It is a genuine pleasure to be here among such distinguished panelists and
guests. I very much regret that I was unable to be here yesterday to
participate in the full conference agenda. Let me first thank Chatham House
for
organizing this timely and focused look at ways to strengthen international
efforts to prevent state and non-state actors from acquiring weapons of mass
destruction (WMD).
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (UNSCR 1540) is the latest
in a
series of internationally-directed, concrete measures aimed at preventing WMD
proliferation and, most particularly, preventing and countering terrorist
acquisition and use of these deadly weapons.
As the original sponsor of UNSCR 1540, the United States took a leading role
in
the international community in developing and adding this tool to our
collective "toolbox" of measures to prevent proliferation. My remarks
today
offer a look back at the conditions prompting the call for UNSCR 1540 and our
priorities in negotiating the resolution. I will also look forward at how the
United States hopes Resolution 1540 will contribute to more effective and more
robust responses to terrorist efforts to acquire WMD.
A Layered Nonproliferation Defense
Over the years, while working with others, we have built a complex
nonproliferation regime to deal with diverse proliferation threats. With each
"layer" or initiative added, the regime has sought to adapt to new
challenges
presented by advances in technology, evolving security dynamics, and other
events. The first line of nonproliferation defense are the global
nonproliferation treaties--the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, Chemical
Weapons Convention, and Biological Weapons Convention. They have served us well
for decades by creating widely-accepted norms against WMD acquisition,
stockpiling, and proliferation and they continue to advance dialogue and
cooperation among nations. However, we have learned hard lessons with North
Korea, Libya, Iraq, and Iran. These treaties have established strong global
norms, but their ability to prevent WMD acquisition is only as strong as States
Parties' willingness to comply with their treaty-based obligations and the
resolve of compliant parties to hold others to their obligations.
The multilateral export control regimes--the Nuclear Suppliers Group, Zangger
Committee, Missile Technology Control Regime, Australia Group, and Wassenaar
Arrangement--are a second, important layer of our nonproliferation defense.
Each of these export control regimes plays a critical role in identifying key
WMD and missile-related material, technology and appropriate approaches to
control access to such items. In the case of the Zangger, NSG, and Australia
Group, these limited membership export control regimes have given greater
specificity to items of concern under the NPT and CWC and have broadened the
materials or technologies controlled.
However, recent experience--such as the clandestine A.Q. Khan nuclear
trafficking network--make clear that having strong supplier state commitments
and solid control lists do not automatically translate into prevention of
illicit exports. Proliferators have adapted and often stayed one step ahead
of
preventors and prevention. We, too, must adapt and stay one step ahead of them.
Proliferators have become adept at circumventing export controls through
falsification of end use information, end user documentation, or cargo
manifests; illicit suppliers and shippers collude and use transport routes and
transshipment points in countries that lack strong controls and enforcement
mechanisms.
In addition to nonproliferation treaties and regimes, the United States and
other countries have engaged in a variety of ad hoc bilateral dialogues,
partnerships with key like-minded states, and other measures to enhance
national controls over sensitive technologies and to reduce, secure, or
eliminate sources of sensitive materials and technology. While seeking positive
solutions, we have not shied away from use of sanctions and other punitive
measures to achieve nonproliferation goals.
In general, this "layered nonproliferation defense" has worked well,
where
implemented, to impede and slow efforts of state and non-state actors to
acquire WMD. But progress has been spotty and even frustrating, since not all
states are willing or able to take seriously the appeal for stronger
nonproliferation measures. Though countries can agree generally on the danger
posed by weapons of mass destruction, rarely can they agree on concrete
responses.
In the wake of 9/11, global nonproliferation took on increased urgency spurred
by the tangible information gathered in the tragedy's aftermath about the
ambitions of terrorists and terrorist organizations to acquire and use weapons
of mass destruction. This clear nexus of terrorists seeking WMD created an
imperative to evaluate whether existing tools were sufficient to address the
growing threat.
Over the three years since 9/11, the United States has looked through fresh
eyes at the nonproliferation "toolbox." After a frank review, we assessed
that
the nonproliferation architecture assembled over the past three decades needed
to be reinforced and fortified by new measures. We did not identify any "quick
fixes" or simple solutions for this threat. We recognized starkly that,
when it
comes to the WMD threat and its correlation with terrorism, time is not on our
side. We simply did not believe that we had the luxury of our predecessors for
negotiation crossing many months or years to arrive at a solution to this
danger.
Against this backdrop, President Bush in the fall of 2003 called on the United
Nations Security Council to adopt an anti-proliferation resolution. He urged
that it require states to criminalize the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and related materials; to enact and enforce strict export controls;
and to secure sensitive material within their borders. In February of this
year, in the wake of revelations about the A.Q. Khan network, President Bush
reissued this call in a speech at the U.S. National Defense University. He also
outlined a number of additional proposals to strengthen nonproliferation
efforts--seven in all. Intersecting with this focus on terrorism was a growing
awareness of the Khan network. Companies within countries were building
specialized components for exports to countries seeking nuclear weapons. In
specific cases, the government was not aware of the company's activities nor
did it have controls in place that would enable it to halt the exports.
Building UNSCR 1540
UN Security Council Resolution 1540 is rooted in the Security Council's
groundbreaking 1992 Presidential Statement. That statement constituted the
Council's first recognition that the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction is a threat to international peace and security.
Resolution 1540 builds on UN Security Council Resolution 1373. Passed in the
immediate aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, resolution 1373 requires
states to put in place measures to ensure their banks do not finance terrorist
activities, they do not allow terrorist travel, and their territories do not
support training for a next terrorist attack. UNSCR 1373 foreshadowed 1540,
in
that it highlighted the importance of controlling the flow of critical
technologies across borders. Resolution 1540 takes this call to a new level,
requiring that states establish and enforce legal barriers to acquisition of
WMD whether by terrorists or by states.
The crux of UNSCR 1540 requires states to ensure that they have the
infrastructure in place to address the threat posed by non-state actor
involvement in any aspect of WMD proliferation. It decides that states shall
not support non-state actors involved in such activities and that states shall
enact and enforce the necessary laws to prevent these activities on their
territories. It requires states to monitor and control sensitive technologies,
materials, and equipment that exist in, are manufactured by, or transit their
territories. The aim is to prevent terrorists from acquiring them, but also,
as
we saw with A.Q. Khan, to prevent non-state actor involvement in trafficking
of
materials, equipment and technology, as well as transshipment and financing.
Ensuring that states adopt effective controls and enforcement over sensitive
items is not a new endeavor. The United States and many other countries have
been trumpeting the importance of strong and effective laws and enforcement
measures for many years in a variety of settings. Significant strides have been
made in elevating awareness about the importance of strong controls and in
taking decisive action to put in place measures that keep deadly technologies
out of the wrong hands. Yet a clear gap remained between the global consensus
about the threat of WMD proliferation and concrete action on the ground. If
I
may use a baseball metaphor, there has been much wind-up but not much pitch
and
very little follow-through.
While not a proliferation panacea, UNSCR 1540 helps close this gap--more pitch
and follow through. It makes strong national controls and enforcement a
requirement rather than an option. Rather than engaging in protracted,
multiyear treaty negotiations, the Security Council responded relatively
quickly to lay out some basic requirements to address the threat to
international peace and security posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction. It is a necessary requirement, because terrorists or those that
sponsor them exploit opportunities where they exist. Prevention is only as
strong as the weakest link in the chain. Proliferators, like those involved
in
the Khan network, have shown their cunning in using not the quickest or most
cost-effective routes to ply their dangerous trade, but in seeking the path
of
least resistance. UNSCR 1540 seeks to meet proliferators' lethal flexibility
with the firm resolve of states to cut off the path to proliferation. It places
a premium on establishment of legal and regulatory measures at the national
level. It seeks to build capacity from the bottom up rather than attempting
to
impose it from above.
During the negotiation of UNSCR 1540, the United States worked hard to maintain
a high standard of accountability in what the resolution requires. Our aim was
not to burden countries with additional obligations; we acted from the
awareness that lax controls over WMD, their delivery systems, and related
materials could be catastrophic for all. The structuring of the resolution
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter reflects this sober reality. The United
States wanted the resolution to address the WMD threat in as comprehensive a
manner as possible and to reinforce existing nonproliferation treaties and
regimes. Though the preoccupation of many nations on terrorist acquisition of
WMD is reflected in the resolution's text, the resolution maintains a broader
thrust that WMD proliferation writ large should be stopped.
Resolution 1540 also reflects the steady progression of national and
international efforts to define and address the challenge of WMD terrorism in
the post 9/11 environment. Virtually every multilateral body and regional
organization that deals with nonproliferation or terrorism has examined this
issue since 9/11. Numerous course corrections have been adopted. The
multilateral nonproliferation regimes have reviewed their control lists to
identify and restrict supply of items of use to terrorists or terrorist
organizations. The International Atomic Energy Agency's Illicit Trafficking
Database Program has new relevance as we look for connections between smugglers
with nuclear or radioactive material and terrorists, and the Agency has
developed innovative approaches to help member states account for and secure
nuclear and radiological materials.
New initiatives have been launched, such as the Proliferation Security
Initiative (PSI), one of the most successful counterproliferation initiatives
in recent memory. The PSI brings together countries in partnership to defeat
the trafficking of deadly weapons and technologies involving state or non-state
actors of proliferation concern. The PSI and 1540 are complementary. Paragraph
ten of the resolution reflects this symbiosis. The October 2003 seizure of the
BBC China traveling to Libya with a cargo hold full of centrifuges is a
dramatic example of cooperative action to prevent WMD proliferation, which 1540
promotes as both necessary and essential.
Many states worked to shape resolution 1540's emphasis on proliferation as
a
serious threat to peace and security that requires concerted action of all
responsible states. States need to have the necessary legal and regulatory
infrastructure in place and they need to enforce it. 1540 also reflects the
growing consensus that cooperation among states is not only useful, but is
essential to preventing proliferation. This is particularly important in
preventing illicit trafficking in WMD, an area of cooperation that is embodied
by the PSI. The consensus adoption of UNSCR 1540 in April signals an important
recognition that every nation has a responsibility in this endeavor and must
redouble their efforts to ensure that terrorists do not succeed in their deadly
quest. It reaffirms the truism that since all states have a stake in combating
use of weapons of mass destruction, all states should play a part in preventing
their acquisition.
Looking Forward--Implementation of 1540
Resolution 1540 is the result of a tedious, sometimes contentious, but
ultimately successful negotiation among many countries, and consensus agreement
on a way forward. It preserves the core priority articulated by President Bush:
the international community needs to take concrete action; states must put in
place effective controls and enforcement so that non-state actors will not
acquire deadly technologies that they would then turn on civilized nations.
We
are determined to work closely with other countries to ensure they establish
effective national controls and enforcement measures.
We also expect that states will take seriously paragraph four of the resolution
and submit comprehensive reports to the 1540 Committee on their efforts to
comply with the resolution's operative elements. These reports will be an
important tool in understanding the scope of the challenge before us and how
best it can be addressed. We live in an era of global economies and growing
interdependence. No state will remain unaffected by WMD proliferation; none
of
us is stronger than the weakest link. It is in all our interests to be a frank
and open about our capabilities to respond to proliferation threats. Each
states' critical review of its own laws and regulations will help locate gaps.
This process may facilitate an understanding of "best practices" by
countries.
The Nonproliferation Committee's review of these reports will help match
assistance with the needs of member states. As President Bush has noted, the
United States is prepared to assist where it can.
The United States has compiled a Report that provides a comprehensive
accounting on the range of U.S. laws, programs, and initiatives to address
proliferation. A multi-agency effort, our report provides detailed information
on U.S. efforts to implement the resolution. The report also includes detailed
reporting on our efforts to assist other states, support existing
nonproliferation treaties, and establish cooperation among states to prevent
illicit trafficking. These are key aspects of 1540 that ought not be
overlooked. The U.S. report is a snapshot in time--albeit a long one at 62
pages in length--but offers a valuable resource for those interested in knowing
how the United States Government has approached this particular problem. We
are
scheduled to submit our report to the 1540 Committee in New York today.
The Nonproliferation Committee in New York is working to assemble a panel
of
experts to review country reports. Though 1540 has been structured under
Chapter VII, we do not envision "enforcement" as a role for the Committee.
We
believe that there is strong international support for this resolution and that
states will comply with 1540's provisions without the need for Council action.
If asked, the United States will work with states on a bilateral basis, or in
partnership with other states, to assist them in fulfilling their
responsibilities under 1540. This includes identifying what countries require
assistance and how best that assistance can be provided. We of course will
revisit this view if it becomes evident that countries are not taking their
1540 obligations seriously or are ignoring their responsibility to put in place
the legal and regulatory infrastructure required under the resolution.
Conclusion
Let me conclude by saying that the clear intent of terrorists and terrorist
organizations to acquire WMD and their known disregard for innocent lives adds
great urgency to an already grave security imperative. The international
community cannot rest on its nonproliferation laurels. It must be as creative,
agile, and aggressive in preventing proliferation as the proliferators
themselves--whether state or non-state actors--are about acquiring WMD. This
is
a race we cannot afford to lose. Preferably, our game plan should be
multilateral, multinational, multiyear, and multidimensional. It should include
diplomacy, law enforcement, economic incentives and disincentives, border
security measures, and where necessary the use of force. It should run the full
gamut of persuasion and coercion, as appropriate. It should flexible and
adaptive.
No one state nor any single approach can solve this global problem. To the
contrary, a single state supplying critical materials or technologies could
defeat the efforts of us all. Success requires collaboration, a long-term
commitment, clear-eyed vigilance, a multiplicity of tools, as well as a serious
commitment to defeat this modern scourge. There must be commitment but there
must also be follow-through in the form of enforcement. There may yet be time
to prevent terrorists and those who sponsor them from acquiring deadly
capabilities. We strenuously hope this is the case. We look forward to working
with other countries in implementing the resolution and building a stronger,
tighter, and more effective set of nonproliferation tools to keep the world's
most dangerous weapons out of the hands of the world's most dangerous
individuals.
Thank you very much.
[End]