaches and failures" of its obligation to comply with
its safeguards agreements. In his late February report to the IAEA Board, IAEA
Director General Mohammed ElBaradei expressed concern that despite three years
of intensive efforts on the part of the IAEA, the IAEA remains unable to clarify
the scope and nature of Iran's nuclear program, including assurances that there
are no undeclared activities in Iran. In his report, ElBaradei noted that Iran
still has not taken any of the steps the Board has called for, including re-suspending
enrichment-related activities, ending construction of its heavy water reactor,
ratifying the Additional Protocol, and cooperating fully with the IAEA investigation.
As an Administration we have often been accused in the past of resorting too
quickly to unilateralism, but no one can say that of our policy toward Iran.
We have worked tirelessly with the international community to resolve diplomatically
outstanding concerns regarding Iran's nuclear program. We have actively supported
the efforts of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany -- the so-called EU-3
-- to negotiate a solution with Iran. These three countries reached an agreement
with Iran in November 2004 that provided a framework for further negotiations,
the so-called Paris Agreement. Most importantly, Iran promised under this agreement
to suspend uranium enrichment-related activities, including uranium conversion
and research and development related to enrichment.
Despite overwhelming international support for the Paris Agreement, and U.S.
support for the EU-3 proposal to provide Iran robust economic incentives as
part of a permanent suspension of Iran's enrichment activities, Iran broke off
negotiations and repudiated the Paris Agreement last August. This left the IAEA
Board with no choice in September 2005 but to find Iran in noncompliance with
its safeguards obligations. Included in the Board resolution was also the finding
that Iran's clandestine nuclear activities and the lack of confidence in its
stated peaceful intentions raised questions that fell within the competence
of the United Nations Security Council. Nevertheless, we agreed to delay the
Board's formal report to the UN Security Council for four months to provide
Iran additional time to reconsider, change course and re-suspend its enrichment
activities. Iran also had the opportunity to consider a proposal from Russia
for a joint venture for uranium enrichment in Russia. When Iran failed to seize
these opportunities, the Board finally last month voted to report Iran's noncompliance
to the Security Council.
The Iran file is now before the UN Security Council. It is our hope that the
Council will act to reinforce and strengthen the IAEA's role in dealing with
the Iran nuclear file, including by providing new authorities to the IAEA. As
a first step, the Council has been pursuing a strong presidential statement
that reiterates the calls made by the IAEA on Iran to comply with IAEA board
resolutions and return to full suspension of uranium enrichment-related activities.
We believe it is essential that the Council make clear to the Iranian regime
that it must abandon its nuclear weapons ambitions or face stark consequences.
We also face a unique and daunting nuclear challenge with respect to North Korea.
We know that North Korea has pursued a nuclear weapons program for more than
20 years in violation of its nuclear nonproliferation obligations. A key component
of our strategy to address the North Korean nuclear program has been through
a multilateral diplomatic effort involving not just the United States and North
Korea, but also South Korea, Japan, China, and Russia -- commonly
referred to as the Six Party talks. In a September 2005 Joint Statement issued
at the last round of the Six-Party talks, North Korea agreed to abandon all
its nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs. This was a welcome development;
however, on the heels of the Joint Statement North Korea issued its own statement
demanding that it be given a light water nuclear reactor immediately.
Moreover, Pyongyang has stated that it intends to boycott any future talks
unless the United States rescinds so-called U.S. economic "sanctions"
against it.
The United States is committed to utilizing all tools available to protect against
illicit North Korean activities, including efforts to end currency counterfeiting
and smuggling, money laundering, and revenue generated from the illicit transfer
of WMD materials and equipment. These U.S. actions are separate and distinct
from the Six-Party talks and it is regrettable that North Korea has taken hostage
the Six-Party process. Such behavior calls into question North Korea's commitment
to the Joint Statement and the complete and verifiable elimination of its nuclear
programs. The United States remains committed to the Six-Party process and stands
ready to return to Six-Party talks to implement the Joint Statement.
To tackle the hardest cases of nuclear proliferation, we have been developing
and exercising a number of robust nonproliferation and counterproliferation
tools.
The Bush Administration has been a vocal proponent of a strengthened IAEA safeguards
system, including the creation of a special IAEA Committee on Safeguards and
Verification. We are pleased that the IAEA Board of Governors agreed to establish
this committee to examine measures to strengthen the IAEA's ability to ensure
that Member States comply with their international obligations. We are active
participants in the Committee's discussions regarding specific measures to expand
the Agency's technical capabilities and legal authorities.
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 is another important tool in
our international efforts to stem proliferation. UNSCR 1540 was adopted almost
two years at the urging of President Bush. It imposes a legally binding obligation
on all countries to put in place and enforce strong export control laws, as
well as other legal and regulatory measures against proliferation. We look forward
to the upcoming 1540 Committee report and working together with other states
to assist states in implementing their 1540 obligations.
The Proliferation Security Initiative, or PSI, is an important counter-proliferation
initiative through which we seek to disrupt illicit WMD and missile-related
trade to state and non-state actors of proliferation concern. More than 70 countries
have indicates support for the PSI. The PSI Statement of Interdiction Principles
commits countries to act cooperatively to interdict WMD shipments consistent
with national legal authorities and relevant international law. PSI is successful
not only because of the tangible benefits accrued from disrupting illicit WMD
trade, but also because of the intangible benefits derived from information
sharing as well as in-depth operational, policy and legal discussions. The strength
of the PSI lies first in its ability to bring to bear the diverse capabilities
and legal authorities of participating states when we have information on proliferation-related
shipments, and, second, in its effectiveness in encouraging states to strengthen
these capabilities and authorities to deter, disrupt and prevent the proliferation
WMD-related material and equipment.
In addition, we employ a variety of "defensive measures" to stem the
trade in WMD materials and equipment as well as to disrupt and defeat the WMD
programs
of rogue states such as Iran and North Korea. Our defensive measures are intended
to address three key threats: the transfer of fissile material, the onward proliferation
of WMD and missiles, and the threat of or actual use of chemical, biological
or nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles.
One key defensive measure to address these threats is our campaign to disrupt
the financial networks that support illicit trade in WMD-related materials and
equipment. In June 2005, President Bush issued Executive Order 13382, which
authorizes the United States to "freeze" assets and block transactions
of entities and persons engaged in WMD proliferation. For example, the United
States has named 11 DPRK entities under the Executive Order on Proliferation
Financing, as well as entities from Iran and Syria. We continue to urge other
countries to adopt similar laws and regulations, consistent with their obligations
under UNSC Resolution 1540, to stem the financial flows related to proliferation
activities.
Using tools such as these, the Bush Administration has put together a comprehensive
national and international effort to stem proliferation. Proactive and dynamic
strategies are necessary in today's strategic environment, where we confront
challenges ranging from terrorism and nuclear-armed rogue states to clandestine
proliferation networks. We have no choice but to act, however, given the unimaginable
potential costs of inaction.
Released on March 28, 2006