DURING Christmas week of 1944, I was in the President’s study talking
to him about the shipping problem. As he looked up from the memorandum I had
given him, he said:
“Jimmy, I want you to go with me on this trip to the Crimea.”
It was a complete surprise. He had talked with me about the forthcoming meeting with Stalin and Churchill a number of times, but there had been no hint that I should be a member of the party.
“You know what went on at the other meetings,” he added, “and as Director of Mobilization you have acquired a knowledge of our domestic situation that will be of great service in settling the economic questions that are certain to come up.”
“When you are out of town,” I told him, “the machinery doesn’t stop. Problems like the one we are now discussing constantly arise. I think I should remain here and work on those problems.”
He insisted, however, that I should go. I agreed, but was not happy about it.
We did not discuss it again until the day scheduled for our departure. That afternoon the OWMR staff met to discuss the problems that were expected to arise during my absence. The discussion convinced me more than ever that I should not go. I left the meeting and went over to see the President. He was having his hair cut by John Mays. the colored man who has greeted guests at the front door of the White House on all formal occasions for thirty-six years. Mays came to the White House from South Carolina during the administration of President Taft, and ever since has acted as barber and enjoyed the confidence of the residents of the White House. He is not only courteous and dignified, he is wise and discreet.
As Mays continued clipping, I again urged that I should remain in Washington. I outlined the problems we anticipated during the month he would be away. He had been so absorbed in foreign affairs he did not appreciate the number of questions and decisions then devolving on the Director of War Mobilization and Reconversion. In fact, I had tried, in so far as possible, to keep domestic issues from intruding upon his consideration of foreign problems. The President persisted in his view that I should go, and I finally agreed. That night we left for Norfolk, where, in the early morning darkness of January 23, we boarded the heavy cruiser USS Quincy, which was to take us as far as Malta.
When we left Washington the President was suffering from a severe cold. On board ship it grew worse and he stayed in his cabin most of the time. He would come to lunch and dinner and after dinner attend a moving picture. But only once or twice was he able to sit on deck, until we reached the Mediterranean.
We were at sea on the President’s birthday, January 30, and his daughter, Mrs. John Boettiger, made the birthday dinner a gala occasion. Gifts purchased from the ship’s commissary were presented to the President. His devoted Filipino chef insisted on providing a birthday cake. But others had the same idea. The commissioned officers presented one; so did the enlisted men and the warrant officers. When four cakes arrived, one of our group, who remembered that the President had just been inaugurated to serve a fourth term, went out and procured a fifth cake. A large candle was stuck into it which the President was challenged to blow out.
Although he responded to the gaiety of the occasion, I was disturbed by his appearance. I feared his illness was not due entirely to a cold and expressed this concern to Mrs. Boettiger. She thought my opinion arose from observing him during the moving pictures, when she usually sat on one side of the President and I on the other. She explained that,while looking at the pictures, the President would have his mouth open because of his sinus trouble and that this made him look badly, but he was not really ill. Dr. McIntyre also expressed the belief that the President’s appearance was due to the combination of sinus infection and cold. Since he had so often “bounced back” after an illness, I dismissed my fears.
By the time we reached Malta he had improved greatly. As the Quincy approached its anchorage we saw Prime Minister Churchill, in navy uniform, waving a greeting to the President from the deck of the H. M. S. Sirius across the channel. Shortly thereafter he and his daughter, Section Officer Sarah Oliver, caine aboard for lunch. There were ten of us at lunch and discussion of the approaching conference was only general. The President did, however, confide to Churchill his plans to visit King Ibn Saud on his return trip to discuss the Palestine question. He wanted to bring about peace between the Arabs and the Jews. Churchill wished him good luck but didn’t seem very hopeful that the President would meet with success. He didn’t.
That night the President traveled for the first time in the Sacred Cow. Months earlier I had tried to induce him to use this airplane, built for his use and provided with an elevator which could be lowered from the plane to the ground, for his trips to Hyde Park and Warm Springs. He told me he disliked to fly; he disliked the monotony of looking at the clouds. His other objection was more surprising. He thought an unnecessary expense had been incurred in fitting a plane solely for his personal use. He said he had not been consulted about it and he did not approve it. This from a man who often had been accused of being the greatest spender ever to hold the office of President!
So far as I could see, the President had made little preparation for the Yalta Conference. His inauguration had taken place the Saturday before we left and for ten days preceding that he had been overwhelmed with engagements. On the cruiser, the President, Admiral Leahy and I, on four or five occasions, usually after dinner, discussed some of the questions to be considered, particularly the proposal for the United Nations. But not until the day before we landed at Malta did I learn that we had on board a very complete file of studies and recommendations prepared by the State Department. I asked the President if the Department had given him any material and he advised me it was all in the custody of Lieutenant William M. Rigdon. Later, when I saw some of these splendid studies I greatly regretted they had not been considered on board ship. I am sure the failure to study them while en route was due to the President’s illness. And I am sure that only President Roosevelt, with his intimate knowledge of the problems, could have handled the situation so well with so little preparation.
Secretary of State. Edward R. Stettinius, who had gone ahead by air, joined us at Malta. We were met also by Mr. Hopkins who had been visiting in London, Paris and Rome. Harry was sick. He took off for Yalta in the first available airplane and during the conference was confined to his bed most of the time. His great courage caused him to attend every session of .the conference, but immediately alter adjournment he would retire to his room. Members of our delegation frequently held meetings there because Dr. McIntyre insisted he remain in bed.
There were some uneasy minds in our party as we took off from Malta. Our pilots were unfamiliar with the airfield at Saki where, we understood, there had been a considerable snowfall. We had conflicting reports on the hazards of the drive from Saki across the mountains to Yalta. There also was some fear of typhus, as we were told the Germans had left the place infested with vermin.
These worries were based on an underestimation of the prodigious effort the Russians exerted to demonstrate their hospitality. The landing strip at Saki was swept clear of every snowflake. The road from the field to Yalta, eighty miles away, was guarded by an unbroken line of Soviet troops, many of them girls—girls with guns. Livadia Palace, which was our headquarters and the scene of the meetings, was immaculate. We were told the Germans had completely ransacked it, leaving behind only two paintings out of all the furnishings in the huge building which had been a summer home for the Czars. Although some of the conveniences we fortunate Americans are accustomed to were missing, the Russians, with only three weeks advance notice, had done an amazing job in completely renovating the place.
As we were shown to our rooms we were told what they had been used for when the Czars were in residence. We soon learned Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King had been assigned to the Czarina’s boudoir. He was reminded of it throughout the conference.
The Yalta Conference opened on Sunday, February 4, 1945, on a rising tide of Allied victories. The German counteroffensive in the west had been stopped in the bloody snow of the Ardennes Forest, and we were preparing to launch our drive across the Rhine. The Russians had begun the drive on Germany’s eastern frontier that was to end in Berlin three months later. The situation was such that at one time President Roosevelt and Marshal Stalin engaged in light banter as to whether they should wager that the Red Army would get to Berlin before the American Army recaptured Manila.
Our chief objective for the conference was to secure agreement on the Dumbarton Oaks proposals for the creation of an international peace organization. But the rapid advance of our armies required also that urgent consideration be given to European political and military problems. It was natural, then, that the President, with the agreement of the other members, opened the conference with the suggestion to discuss “what we shall do with Germany.”
Stalin immediately made it clear that he wanted to discuss the terms of the German surrender, the future form of the German state or states, reparations, and the allocation of a zone of occupation to France.
In the fall of 1944 the Soviet Union and the Provisional Government of France had entered into a treaty of friendship. It was immediately obvious at Yalta, however, that the treaty and the friendly words exchanged over it by the diplomats had not changed in any degree Marshal Stalin’s opinion on the contribution of France to the war. He thought France should play little part in the control of Germany, and stated that Yugoslavia and Poland were more entitled to consideration than France.
When Roosevelt and Churchill proposed that France be allotted, a zone of occupation, Stalin agreed. But it was clear he agreed only because the French zone was to be taken out of the territory allotted to the United States and the United Kingdom. And he especiafly opposed giving France a representative on the Allied Control Council for Germany. He undoubtedly concurred in the opinion expressed to the President by Mr. Molotov that this should be done “only as a kindness to France and not because she is entitled to it.”
“I am in favor of France being given a zone,” Stalin declared, “but i cannot forget that in this war France opened the gates to the enemy.” He maintained it would create difficulties to give France a zone of occupation and a representative on the Allied Control Council and refuse the same treatment to others who had fought more than France. He said France would soon demand that de Gaulle attend the Big Three’s Conferences.
Churchill argued strongly in favor of France’s being represented on the Council. He said the British public would not understand if questions affecting France and the French zone were settled without her participation in the discussion. It did not follow, as Stalin had suggested, that France would demand de Gaulle’s participation in the conferences of the Big Three, he added. And, in his best humor, Mr. Churchill said the conference was “a very exclusive club, the entrance fee being at least five million soldiers or the equivalent.”
Stalin, however, feared there would be such a demand. He said General de Gaulle was “very unrealistic,” and reiterated that even though “France had not done much fighting in the war, yet de Gaulle has demanded equal rights with the Soviets, the British and the Americans, who have done the fighting.”
President Roosevelt did not take issue with Stalin on de Gaulle. The President had great admiration for France and.its people but he did not admire de Gaulle. On several occasions he referred to a conversation at Casablanca in which de Gaulle compared himself with Joan of Arc as the spiritual leader of France and with Clemenceau as the political leader.
President Roosevelt’s first opinion was not to insist upon giving France representation on the Allied Council if she, were allotted a zone. As the argument proceeded, however, the President said he wished to consider further that phase of the question and asked that action be delayed. The following day Mr. Hopkins, Averell Harriman, our Ambassador to the Soviet Union; and I urged upon the President the view that France should be represented on the Council, that they could not accept a zone without such representation, and that any other action would greatly humiliate them. The President finally reached the same conclusion, and he later succeeded in inducing Stalin to agree with him.
The major problem in connection with the surrender of Germany arose from an informal suggestion, broached at Teheran, that the future security of Europe required Germany to be cut up into a number of individual states.
The discussion was brief but there seemed to be general agreement among all three that Germany should be divided into an unspecified number of states. Marshal Stalin was of the opinion that the Germans in surrendering should be told about this plan. Mr. Churchill suggested that the questions involved were so complex that further study should be made. The President then suggsted that the Foreign Ministers study the matter and submit recommendations within the next thirty days.
At the later meeting in London, in which Ambassador John C. Winant represented the United States, no agreement was reached. When Mr. Hopkins saw Marshal Stalin late in May it was apparent that the Soviet leader had changed his views and had reached the conclusion that we and the British were opposed to dismemberment. He said it was evident there was no agreement at Yalta; and that at the London meeting the British had interpreted the Crimean discussions to represent not a positive plan but something to hold over Germany’s head in case of bad behavior. He suggested that the matter be discussed at the forthcoming meeting of the Big Three at Potsdam. By the time that meeting occurred, however, the thinking of all three governments had veered away from dismemberment and the issue did not arise.
During all the consideration of the German question at Yalta, reparations were the chief interest of the Soviet delegation.
At the conference table Marshal Stalin sat between Mr. Molotov and I. M. Maisky, Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs. Maisky had served as the Russian Ambassador in London for eleven years, and at Yalta often acted as interpreter as well as adviser to Stalin. It was he who presented the Soviet proposal on German reparations
"Our plan foresees that reparations in kind should be demanded from Germany in two ways,” Mr. Maisy explained. “First, withdrawals from the national wealth of Germany. That means factories, land, machinery, machine tools, rolling stock of railways, investments in foreign enterprises, and so on. Second, yearly payments in kind after the war in the course of ten years.”
He proposed that 80 per cent of all German industry should be withdrawn, specifying the iron and steel, engineering, metal and chemical industries. He added that aviation plants, facilities for the production of synthetic oil and all other military enterprises and factories should be withdrawn entirely.
“By withdrawal I mean to confiscate and carry away physically and use as reparations payments,” he emphasized.
Retention of 20 per cent of Germany's heavy industry would be adequate to sustain the country’s economic life, he said. All reparations should be terminated within ten years and the removal of factories and other wealth should be completed in two years. German enterprises important as war potentials should be internationalized with representatives of the three powers sitting on the board of these enterprises for as many years as the three countries should desire.
Reparations funds should be paid only to those countries that had sustained direct material losses such as damage to factories, land and homes and the losses of personal property by citizens, Mr. Maisky maintained. Because such losses were so huge he proposed that a systan of priorities be established among the countries to receive reparations based on their contribution to the winning of the war and the value of their direct material losses.
He then stated that reparations should be fixed at twenty billions of dollars and that the share of the Soviet Union in the reparations fund should not be less than ten billion dollars.
Mr. Churchill responded first to Mr. Maisky’s statement. He recalled the experience of the United Kingdom after World War I.
“The process was a very disappointing one,” he said. “With great difficulty about 1,000 million pounth was extracted from Germany, and that would never have been extracted if the United States, at the same time, had not loaned Germany a larger sum.”
“Removal of plants and factories to a certain extent is a proper step,” be declared, “but I am quite sure you will never be able to get out of ruined Germany for Russia alone anything like 215 million pounds a year.” He pictured Britain’s losses and heavy debts and referred to the severe losses of other countries which must be considered in allotting reparations.
“Secondly,” Mr. Churchill continued, “there arises in my mind the specter of an absolutely starving Germany.
“If our treatment of Germany’s internal economy is such as to leave eighty million people virtually starving, are we to sit still and say, ‘It serves you right,’ or will we be required to keep them alive? If so, who is going to pay for that?... If you have a horse and you want him to pull the wagon you have to provide him with a certain amount of corn—or at least hay.”
“But the horse must not kick you,” Mr. Maisky objected.
Mr. Churchill switched to a nonkicking illustration by saying:
“If you have a motorcar you must give it a certain amount of petrol to make it go. I am in favor of having a reparations inquiry committee set up to explore this subject with the object of getting the most we can in a sensible way.”
In presenting the position of the United States, President Roosevelt pointed out that after the last war we loaned to Germany billions of dollars, and emphasized “We cannot let that happen again.”
“We are in the position of not wanting any of Germany’s manpower,” the President said. “We do not want any of her machinery, tools, or her factories. There will be some German assets in the United States that might be credited against what Germany owes the United States. but it will amount to very little.” After the meeting I advised the President that the best estimate placed the value of German assets in this country at 150 million dollars and that the value certainly would not exceed 200 million. He later used these figures to point out what an exceedingly small amount we would receive in contrast to other nations.
The American people want the Gennans to live, the President told the conference, but do not want them to have a higher standard of living than other states, such as the Soviet Republic. He stressed that the United States would emerge from the war in poor financial condition and that we would have no money to send into Germany for food. clothing or housing.
“All I can say is that we will do the best we can in an extremely bad situation,” the President said, and concluded by adding we would support the creation of a reparations commission as proposed by the Soviet Union.
Marshal Stalin then entered the discussion. “The root of the trouble the last time,” he asserted, “was that reparations were demanded in money. Then, the question arose of transferring the German mark into foreign currencies. That was the rock upon which reparations broke down.”
Marshal Stalin urged that the three powers that carried the burden of the war should have priority in reparations. He said it must be admitted that “France did not have any sacrifice to compare to the three powers I have in mind.” And then to clinch I the argument, he said, “France at this time has in the war eight divisions while the Lublin government has ten divisions.” There is no doubt that his opinion as to the claims of a government was influenced by the number of its divisions. He is credited with having said at Yalta, when reference was made to the views of the Pope, “How many divisions does he have?’ The Marshal did not make that statement at Yalta. But it was the yardstick he frequently used.
Stalin concluded his statement with a proposal that a decision be made as to whether reparations should be based upon the contributions made in the prosecution of the war or upon the losses sustained, or whether both should be considered. During the discussion, the President made a statement which still remains a source of misunderstanding between ourselves and the Russians. He said the Reparations Commission “should take, in its initial studies as a basis for discussion, the suggestion of the Soviet government, that the total sum of reparations should be twenty billions and that fifty per cent of it should go to theSoviet Union."
This language was later incorporated in the Conference Protocol, the document prepared by a committee appointed to set forth in writing the agreements reached during a conference. The protocol, which on the last day of the conference was submitted to the heads of government for final approval, also contained the statement that the Reparations Commission could consider “the use of: labor” as a possible source of reparations. There was no discussion of this proposal at the conference table except a passing reference by the President in which he said the United States “cannot take manpower as the Soviet Republics can.” Later I learned the language was added by Mr. Maisky, the Soviet representative, and subsequently agreed to by the other delegations. At any rate, I did not know of it at the time I left Yalta. Had I known it, I would have urged the President to oppose the inclusion in the protocol of any provision for the use of large groups of human beings as enforced or slave laborers. The program later drafted by the Reparations Commission contained no provision for “the use of labor.” But I regret to say that Germans and Japanese still are being held in Allied hands for use as laborers.
In the days that followed Yalta, as our armies fought their way into Germany from the east and the west, and as our combined air power and artillery pounded the cities of Germany into rubble, it became fully apparent there was no adequate answer to Prime Minister Churchill’s contention that Germany would be unable to reimburse the Allies for all the losses inflicted on the people in the various Allied countries.
Closely related to the reparations issue was the problem of fixing Poland’s boundaries. President Roosevelt said, at the outset of the discussion, that the United States felt that Poland’s eastern boundary should generally follow the so-called Curzon Line. He still held, he said, the view he had expressed at Teheran that it would be desirable to adjust the southern end of the line so that the city of Lwow and at least a portion of the oil fields should be inside Polish territory.
Prime Minister Churchill pointed out he had supported the Curzon Line in Parliament including the Soviet Union’s retention of Lwow. The claim of the Soviet Union to this area, he said, “is one not founded on force but upon right.” But if the Soviet Union made a “magnanimous gesture to a much weaker power” such as that suggested by the President, Mr. Churchill said, Britain “would admire and acclaim the Soviet position.”
Marshal Stalin replied with an impassioned statement.
“The Curzon Line is the line of Curzon and Clemenceau and of those Americans who took part in 1918 and 1919 in the conference which then took place,” Stalin declared. “The Russians were not invited and did not take part. . . Lenin was not in agreement with the Curzon Lines... Now some people want that we should be less Russian than Curzon was and Clemenceau was. You would drive us into shame. What will be said by the White Russians and the Ukrainians? They will say that Stalin and Molotov are far less reliable defenders of Russia than are Curzon and Clemenceau. I could not take such a position and return to Moscow with an open face.”
At this point, Stalin stood at the conference table as he spoke. It was the only time during the entire conference that he exhibited his strong feelings in such a manner.
I prefer the war should continue a little longer although it costs us blood and to give Poland compensation in the west at the expense of the Germans,” he continued. “I will maintain and I will ask all friends.to support me in this. . . I am in favor of extending the Polish western frontier to the Neisse River.”
Mr. Churchill doubted the wisdom of extending the western boundary of Poland to the Neisse River. He agreed that Poland’s western boundary should be moved into what had been German territory but asserted “it would be a pity to stuff the Polish goose so full of German food that he will die of indigestion.” He estimated that the taking of territory in East Prussia as far west as the Oder would necessitate the moving of six million Germans.
Stalin protested that the number would be much smaller because “where our troops come in, the Germans run away!’
Churchill’ reminded him that consideration must be gvten “to where those Germans are that run away,” and asked, “will there be room for them in what is left of Germany?”
Privately, Churchill expressed to me the opinion that placing the line at the Neisse River would mean the transferring of nearly nine million Germans. Such a number, he asserted, could never be absorbed in what would remain of Germany.
The discussion was long and earnest but Stalin finally accepted the Curzon Line in principle and the following somewhat equivocal statement on Poland’s frontiers was approved for inclusion in the protocol:
"The three heads of government consider that the eastern frontier of Poland should follow the Curzon Line with digressions from it in some regions of five to eight kilometres in favour of Poland. They recognize that Poland must receive substantial accessions of territory in the North and West. They feel that the opinion of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity should be sought in due course on the extent of these accessions and that the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should thereafter await the peace conference.”
Not only Poland’s boundaries but Poland itself was one of the most serious issues of the entire conference. More time was spent on this subject than on any other. Because of’the intensity of the argument, Mr. Roosevelt would assume a role more of arbiter than of advocate although he, as well as Prime Minister Churchill, urged the establishment of a new Polish government in Warsaw.
The Soviet Union, on the other hand, wanted to continue the Lublin government. Stalin was willing to add a few persons but he wanted to make certain that those who were added did not affect the Soviet Union’s control of the government.
The President said he favored a Polish government which would resolve all the political differences by “creating a government of national unity, a government which would represent all the political parties.” Such a government, be maintained, should be provisional, and should regard as its primary duty the establishment of a permanent regime. He said the United States wished to have Poland on friendly terms with the Soviet Union and he felt if the conferees should solve the Polish question, they could make it easier to establish peace in the world.
“Britain,” the Prime Minister said, “declared war on Germany in order that Poland should be free and sovereign. Everyone knows what a terrible risk we took and how nearly it cost us our life in the world, not only as an Empire but as a Nation. Our interest in Poland is one of honor. Having drawn the sword in behalf of Poland against Hitler’s brutal attack we could never be content with any solution that did not leave Poland a free and independent sovereign state.”
He repeated the sentiment expressed by the President saying that Poland should not be "free to entertain hostile designs against the peace and safety of the Soviets.”
Mr. Churchill eloquently painted the danger which arose from the continuing existence of two Polish governments. He urged that provision be made for a free election and that, in the meantime, effective guarantees could be made to secure the lines of communication of the Soviet army.
Stalin displayed great earnestness in replying.
“For the Russian people, the question of Poland is not only a question of honor but also a question of security. Throughout history, Poland has been the corridor through which the enemy has passed into Russia. Twice in the last thirty years our enemies, the Germans, have passed through this corridor. It is in Russia’s interest that Poland should be strong and powerful, in a position to shut the door of this corridor by her own force. . It is necessary that Poland should be free, independent in power. Therefore, it is not only a question of honor but of life and death for the Soviet state.”
In every subsequent discussion the Soviet Government has used this argument to justify what it has done in Poland. Their idea of a friendly government is a government completely dominated by them. The Lublin government fitted this description and Stalin did not want to take any chances with representatives of other political parties. Later I discussed the subject with Mr. Molotov. I could not impress him with my views that Soviet security would be better assured by having in Poland a people who were friendly, rather than a government that was friendly only because it was dictated to by the Soviet Union. Unsuccessfully, I argued that governments would come and go, but that if the Soviet Government’s conduct in Poland won the friendship of the people, the friendship of the government would be assured.
After the first discussion of Poland, President Roosevelt wrote a letter to Stalin suggesting that delegates from the Warsaw and London governments, and representatives of the sevenl political factions in Poland not represented in those governments, meet to consider the formation of a new Polish Government. The letter became the basis of further discussions.
The conferees debated the President’s proposal for several days. Finally they agreed on a declaration providing, among other things:
“The provisional government which is now functioning in Poland should therefore be reorganized on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad. This new government should then be called the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.”
A commission, composed of Mr. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, was appointed to consult, first, in Moscow with members of the Lublin government, with democratic leaders from within Poland, and others from abroad, with a view to reorganizing the government along the lines indicated.
The declaration pledged the Provisional Government to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot.
As the conferees neared what we thought was agreement on this troublesome issue, President Roosevelt asked:
“How long will it take you to bold free elections ?“
“Within a month’s time,” Mr. Molotov replied.
The election which, by our standard, was not “free,” actually was held twenty-three months later on Jaunary 19, 1947.
The day we arrived at Yalta I learned for the first time of a draft declaration of policy on the liberated areas that had been prepared by the State Department. The President did not like the declaration as drafted, but it greatly impressed me and I undertook to see if it could be revised to meet his objections. After conferences with Secretary Stettinius and other State Department officials a draft was prepared which received the President’s approval.
When Secretary Stettinius presented the paper, several amendments were suggested by Foreign Secretary Eden and Foreign Minister Molotov. These were.accepted and the paper was placed before the Big Three.
The declaration referred to “a principle of the Atlantic Charter—the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live—the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who have been forcibly deprived of them by the aggressor nations.”
It then asserted:
"To foster the conditions in which the liberated peoples may exercise these rights, the three governments will jointly assist the people in any European liberated state or former Axis satellite state in Europe where in their judgment conditions require (a) to establish conditions of internal peace; (b) to carry out emergency measures for the relief of distressed peoples; (c) to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people; and (d) to facilitate where necessary the holding of elections.”
Agreement was quickly reached among the Big Three. At least, we thought there had been a meeting of minds, but, ever since, there has been continual disagreement between the Soviets and ourselves as to its proper interpretation.
The discussion of the proposal was brief. Stalin opened it by saying, “On the whole, I approve of the declaration.”
The President called attention to the paragraph containing the agreement to “facilitate if necessary the holding of elections,” and Stalin quickly replied: “I accept that.”
"Poland will be the first example of operating under this declaration,” the President said. . . . “I want the election in Poland to be beyond question, like Caesar’s wife. I did not know Caesar’s wife, but she was believed to have been pure.”
Stalin smilingly replied:
“It was said so about Caesar’s wife, but, in fact, she had certain sins.”
I only hope the lady had fewer sins than, in our view, this declaration has had violations. It seems to me there is no question as to the intention of the parties to the agreement. We thought it was a step forward. But it proved to be a very faltering step.
When the draftsmen assisting the Foreign Ministers agreed to include in the declaration a statement that certain things would be done by the three governments “where in their judgment conditions require,” the Soviets were able to say—as they so often did—whenever they disliked to act, that in their judgment conditions did not require action.
The American public greeted the publication of this declaraton with enthusiasm. Editorial writers commented on it favorably. From the close of the Yalta Conference to the present day it has been a source of conflict between the Soviet Union and ourselves. But it is the basis on which we have shown the world that Russian actions in eastern Europe have been in violation of Russia's pledged word. In that respect it has been useful.
In October 1943, Secretary of State Cordell Hull had taken with him to Moscow the first proposal that finally developed into the Dumbarton Oaks plan for a United Nations organization. He and the President believed it would be far easier to obtain agreement on a plan for a peace organization while the war was still in progress. How right they were!
At the conclusion of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, in the autumn of 1944, the only major point remaining at issue was the formula for voting in the Security Council. The Soviet delegation had insisted that all decisions in the Security Council must be by a unanimous vote on the part of the major powers. We agreed that no decision committing our military forces to action should be taken without our consent but did not believe the right of veto should extend to all matters.
We finally had devised a compromise formula which we hoped the Soviets could be persuaded to accept, and the President sent it direct to Marshal Stalin on December 5. At the same time, the State Department prepared and delivered to the Soviet and British embassies in Washington lengthy statements in explanation and support of the President’s proposal.
We sought to meet the Soviet insistence that the votes of the five permanent members of the Security Council must be unanimous on all questions, by suggesting that Paragraph 3 in the section of the plan dealing with voting procedure in the Security Council should state that unanimity would be required for all categories of decisions except one: in those decisions involving promotion of peaceful settlement of disputes, a permanent member of the council would not cast a vote if it were party to the dispute in question. Such cases, we believed, would be quasi-judicial in character and no nation should be placed above the law in an organization based on the principle of equality under the law. Where the decisions might require the use of force, we felt justified in placing the permanent members in a special position, since they would have to beat the principal responsibility for such action.
It was on the, second day of the conference that Secretary Stettinius formally presented our proposal, and the President then asked for its immediate consideration. In supporting the plan, the President referred to the agreemed reached at Teheran in which the three heads of government declared: “We recognize fully that supreme responsibility resting upon us and all the United Nations to make a peace that will command the good will of the overwhelming mass of the peoples of the world and banish the scourge and terror of war for many generations."
Conflicting reports of the exchange that followed were presented in the Security Council of the United Nations in the spring of 1947 by the Soviet and the British representatives during a discussion of the veto power and its relationship to the control of atomic energy. Because of this, and because the veto power has remained one of the most controversial issues of the United Nations structure, it may be of interest to present here the major portion of my shorthand record of the views expressed on the veto issue at Yalta.
Since the United States, as the author of’ the proposal, had clearly stated its position, the exchange was almost entirely between Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin. It follows:
Pñnce Minister: “The peace of the world depends upon the lasting friendship of the three great powers, but His Majesty’s Government feel we should be putting ourselves in a false position if we put ourselves in the position of trying to rule the world when our desire is to serve the world and preserve it from a renewal of the frightful horrors which have fallen upon the mass of its inhabitants. We should make a broad submission to the opinion of the world within the limits stated. We should have the right to state our case against any case stated by the Chinese, for instance in the case of Hongkong. There is no question that we could not be required to give Hongkong to the Chinese if we did not feel that was the right thing to do. On the other band, I feel it would be wrong if China did not have an opportunity to state its case fully. In the same way, if Egypt raises a question against the British affecting the Suez Canal, as has been suggested, I would submit to all the procedure outlined in this statement. I would do this without fear because British rights would be preserved under paragraph 3 when our veto would kill action if we chose to use it.
"I presume, Mr. President, if Argentina raises a question against the United States, that the United States will submit to all the procedure of the last five paragraphs and would not vote on the issue. However, the United States could raise its fundamental objections in respect to all the measures to be taken under paragraph 3. . .
“His Majesty’s Government see no danger from their point of view in associating themselves with the proposals of the United States. We see great advantage in the three great powers not assuming the position of rulers of all of the rest of the world without even allowing them to state their case. It would not be right for us with the great power we possess to take that position, denying them the right to state their case, and to have measures taken to adjust difficulties short of the powers set out in paragraph 3, on which powers we rely if we are not convinced by our friends and colleagues on the Security Council.”
The Marshal: “I would like to have this document to study because it is difficult on hearing it read to come to any conclusion. I think that the Dumbarton Oaks decisions have, as an objective, not only to secure to every nation the right to express its opinion, but if any nation should raise a question about some important matter, it raises the question in order to get a decision in the matter. I am sure none of those present would dispute the right of every member of the Assembly to express his opinion.
“Mr. Churchill thinks that China, if it raised the question of Hongkong, would be content only with expressing opinion here. He may be mistaken. China will demand a decision in the matter and so would Egypt. Egypt will not have much pleasure in expressing an opinion that the Suez Canal should be returned to Egypt, but would demand a decision on the matter. Therefore, the matter is much more serious than merely expressing an opinion. Also, I would like to ask Mr. Churchill to name the power which may intend to dominate the world. I am sure Great Britain does not want to dominate the world. So one is removed from suspicion. I am sure the United States does not wish to do so, so another is excluded from the powers having intentions to dominate the world.”
Mr. Churchill: “May I answer?”
The Marshal: “In a minute. When will the great powers accept the provisions that would absolve them from the charge that they intend to dominate the world? I will study the document. At this time it is not very clear to me. I think it is a more serious question than the right of a power to express its intentions or the desire of some power to dominate the world.”
Prime Minister: “I know that under the leaders of the three powers as represented here we may feel safe. But these leaders may not live forever. In ten years time we may disappear. A new generation will come which did not experience the horrors of war and may probably forget what we have gone through. We would like to secure the peace for at least fifty years. We have now to build up such a status, such a plan, that we can put as many obstacles as possible to the coming generation quarreling among themselves.”
The Marshal: “I think that the task is to secure our unity in the future, and, for this purpose, we must agree upon such a covenant as would best serve that purpose. The danger in the future is the possibility of conflicts among ourselves. If there be unity, then the danger from Germany will not be great. Now we have to think how we can create a situation where the three powers here represented, and China—”
Prints Minister: “—and France.”
The Marshal: “Yes, and we will keep a united front. I must apologize to the conference. I have been very busy with other matters and had no chance to study this question in detail. As far as I understand what was said in the American proposal, all conflicts are being divided into two categories—conflicts which demand sanctions of a military nature; the other category includes conflicts which could be regulated by peaceful means without military sanctions. Then I understand that, in the consideration of conflicts of both kinds, it is contemplated there should be first a free discussion of the conflict. I understand, also, that in considering the disputes of the first category, which demand military sanctions, that a permanent member being a party to the dispute has a right to vote. But in conflicts of the second category, which could be regulated by peaceful means, and do not require sanctions, the party in dispute is not allowed to vote.
“We are accused of attaching too great importance to the procedure 'how to vote.’ We are guilty. We attach great importance to the question of voting. All questions are decided by votes and we are interested in the decisions and not in the discussions. Suppose China is a permanent member and demands Hongkong be returned to her. I can assure Mr. Churchill that China will not be alone. They will have some friends in the Assembly. That would be true of Egypt in the case mentioned.”
Prime Minister: “I coulld say ‘no.’ I would have a right to say that the powers of the World Security Organization could not be used against us if we remained unconvinced.”
The Marshal: “There is another danger. My colleagues in Moscow cannot forget the case which occurred in 1939 during the Russian-Finnish War, when Britain and France used the League of Nations against us and eventually expelled us and isolated us.
The President: “It is entirely satisfactory for the Marshal to have sufficient time to study the proposal.”
I was deeply disturbed by the clear evidence that Stalin had not considered or even read our proposal on voting in the Security Council even though it had been sent to him by diplomatic air pouch on December 5. This was February 6, and it occurred to me that if in those sixty-three days he had not familiarized himself with the subject, he could not be greatly interested in the United Nations organization. It was all the more impressive since this certainly was the only proposal on the agenda with which he was not entirely familiar. My concern remained even though at the next day’s meeting Mr. Molotov announced the Soviet Union’s acceptance of our proposal, which was later adopted in substantially the same form at San Francisco.
The discussion on the United Nations then turned to what governments should become members. There followed this colloquy:
The Marshal: “I have a list of the states that declared war on Germany. It means that they become future members of the Assembly. Among those states are ten which have no diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. [Most of these ten were South American republics.] We are to meet with them to build up international security. How is it possible to build up international security with states that have no diplomatic relations with us at all? Perhaps the conference would discuss this matter.”
The President:.”I think most of them would like to establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. They just have not got around to it yet. At the same time it should be recognized that most of the states that have not recognized the Soviet Union have been sitting with the Soviet representatives at Bretton Woods and other places in conferences that have been held.”
The Marshal: “That is right. But it is difficult to build up international security with states that do not want to have anything to do with the Soviet Union.”
The President: “I think the easiest way to establish complete diplomatic relations with them is to invite them. This whole question involves a matter of history which should be explained.
“Four years ago the Acting Secretary of State, Mr. Welles, told the South American republics it was not necessary to declare war on Germany but that it was necessary to cut off diplomatic relations. So there are five or six republics which think they should be invited because they took the advice of the United States at that time. This matter was brought to my attention one month ago. As a result, I sent a letter to the Presidents of these six republics explaining that if they want to attend the Conference of United Nations they should declare war. I think one, Ecuador, has done so, but has not yet had a chance to sign the Declaration of the United Nations. Paraguay will do so in a week or ten days. Peru and Uruguay will soon declare war. The result is that it would be a little embarrassing if, after they declared war, they should then be excluded from coming to the meeting. Quite frankly, it was a mistake of Mr. Welles in not advising them to declare war instead of merely breaking off diplomatic relations.
“In the meantime all these nations have helped us in the conduct of the war. A large part of the raw materials for the manufacture of munitions has come from them. The result is, I am in a difficult position.
“In addition to those nations that bate signed, there are a small number called associated nations which have worked with us. They broke diplomatic relations but did not declare war.”
The Marshal: “What about Argentina?”
The President: “The Argentines are not in it at all.”
The Marshal: “But the Argentines broke relations with Germany.”
The President: “But have not been accepted as an associated nation.”
The Marshal: “I am not for the Argentines. I do not like them; but I do desire there should be no logical contradiction. If we invite the nations that declared war and also the associated nations that have broken relations, there is then a category of nations like Argentina. This means Turkey and some other countries would come. I think the nations which declared war would feel not quite at ease with those nations that have not declared war, but were saving all the time, trying to speculate on who would win and who generally were not straight in their behavior.”
The President: “My idea would be to invite only those associated nations that have helped us on the condition that they declare war.”
The Marshal: “When should they act?”
The President: “Right away. Put a time limit on them.”
The Marshal: “Say, the first of March.”
The President: “All right, the first of March.”
Mr Churchill allo approved this solution, citing Turkey as an example of a state that had remained neutral heretofore and had been encouraged to do so. Although somewhat reluctant, Marshal Stalin likewise agreed.
Immediately after announcing the Soviet Union’s acceptance of the Presidnit’s proposal on voting procedure in the Security Council, Mr. Molotov expressed the hope that Byelorussia, the Ukraine and Lithuania would be admitted to the United Nations. In any event, he sald, he hoped the first two would be admitted. Marshal Stalin made a forceful plea in support of the suggestion.
Prime Minister Churchill supported the Soviet request, stating: “My heart goes out to White Russia, bleeding from her wounds while beating down the tyrants’
Not wishing to agree, and yet not wanting to oppose Churchill and Stalin directly while the issue of the international organization was in the balance, the President made this statement: "The British Empire has great populations in its dominions, like Australia, Canada and South Africa. The Soviet Government has great masses of population like the three dominions mentioned. The United States has no colonies but has a large population. Brazil is smaller than the Soviet Union but larger in area than the United States. There are many countries with small population, like Honduras and Liberia. We must study the question of whether any country should be given more than one vote. I do not want to break down the principle of one vote to each nation. Therefore, we can decide on the general plan of a meeting to organize the association and then before the meeting, through the Foreign Secretaries, or at that meeting, we can decide these questions and I will be glad to take them up.”
There was no dissent. Because I was strongly opposed to granting the Soviet request, I thought the President had done a good job and that we might hear no more of the proposal. But at the conference table the next afternoon the president began reading a report of the meeting of the Foreign Ministers which had just been handed him and said:
“Paragraph 2 is that it will be for the conference to determine the list of the original members of the organization. At that stage the delegates of the United Kingdom and the United States will support the proposal to admit to original membership two Soviet Socialist republics.”
The report was agreed to.
I learned later that at the Foreign Ministers meeting, Mr. Eden, who wanted to be certain of the admission of all members of the British Commonwealth including India, which was not an independent state, agreed with Mr. Molotov on the votes for Byelorussia and the Ukraine. Mr. Stettinius then also agreed to the arrangement. As the meeting opened, the Secretary advised the President of the action which the President later announced, and the heads of government approved.
I was surprised at the agreement which, in my opinion, was very unwise. After the meeting I urged my view upon the President. I reminded him that before we left Washington he had told a group of Senators that if Stalin proposed granting membership to Byelorussia and the Ukraine, he would insist upon membership for each of our forty-eight states. The truth is, the Soviet republics are no more independent than the states of our Union.
I recalled to him how effectively the opponents of the League of Nations had argued that the British, because of their dominions, would have five votes in the Assembly while we would have but one. Our people had come to realize that the dominions were independent states and frequently held views different from the United Kingdom, but that was not true of the Soviet republics. I feared the opponents of the United Nations might use the allotment of three votes to the Soviet Union as effectively as the foes of the League had used the argument against the British votes twenty-six years earlier. I urged the President at least to ask that the United States be granted a number of votes equal to those of the Soviet Union. The President feared it was too late but said he would consider it.
I convinced Hopkins that, at the very least, we should secure such an agreement from Stalin and Churchill whether or not we afterward exercised the right. He then joined me in urging the President to withdraw his agreement regarding the two Soviet republics unless Russia agreed the United States also should have three votes. The President finally told us he would present it to Marshal Stalin. On the last day I spent at Yalta, February 10, the Ptesident wrote him a letter which stated:
I am somewhat concerned lest it be pointed out that the United States will have only one vote in the Assembly. It may be necessary for me, therefore, if I am to insure wholehearted acceptance by the Congress and people of the United States of our participation in the World Organization, to ask for additional votes in the Assembly in order to give parity to the United States.
I would like to know, before I face this problem, that you perceive no objection and would support a proposal along this line if it is necessary for me to make it at the forthcoming conference.
The following day Marshal Stalin advised the President that he entirely agreed with him that “since the number of votes for the Soviet Union is increased to three in connection with the inclusion of the Soviet Ukraine and Soviet White Russia among the members of the Assembly, the number of votes for the USA should also be increased.
“The number of votes for the USA might be increased to three as in the case of the Soviet Union and its two basic republics,” he said. “If it is necessary I am prepared officially to support this proposal.”
President Roosevelt also asked Churchill for his views, and Churchill stated he would support the President in any proposal be made to achieve American equality with other nations.
When I arrived in Washington there was waiting for me in the White house Map Room the following cable:
For Justice Byrnes from Mr. Hopkins
THE PRESIDENT HAS RECEWED COMPLETELY SATISFACTORY REPLIES
PROM THE PRIME MINISTER AND MARSHAL STALIN ON ADDITIONAL
VOTES TO ACHIEVE PARITY FOR THE UNITED STATES, IF NECESSARY.
IN VIEW OP THE FACT THAT NOTHING ON THIS WHOLE SUBJECT
APPEARS IN THE COMMUNIQUE, THE PRESIDENT IS EXTREMELY
ANXIOUS NO ASPECT OF THIS QUESTION BE DISCUSSED EVEN
PRIVATELY.
I assumed he had some very good reason for not wishing this matter to be discussed, and I complied with the request.
The President and his advisers concluded not to ask at San Francisco for compliance with the agreement that we have as many votes as were given to Russia. He did not again discuss the subject with me, and I did not know he had changed his mind. I admit that the public opposition to Russia’s three votes as against our one was not so great as I had expected. But nevertheless I think we should have insisted at San Francisco on the agreement made at Yalta. I felt then and feel now that the smaller states would have opposed the request of the Soviets and the United States. This course would have been just and it would have resulted in both governments having only one vote. That would have been the best solution.
In granting three votes to the Soviet Union, we established a pzecedent. The Soviets do not overlock.precedents favorable to themselves. At the Peace Conference in Paris, for example, Byelorussia and the Ukraine were members. They will demand membership in every other conference. This means the Soviet Union has three arguments as well as three votes. They never fail to make the three argumients or cast the three votes.
The Paris Peace Conference agreed upon two kinds of recommendations, one requiring only a majority vote, the other requiring a two-thirds vote. The Soviet representatives announced that in the Council of Foreign Ministers they would not consider any recommendatiai adopted by less than a two-thirds vote.
There were twenty-one members of the peace conference. Therefore, eight votes in opposition to a recommendation would prevent its recieving the two-thirds endorsement. When the Soviets opposed a proposal, it was much easier for them to secure these eight votes because they had three votes to start with. Had the Soviets possessed only one vote, or had the United States been given three votes, as was agreed at Yalta, many of the recommendations which received thirteen vote, one short of two-thirds, would have been adopted.
Another agreement was made at Yalta which was to confront me later. This was the ‘Top Secret” Protocol in which it was agreed that in return for Soviet participation in the war against Japan, the Kurile Islands would be “handed over” to the Soviet Union. It also provided that “the former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904 shall be restored,” and listed these as the return of the southern half of Sakhalin Island, internationalization of the Port of Dairen, the lease of Port Arthur as a Russian naval base, and joint Russo-Chinese operation of the Chinese Eastern and South Manchurian railroads. The United States was to use its influence to have China agree to that part affecting China’s territory.
I did not know of this agreement, but the reason is understandable. At that time I was not Secretary of State. Mr. Stettinius was Secretary.
Because of problems that had arisen in Washington, the President wanted me to return with Admiral King, who was leaving at noon on February 10. We expected the conference would end that evening and that the President would leave the following day. But that afternoon Stalin requested the President to remain one more day. He said they could not conclude their work and he wished to discuss some matter he deemed important. The President complied. The agreement as to the Kurile Islands was reached in private conversations among the Big Three instead of at the conference table, and the protocols, including thiss one, were signed on February 11. Had I been in Yalta that day it is probable I would have learned of it.
When the President returned, he did tot mention it to me and the protocol was kept locked in his safe at the White House. In the early summer I learned that President Roosevelt had undertaken to induce China to make the concessions affecting Port Arthur, Dairen, and the railroad, but it was not until some time after I became Secretary of State that a news story from Moscow caused me to inquire and learn of the full agreement. I presented the matter to President Truman and he requested Admiral Leahy to transfer to the State Department those documents at the White House containing agreements with foreign governments. I wanted to know how many IOUs were outstanding.
In considering the wisdom of these Pacific agreements entered into by President Roosevelt, one should be fair enough to consider the circumstances under which the promises were made. It was six weeks after the serious German counterattack on the western front Although progress was being made in both the east and the west, neither the President nor anyone else at that time knew how long the Germans could hold out and how many casualties we would suffer before they surrendered. The President had with him at Yalta the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They knew the situation.
The evidence is clear that the agreement was, in great part, a military decision. The military leaders already had their plans for the invasion of Japan under way. They undoubtedly gave the President their estimate of what such an invasion would cost us in human lives with Russia in the war and what the cost would be if Russia were out of the war. They naturally wanted Russia in the war to engage the Japanese armies in the north. But once Stalin knew our plans for invasion were under way, he knew also that we would want his armies and he could demand more for them. Mr. Stalin is not bashful about making demands.
Nor should President Roosevelt be criticized for keeping the agreement secret. The Soviet Union was party to a treaty with Japan and we could not announce Russia’s intention to go to war with her. Furthermore, Russia's military strength was then concentrated on the German campaign. Any hint of the agreement would have been an invitation to the Japanese troops on Russia’s borders to launch an invasion. It was in the interest of all of us to allow the Soviets ninety days after Germany’s surrender to transfer troops from the European front. It is, therefore, quite understandable that both Marshal Stalin and President RooseveIt wished to maintain strict secrecy.
Toward the end of the conference, Marshal Stalin entertained at dinner. At the time, the press quoted one of the Americans, F~flt as saying forty-five toasts were proposed. I am willing to believe it, but the simple statement certainly is misleading. Unexplained, it would indicate the diners were thoroughly intotted. The fact is that with each toast, the diners took only a sip of wine and many made the gesture without the sip. The dinner lasted four hours. Forty-five sips of wine in four hours, during which time enough food was coi~sumed to last twenty-four houçs, did not intoxicate any one of that group. As for me, I do not drink wine.
About the time we reached the soup course, I noticed Mr. Vyshinski, who was sitting near me, pouring water into his vodka glass. Since vodka is the color of water, I decided if he could do it, I could. In the confu¬sion incident to everyone’s standing up when a toast was proposed, I would pour water into my vodka glass. It was not very stimulating, but I do know what took place at the dinner. Because of some of the reports in the United States about Soviet officials getting intoxicated, it is only fair to say that all those with whom I have come in contact have been most temperate. Never have I seen a Soviet representative at a social affair who, showed the slightest evidence of intoxication.
The Marshal was generous in the toast he proposed to Churchill and particularly generous in his remarks proposing the health of the Presi¬dent, whom he described as the “chief forger of the instruments which had led to the mobilization of the world against Hitler.”
The Prime Minister toasted Marshal Stalin as the “mighty leader of a mighty nation whose people had driven the tyrants from her soil.” The President spoke with pride of the unity that characterized the rela¬tions among the three countries, and expressed the hope it would continue.
‘One statement of Stalins that interested me was: “it is not so difficult to keep unity in time of war since there is a joint aim to defeat the common enemy, which is clear to everyone. The difficult task will come after the war when diverse interests tend to divide the Allies. It is our duty to see that our relations in peacetime a~ as strong as they have been in war.”
I can testify to the accuracy of his prophecy, and I share his views as to our duty.
When toasts had been proposed to all the military chieftains and the heroes of the war on land, sea, and in the air, I proposed a toast “to the people of our respective countries—the workers on farms and in factories—who did not wear the uniform but whose contribution made possible our victories.” The Marshal left his place and came to clink his glass with mine in approval of the sentiment. The truth is, he is a very likeable person.
The report of the Yalta Conference was released simultaneously from London, Moscow and Washington on Monday afternoon, February 12. All the Allied nations responded favorably and American public opinion was especially enthusiastic. The Philadelphia Record called the conference the “greatest United Nations victory of the war.” The New York Herald Tribune declared that “the overriding fact” is that the conference has produced another great proof of Allied unity, strength and power of decision.” And Time Magazine asserted: “all doubts about the Big Three’s ability to co-operate in peace as well as in war seem now to have been swept away."
That was how I felt about it. There is no doubt that the tide of Anglo-Soviet-American friendship had reached a new high. But President Roosevelt had barely returned to American soil when the tide began to ebb.