Richard Lugar, "Timely exit for ambiguity," The Washington Times, 17 May 2001

(Richard G. Lugar of Indiana is the ranking Republican
member on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.)


President Bush struck the right balance in his recent
announcement of arms sales to Taiwan. A few days
later, in a television interview, he indicated it
would be unthinkable for the United States to remain
aloof if China attempted to subdue Taiwan by military
force. Though the president's statement surprised, and
even alarmed, some American observers, it reflected a
common-sense appraisal of the strategic situation in
Asia.


For many years, successive U.S. administrations have
affirmed that there is one China and that the people
on Taiwan and the people of China should work out a
plan for peaceful unification. In recent years, as
this process moved at a glacial pace, the Taiwanese
have attempted to fashion a political and economic
system based on the American model. They have achieved
remarkable progress in establishing market economic
development, democratic elections, civil liberties,
and stable governmental institutions. Most Americans
share President Bush's admiration for Taiwan's
progress, and they agree we have a moral
responsibility to support peoples whom we have
strongly encouraged to embrace freedom in the face of
difficult or even dangerous circumstances.


Foreign-policy leaders within both the Republican and
Democratic parties have used diplomatic language
related to Taiwan that is often characterized as
"strategic ambiguity." Under this approach, the United
States has fulfilled treaty obligations by making
suitable arms sales to Taiwan, but we have avoided
stating firmly that a Chinese military attack on
Taiwan would lead to U.S. military intervention in
defense of the island. Perhaps we hoped to deter
aggression with a minimum of commitment and to
forestall what would be a contentious debate on the
nature of our obligation to defend democracy in
Taiwan.

China's long-term interest in fully joining the
international economy provided some cause to expect
that ultimately Beijing would pursue unity through
peaceful persuasion, perhaps based on the evolution of
democracy and market economic progress in China.

But strategic ambiguity must be re-examined now in
light of the well-publicized Chinese military
modernization effort and the specific Chinese buildup
of missile capability that is designed to intimidate
Taiwan. The rationale for strategic ambiguity was that
it would buy time for peaceful unification with
minimal U.S. risk. But that rationale has been
invalidated as Chinese actions and words have become
more aggressive at least in part, as a means of
fleshing out the U.S. commitment toward Taiwan.

The accident which killed a Chinese aviator and forced
an emergency landing of our EP-3 aircraft on Hainan
Island tragically illustrated the Chinese concern with
the U.S. military presence in the region. The
subsequent holding of the crew and the tedious
negotiations over the U.S. aircraft demonstrated that
the Sino-American relationship is in need of both more
efficient means of communication and greater clarity.

President Bush has stated that the United States will
do what is necessary to prevent the "one China" policy
from being instituted by military force. American
policy-makers must now begin a debate on how we make
that clear commitment more credible. For example,
should American expertise and training accompany
deliveries of weapon systems to Taiwan?

Should the United States develop logistical support
for our own military forces in the area to enhance
their readiness? Establishing a less ambiguous posture
toward Taiwan will require a new level of energy in
formulating American foreign policy for the entire
Pacific region.

Our own peace and prosperity depend upon Asian
countries, especially China, recognizing that their
domestic and foreign policy interests can best be
achieved through peaceful means. Strategic ambiguity
is unlikely, at this stage in history, to further that
objective. Recent Chinese actions have punched large
holes in the policy. Maintaining strategic ambiguity
as if nothing has changed would be an attempt to have
an American foreign and defense policy on the cheap
with a minimum of planning, commitment or expense.

I believe President Bush understands this. Without
dramatic rhetorical threats, he has informed the
Chinese that their military activities have
consequences. Perhaps a more concerted
Chinese-American dialogue will lead to a demonstrable
change of course by Beijing. In the meantime, I will
be one of many Americans assisting the president in
his assertion that a forceful military unification of
Taiwan and China will not be tolerated. That
assertion, undergirded by sophisticated United States
military planning and implementation and equally
inspired diplomacy, is the strategy most likely to
prevent miscalculation and conflict.

(Distributed by the Office of International
Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web
site: http://usinfo.state.gov)

Return to Vinnie's Home Page

Return to China Page