THE Thirty Years' War had been waging for many years when France first became an actor in it, and the war itself was the result of religious and political controversies, which had disturbed Germany for a century. The rapid growth of the Reformation bade fair to render all Germany Protestant. In all the states where the rulers were Protestant, the great mass of the people professed the same faith; and in many where the princes adhered to the ancient creed, the majority of the subjects had abandoned it. In Hungary, Bohemia, and Austria, the Catholics, in 1618, were in the minority.
Personal as well as religious motives kept the Protestant princes steadfast in their faith. They had seized vast amounts of church property. The possessor of the lands of some rich abbey, the successor to the emoluments of some wealthy bishopric, was sure to see keenly the iniquities of the Scarlet Woman, and to repel vigilantly any return to the corrupt rule of the Papacy. Thus far the struggle between the two faiths had, on the whole, been favorable to the reformed party. They had resisted the great power of Charles V, and secured at the last a reasonable toleration. The contest of the Netherlands with Philip II. had ended in the complete victory of the new faith in seven of the provinces, and in their political independence. The numbers of the Protestants had largely increased since the peace of Augsburg in 1555. Though it seemed impossible that the head of the Holy Roman Empire should not be a member of the Holy Roman Church, yet the Protestant party hoped to gain that great dignity. The possession of the throne of Bohemia by Austria gave the Catholics four out of the seven electoral votes, but it was not impossible that even those electors who were church dignitaries might abandon their party. An elector of Cologne had been led by love for Agnes of Mansfield to espouse a young bride and a new faith. The change failed to be important, because the supineness of the Protestants allowed the successor appointed by the Pope to dispossess the legal elector.
During the sixty years preceding the great war, the emperors had done little to interfere with the Protestants. Ferdinand and Maximilian II. had exercised a wise tolerance. Rudolph II. had the inclination but not the vigor to persecute. His time was given to abstruse studies. He pored over chemistry and the science of the stars; seeking to solve the mysteries of another world, he let slip the affairs of this, and contemplating the cadent houses of the zodiac, he let rebellion rage unchecked and the fortunes of the Church decline.
At last his brothers, the Austrian archdukes, rose against him and chose Matthias, the third son of Maximilian, as Rudolph's successor. The unfortunate Emperor found the planets all adverse. He was driven from his possessions one by one, and in 1612 death took him from a life of humiliation.
The rebellious Matthias found little comfort in the throne from which he had so ruthlessly pushed his brother. The five sons of the Emperor Maximilian II. had all been childless, and the younger brothers of Matthias agreed to postpone their claims to those of their cousin Ferdinand of Styria, who though a young man was recognized as the future hope of the Catholic party and of the House of Austria. Ferdinand was elected King of Hungary and Bohemia during the lifetime of Matthias, and the Emperor had the melancholy feeling that all were impatient for him to surrender the Empire to a younger and an abler successor.
But before Matthias' death the great war had begun. The action of the Protestants of Bohemia over the denial of their rights commenced the struggle. Rudolph, in 16o9, when seeking refuge in Bohemia from his brothers, had granted to that state what was called the Majesty Letter, by which was given to the Utraquists, the Protestants of Bohemia, rights nearly equal to those of the Catholics. They could continue to occupy the churches which they then had, and the nobles and inhabitants of royal lands could build such new ones as they might desire. Matthias wished to annul and endeavored to limit these concessions. He made the distinction that the edict did not allow Protestant places of worship to be erected by those living on church lands. These claimed, however, and exercised the same rights as the inhabitants of the royal lands. One of their churches was torn down, another closed, and some of the unruly Protestants were imprisoned.
An assembly of the Protestants of Bohemia complained of this as a violation
of the Majesty Letter. They were answered by a letter which pronounced their
own conduct illegal and rebellious. Thereupon a second assembly was held in
the castle of Prague, and on May 23, 1618, the deputies insisted on knowing
from some of the chief advisers of the Emperor whether they had written or suggested
the offensive answer. This was denied, but they were thereupon accused of other
conduct contrary to the interests of the state, and the Stadtholders Martinitz
and Slawata, and the Secretary Fabricius, were forthwith thrown out of the window
into the moat, eighty feet below. All three escaped with little harm, but the
"window tumble" was considered as the commencement of the Thirty Years'
War. To such struggles there is, however, no fixed beginning but they assume
more definite shape as the exciting causes become more intense. Matthias died
in 1619, and Ferdinand was elected to the imperial throne, receiving all the
seven votes cast. Many other names had been proposed for this dignity. It was
suggested to Maximilian of Bavaria and to the Duke of
Savoy. But when the day of election came, the influence of the House of Austria,
aided by dissensions between the Protestant electors, on this as on many similar
occasions, secured an easy victory.
Even had the efforts to prevent this dignity becoming practically hereditary been successful, the result would have been of little political importance. The crown of the Holy Roman Empire was a great dignity; it conferred a title of indefinite grandeur and glory, but it did little more. The power of the Emperor was found in his hereditary dominions and not in his shadowy authority over what was an empire only in name. Possessed by a weak German prince, or by a foreign king, it would have been almost as empty a title as that of King of Jerusalem.
Ferdinand hastened back from Frankfort to meet the dangers that awaited him at home. He was the first emperor since the days of Luther who was filled with an intense Catholic zeal. Even Charles V. had viewed the Protestants only as rebels against his own authority. To Ferdinand they bore the more hateful aspect of rebels against God. Educated by the Jesuits and entirely under their influence, he had, as a young man, made a pilgrimage to Loretto and Rome, and had there vowed to crush out the heresies that were rampant in the countries over which he was to rule. It was a vow he never forgot, and in performing which he plunged Germany into the worst misery it suffered during its long history. He had begun in his own province of Styria, and by a policy of unwavering repression had crushed the Protestant sects, which there, as almost everywhere in Germany, had become predominant. His energies were now to be displayed in a larger field.
Almost insurmountable difficulties seemed to meet him. His capital of Vienna
was in danger of capture, and in Bohemia he was declared to have forfeited the
crown, and the States proceeded to choose for his successor Frederick V., the
Calvinist elector palatine. Frederick accepted the throne against the advice
of prudent
counsellors, and was crowned at Prague with much pomp, and with the good-will
of the mass of his subjects. But his own weakness and the indifference of the
Protestant princes soon lost him the advantage of his position.
In 1608, the Protestants had formed a union for the protection of their religion and for mutual aid. It was intended to disregard the party lines of Calvinists and Lutherans, but that was not the result. The Elector of Saxony and the majority of the German Protestants were Lutherans. The Palatinate had wavered from Lutheranism to Calvinism, and from Calvinism back to Lutheranism, four times in sixty years, but the present elector had been reared and had remained a Calvinist. The jealousy between these two great sects often exceeded their hatred for the common enemy, and united with Jesuit zeal in producing the final triumph of Catholicism in a great portion of Germany. The Union left Frederick to his fate, and the lack of money destroyed the efficiency of the Bohemian armies.
Ferdinand, in the meantime, obtained the assistance of the Duke of Bavaria, of Spain, and of the Catholic League, and thus reinforced, his armies defeated the Bohemians at Weissenberg on November 8, 1620. During the engagement Frederick was eating his dinner at Prague, and as he started to ride to the field of battle he was met by the fugitives from his routed army. He at once despaired of the cause. To a resolute man Bohemia was by no means utterly lost; but Frederick had neither the skill of a general, the courage of a soldier, nor the qualities of a king. He fled back to the Palatinate in such haste that he left his crown behind him. He was to have no further use for it. Bohemia fell under the complete control of Ferdinand, and he carried out a policy of confiscation and of religious repression, which crushed the Protestant party, and in so doing drove away more than half the population and blighted the progress, the prosperity, and the development of that unhappy country. Thirty thousand families are said to have been expelled for refusing to abjure their faith; the use of the national language was forbidden in public acts.
But Ferdinand was not content with this. Encouraged in his hopes of bringing back not only his hereditary possessions, but all Germany, into the one fold, he declared that Frederick, as a rebel against the Empire, had forfeited his dominions. The troops of the Emperor and of the League invaded the Palatinate and conquered it with ease. This Ferdinand bestowed on his friend and follower, Maximilian of Bavaria, and with it the seat in the electoral college which Frederick had held. The Protestants had now only two electors, Saxony and Brandenburg. The unhappy Frederick fled into Holland, and began a life of wandering and disappointment.
The success of the Emperor in his conflict with the Elector Palatine was followed by a steady growth in power. The Protestants were disunited. The Catholics were led by great captains, and were animated by pious devotion and by the unlimited plunder that was granted them.
Ferdinand devoted his first energies to the extirpation of heresy in his own dominions, and he labored so effectually that Austria, Bohemia, and a large part of Hungary were permanently secured to the Catholic Church.
Such victories and the military supremacy of the Catholics rendered possible still greater triumphs, and many countries that had been deemed lost to the faith might now be recovered. The Jesuits were Ferdinand's advisers, and they were especially eager to reclaim the lands and property which had been wrested from the Church. Great ecclesiastical possessions had been seized, and were now held by temporal princes. Their occupation was long established; it had been recognized by repeated treaties, until they seemed to hold the church lands as firmly as their hereditary rank. But no time, the Jesuits said, could strengthen a title which was based on the robbery of God; no statute of limitations ran against the Almighty; no treaty of man could be pleaded against the rights of Heaven. Their early influence over the Emperor had been increased by the active part taken by the Society in the conversion of the masses, who had been forced by the results of the war to return to the faith they had renounced.
This is among the great eras in the history of the Society of Jesus. Gregory XV. belonged to the proselyting popes. He had incited Ferdinand to the utmost zeal, and he had recognized the services of the Jesuits by receiving Loyola and Xavier among the saints of the Church. With their zeal thus encouraged, the Jesuits spread over Germany, and their missions were numerous in the hereditary dominions of the House of Austria, where the work of conversion had been most successful. In one year they claimed to have converted i6,ooo heretics in Bohemia alone. Their persuasions were aided by earthly weapons. Vigorous confiscations, the expulsion of the obstinate, and the quartering of soldiers upon the refractory, to the end, said the nuncio, that their vexations might enlighten their understanding, aided the result. In 1627 the Emperor declared that after six months he would not tolerate in Bohemia any person who did not believe in the only true Catholic and saving faith, and similar edicts were proclaimed in Austria and Styria. A thorough, systematic and continued persecution was rewarded by complete success.
Intoxicated by his victories, and incited to further acts that might yet more ensure the favor of Heaven, in March, 1629, Ferdinand published the Edict of Restitution. By this commissioners were directed to demand from their present unauthorized possessors the restitution of all arch-bishoprics, bishoprics, prelacies, and other ecclesiastical property confiscated since the treaty of Passau in 1552. It was an edict, the enforcement of which would have revolutionized a great portion of Germany. The Emperor now hoped to gratify both his piety and his ambition. Ferdinand had armies in the field, not only in Germany, but in Italy, where he was endeavoring to settle the question of the succession to the possessions of the Duke of Mantua, and show the Italians that the Emperor had not lost all power among them; he was assisting the Poles against Gustavus, and Spain against the Netherlands; Prussia was to be subjected to Austria, and plans were even cherished for extending the power of the House of Austria over the dominions of the Turks, and planting the banners of the Emperor on the shores of the Bosphorus.
The military power which encouraged such vast plans was chiefly due to Wallenstein, the Duke of Friedland. 1 This leader, who seems almost to belong to the realms of romance, and whose conduct and ambitions were surrounded by a dim halo of mystery which centuries have not entirely cleared away, was now in the height of his glory.
Ferdinand's early successes had been due to the Catholic League, under the leadership of Tilly and the Duke of Bavaria. He was thus dependent on the princes of the League, and, abandoned by them, his power would have been greatly diminished. A remedy for this condition was unexpectedly offered. The Count of Wallenstein was the richest nobleman in Bohemia, having greatly increased his wealth by acquiring, for little or nothing, large amounts of the lands confiscated in that country. He had attained distinction as an officer, but he had as yet no such reputation as a general as had been gained by Tilly or Mansfeld. In 1625, he offered the Emperor to furnish an army of 20,000 men for his service, and to support it, feeding, clothing, and paying the troops, and asking nothing save the royal authority for his acts. The offer seemed one which he might find it difficult to execute, but it was approved by the Emperor, and Wallenstein was authorized to raise an army on these terms. The result was to show he had correctly judged the conditions of the time, and that he had conceived a system of warfare as bold as it was atrocious. Already the ravages of the war, which had for eight years laid waste parts of Germany, together with the great numbers despoiled or driven into exile by religious persecution, had begun to break up the peaceful forms of German life. The farmer planting his fields only to see them laid waste, the tradesman subjected to ruinous levies upon his wares to protect his shop from pillage or help in saving his city from sack, the artisan finding work uncertain and his pay precarious, were abandoning peaceful avocations for a mode of life which offered the plenty of license and plunder. Each year of war left more persons without homes or property. He whose house is burned must become a soldier, says the Highland proverb, and the places of those soldiers who fell were more than filled by those whom war had left without means of subsistence.
The revenues collected by the Emperor or by the princes were insufficient to pay the armies in the field, and the maxim that war must support war, had received full development. Count Mansfeld and Duke Christian of Brunswick, who had carried on a gallant struggle against the tyranny of the Emperor, had themselves been compelled to support their armies by contributions levied on the countries in which they were.
But Wallenstein saw that with greater numbers the system could be carried further. Society is safe from devastation because the forces on the side of order are stronger than those opposed, but if a body of men were of such size and discipline that it could overcome resistance, there was no city so great, no province so powerful, that it was not at its mercy.
Wallenstein viewed also with entire impartiality those who opposed and those who favored the cause for which he had taken up arms. The friend must pay contributions for the good cause. The foe must pay ransom to save from destruction the property which was justly forfeited. The failure of either to meet demands was followed by impartial pillage, and this was often chosen at once as the shorter and easier way to satisfy the soldier's needs. The forces that gathered to Wallenstein's standard soon exceeded the number he at first agreed to raise. The army he commanded at times consisted of over 100,000 men. Though covered by the Emperor's name, its general wished his soldiers to feel that they were bound to him alone. He practised a system of lavish bounties. His own great wealth was enormously increased by his military successes. Of this he gave profusely, not only to the commanding officers, but to every promising subaltern. Large bribes were bestowed also on the officials at court to preserve the favor of the Emperor, for at that time every one was open to bribes, from an elector to a turnspit.
But Wallenstein based his vague and aspiring ambitions, less on court favor than on an army dependent on him, and ready to follow him if needs were against the Emperor himself. Confidence in his own good fortune and a boundless ambition nursed hopes of becoming not only the most powerful noble, but a sovereign, in Germany. Naturally proud and reticent, he fostered these qualities. He appealed to the influence of the mysterious on the imagination, partly from calculation and partly because his nature had a certain vague grandeur. His words were few; he met the vicissitudes of the battle-field with the same unruffled calm that was one of the causes of Marlborough's success. By the severity of his silence he seemed to exhort his men, said Richelieu. 2 Nor was this love for the mysterious wholly an affected quality. He had plunged into astrology. In the phases of the sky and the combinations of the planets, he sought to read the mystery of his future career. An Italian astrologer, called Seni, whom he kept with him, exerted a strong and often a baneful influence over one whose fortunes had been so strange that he could easily believe the forces of nature took part in them.
The combined forces of Tilly and Wallenstein crushed resistance. Mansfeld and Christian died in the cause they had defended with much valor and little success. Christian IV. of Denmark interfered in behalf of the Protestant interests, but he was a man possessing neither ability nor resolution. Wallenstein gained continued successes and the King of Denmark was driven back to the Baltic. The Emperor now hoped to establish a northern maritime power, and to have his dominions extend from the Baltic to the Adriatic.
Wallenstein besieged the important port of Stralsund. Its harbor stood open to the sea, but the general, whom as yet no obstacle had thwarted, said he would take the city though it were bound with chains to heaven. But here at last his fortune reached its limit. The Swedes furnished troops to the city, and after a siege of months and the loss of 12,000 men, the stubborn commander abandoned the endeavor. Denmark was, however, ready for peace. Her dominions on land were all held by the Emperor's forces, and upon the surrender of these possessions Christian cheerfully promised to interfere no further in the affairs of Germany, and to leave his allies to their fate.
This treaty was in 1629, and the Emperor could now have ended the war, with the power of his House and that of the Catholic Church greater than it had been for almost a century. But he resolved to undertake the execution of the restitution edict, and peace was more remote than ever. Yet in the year 1629 it seemed not improbable that Protestantism would be crushed in the rest of Germany, almost as thoroughly as it had been in the hereditary states of the Emperor. The Protestant princes were weak and disunited. Some had already been driven from their possessions, and the enforcement of the edict would cripple the strength of those who were yet undisturbed. The Elector of Saxony desired to secure his own safety at the expense of his party, and might think absolute security would only be found in a retuin to the Catholic faith. There were, however, two foreign powers from whom help might be expected. Richelieu had long shown a willingness to check the dangerous growth of Austria, and if his life were spared it could not be long before France would take some part in the war. But Richelieu's life and favor were alike uncertain, and he had no sympathy with the Protestants of Germany, except as they were a check upon the Emperor's power.
But in Gustavus Adoiphus, the King of Sweden, the Protestants found an ally, less powerful than the French king, but strong in genius and an unwavering faith. Gustavus was now thirty-six. inheriting a throne at seventeen, he had been bred to battles from his youth, and had won the name of a bold and skilful commander. He was in sincere sympathy with the Protestants. An earnest resolve to protect his brethren of the faith was mingled with the desire to extend his power and possessions by playing his part in the battlefield of Germany.
The disgraceful failure of the King of Denmark only excited the ardor of Gustavus. His rising talents had long been apparent, though the extent of them was yet to be disclosed. Richelieu selected him as the most valuable ally for his plans. In 1628 France had agreed to give Gustavus 500,000 livres for two years on condition that he invaded Germany. Gustavus was embarrassed by a war with Poland. The Polish king claimed to be entitled to the Swedish throne, but the adroitness of Charnacé, one of the most skilful of those diplomatists whom Richelieu found to assist his foreign policy, arranged a truce between Sweden and Poland. The cardinal did not wish to assume a position of armed hostility towards Austria, but in 1631 a treaty for five years was signed with Gustavus, by which, for the defence of their oppressed friends and to restore to their former condition the princes and States of the Empire, he was to invade Germany with 36,000 men, and the French were to furnish him 1,200,000 livres per year. 3 Richelieu endeavored to have the treaty provide that the only change to be made in the religious condition of Germany should be the toleration of the Catholic religion where it was not then permitted. Gustavus said such an article would repel his Protestant allies, but he agreed to leave the Catholic worship, or that of any other faith, undisturbed in any places that might be conquered. 4
Even before the final execution of this treaty the Swedish king had thrown his dice for this great prize, and at the head of a small army of about fifteen thousand men had invaded Germany. After regulating the affairs of the kingdom, he made his farewell address to the States. "It is from no light caprice," said he, "that I involved you and myself in this new and fearful contest. God is my witness that I do not fight from any lust of war, but the Emperor has insulted my ambassadors, oppressed my friends, persecuted my religion, and stretched out his hand after my crown. The down-trodden States of Germany cry to us for help, and God willing we will give it to them."
In June, 1630, he landed on the coast of Pomerania. He issued proclamations to the electors and to the Protestant princes, but he met at first a cold reception. Even those most inclined to assist him were afraid of exposing themselves to the Emperor's wrath by joining his enemy. In Vienna, Gustavus' undertaking was lightly regarded. "This snow king will soon melt away," was the popular jest. But already the Emperor's position had been seriously weakened from other causes.
An imperial army, as powerful as that led by Wallenstein, excited jealousy among the princes who formed the Catholic League. An Emperor with a great standing army could do away with the privileges of the loosely-bound members of the Empire, and turn a nominal allegiance into an actual subservience. However willing to assist in the suppression of Lutheran or Calvinistic heresies, the danger to their own independence dampened the ardor of the Catholic States. Their discontent was increased by the ruinous and wanton devastations of Wallenstein's soldiers, and the hauteur and calculating cruelty of the leader. To complaints as to appeals Wallenstein turned a deaf ear. In 1630 a diet of the electors and German princes, attended by the representatives of France and Spain, met at Ratisbon. A united outcry against Wallenstein was there raised by the German leaders, and especially by the Duke of Bavaria. The misery, devastation, and ruin with which Wallenstein visited Catholic as well as Protestant lands was told the Emperor, with bitter complaints that all the crimes of the army, against God and man, were done under his name. Unlike his general, Ferdinand was not a ruthless man, except against heretics; yet he was friendly to Wallenstein, and realized how much of his success was due to the commander of his forces. But he was also anxious to conciliate the electors, for he desired his son to be chosen king of the Romans, and thus designated as his own successor as Emperor. In his perplexity his mind was influenced by the counsels of Father Joseph, the Capucin, who was Richelieu's friend and most skilful diplomat. The Emperor always regarded the voice of a priest as the voice of God, and the subtle suggestions of the Capucin helped to decide Wallenstein's overthrow.
Wallenstein was relieved of his command. He was at the head of a hundred thousand
men, bound to him as soldiers rarely are to their commander. The influence of
a successful general over his followers had been increased by innumerable personal
ties, by gifts, by bribes, by promotions, by plentiful rations, and abundant
plunder. But Wallenstein resolved to obey. He was not in a position to defy
the Emperor and hold the army in opposition to its allegiance. "The Emperor
has been betrayed," he said. "I pity him, but I forgive him. It is
clear that Bavaria has forced this from him. I am sorry he should have abandoned
me with so little resistance, but I will obey."
He was the more reconciled because his astrologer told him that the stars still
reserved a brilliant future for him. But a seer's eye was hardly needed to descry
that. A portion of the troops were disbanded, and many of them took service
under the King of Sweden. The armies were now almost wholly composed of mercenaries,
who served either cause with equal zeal.
Wallenstein retired to Bohemia, where he lived in more than royal state. Magnificent palaces were built on his various estates; he was attended by great retinues of pages and servants; his table was always laid for a hundred places; sixty carriages with his court followed him when he drove over the country, and a hundred wagons, carrying servants and supplies; six barons and as many noble knights constantly attended him. He needed quiet, and the streets approaching his palace were often closed, lest any passing wagon should disturb his contemplations. Surrounded by such pomp, he lived silent and reserved, despising pleasures, watching the course of the stars, and the ebb and flow of events, and waiting for his hour to come.
The treaty of Ratisbon, which was signed by the French ambassadors in October, 1630, provided that France should give no aid to the enemies of the Emperor. 5 The ambassadors had received full powers to negotiate a treaty, and technically, perhaps, had not exceeded their authority. But their private instructions had related to a peace which should regulate the condition of Italy. The relations of France with Gustavus were known to them, and Richelieu's letters had stated explicitly that this alliance would not be abandoned. It is uncertain whether this provision had been acceded to by Father Joseph in order to deceive the Emperor, or whether, alarmed by the news of Louis' illness at Lyons, he thought best to yield; but Richelieu immediately disavowed the treaty, and Father Joseph was sent into a brief and nominal disgrace.6 The negotiations with Sweden continued, and the treaty was signed in 1631, which Gustavus at once published to the world.
In the meantime he had been strengthening his position in Germany. The army with which he landed was small, but it was composed of. thoroughly disciplined men. Gustavus' forces furnished a strong contrast to the great predatory hordes that had pillaged Germany for years. Whatever was needed for the army was paid for at fair prices. Pillage and excesses were punished. Not only discipline, but religious order and service, prayer and praise were found among the Swedish troops. Morning and evening service was said among the soldiers with as much regularity and more fervor than among the canons of a cathedral. They were those best of soldiers who combine experience and discipline with moral character and a conviction of the justice of the cause for which they fight. They prayed long and fought hard.
The great numbers who gathered under Gustavus' command as the war advanced lowered the discipline of the army. Though called Swedish, it came to be composed of every nationality, and after Gustavus' death it mattered little to a district whether the Swedish or the imperial army was quartered upon it.
Gustavus slowly marched southward, meeting with little aid and little opposition. Those whom he came to protect were so timorous about joining him that he compelled their adhesion by vigorous measures. " If your master holds with God," said he to the envoy of the Duke of Brandenburg, "let him stand on my side; if with the Devil, he must fight against me." Both Pomerania and Brandenburg at last joined the ally, who offered them the alternative of having their cities protected or bombarded.
Gustavus continued his advance. It was suggested by the imperial general that both sides should go into winter-quarters, as was the custom in those days of slow and ineffective warfare; but the king sent word that the Swedes were soldiers in winter as well as in summer. The publication of the French treaty made Gustavus seem less like a friendless adventurer in a desperate cruise, but he received a severe blow in the spring of 1631.
Tilly had assumed command of the forces of the Emperor and besieged Mágdeburg.
Gustavus felt bound to rescue this flourishing Protestant city, which asked
him for protection, but the remissness of Brandenburg and Saxony delayed him
until Magdeburg fell. The ruin visited on this place exceeded the worst barbarities
of the war. The city was populous--one of the richest and most flourishing in
Germany. It was laid waste as, Tilly boasted, no city had been laid waste since
Troy and Jerusalem. Thirty thousand persons were murdered during the sack. Every
refinement of cruelty was added which the experience of a long war had taught
the soldiers. Women were violated before their husbands and parents, and death
was aggravated by dishonor. The Croats sought recreation in throwing infants
into the burning buildings, while the Walloons preferred spearing them in their
mother's arms. To the destruction of the inhabitants was added that of the city
itself, and only two
ochurches and a few houses escaped the flames. 7
The blotting out of this great and prosperous city sent a thrill of terror through Protestant Germany. If Gustavus could not protect his allies from the destruction with which the Emperor would punish them, it would be madness to join him. In order to force the Elector of Saxony to a decided course, Tilly now invaded his dominions. The Elector of Saxony was the most despicable of all German princes. His only claim to fame was that he had killed more birds and beasts than any other man in Germany, and his achievements in other lines were celebrated by the titles of the " Beer King" and the " Beer Jug." He had hoped to escape the ravages of the Emperor's troops and to leave to their fate his brethren in the faith. This cautious policy had secured immunity thus far from the evils of the war, and the imperial forces now exulted in the plunder of a virgin land, where the fields were tilled, the villages unburned, and the burghers' purses full of gold with which to purchase their ransom. But Tilly had reached the summit of his renown, and the sack of Magdeburg was to be followed by a disastrous ending of a long and successful career. The elector was at last moved to a resolution, and he now wearied Gustavus with prayers for assistance. " He has come to me," said the king to the ambassadors, "in his sore need, when there is no other escape. He must place Wittenberg in my hands, give me his eldest son as a hostage, and pay my troops for three months before I will help him." " Not only Wittenberg, but all Saxony," answered the elector, "and my whole family for hostages, and if that is not enough, myself besides."
The united armies of Sweden and Saxony now marched against Tilly, and encountered him at Breitenfeld, close by the walls of Leipsic. On September 17, 1631, the battle began. The allies had about 45,000 men, and Tilly a few thousand less. The Saxons'were defeated and put to flight, but the discipline and valor of the Swedes, under their king's fiery leadership, carried all before them. Tilly met his first defeat, but it was one that was to embitter the rest of his days and change the whole course of a thirty years' war. He lost 19,000 men, and his army was scattered. This victory, the first great battle won by the Protestant cause, made Gustavus Adolphus the hero of Europe. A single victory exposed the weakness of the Emperor and of the loosely bound German states. Gustavus could have advanced at once into the hereditary possessions of the House of Austria, and probably have reached Vienna without a battle. He chose, however, instead of this assault on the centre of the enemy's power, to attack the scattered members of the League and obtain control of northern and western Germany.
His march was a series of rapid successes, such as few generals have met with. Leaving in September with an army of 25,000 men he reached the Rhine in a little over two months with a force of 60,000. Every thing yielded before him. The Protestants joined his alliance; the Catholic princes and electors made the best terms they could; some yielded at once; some made a fruitless resistance. Those who would promise neutrality were left undisturbed. Gustavus took possession of the provinces which resisted, and announced that he should hold them until the end of the war. The electors of Cologne and Treves put themselves under the protection of France. In December the king crossed the Rhine, and Lorraine, Alsace, and the whole left bank of the river lay open before him. But his close approach was viewed with uneasiness by Richelieu, who was finding the success of his champion greater than he desired.
Gustavus therefore left the French to chastise the Duke of Lorraine, and turned his army eastward. Allowing his forces a brief rest, while he regulated the affairs of the numerous electors, dukes, counts, and other potentates, of whom he had so rapidly become the autocrat, in March, 1632, he began again his triumphal progress, but now he marched eastward toward the Duke of Bavaria.
The duke had declined the early overtures of France for his neutrality, and
had not beeii able to bring himself to the humiliating terms which Gustavus
had offered
since his victories. The whole force of the war was now to be turned upon the
territory which had been spared so long.
Tilly had gathered another army, but he had orders not to risk it in a pitched battle against his victorious rival. The Swedes passed the river Lech in the teeth of Tilly's forces. The defeated general was mortally wounded, and his army yielded a position that seemed impregnable, and left Bavaria open to the enemy. Gustavus marched through the country, meeting little further opposition, and entered Munich. The Elector Palatine, the unlucky Frederick, was among the large body of vagrant and expectant princes that accompanied the conqueror. He had at least the satisfaction of entering the capital of Bavaria, from which the despoiler of his own provinces and electorate had been forced to fly.
Austria lay next to Bavaria, and there seemed nothing to prevent Gustavus having all Germany at his feet, but the Emperor had already turned to what he knew to be his only refuge. Messenger had followed messenger asking Wallenstein again to assume command of the imperial forces. But the deposed leader turned a reluctant ear to the calls. He is said, after Gustavus landed in Germany, to have intimated a readiness to ally himself with the enemies of Austria. He did not raise a hand to protect Bohemia when the Saxons invaded and overran it after the battle of Breitenfeld. Though he desired again to hold the great place from which he had been driven, he was resolved to increase the bids by a persistent coyness. Fle praised the happy rest of private life. He had enjoyed peace too long, he said, to seek again the delusions of fame and the uncertain favor of princes; his desires for power and might had perished, and tranquillity was now the only object of his wishes. The envoys labored long with the pretended recluse. At first they suggested that the Emperor's son should act with him and learn the art of war. " I will have no associate," said the duke, "not if God himself wished to divide the command with me."
Finally he consented to devote three months to raising an army for the Emperor, but he must not be asked to lead it. So much he would do for his king, but after that he should be allowed to return to his sweet retirement. At the name of Wallenstein soldiers sprang up from every part and hastened to enlist under his banner, and at the end of three months he had 40,000 men in arms But the great forces which his name had gathered, he alone could hold together. When the genie that had summoned them disappeared, they would fade away as rapidly as they had come. The Emperor besought, entreated, commanded the general's services. At last Wallenstein consented to lead the army, but the terms he imposed were such as subject had never asked from master. Wallenstein was to have absolute control over the Emperor's forces; he alone could punish or reward; neither the Emperor nor his son could exercise any authority in the army or direct any movements in the campaign. Wallenstein alone should dispose of all that was confiscated or conquered; he should not be removed from his position without formal and timely notice, and his services \ver~ to be rewarded by the Duchy of Mecklenburg and other great possessions. 8
To grant such power was almost an abdication, but Ferdinand had no choice, and his subject would abate nothing from his demands. The name of Wallenstein again in command encouraged the adversaries of Sweden, but the great leader showed no disposition to take any hasty steps. The troops of Gustavus were laying waste Bavaria, the territory of the Emperor's most powerful and most trusty ally. Wallenstein owed the Duke of Bavaria an old grudge, and he did not hasten to his relief. Not only the duke, but the Emperor besought him to go to the rescue, but Ferdinand was to find what it meant to have no right to command his own army.
At last when there was little left of Bavaria to protect, the general joined the forces of its duke, insisting, how ever, that he should exercise sole command over the united armies. The presence of so skilful an opponent, with a fresh and powerful army, checked Gustavus in his hitherto uninterrupted course. The united armies marched against Nurnberg, and Gustavus led his forces, now much reduced in number, to the protection of that city. It seemed that the great commanders would now meet, and the fate of Germany be decided. But Wallenstein would not risk all on the fortune of an assault. Gustavus was too weak to do more than maintain the defensive, and he encamped by the city waiting reinforcements. These he received, and the imperial army was also strengthened, until 120,000 men lay encamped over against each other in front of Nürnberg. The support of so large a force laid bare the country around. Disease wasted both armies, and pestilence each day worked more harm than the bloody skirmishes which took place. Still Wallenstein rested strongly entrenched on the hills and watched his adversary. Gustavus' patience was first exhausted, and he led a desperate attack on the imperial forces. But their position was too strong to be forced, and the king was obliged to abandon 'the effort after severe loss, and he retired to his own camp. After these great armies had been watching each other for nine weeks, hunger and distress compelled them to move. Gustavus broke camp and marched away, and Wallenstein slowly followed. Forty thousand men from the two armies had perished, victims of this long and terrible encampment, and the war was not a hair's breadth nearer an end.
The fatal battle, so long expected, soon occurred. Wallenstein resolved to quarter his troops in Saxony, and Gustavus marched there for the protection of the country. The armies engaged at Lutzen on November i6, 1632, very nearly in sight of Breitenfeld. Gustavus was to end his career as a great conqueror, almost where he had begun it fourteen months before. In the morning the king prayed before the troops, and the whole army kneeling down sang a hymn to the God of battles, and then, as the mists broke away, they marched against the forces of Wallenstein. The king had one fault as a great general, and that was the one most easily forgiven with his reckless courage he exposed himself in battle as freely as a common soldier. Early in the combat he was severely wounded. Overcome with pain he asked the Duke of Luneburg to take him to the rear. As they went, a bullet from an unknown hand struck Gustavus in the back. "I have enough, brother," said the king, "save yourself," and he fell, and was covered by the dead that were slain in the struggle round his body. But the desire for revenge gave increased vigor to the Swedes, and after a desperate battle, they remained in possession of the field. Wallenstein fell back and retreated from Saxony.
He claimed, with little cause, a victory in the field, but he had won what was of greater profit. The death of Gustavus saved the House of Austria from the humiliation that his genius would have made almost certain. His career in Germany had saved the Protestant cause from utter overthrow. His death left the long war to end less disastrously than had seemed probable when he landed in Pomerania-but far less triumphantly than had been hoped when the mist broke away in the morning at Lutzen.
Gustavus Adolphus was reckoned by Napoleon as among the eight great generals of the world. Of the qualities that make the hero, as distinguished from the conqueror,--daring, high resolve, lofty piety, the kindly heart, the open speech,--he had more than any of his rivals in fame. Had his life been spared, he would have made Sweden a great Continental power,--perhaps the head of a northern Protestant empire. But his untimely death put an end to the plans for changing the destiny of northern Europe, and left the fate of Germany to be worked out by sixteen years more of war and constant misery.
The great alliance of which he was the leader was discouraged by his loss,
and it left the Protestant cause in a condition of great peril. It seemed for
a time as if the struggle might suddenly end in an entire surrender to the Emperor.
Ferdinand himself believed so, for he refused to offer any moderate terms of
peace.
But France was now to take the chief part in the contest against Spain and the
Emperor. Richelieu had watched with jealousy and apprehension the marvellous
success of the Swedish king. Desirous to check the House of Austria, he did
not wish a far more powerful empire to succeed it, and his Catholic zeal apprehended
much from the eager Protestantism of Gustavus. 9 But at his death Richelieu
resolved that what had been won should not be wholly lost. Oxenstiern, the chancellor
and friend of Gustavus, succeeded to his position as the Swedish leader. A treaty
was made at Hailbron, in 1633, by which the chancellor was given command of
the ill-united members of the Protestant party. 10 No longer content with giving
money, in 1634 France agreed to furnish an army for the cause, and she became
not only an actual but an avowed combatant.11
This great struggle against Austria and Spain absorbed most of the energies of the remaining years of the cardinal's rule. Continued with varying fortunes, but with unwearied pertinacity, it was a terrible strain upon the resources of France. It was to result in a great increase in the power of that kingdom. "The cardinal," says Martin, "sacrificed, not without regret but without remorse, the generation that passed away, to the fatherland that does not pass away." But the war was carried on with more zeal than brilliancy. Failing in any rapid success, it became a long and sullen attempt to conquer the enemy by exhaustion, and the forces of the Emperor were worn away with the same grim tenacity the cardinal had shown at La Rochelle. Richelieu had not the qualities of a great general, nor had he a keen eye to discern military genius in others. The forces of France were scattered over half of Europe. There were French armies in Italy, in Lorraine, in the Low Countries, in Germany, and on the Spanish frontiers. But not one of them struck those rapid and decisive blows at the heart of the enemy that end a war in a campaign. No great general arose among the French. In war, as in diplomacy, Richelieu showed a taste for ecclesiastics. The Cardinal of La Valette for some years commanded, on the German frontiers, forces as great as those which had conquered at Breitenfeld. But La Valette, though a fair general for a priest, was a poor general for a soldier. The Archbishop of Bordeaux was made admiral of the fleet ; but his ill-success lost him Richelieu's favor. The episcopal warriors accomplished little by land or sea. The predatory leaders who had been trained under Gustavus were the only ones who showed any talent for their art.
The varying fortunes of the few years following Gustavus' death did not bring the war any nearer to a close. The Swedes gained some successes, but these effected no substantial progress. They were occasional victories rewarded by rich plunder, but followed by no steady extension of power, such as had brought two thirds of all Germany under the control of Gustavus. One part of his foreign policy Richelieu brought to a successful end. A treaty in 1631 left the Duke of Mantua established in his Italian possessions, and secured to France the possession of Pignerol. In the long and tortuous negotiations, a prominent part was taken by a young Italian called Giulio Mazarini, and though his versatile talents at first excited Richelieu's mistrust, he at last so pleased the cardinal that the French ambassador was told to intimate to the Pope that Mazarini would be an acceptable nuncio to France.12
The Swedes still cherished hopes of great accessions of territory in Germany, and they suggested plans that perhaps would have been possible if Gustavus had lived, but were chimerical after his death. In 1636, in the negotiations for a further alliance, Oxenstiern proposed a partition of Germany, by which Sweden should receive Bohemia, Westphalia, and Upper and Lower Saxony.13 Richelieu had himself cherished a scheme which would have made the French minister a German prince. The coadjutor of Treves, on the death of the elector, would succeed to the electorate. Treves had been driven to accept the protection of France, and the French diplomatic agents endeavored to obtain the election of Richelieu as coadjutor. The elector himself was in no position to oppose such a desire, but the chapter were unwilling, and the papal sanction could not be obtained for a choice that would have so strengthened the power of the French cardinal, and made possible the election of a French king as Emperor. Such a dignity as the electorate, it was said, could only be given to a German subject, and the plan was abandoned.14
Wallenstein's fortunes declined from the death of his great rival. The army under his command accomplished little that was worthy of its leader's fame, and the devastation it wrought was borne with less patience when the greatest danger had passed. The general himself seemed more than ever veiled in mystery. He undertook no vigorous campaign, but kept his great army for the most part inactive, conducting obscure negotiations, and brooding over mysterious plans. Mistrusting the Emperor, he was resolved to use his army solely for his personal ambitions.
The crown of Bohemia had long been the ignis fatuus of his hopes, and he now began ill-disguised negotiations with his master's enemies, which should ensure the success of their arms and satisfy his own ambition. Suggestions of such an alliance were made to the Saxons, the Swedes, and the French. But the tortuous nature of the man created as much distrust among those he sought to befriend as those he sought to betray. The negotiations at last became so open that the imperial Court could have no doubt of the treason that Wallenstein was meditating. He had pondered on his ambitions so long, he had communed so deeply with the constellations, that, in the hour of his great enterprise, he was feeble and vacillating.
On January 12, 1634, at Pilsen, the generals and commanders were assembled,
and a paper was presented them which recited the dangers to which their leader
was exposed by the devices of his enemies, and by which they bound themselves
to remain faithful to him to the last drop of their blood. Over forty of the
chief officers signed this paper, though one or two added aloud, saving the
rights of the Emperor and of religion. Wallenstein now felt sure of his army,
but in fact most of those who signed the pledge did it with mental, if not with
oral, reservations. The Emperor hesitated no longer, and a secret decree was
issued by which Wallenstein was declared a traitor and deposed from his command.
Piccolomini, Gallas, and the most of his officers were unwilling to follow him
in a revolt against the Emperor, and the command of the army was entrusted to
them. It was not, however, until February that the decree was published, and
that Wallenstein was himself notified of his deposition.
He found that many of his most trusted officers refused to obey him. Disease
had long crippled him physically, and he seemed to be struggling under plans
greater than he could accomplish. He now led a small body of troops to Eger.
His position seemed so full of danger, that the Swedes and Saxons felt at last safe in trusting his overtures. They marched to meet him, and once in command of their forces and of his own devoted followers, the great general might have ended the war, and gained the crown which the stars had so long promised him. But he was under the ban of the Empire. His capture or death would be welcome news at Vienna, and his life was at the mercy of every mercenary outcast, who could expect a great reward for a murder done under the guise of patriotism. His extraordinary fortunes, and his strange character, exposed him the more to the vagaries of murderers, who seek the lustre that come from the slaughter of those preeminent among their fellows. Wallenstein's confidence in his officers and men exposed him to constant danger. The strong desire of genius to reach its object blinded him to the difficulties in its attainment, and constant desertions left him still trustful of those who remained. He had so long endeavored to win the army entirely to himself, that he could not believe it would now be false to him. Among the officers of the small force that followed him to Eger, were Butler, Gordon, and Leslie, all of whom belonged to the foreign adventurers, who were so numerous in his service. Gordon and Leslie were Scotch, and Butler was Irish. They now resolved to murder the traitor, as they called their commander, and to kill also some of his officers, who still continued faithful to him. A dinner was given, at which Trêka, Illo, and Kinsky, Wallenstein's most trusted lieutenants, attended. In the midst of the festivities, some soldiers entered the room, and the three, with one Neumann, were butchered by their entertainers. Butler and a Captain Devereux at once led a few soldiers to the house where Wallenstein had taken his quarters. They burst into his sleeping room, where they found him undressed, and Devereux cried: "Are you the wretch that would lead the Emperor's forces to the enemy, and tear the crown from the Emperor's head. Now you must die." Wallenstein made no answer, and the soldiers murdered him where he stood. He died as silent and mysterious as he had lived. His murderers were all liberally rewarded by the Emperor. Wallenstein was but fifty years old, and his fall took out of European history a figure as important and portentous as that of Richelieu.15
Wallenstein was murdered on February 25, 1634. His death was soon followed by the utter overthrow of the Swedish and allied forces at Nordlingen. The Emperor gained in one battle a great portion of what he had lost during Gustavus' long triumphal march. A victory equally important was gained, when the Elector of Saxony executed his long-cherished purpose of deserting his Protestant brethren. In 1635, by the treaty of Prague, the Beer-Jug made his peace with Ferdinand, and agreed in the future to assist him in the war. It was provided that the Edict of Restitution should be suspended for forty years, and ecclesiastical possessions should be left as they were in November, 1627. The Confession of Augsburg was to be allowed to the nobility, to the imperial cities, and to Silesia, but not in Bohemia or the hereditary dominions of Austria; the Elector Palatine was not to recover what he had lost, but the Duke of Lorraine was t be restored to the possessions of which France had despoiled him. 16 The Elector of Brandenburg was offered Pomerania as a bribe if he would assent to the treaty, and this he presently did. The abandonment of the Protestant Germans by these two great princes left them still more exposed to the vengeance of the Emperor, and many of them joined in the treaty. Had it not been for France and Sweden, it is probable that a general peace on these terms would have been made, but except for their interference, even such terms as were granted by the treaty of Prague would not have been extended to the Protestants. The treaty was followed the next year by the election of Ferdinand's son as King of the Romans. A few months after this last success, for which he had so long labored, in February, 1637, Ferdinand II. died, leaving his son to succeed him as the third of that name.
The misery and devastation which was caused among great masses of humankind by the narrow and unrelenting bigotry of Philip II. was equalled if not exceeded by that caused by his kinsman Ferdinand II. Either of them might have consoled himself with the reflection that his labor had not been in vain. Dissent from the Roman Catholic Church was crushed in most of the hereditary dominions of Austria, as it had been in Spain. Either of these sovereigns would have been undisturbed by the thought that in accomplishing the desired result hundreds of thousands of lives had been lost, a whole generation had been gi~ren over to pillage, vice, and misery, and a great portion of Europe had been retarded a century in its progress. A hundred years did not restore portions of Germany to the condition of prosperity or advancement which they enjoyed in 1618.
While these changes were taking place in Germany, France was experiencing the vicissitudes of warfare. The open alliance with Sweden was followed in 1635 by a formal declaration of war against Spain.17 The detention of the Elector of Treves was taken as the ground for declaring a war that was in fact begun some years before. Richelieu gave to the declaration a formality that would have seemed more in place in the wars of Louis XI. and Charles the Bold. A herald arrayed in the traditional dress and blazonry of his order, was sent to the Cardinal Infant, the Spanish viceroy in the Low Countries to proclaim the war. But the Spanish treated this survival of feudalism with scant courtesy, and being denied admission to the cardinal, the herald was obliged to content himself with throwing copies of the declaration at the feet of those who refused to receive it, and fastening it as he returned to a post on the frontier.18
The war proceeded even with this defect in the formalities. France had for many years assisted the United Provinces in their contest with Spain. A treaty in 1630 had increased to 1,000,000 livres the amount which Louis agreed to pay annually to Holland for seven years, should the war last so long. 19 Holland and France united in a treaty against Spain, and each agreed to furnish 30,000 men for a joint invasion of the Spanish Low Countries. For some years Richelieu had watched for internal discontents there, hoping to avail himself of some uprising to assist in expelling the Spanish from the Netherlands. As the result of such a success, these provinces were to be divided between France and Holland. Luxembourg, Namur, Hainault, Artois, Cambrai and part of Flanders might well be united with France, while the other provinces would join their sisters, who had shaken off the Spanish dominion.20 But in fact the Low Countries which remained under the Spanish rule had little desire to change their condition. The Spaniards had learned moderation from the revolt of the United Provinces, and a change from the easy rule of the Cardinal Infant to the tax-ridden and oppressed condition of French provinces under Richelieu was desired by none but a few discontented schemers.21 Even the States-General, though possessing greater political rights, did not excite the envy of the Spanish provinces, which were chiefly Catholic and were reasonably prosperous.
The war now openly waged against Spain did not produce any revolt in her Dutch provinces. 22 The French armies largely outnumbered their enemies, entered Luxembourg and won a brilliant victory at Avein, but no advantage resulted from this. The army was paralyzed by the manner in which it was commanded. Two marshals of equal rank settled disputes of precedence by each having sole authority over the army on alternate days. Each naturally employed his day of command so that his rival could do nothing notable on the morrow. 23 Their forces were presently joined by those of the Prince of Orange, and he commanded the allied troops. But the prince had been trained to long sieges, and regarded the tedious besieging of one town as ample employment for a year's campaign.
Any friendship that might have been aroused among those whose enfranchisement the allies claimed to desire, was checked by the conduct of the troops. Tirlemont was captured and the soldiers sacked it in the most brutal manner, even fighting with each other in their greed for rape and plunder. The great army of 50,000 men accomplished nothing more, and was finally practically reduced to the defensive by opponents that were inferior in number but superior in skill. 24
Two armies under the command of La Force and the Cardinal La Valette were sent against Lorraine and the Germans, but they accomplished little.25 Richelieu prepared, however, for future success, by employing the Duke Bernard of Saxe Weimar, a young general who had proved himself a worthy pupil of Gustavus. For 4,000,000 livres a year the duke agreed to maintain an army of 18,000 men, and to use them in the service of the French king. 26 Of all the great armies sent out in many different directions, the only one that achieved any marked ineasure of success, was that which the Duke of Rohan commanded in the Valteline.
In the year 1636, the feeble conduct of the war not only accomplished nothing against the enemy, but it exposed France to very serious peril. The army in Italy carried on a dilatory warfare, and the Prince of Condé was sent to invade Franche Comté. This great and fertile province was still a part of the dominion of Spain. But as its position rendered it easy for it to shake off its allegiance, it was favored with a mild and almost nominal rule, and the desire of the French to gain Franche Comté for themselves met with no sympathy among its inhabitants. On the claim that they were not preserving neutrality, the Prince of Condé, in May, led there the chief army sent out during the year, with the hope of seizing the entire province. After capturing a few towns, he began the siege of Dole, but the large force under his command seemed utterly unequal, even to the task of capturing that city. 27 For eleven weeks they lay before while at Amiens, he had his narrowest escape from any of the many plots laid for his assassination. Soissons and Orleans formed a plan to murder the cardinal, and it was not discovered by any of the force of spies he always had in his employ. The design is told us by the Count of Montresor, one of the confederates, with apparently as little hesitation as if it had been a plan for hunting a stag or spearing a wild boar. It was calculated that as the king departed after a conference which he was to hold, Richelieu would be without attendants. Some conversation was to be held with the minister, and on the pretext that he showed some disrespect to Monsieur, the latter was to give the signal, and Richelieu was to be killed on the spot. All went as had been expected, but when the moment for execution came, the courage of Orleans failed him, and instead of talking with Richelieu, and giving the signal, he walked abruptly away. One of his associates remonstrated, but he only stammered out doubts and fears, and the cardinal entered his carriage and drove away from the unknown peril. 28 Fearful that their plot might be discovered, at the close of the campaign Monsieur and Soissons both fled, and sought an alliance with the Spanish. Monsieur was presently lured back by promises of allowing him both his wife and his pensions, but Soissons agreed to desist from hostilities only on condition that for four years he should be allowed to remain at Sedan in the enjoyment of his pensions, and without being required to appear at the Court. 29
Paris was not again exposed to such dangers as in 1636, yet the war made but little progress. The forces levied were sufficiently large; 150,000 men were in arms in 1635, and the numbers were increased rather than diminished, but their division into eight armies, besides garrisons, kept any of these from being imposing in strength. 30 Even greater evil resulted from the want of discipline in the army, and the impatience of the nobility of all restraint; from the number of desertions, the irregularity of pay, the lack of supplies, the disputes of the commanders, the corruption of the financiers. Richelieu endeavored to superintend himself each department of the government, but without success. The administration was so imperfectly organized, that the minister found it impossible to have his plans executed as he directed. He was unable to complete an organization by which the detail work of the government could be thoroughly done. He did, indeed, make some changes, and the condition of French political life was such that it was perhaps impossible that an honest and effective system should be created. From all these defects it resulted that the soldiers were often poorly clothed and fed and irregularly paid, and such conditions aggravated the troubles resulting from inefficient leaders and divided commands.31 In 1635, St. Simon writes from the army commanded by Cardinal La Valette; " I hope for good success if bread is not wanting. We have too many generals, too many by half. We have marshals of the camp who do not serve with efficiency. The army needs repose and supplies. There are complaints from every side." 32 La Valette wrote: "We could have ruined Galas' army, if we had only had sufficient bread. All our cavalry is practically disbanded." 33 The king himself when he was present with the army in 1635, wrote the cardinal from St. Dizier: "There is neither money nor provisions; all the troops are on the point of disbanding if they are not promptly provided for. I do not dare go there on account of the complaints I hear on all sides, which I cannot remedy" Again he writes from Chalons: I am annoyed at staying here so long doing nothing, but having found neither money, troops, nor provisions, I do not wish to advance." 34 In December, 1635, the Governor of Grave wrote that soldiers were asking alms and dying of hunger.
Nor were such complaints heard only at the beginning of the war. In 1640 the Marshal of Châtillon wrote: "For six days we have been able to do nothing, because they have not sent us bread enough for a third of the army." 35 The results of such irregularities were that the soldiers frequently supplied their needs by plundering the country where they were encamped, and that desertions were numerous. The number of soldiers was much greater on the rolls than in fact, and a fruitful source of corruption was in receiving allowance for rations for a larger number than were actually in service. Says Richelieu: "There are not more than 20,000 effective men in the army, and yet orders are given for the distribution of 28,000 rations of bread, which is much more than enough to satisfy the officers. 36
The officers themselves, taken from the nobility, were restive under discipline, impatient under any hardship, eager to leave at the close of a campaign, and they frequently left without orders. "They have," writes Châtilion of his officers, "an incredible impatience to gain winter quarters." La Valette writes to Chavigni, early in November: "The nobles are leaving without its being possible to retain them. The most infamous thing for our nation is the little heart or affection of the nobles." 37 The campaign usually lasted only a few months in the year. The forces of Gustavus, which conquered the most of Germany in twelve months boasted of being soldiers in winter as well as summer, but the French did not carry on war after their fashion. By the end of October the armies generally had retired into their winter quarters, and they would not begin the next campaign until late in the following spring. 38 There was not often snow enough to interfere with the prosecution of any campaign, but the commissary was ill supplied, and the difficulties of transportation were serious to a poorly equipped army. The noblemen also who flocked so liberally to the camp, and were the officers in command, desired to return to the pleasures of the Court. Long months spent in seeing artillery and baggage wagons dragged over wretched roads would have been odious to gentlemen who were not afraid of bullets but were much afraid of mud.
While the war was slowly waging, some attempts were made towards peace. As early as 1636 propositions had been made for a conference where a full and final peace might be arranged, and Cologne was chosen as the place where it should be held. But it was not until twelve years later that the negotiations now begun resulted in the peace of Westphalia. 39
Except some victories won by the Duke of Weimar, the condition of either party was little changed by the progress of the war from 1636 to 1640. In Italy the French position was weakened by the deaths of the Dukes of Savoy and Mantua. Mantua came under the influence of the mother of the young duke, and she was Spanish in blood and sympathies. 40 The widow of the Duke of Savoy, who also left a child the heir to his duchy, was the sister of Louis XIII., but she was a woman whose immorality offended even the lenient judgment of the time, and she was ruled in turn by her lover and her confessor. Neither of these befriended the French, and Richelieu, in his offers of assistance to the duchess, haggled for terms which would have left Savoy little more than a dependent on France. The duchess hesitated long about accepting such aid, and her subjects, who felt the dislike and distrust of Richelieu, that was almost universal in Europe, were impatient of any plan for French protection. Profiting by her unpopularity, her brothers-in-law captured Turin and were the actual rulers of Piedmont until the brilliant successes of Harcourt in 1640. 41
But though the war was little pressed in Italy, it was carried on against Spain itself and its northern provinces with some degree of vigor. A Spanish invasion was checked by the victory of Leucate, won by the soldiers of Languedoc against the veterans of Spain. 42 Abandoning the defensive in 1638, the French laid siege to the important town of Fontarabia. The siege was begun in the middle of July, and success was confidently promised. Richelieu had this conquest greatly at heart, and awaited it with a desire that was strengthened by confident expectation. 43 Entire failure was in store for him, and in September the siege was raised. It was due probably to the insubordination and jealousy of the great French nobles, to whom were given the chief commands. In this siege the conduct of some of the generals reached the point of actual disloyalty. The command of the army had been given to Condé, who was a poor general, but was rich and influential and firmly attached to the cardinal by the chains of absorbing avarice; but abundant pay, though it ensured fidelity, did not create capacity. The Prince of Condé at Fontarabia, as in all his campaigns, showed a lack of all those military talents the possession of which was to make his son so famous. A still more fatal obstacle to success was found in the conduct of the Duke of La Valette, a younger son of the Duke of Epernon. It was thought necessary to conciliate this powerful and unruly nobleman by making his son lieutenant-general in the army under Condé. But La Valette chafed at any authority, and was still more irritated when the Archbishop of Bordeaux, as admiral of the fleet, claimed an equal position with him. 44 He used the power he had, if not with deliberate purpose to thwart the efforts of the French army, yet in a manner which produced that result. The assaults attempted were conducted by him with such wavering zeal and frequent disobedience, that little progress was made in the siege. A sudden attack of the Spanish threw the whole army into confusion. The plate and furniture of the Prince of Condé were plundered, and the siege was ignominiously raised. 45
Condé had confidently promised this victory to his employer, and he sought to cover his defeat by accusing La Valette of disloyal conduct. The cardinal had already shown that, although he employed great nobles in places for which they had little fitness, he did not hesitate to punish them when they aroused his anger. His wrath at this great disappointment demanded a victim, and La Valette felt no consciousness of rectitude to encourage him in meeting an enraged minister. Not daring to return to Paris, he fled to England. Richelieu tried in vain to bring him within his power. He wrote to the duke's brother, the Cardinal of La Valette: "M. de La Valette is a lost man if he does not purge himself of what is laid to his charge. I write him that he may seek the king for that purpose. * * * I desire and doubt not that he will free himself from blame." To the duke himself he wrote: "The king desires that you should come to render an account of your conduct, which is the same thing that you wish, and that your friends desire for your justification." 46
But the duke would not come to Paris, and he was in his absence judged by a council of state, the king presiding in person. By this extraordinary court he was condemned to death for disloyalty, Louis casting his vote with the others for this opinion. 47
The affairs of Lorraine occupied much of Richelieu's attention during the early years of the war, and the first steps were taken toward the union of that province with France.
The position of the great duchy of Lorraine in the midst of other states was one of peril, but in an especial degree it lay open to the attack of France. Its situation, as well as its wealth and fertility, made it an acquisition specially valuable to that kingdom. To a minister who desired to gain a foothold in that province, abundant opportunity was afforded by its rash and indiscreet ruler.
Lorraine had long been ruled by the present family of dukes, and in its government more had remained of feudal usages than in the monarchy that had grown up beside it. The character and career of the members of the house of Guise had brought Lorraine into very intimate connection with France, and the closeness of its relations added danger to its position as an independent state.
Charles IV. became Duke of Lorraine in 1624 by virtue of the rights of his cousin and wife, the daughter of the last duke. Charles claimed, however, that by the Salic law he was himself the legal heir, and by the cession of his father's rights he presently assumed to hold the dukedom for himself and not for his wife.
He soon began to take part in the intrigues of the French Court, and he enrolled himself among the lovers of Mme. de Chevreuse and the enemies of Richelieu. It was in his domains that Gaston sought refuge, and there in 1632 he was secretly married to the duke's sister.
Richelieu had long sought occasion for offence against the Duke Charles. The
Duke of Lorraine was bound to do honor to the French king for the Duchy of Bar,
a
duty which was often omitted, and the agents of Richelieu discovered that France
had ancient and valid claims to other parts of his territory. 48 His relations
with France were rendered still more uncertain by his own untrustworthy character.
To tell the truth or to keep his agreement were equally impossible for Duke
Charles, and he was dealing with a man with whom it was dangerous to trifle.
Gustavus Adolphus had invaded Germany, and the Duke of Lorraine was eager in
defending the cause of the Emperor.
In January, 1632, he was forced to make a peace with France, by which he agreed to make no treaty with any other prince or state without the knowledge and permission of the French king. 49
Charles paid no attention to this treaty, and for all these causes in June, 1632, Louis invaded his dominions. 50 They lay open to the French army, and no efficient opposition could be made, On June 26th Charles was forced to sign a second treaty, by which he surrendered the city and county of Clermont, and also yielded the possession for four years of the citadels of Stenai and Jametz. 51 "This invasion and its results," said Richelieu, "teach little princes not to offend great ones if they do not wish to ruin themselves." 52
This treaty made little change in the condition of affairs. Charles continued to act in hostility to the Swedes, to assist Gaston, and in every way to violate the conditions of the treaty he had made. He seemed resolved to complete his own ruin, and he did not have to wait long for its accomplishment.
In 1633 Louis a second time invaded Lorraine, and the Swedes, in return for the duke's hostility to them, also entered the province. Charles' forces were scattered and he was helpless, but he was as false as he was weak. He promised to surrender his sister Margaret, and he allowed her to escape. He sent his brother to make a treaty and then refused to ratify it. At last, he made the most disadvantageous treaty that was possible, and surrendered his capital, Nancy, the most strongly fortified city of Lorraine, into Louis' possession until all difficulties should be settled between the king and the duke, which, as Rich elieu said, might take till eternity. 53
In January, 1634, Charles pursued his eccentric career by granting all his rights in the duchy to his brother, the Cardinal of Lorraine. The new duke also married a cousin in order to unite the rights of the two branches. He was in sacred orders, and a dispensation from the Pope was needed on account of the consanguinity of the parties. He advised with the canons of Saint Remy if, as bishop, he could not himself grant the necessary dispensation. They consulted Sanchez and informed him that he could, in a case of absolute necessity. He replied that he was certainly in that case, and he forthwith granted a dispensation in behalf of the Pope, dispensed with the publication of banns by virtue of his own authority as a bishop, and had the marriage celebrated on the spot. 54
Charles adopted the life of a wandering soldier of fortune which was most to his taste, and commanded the imperial forces at the battle of Nordlingen. He soon assumed again the rights which he had ceded, but his conduct rendered them constantly less valuable. The following years were filled with struggles with France, which resulted in her taking possession of still more of Lorraine, until its duke was entirely a fugitive. Such struggles brought upon its inhabitants a condition of constantly increasing want and misery. The common people were glad to find even herbs to eat. Sickness and need so prevailed that it was said three quarters of the population perished or left their country. It was ravaged by the hordes of the Duke of Weimar and the Swedes, and on every side were pillage and burning and murders. Famine followed, and the horrors perpetrated from it were said to be more than could be described. Richelieu himself wrote that the inhabitants of Lorraine were mostly dead, villages burned, cities deserted, and a century would not entirely restore the country. Vincent de Paul did much of his charitable work in that unhappy province, and it is said that he spent 2,000,000 livres in trying to bring some relief to the misery of the inhabitants. 55
The duke at last, in 1641, came as a suppliant to Richelieu to ask for his duchy, and it was granted him, but on the condition that Stenai, Dun, Jametz, and Clermont should be united to France, that Nancy should remain in the king's possession until the peace, and that the duke should assist France with his troops against all enemies whenever required. 56
He accepted these terms the more readily because he had no thought of abiding by them, and he returned to his dominions. Always popular among his subjects he was greeted by them with eager enthusiasm. He had endeavored to obtain a divorce from his first wife, the Duchess Nicolle. The duchess, he claimed, had been baptized by a priest, that was afterwards condemned for sorcery, and his marriage with her had been by constraint. After a married life of ten years, his conscience could no longer bear this, and he formed an alliance with the Princess of Cantecroix and, in 1637, he married her. The Pope refused to sanction such conduct, and pronounced his anathema on the alliance with the Princess of Cantecroix. Little disturbed by this, the duke took her with him in his triumphal entry through his duchy, and his subjects, wishing to make no decision on this question, are said to have cried: "Long life to our duke and to his two wives." 57
Charles was hardly back in his dominions before he chose to regard the treaty
he had made as of no validity, and in July he violated it openly, and shortly
took refuge with the Spanish army. The life of a wanderer was familiar to him.
He kept with him his army and his mistress and he asked no more. Thereupon the
French again invaded Lorraine, and by October, 164!, practically the whole province
was in their hands. It so continued until 1663, and after a century more of
varied rule it was definitely united to France in 1766.
Footnotes
1. This name is more properly Waldstein, but it is as Wallenstein that he is
best known to history. The name is so written, not only in Schiller's great
drama and pleasing history, but in recent and scholarly German histories such
as Ranke's "Life of Wallenstein." Gindely, however, uses the name
of Waldstein.
2. Richelieu, xxii., 431.
3. See Mercure Frauçois, 1631, 469-472. Dumont, Corp. Dip., vi., 1-2.
4. Richelieu, xxii., 298-305. See Lettres de Richelieu, t. 3 and 4.
5. A translation of this treaty is published in Mercure François, xvi., p. 704. See also Corps Dip., v., pp. 615-618
6. Richelieu's letters of August, 1630, to Father Joseph and M. de Leon say explicitly: "On vous envoye un pouvoir de faire la paix, non limité. Lettres de Richelieu, iii., p. 877. But the letters of instruction are explicit as to the king's purposes with Gustavus. A despatch of September 5th says: "Nous avons une vraye et sincere intention de nous employer avec Suede pour etablir un vray repos en Allemagne; vous en pouvez assurer, et certainement nous n'y manquerons pas." See also Lettres de Richelieu, t. iii., pp. 882 893, 900, 937, etc. The suggestion that Father Joseph agreed to the article about allies, simply to deceive the Emperor, I think is fanciful. His own explanation is found in Affaires Etrangéres, Allemagne, t. vii., p. 451. Their letter of September 20th contained proposed articles such as were agreed to. In the anxiety of the king's illness, no answer was sent them until October 9th, and the treaty was signed on the 13th, before the arrival of the letter, which decidedly disapproved of any such article. A study of all this correspondence shows the superiority of Richelieu's judgment and firmness as a diplomat, even over the skilful diplomats whom he employed.
7. It seems, however, probable that the burning of the city was in large part started by the citizens to prevent Tilly's gaining any advantage from its possession. It was, at all events, one of the results of the capture.
8. The terms of the conditions made with Wallenstein are involved in a great deal of doubt. From the contemporary authorities and the subsequent conduct of the parties, what I have given seem to have been substantially the terms that Wallenstein exacted.
9. The minute prepared by Bouthillier after Gustavus' death, but expressing Richelieu's views, says: "On pouvait dire que S. M. n'y avait peutétre pas beaucoup perdu a la mort du roi de Suede. "--Lettres de Richelieu, vii., 686. Mazarin alludes to the jealousy which the ambition and success of Gustavus caused France.--Let., ii., 871.
10. The articles, translated, are printed in "Mercure François," vol. xix., p. 463. See also Dumont, Corps Dip., vi., 50-54. The treaty was signed April 9, 1633. A full account of these negotiations is found in Lettres de Feuquières, 1633, 1634, and 1635 (Amsterdam, 1753), t. i., ii, and iii. Feuquieres was the French ambassador in those years, and his correspondence details these negotiations very fully, and also those with Wallenstein. From Feuquières' instructions and letters, it appears that France preferred that Oxenstiern and the Electors of Saxony and Brandenburg should be associated in command, but the Swedes utterly refused such an arrangement. All whom Feuquieres met seemed to unite in a contemptuous opinion of the Elector of Saxony. The letters are full of the plans, attributed to Wallenstein, to make himself king of Bohemia.
11. Dumont, Corps Dip., vi, 78, 79.
12. Lettres de Richelieu, t. iv., 35, 174, 175.
13. Lettres de Richelieu, viii., 302.
14. The secret history of this curious intrigue can be gathered from the documents and correspondence collected in Lettres de Richelieu, t. vii., p. 720, et seq.
15. The uncertainty that hangs about the end of Wallenstein's career has never been wholly cleared up, notwithstanding the numerous volumes of his correspondence and negotiations that have been published, and the still more numerous volumes that have been written on the subject. Some still claim that Wallenstein was guilty of no act that could be called treasonable, and that his deposition and overthrow were unjustifiable. However brutal his murder may have been, it seems impossible to reconcile his conduct with faithful service to the Emperor. This is the view taken by such authorities as Ranke and Gindely and by many others, and from such examination as I have given the printed correspondence of Wallenstein, considered in the light of his conduct, it seems evident that the Emperor was justified in removing him from his position, and declaring him guilty of treason.
16. Dumont, Corps Diplomatique, vi., 89-102.
17. Dumont, Corps Dip., vi., 106-108
18. Lettres de Richelieu, iv., 765-763. Gazette, June 18, 1635. This was the last time that war was declared by France in this Gothic fashion.
19. Richelieu, xxii., 237.
20. Epistohe Grotii, 555. Lettres de Richelieu, iv. 424. Dumont, Corps Dip.,
vi., 81-85. The following is the memorandum made by Richelieu in
1633, which I think interesting as showing his plans for the extension of the
French boundaries in this direction: (Projet de Partage) Pour la France, le
Hainault, l'Artois, le Tournesis, l'Isle, Doue et Orchy. La Flandre Gallicane,
qui consiste en Graveline, Dunquerque, Ostende, Nieuport, et le
Namurois, Luxembourg.
"Pour les Estats: le Brabant, Malines, Limbourg, la Frise, Ia Gueldre.
Une partie de Ia Flandre imperiale qui contient depuis la rivière de
l'Escaut jusques en Hollande. Ils pretendront aussy part dans le Namurois et
dans le Luxembourg."
In Lettres de Richelieu, vii., 677-682, are contained further memoranda made
by him on the subject, and curious details as to the mode of accomplishing this
change. Like all great men the cardinal designed more than he could accomplish.
21. Epistolae Grotii, 105, 108.
22. Ibid.
23. Richelieu, xxii., 606, 641.
24. Epistolae Grotii, 167. Richelieu, xxii., 606-616.
25. Richelieu, xxii., 641-642.
26. Dumont, Corps Dip., vi., ii8, 119. Richelieu, xxii., 642. Mémoires de Montglat, ed. Michaud, 29., 38. Much of the detail of this negotiation is found in Lettres et Negotiations de Feuquières, t. iii., and Lettres de Richelieu for 1635, and Gazette for that year passim.
27. Ad Dolam res sperato tardius procedunt, imperitia ut videtur artium obsidendi. Grot. Epis., 250, July, 5636. Grotius' letters are both interesting
28. Mém. de Montresor, 204, 205. Mem. de Retz, 35-40. Montglat, 49, 50. Let. de Campion, 312. The exact date of this seems very uncertain. See Lettres de Richelieu, vii., 760. It was probably during October, 1636.
29. Lettres de Campion, 317-336.
30. Lettres de Richelieu, v., i, et passim.
31. See Mém. de Bussy, i t, 6 et passim, for some account of the disorders among the soldiers.
32. Cited in Lettres de Richelieu, v., 337.
33. Lettres de Richelieu, v., 161
34. Lettres de Richelieu, v., 367-391.
35. Lettres de Richelieu, vi., 723, 724.
36. Lettres de Richelieu, v., 998. On October 22, 1636, he minutes: "On délivre encore 42,000 rations de pain, qui est un abus insupportable, et ii est certain que c'est tout s'il y a des gens pour la moitié " (Lettres v., 635 vii., 268). Gazette, Aug. 16, 1635.
37. Lettres de Richelieu, v., 140, 284, 356, 880. Memoires de Richelieu, xxiii., 98. Lettres de Chavigni cited in Let. de Richelieu, v., 284
38. Lettres de Rich v., 345, Mém. de. Rich., xxiii., 260, and see constant illlustration of this in Mémoires of the time.
39. Lettres de Richelieu, v, 521; Gazette of Aug. 23, 1636
40. Richelieu, xxiii., 173, et. seq.
41. These negotiations are discussed at great length in Richelieu's
letters for 1637-1640. See Lettres de Richelieu, vi., 580, 585-589, etc.; vii.,
806-812~
et passim.
42. See Gazette of 1637; Correspondance de Sourdis, t. i., 476-510; Documents inédits sur l'histoire de France.
43. See his letters for 1638, vol. vi., passim. He wrote the king, Sept. 2d: "Je supplie vostre majeste lorsqu' elle aura nouvelles de la prise de Fontarabie de me les faire scavoir aussy tost" (vi., 135). "La douleur de Fontarabie me tue," he wrote after the siege was raised (vi., 182, letter of Sept. 17, 1638).
44. Correspondance de Sourdis, t. ii., 31, 32.
45. Ibid. ii., 59-78. Lettres de Richelieu, vi., 195-209. The Spanish celebrated this great repulse by comedies played before Philip III. during the winter, representing the rout of the French at Fontarabia. Montglat, xxix., 72. Mém. d' Omer Talon, ed. Michaud, xxx., 64-67.
46. Lettres de Richelieu, vi., 185, 186.
47. Omer Talon, t. xxx., 64-67, ed. Michaud.
48. The proces verbal stating these rights is found in Aff. Etr. Lorraine, vii., 423. See also Richelieu's private memoranda, Documents Inédits Mélanges, iii., 738-742.
49. Manuscrits de Conrart, printed by Haussonville. M. Haussonville, in his interesting and learned work on this subject "La Reunion de la Lorraine a la France," has printed in his appendices all the most important documents on this subject.
50. Richelieu, xxii. Gazette, for 1632.
51. Ibid.
52. Richelieu, xxii., 389.
53. Rich., xxii., 488. Mss. de Conrart, printed by Haussonville. Gazette for 1634-35. Mem. de La Force, t. iii. In Richelieu's letters and memoranda there are very frequent statements of the value of Lorraine to France. If it was not incorporated with that kingdom Richelieu intended that its duke should he entirely subject to France.
54. Haussonville. t. i, p.406. Interrogatoire des chanoines de Saint Remy.
55. Mem. de Beauveau, 75, et seq., and original documents collected by M. de Haussonville.
56. Dumont, Corps Dip., vi., 211-214. Montglat, 103.
57. Mém. de Beauveau.