ON October 24, 1648, the day on which the edict was registered with the Parliament, the treaty was signed which ended the Thirty Years' War. The negotiations resulting in this memorable treaty had extended over twelve years. It was natural that many years should be occupied in the closing of struggles which, with various intermissions, had extended over more than a century.
The growth of the new religion had forced an issue of arms not many years after Luther nailed his theses to the church door in Wittenberg. By the Peace of Passau in 1552, an attempt was made to regulate the controversy between the new arid the old faiths; but Protestantism was still in its fresh and vigorous growth; it was impossible that a fixed line could then be drawn which would limit its territory; impossible that any agreement should be made at that time which would enable creeds, mutually intolerant and struggling for the control of Germany, to dwell together in amity and good-will.
Though the Netherlands were actually no part of Germany, though they were subject to the king of Spain, and not to the Emperor,1 and though their struggle was for political as well as for religious freedom, yet the long war of a people closely related to the Germans in blood, faith, and speech, must be regarded as a part of the conflict which began under Charles V., and ended under Ferdinand III. In 1609 a truce for twelve years had been made between Spain and the Netherlands. It was a truce in form, but only the blindness of Spanish pride could fail to see that the independence of the seven provinces was an accomplished fact. Still that independence was not formally recognized, and the unsettled relations between Spain and the United Provinces increased the dangers which hung over Germany.
When the Duke of Cleves died, leaving his possessions to be contested by various claimants and by different creeds, it seemed as if the spark had been thrown which would start the great conflagration. Had Henry IV. lived, it is possible that his interference would have involved all Germany, but his death and the expedient of the joint occupation of the inheritance of the Duke of Cleves by the Possessory Princes, postponed the day of strife.
In 1618, however, the ill-advised ambition of the Elector Palatine, and the unswerving bigotry of Ferdinand II., had at last blown the embers into a flame. The war was carried on with such success, by the zeal of Ferdinand and the ability of Maximilian of Bavaria, that the whole of the Palatinate was conquered, while in Bohemia and the hereditary dominions of the House of Austria, the reformed creeds were permanently crushed. Dazzled by such success, Ferdinand had issued the edict for the restitution of the territory once belonging to the Catholic Church. 2
At this time Gustavus Adoiphus had entered the field, and in two years of brilliant success had more than undone all that the Imperialists had accomplished. France was the somewhat faltering ally of Gustavus while he was alive, but united herself firmly with Sweden after his death. These two nations, receiving assistance from some of the Protestant German states, but deserted by others, carried on the contest with the Emperor and his allies for sixteen years after Gustavus' death.
In the meantime the war had spread far beyond the limits of Germany, and now waged from the Baltic to the Straits of Gibraltar. At the expiration of the truce in 1621, Spain and Holland had at once renewed their hostilities, begun fifty years before. The endeavor to subjugate the provinces was carried on with the failing ardor of a dying cause, and commercial advantages in the Indies, with some slight accessions of territory in the Netherlands, were the only advantages that either party expected to gain.
But the war between Spain and France, formally declared in 1635, and actually waging for some years before, was far more extended, was carried on with greater vigor, and sustained by larger anticipations. Spain, Portugal, Italy, Franche Comté, the Low Countries, sea and land, were the scenes of active hostilities between the rivals. Their armies contended among the Alps, in the defiles of Savoy and the villages of the Valteline, on the high plains of Lombardy and amid the marshy flats of Mantua. The Bay of Biscay, the lemon groves of Sorrento, the slopes of the Pyrenees descending through Roussillon and Catalonia to the Mediterranean Sea, the hills of the free country luxuriant with the vine, the low lands of Artois, Flanders, and Picardy, blooming with fertility, and swarming with a dense population, were all the scenes of that contest between the two great powers of Western Europe which continued for a quarter of a century, and exhausted the resources of the inheritance of Philip II.
Few wars of which history tells us were productive of more ruin and misery to the countries in which they were waged. France and Spain, though consumed by taxation, and drained of men and money, escaped with less injury. Nor were the worst ravages found in the territories in which they carried on their hostilities, but Germany, the scene of the Thirty Years' War, was laid desolate as few countries have been. It is doubtful whether the Goths under Alaric, or the Huns under Attila, inflicted such injury on the countries over which they spread, as was caused in German lands by German armies.
The art of making war support war, the maintenance of armies by systematic plunder, had never before been carried to so great perfection. Early in the conflict, Mansfeld and Christian of Brunswick had organized and commanded hordes which, as there were no regular funds from which they could be paid, were necessarily supported by pillage. On the example thus set, Wallenstein had improved with the sure touch of genius. Instead of small commands of ten or twenty thousand men, he had raised armies of fifty and a hundred thousand to be supported by similar means, and so large and powerful that neither city nor province could resist them.
The ravages of the war increased the number of the ravagers. When the cottage was in ashes, the cattle slaughtered, the field laid waste, what remained but to seek war as a means of sustenance, and under the banner of Wallenstein, or Bernard of Weimar, to gain a livelihood by the plunder of others? The devastation led not only men, but women and children into the field. Many of the armies were accompanied by a body of camp followers, far more numerous than the men-at-arms. Wives and children, harlots and thieves clung to the skirts of these hordes, whose entry into any district meant its entire ruin.
In these long years of misery, men grew callous to such modes of life. Babes were born,and grew to be men,and had children born to them, who had never known the order, the industry, or the security of peaceful and civilized life; who had never seen a year that might not strip them of all they had; who had no idea of a law that protects, and little conception of a God who preserves his people and gives peace to the land.
The condition of the country became such as we should expect. A generation of pillage left the land ruined; towns entirely blotted out ; the wealth of many districts wasted; their population but a scanty remnant. The population of Wurtemberg is said to have diminished from five hundred thousand to fifty thousand. Many provinces had lost three fourths of their inhabitants. Three fourths of the houses that were standing in i6i8 were in ruins or had been entirely destroyed. Of one village it was said, in 1636, that it had already been plundered twenty-eight times. In a district of Thuringia, out of over seventeen hundred families but six hundred were left; of seventeen hundred houses but three hundred were standing, and of those one half were deserted. Where fourteen hundred oxen had been pastured, there were now only two hundred and forty.
The desire to restore peace to Europe was held, or at least professed, long before it bore any fruit. Hardly had the French declared open war in 1635, when the Pope, Urban VIII., exhorted them to renounce their impious alliance with the Protestants. Though all parties claimed an eager desire for peace, each hoped to gain further advantages by war, and had little desire to abandon the chance of arms. The Catholic princes, however, agreed on a congress to negotiate a treaty, arid, after much debate, Cologne was chosen as the place of meeting. There, in 1636, the Cardinal Ginetti formally repaired as legate of the Pope, and mediator between the Catholic powers. Both Spain and the Empire sent ambassadors to Cologne, and loudly demanded of France to show the sincerity of her professions by doing the same; but unless accompanied by her allies, France would not undertake any negotiations for peace. Neither Holland nor Sweden would accept the Pope's mediation, nor was it offered to them. Only by surrendering the lands of the church, could heretics expect to induce the Holy Father to exert for them his friendly offices.
Very protracted trouble was caused by the question of safe conducts. Spain would grant no safe-conducts to the representatives of the United Provinces, and the Emperor would grant none to representatives from Sweden, and both united in refusing any to the minor Protestant states. The safe-conduct that was offered to the French was little better than none. It assured their representatives of protection so long as they bore themselves modestly, and negotiated in good faith, without questioning the treaty of Prague; but that treaty, made with the Emperor by the unstable and lukewarm Electors of Saxony and Brandenburg, was one which the allied powers would neither acknowledge nor accept. Three years passed, and preliminaries such as these were still languidly discussed.
In 1639, the names of the French plenipotentiaries were at last announced. Mazarin had only that year become a naturalized Frenchman. He was still a young man, and had taken no part in German politics, but the abilities he had shown at Casal and Turin caused Richelieu to regard him as a diplomat of the highest order.. The young Italian was therefore announced as the first plenipotentiary of France at the Congress of Cologne. With him was associated the Count of Avaux, who for many years had conducted the diplomatic relations of France with Sweden, and who joined to an unrivalled familiarity with German and Swedish politics, the highest degree of skill in their treatment. In 1640, houses were rented at Cologne for the ambassadors, and it was known that state equipages, befitting the dignity and pomp of the representatives of France, were making in Paris, but neither the houses nor the carriages were soon to be used.
Preliminary councils were held, to see if the place and terms of meeting could not be agreed upon, and satisfactory safe-conducts granted. Ferdinand held a diet at Ratisbon, and deliberated upon measures for obtaining peace. Most of the members were willing to take any steps to this end, but the influence of the House of Austria embarrassed their endeavors. The diet narrowly escaped the perils of war, while it was considering the terms of peace. The Swedish army, under the command of General Banier, was not far away. Banier combined the virtues of the soldier with weaknesses peculiar to himself. He had achieved an enviable reputation by his military skill, by his care for his soldiers, and by what was much rarer, his care for the unhappy countries through which they marched. He was indifferent to personal gain, and would not allow his troops to become mere plunderers. But to these qualities, which might have befitted a Norse warrior, he added equally primitive vices. His drinking bouts were extraordinary, even at a time and in a country where hard drinking was not uncommon. A French envoy from Richelieu was much delayed in delivering his message, because the Swedish general remained hopelessly drunk for four continuous days. His wife, of the noble house of Erpach, followed him in all his campaigns, and was endeared to the soldiers by her courage and fortitude, and by the skill with which she managed her husband in his flts of drunkenness or rage. Banier had bestowed on her the strongest affection, and, at her death, lamented piteously to his comrades that his joy and his support were gone; yet, while he was taking her remains to the grave, he saw by chance a princess of Baden, for whom so violent a passion was instantly kindled that he could hardly wait three months before marrying her, and he neglected even his military duties in the fervor of his devotion. This general, accompanied by the French under the Marshal Guébriant, a man who possessed Banier's virtues without his vices, suddenly advanced on -Ratisbon. The Emperor, who was preparing for the chase, escaped being made a prisoner by hardly an hour. The allies discharged their cannon against the city, but their situation was perilous, and they were obliged to fall back without capturing either the town or its inmates. 3
Questions of etiquette, as well as of religion, made the Swedes unwilling to
meet with the French in the congress at Cologne. Precedence must be yielded
the latter, as representing a monarchy confessedly of greater dignity, and this
was distasteful to the Swedes, at a time when the right to sit first at the
council, or at the highest table at
the feast, was contended for as tenaciously as the dominion of Pomerania or
Lorraine. It was suggested, therefore, to avoid this embarrassment, that the
council should be held in two cities. The Catholic states would, for the most
part, naturally consult at some place under the direction of the papal envoy,
while the Protestants would discuss elsewhere questions of special interest
to themselves. These deliberations would proceed together, and frequent consultations
would preserve the unity of the entire negotiation. As the Catholic city of
Cologne had been selected for one place of meeting, the Swedes suggested that
the free city of Lubeck should be chosen for the other.
The idea of two places of meeting was little relished by France. It was known that the Emperor was endeavoring to make a separate peace with Sweden, and that the Spainards were trying to obtain a separate treaty from Holland. The most tempting offers of territory were held out to Sweden if she would make her own arrangements apart from France, and except from the fear that once left alone those promises would be evaded, there was no reason to suppose that she would lose the opportunity of an advantageous peace from any romantic devotion to the interests of her allies. France might thus find herself left to contend alone against the Empire and Spain. Such intrigues could be easily carried on, when one set of representatives were discussing by the Rhine, and another were caballing by the Baltic.
To lessen these dangers, the Count of Avaux proposed two cities near together, as, for instance, Münster and Osnabrück, in Westphalia. The places were but thirty miles from each other, and congresses held in the two, though in form separated, would really constitute one body. The preliminary treaties progressed but slowly. By the skill of Avaux, a further treaty had been made between Sweden and France, and the continued union of these powers seemed sure. Richelieu was encouraged by this success, and thinking, perhaps, that the necessities of war would assure the continuance of his own power, he instructed his representatives to delay the completion of any treaty. 4 Spain hoped soon for better success, and Austria hoped for the desertion of some of the allies of France, and they were in no haste.
But, on December 25, 1641, after more than five years of negotiations, a preliminary treaty was signed at Hamburg. It was accomplished by the mediation of Christian of Denmark, who, having been unsuccessful in making war, was now endeavoring to show his skill in making peace. By it, the debated question of safe-conducts was settled. It was agreed that two congresses were to meet, one at Münster, and one at Osnabruck; the French and most of the Catholic princes carrying on their negotiations at Munster, while the Swedes and the Protestant states conferred at Osnabruck. Any power could have a resident in both cities. The two treaties to be made would be regarded as forming but one. Safe-conducts were to be exchanged within two months, and the conferences were to begin on March 25, 1642. 5
But no speedy meeting followed this long-delayed arrangement. Instead of its ratification by Ferdinand, his ambassador at Hamburg was recalled and disgraced, for having been simple enough, Avaux said, to believe that the House of Austria was sincere in pretending to desire peace. Not until late in 1642, after a year of almost unbroken success for the allies, did the Emperor ratify the treaty which had been signed in December, 1641, by his representative.
The king of Denmark was resolved to have no further delay, and he appointed April 28, 1643, for the exchange of safe-conducts, and May 15th for the opening of the conference, On May 14th Louis XIII. died. Richelieu had died some months before, and Mazarin had now the entire control of the foreign relations of the government. It was announced that he would adopt the policy of his predecessor. His private views were probably much the same as those of Richelieu. If a peace could be made with such advantages and increase of territory for France, as would bring glory and popularity to the minister under whom it was accomplished, such a peace he desired. If advantageous terms could not be made, he was willing further to try the fortune of arms, and have the nation feel that a strong hand was still needed at the helm. 6
Mazarin's elevation rendered it impossible that he should act as the representative of France at the congress. The diplomatic services of Avaux had been such that he could not be slighted, though he was not regarded by Mazarin as a trusty friend. He was accordingly chosen as one of the ambassadors, but Abel Servien, Marquis of Sable, was associated with him. With less display than Avaux used in his diplomacy, and with less experience, Servien was quite his equal in ability, and had the advantage of enjoying the confidence of the chief minister.
July, 1643, was now fixed as the time for the congress, but the French ambassadors did not leave Paris until October in that year, and they first went to Holland. 7 There they remained for some months, and obtained from the States-General, after much urging, a renewal of the treaty of 1635, and a promise that no peace or truce should be made with Spain, except by the allies jointly. 8 But their relations continued somewhat strained, and the treaty did not prove such a triumph for France as it was at first thought to be.
An injurious effect was produced also, by the Count of Avaux, whose zeal for the Catholic religion was often embarrassing, arid whose piety was greater than was convenient for a diplomat. In a farewell address to the States, he asked them to grant additional privileges to the Catholics, and to allow them at least to hold religious services in their own houses. 9 This request would not have been unreasonable, if it had not proceeded from one who advocated freedom of worship for Catholics in Amsterdam, and strict repression for Huguenots in Paris, but it was regarded by the Dutch burghers as an impertinent interference with their internal affairs.
An injudicious step was not excused by Mazarin because it sprang from religious zeal. "The States are scandalized," he wrote Avaux, "at the proposition you made them of liberty of conscience for the Catholics. I see that the proposal comes from the great zeal you bear for religion, which is certainly very praiseworthy in itself, but I wish you had been able to foresee these inconveniences. You cannot doubt we have the same passion for religion that you have, as you know the piety of the queen, and that I have a special duty to spend my blood and even my life for the good of the church, where there is opportunity for it, and where prudence counsels it." 10
The representatives of the other powers had for some time been gathering at Münster, and that city and Osnabrück were already crowded with those drawn there as members or observers of the great congress. Thither the French ambassadors at last turned their steps, and they arrived at Munster in March, 1644. Two days later, the Nuncio Chigi also arrived, to begin those labors as mediator, for which the papal representative had so long and so vainly waited at Cologne. A solemn mass, performed by the nuncio, celebrated, after eight years of delay, the formal beginning of the Congress of Westphalia. The mediator, though his choice was approved by Mazarin, and though he was nominally an umpire among the contending parties, soon showed himself a friend of the Austrian house. It could hardly be otherwise. How could the sympathy of a true Catholic fail to be with the Holy Roman Emperor and thc! Catholic king, and against France, who had allied herself with the enemies and despoilers of the church? Venice, on the other hand, offered her mediation not only to the Catholics, but also to Sweden, the States-General, and the other Protestant powers.
Questions of etiquette proved as embarrassing as those relating to the secularized bishoprics. The Count of Avaux was skilled in graduated politeness, and he accompanied Contarini to the foot of the staircase and there he stopped, but Contarini claimed that the dignity of Venice demanded that he should be escorted to his carriage. The home government deemed the friendship of Venice too important to be lost for a question of steps, and after Avaux had reported the matter to Paris, he was instructed to extend to Contarini full diplomatic honors. 11
The various countries were not unequally matched in the abilities of their representatives. The Emperor, indeed, had sent ambassadors of such small personal importance as to indicate that he took little interest in their labors. Fle was represented by the Count of Nassau, a nobleman with more reputation for good manners than for capacity, together with one Dr. Volmar, a man reputed to be deeply versed in the subtleties of civil and international law, and used to courts as well as to universities. Spain sent the Count of Saavedra, a nobleman who combined the national pride with considerable ability, but his colleague, Brun, was his superior in diplomacy, and in this art had few equals. To him were largely due the defection of Holland, and the fact that the Congress dispersed without Spain's yielding to France the terms which the latter seemed in position to demand. From Sweden came the young Baron Oxenstiern, son of the famous chancellor, who still exercised a controlling influence in Swedish politics. Oxenstiern made himself noticeable by his arrogance and by his obstinacy, and by the splendor he maintained, which exceeded even that of his associates. Twelve men-at-arms and a great number of gentlemen, pages, and valets, all richly dressed, accompanied his carriage when he drove out on his visits of ceremony. Trumpets and cymbals loudly sounded to the public ear when his excellency rose, or retired, or seated himself at table. 12
Though with much less state, his colleague, Salvius, a diplomat equal in ability and experience to Avaux, took an active and important part in the negotiations. The representatives of Holland did not arrive until 1646 and they were watched with special interest, as much doubt was felt of their firm adherence to the common cause, and they were believed to incline towards friendship with Spain. 13 A vast number of minor states and princes were also represented, and nearly 150 envoys and ambassadors of different rank and importance took part in the consultations, either at Münster or Osnabrück.
Many of the minor German states at first were not represented. The Emperor claimed the right to make peace or war with foreign powers in behalf of the Empire and all of the states that composed it, and that at all events only the electors had the right to take part in such negotiations. But the French at once issued an open letter to the princes and free cities of the Empire, asking them to send their representatives to the Congress. They were bidden to consider what had been one of the chief objects of the war, the creation of some check to the efforts of the House of Austria to establish its power upon the ruins of German liberty; efforts, the signs of which could be seen in rights abolished, laws violated, magistrates despoiled, and electors and princes put under the ban of the Empire. If they now suffered the Emperor to exercise his illegal claim of making peace or war for them, their liberty was gone. 14
Both the matter and the form of this letter were offensive to the Emperor. It asserted a right in the members of the Empire which, if it had existed, had long been dormant, and it was asserted in language which seemed unnecessarily offensive. 15
It was, however, received with eagerness by the German states, and most of them responded, after more or less delay, by sending ambassadors to Munster or Osnabrück.
The Congress, in the meantime, although now formally assembled, proceeded with the same deliberation with which it had convened. The wording of the powers granted by the different governments to their plenipotentiaries was subjected to a carping criticism. 16 Matters which, if all had been zealous for peace, could have been arranged in a day, occupied the mediators until November. When, at last, these were satisfactorily arranged, the mediators required from all parties a preliminary statement of their demands. Such a request was especially embarrassing to Sweden and France. They were anxious for large territorial acquisitions. Yet, in a war nominally undertaken for the oppressed states of the Empire, and the oppressed members of Protestant creeds, they would be exposed to open scorn if they now admitted that their chief motive had been the lust of conquest and a desire for their neighbors' lands. For the Emperor and the Spanish the task was much easier, and their propositions were promptly given the mediators. They demanded that all parties should abandon their conquests, and peace should be made by the restoration of all things to the condition established by former treaties. 17 Such a proposition was simple and specious, and while all knew that by no possibility would it be accepted, it avoided any expression upon the real questions which were to be decided. It was idle to suppose that France and Sweden would surrender all the advantages of fourteen years of successful war, and this was expected by no one. They, on the other hand, were reluctant to say how much of their gains they were resolved to hold, and they submitted propositions which stated only that they must wait for the deputies from the German states, that they might decide with them what should be demanded for the interests of all. These documents were criticised by the adherents of Ferdinand and Philip as a mere apology for propositions, and proofs of the bad faith of the allies. 18
Further and more definite statements were accordingly demanded by the mediators,
and with this demand the allies felt bound to comply. Avaux and Servien favored
a proposition which would be so magnanimous as to excite the admiration of Europe,
and yet of such a nature that it would surely not be accepted. All the conquests
made during the war were to be surrendered upon the condition that Germany should
be restored to the condition in which it was in i6i8. The allies could thus
claim that they asked for no personal advantage, if only Germany could again
be what it was, before ambition and bigotry had turned it upside down. At the
same time, this magnanimity would be entirely safe. The Emperor and his allies
would never consent that Germany should be restored to its situation before
the window-fall at Prague. 19 To agree to that would take from the Duke of Bavaria
his hard-won electorate, and also the Upper Palatinate, which he had received
in discharge of Austria's debt. It would declare Bohemia again an elective kingdom,
undo what had been accomplished by the persecutions of Ferdinand and the Jesuits,
and restore the hated house of the Palatine to all its former power.
But Mazarin and the Swedes hesitated at so bold legerdemain. 20 The Emperor
might meet it with equal insincerity, and accept the terms offered, and it would
then be difficult to escape gracefully. It was decided, therefore, that a request
should be made for the reasonable satisfaction of the two crowns and their allies,
without specifying what would be deemed reasonable.
There was variance, also, now, and during all these negotiations, between Sweden and France, on the subject of the religious settlement of Germany. It had been from no desire to protect Lutherans and Calvinists from oppression, that France had taken up arms against the Emperor. Though Richelieu had overthrown the Huguenot party more upon political than upon religious grounds, and though he was too great a statesman to alienate a large and valuable portion of the French nation, he was still a strong Catholic. If the overthrow of the Protestant party in Germany had not involved an enormous increase of the power of the Emperor, it would have met with no hindrance from France. Richelieu's successor was a man of less religious belief, but still he was a cardinal of the church, and Anne of Austria was a fervent and bigoted Catholic. Avaux, a chief plenipotentiary, was equally strong in his convictions, and the French constantly attempted the incompatible tasks of obtaining greater independence for the members of the Empire, without allowing greater privileges to the professors of the reformed faiths. It was desired, Brienne wrote the plenipotentiaries, to fortify the Catholic party, if this would not strengthen the House of Austria, and it was with pain that consent was given to the advantages to be secured the Protestants by the treaty. 21 It was in vain that the Swedes reminded the French that their German allies were Protestant allies; that the endeavors begun under Richelieu, and continued for fifteen years, to build up a Catholic party in opposition to the Emperor, had for fifteen years been unsuccessful.
The proposition suggested by the Swedes was that the Protestant religion should be established wherever it had existed before the war in Bohemia, and that Lutherans and Calvinists should be restored to their country and their property, under whatever pretext they had been deprived of them. But the French ambassadors remonstrated with energy that the war in Germany had not been undertaken as a war of religion, and could not be regarded as such, and the Swedes at last consented to ask only that the differences between Evangelical and Catholic parties should be terminated by just and Christian means, so that the grievances that had so long divided them should be forever quieted. 22
On Trinity Sunday, 1645, the propositions of the allies were at last submitted. Separate in form, but, except as to matters of religion, similar in substance, they demanded a perpetual peace, universal amnesty, and the restoration to the princes and the states of the Empire of all their ancient rights and liberties, including the right of suffrage on all questions of war and peace. All things in the Empire were to be restored to the condition in which they were in i6i8, notwithstanding subsequent confiscations or changes. In the future no king of the Romans should be elected during the lifetime of the Emperor, as that was a method of perpetuating the imperial dignity in one family, and excluding from it all other princes. All conquered places or territories were to be surrendered, provided only that due satisfaction was given the two crowns and their allies for the fatigues, losses, and expenses which the war had caused them. 23
These propositions were received by the Imperialists with great disfavor. It was said that they sought to overthrow the constitution of the Roman Empire, to fetter the liberty of the electors which they professed to restore, to annul the peace of Prague, to reestablish the Palatine, to afford impious advantages to the Calvinists, while, by concealing the indemnity they demanded, they left the way open for any requests, however monstrous and unconscionable. "These propositions of Sweden," said Dr. Volmar, "were more insupportable than the icy breezes of their frozen North." 24
A formal response to them was long delayed, and, in the meantime, the questions continued to be decided by the sword, with the advantage chiefly on the side of the allies. The effect of Turenne's check at Marienthal was overcome by Condé's bloody victory at Nordlingen, while in the Low Countries and in Catalonia the French arms were fairly successful.
By the autumn of 1645, the answer of the Emperor was ready. The deputies of the various members of the Empire were called together to consider it ; a recognition of their authority which had long been refused, and which made the enthusiastic declare that on that day German liberty was born again. By this response the dem~tnd for universal amnesty was agreed to, but the condition of Germany was to be restored as it existed in 1641 instead of i6i8. That a king of the Romans should only be elected after the death of the Emperor, was declared to be contrary to the rights of the Empire and to the Golden Bull, while as to the satisfaction to be given to the allies, it was rather the Emperor who might justly insist that restitution was due him, and this his representatives would expect and demand.
Both parties were as far from agreement, after a year and a half spent in counter-propositions, as on the first day that the Pope's nuncio set foot in Cologne. All knew that neither France nor Sweden would make peace without some accession of territory, and that they regarded this as of more importance than any question of religious or local rights. For France to make any such demand was not, however, altogethert easy. From the beginning of the war it had been steadily proclaimed that she had taken up arms for no purpose of selfish aggrandizement, but solely for the protection of the persecuted states of Germany. Mazarin had written to the magistrates of the city of Colmar in 1644, that he wished them to bear testimony, that the king of France would spare neither the blood nor the money of his subjects, in putting the states of the Empire in the condition in which they should be by their constitutions; that this was the sole end which he proposed for his arms, without design or thought of deriving any advantage from so much blood lost and treasure spent, except the safety of his neighbors and allies, and the glory of having saved them from the oppression under which they suffered. 25 But when peace was to be made, it was manifest that the territory to be annexed to France would be a more important question than the safety of her allies.
Sweden had been more consistent. She had, long announced that she must have some possessions in Germany granted to her, but there was much coyness in stating the amount to be demanded. Even the French could obtain no clear statement of how much would be necessary to satisfy their ally. Avaux asked why they made a mystery of that which was in the mouth of all the world. Public report gave Alsace to France, and Pomerania to Sweden. "The voice of the people is the voice of God," replied Salvius, apparently content, but Oxenstiern added: "Why should we not have also the archbishopric of Bremen?" The great province of Pomerania extended over two hundred miles along the Baltic, and with Bremen at the mouth of the Weser on the German Ocean, would have been accessions to Sweden sufficient to make it the greatest maritime power in Northern Europe.
It was not until January, 1646, that the two powers agreed upon the demands they would make. They were sufficiently large to remove any doubts as to whether their interference in German politics had been disinterested. France asked for the whole of Alsace and certain adjacent cities, and also that the Emperor should not interfere with her possession of Lorraine, which had been justly forfeited to her by the repeated treasons of its duke. Sweden demanded Pomerania, Bremen, Verden, and various other bishoprics, or Silesia would be accepted in exchange for part of Pomerania. These formidable requests were received by the Imperialists with much complaint, and were considered with much deliberation.
In the meantime the French embassy at Munster had received a dignified if not an important accession. Avaux and Servien had been jealous and unfriendly from the beginning of the embassy, and their undisguised enmity was a serious inconvenience in the performance of their duties. 26 Relations such as theirs seem to breed dislike, and the ambassadors of many of the powers were equally inharmonious. To allay these bickerings by the presence of an ambassador of higher rank, as well as to gratify a powerful and uneasy subject, the Duke of Longueville was sent to Munster as the chief plenipotentiary of France. He had small experience in such labors, but his rank and wealth would add lustre, and perhaps restore peace, to the French embassy. After a long delay, which was said to be caused by his wife's reluctance to leave Paris, the duke arrived at Munster in 1645. 27 The arrival of so elevated a personage aroused numerous questions of etiquette. Contarini and the electors quarrelled so bitterly as to the order of their carriages at the duke's entry, that the Venetian threatened to abandon his mediation. Chigi avoided the quarrel by inducing Longueville not to make a formal entrance into Munster, but his entry, though made unofficially, none the less surpassed that of the other ambassadors in the magnificence of his followers and equipages. 28
The duke was joined, in the summer of 1646, by Mme. de Longueville, who at
Munster began her political life. She had been unwilling to leave Paris, notwithstanding
the dignity of the position she was to hold. 29 There was no time when Paris,
for the French of rank and social prominence, more entirely contained the best
of what the world had to offer. The taste for the country has always been more
English than French, and it existed less in France two hundred years ago than
now, The brief seasons spe.nt at the chateaux in Normandy or Provence were little
but temporary exiles from the pleasures of the world. The Louvre, the salon
of Madame de Rambouillet, the society of the Hotel of Condé, the gorgeous
fétes of the Palais Cardinal, the persiflage of Voiture, the stirring
dramas of Corneille, Importants plotting conspiracies, stately and decorous
first presidents discussing the privileges of Parliament, ladies of the Court
casting innuendoes at the relations of the pious queen and her favorite cardinal;
in such things was a joyousness of life which could nowhere else be found. For
the loss of such pleasures, the excitements and changes of foreign life and
society no more compensated, than the views from the chateau windows or the
ride through the ancestral forests. The desire for change, for travel, and for
new phases of society, is one of the many products of modern unrest. Madame
de Longueville saw little gain in leaving the polished society of Paris for
a motley assembly of ambassadors, who could talk to her only in Latin, German,
or bad French.
She received such honors on her journey as befitted her rank. Governors, at the head of their garrisons, met her, and offered her the keys of their cities. Turenne reviewed and manceuvred his army of veterans for her amusement. When she entered Munster, she was accompanied by the gentlemen and equerries of Avaux and Servien, by forty pages and valets, gorgeous in silver lace, fifty gentlemen superbly dressed, fifteen Swiss with their velvet caps surmounted by floating plumes, together with a company of soldiers, trumpeters, and valets. Fourteen carriages of the ambassadors, each drawn by'six horses, closed the procession, which was saluted at the public squares by repeated discharges of musketry. 30 Though her attractions made her the centre of society in i\Iünster, the time had not come when Madame de Longueville herself was to take a leading part in making peace or waging war.
Shortly after the Duke of Longueville, the Count of Pegnaranda arrived as first ambassador of the Spanish king. He, it was claimed, owed his brilliant position to the beauty of the young girl he married, but such a cause of favor was not without its trials. His wife was kept at the Court, and the count was long refused permission to return to her.
He was, the French ambassador wrote Mazarin, a crafty and malignant spirit, who covered with apparent sincerity continued dissimulation and trickery. 31 The Count of Trautmansdorff also arrived at Münster, and took the leading part in the negotiations on behalf of the Emperor. After vain endeavors to detach Sweden from her ally, the territorial demands of France were at last considered. The negotiations concerning these were only a long huckstering, the one party gradually offering a little more, and the other asking a little less, like an Eastern vendor of trinkets chaffering with his purchasers. The French showed, however, great firmness in their demands for new territory. If those were satisfied, it was intimated that there would be every disposition to agree on all questions of religion, or as to the regulation of the states of the Empire. Trautmansdorff offered first Lower Alsace; then all of Alsace, to be held as a fief of the Empire; then to be held in absolute sovereignty; then various towns without Brisach; then Brisach dismantled; at last Brisach fortified. Finally, Philipsburg was added to Alsace. Alsace, Brisach, and Philipsburg, the Bavarians said, were worth as much as half a kingdom, but the French were resolved to abandon their demands for a few other places, only upon receiving these great possessions. 32
The news of the cession of Alsace was received with great exultation, for "the Court of France had long sighed for it as for a new promised land." There was some uncertainty in what manner it should be held. It was not wholly distasteful to allow it to remain a fief of the Empire. This would make the king of France, as Landgrave of Alsace, a member of the Empire. His representatives could sit in the imperial diets, and he might hope to be regarded as an eligible candidate for the imperial throne; but it was decided at last to hold the province in absolute sovereignty, and make of it a part of the French kingdom. A pecuniary indemnity was to be paid by France to some of the German nobles, whose rights were affected by this cession. The limits of France had been extended to its most ancient boundaries, the ambassadors wrote to the queen, with much exultation, and little historical accuracy.33 But then, as now, France was identified with the Empire of Charlemagne, which had truly comprised Alsace and the shores of the Rhine, and this has been one of the many historical mistakes which have had a large influence on the desires and wars of nations. 34 The French were successful also in their demand that the affairs of Lorraine should not be considered by this Congress. That province, they said, had been conquered in a most just war, and should be left to settle its own affairs with France, and they insisted that representatives from its duke should not be received at Miinster. He was left to protest against the abandonment of his rights by the Empire.35
When this agreement was reached, in September, 1646, peace seemed near at hand, but two years elapsed before it was attained. The demands of Sweden were as troublesome as those of France, and gave rise to as much bargaining. The Swedes wanted Pomerania, but to grant them this province was to deprive the Elector of Brandenburg of his rights over it. He was willing to receive in exchange for these rights the province of Silesia, which was taken by the strong hand of his descendant a century later. Silesia, however, belonged to the Emperor, and Ferdinand's piety did not prevent his preferring to compensate the elector with church lands; instead of from his own patrimony. If the hereditary estates of the House of Austria were not touched, he cared little for the possessions of St. Peter. 36 The Swedes demanded, also, the bishoprics of Bremen and Verden, and various cities. They insisted that the status of 1618 should be reestablished, and that the Protestants should receive redress for their wrongs, and should have in the future full and secure religious privileges. The fortune of war still favored the Swedes, and inclined them to increase rather than diminish their pretensions, but the French ambassadors, having obtained satisfaction of their own demands, were eager that Sweden should also make terms, and a final peace be signed. 37 Fortune and circumstances might change, and much less favorable terms be secured. Mazarin had learned wisdom from large experience at Roman gambling tables, and he wrote Avaux that it was no little skill to quit the game when a winner, for one made his gain sure. 38
Mazarin was resolved that the alliance with Sweden should not be continued indefinitely for ends which were of no interest to him. The French ambassador~ were instructed to inform those of Sweden without bitteiness, but with firmness, that France was no longer in condition to continue the war in Germany, either for the interests of the Palatine, who might be thankful that he was to receive any thing, or for any unjust advantages to the Protestant party. While they had faithfully resolved to come to no peace unless Sweden had just satisfaction, yet it had been stipulated that the French should defend the Catholic faith, and preserve it in all conquered places in the same condition as it had existed. 39 Moreover, Mazarin wrote in the spring of 1647, France was no longer able to furnish the usual subsidy or to bear the excessive expenses which had thus far been incurred. The great disbursements she had made, the labors, fatigues, and perils of the army in the last campaign and the past winter, had no other purpose than to procure due satisfaction for the crown of Sweden, but the war could not be carried on indefinitely only that her pretensions might be increased. 40
Amid the wrangles over territorial gains, the religious questions, from which the war had arisen, were not wholly forgotten. A large body of representatives from many of the minor German states had little to ask, except whatever advantages could be gained for the religious creeds to which they belonged. The Protestants complained that the rights secured them by the Peace of Augsburg had not been respected. In Catholic states they suffered constant molestation. They were annoyed by unjust decrees, pronounced by courts composed almost wholly of Catholics. The Aulic Council, in which only Catholics sat, assumed to pass on religious as well as on civil cases, and deprived Protestants of their dignities and their domains. The children of ministers were stigmatized as bastards, and were even denied Christian burial. In some Catholic states, Protestants were constrained to abjure their faith, or to leave their homes, with the necessity of selling their property at ruinous sacrifices. Even the new Gregorian calendar, which they were obliged to use, disturbed the order of their religious services. They demanded that courts should be created, composed equally of members of each religion, from which justice might be obtained for those of their faith. To all the evangelical states, to the free cities and the nobles, the right should be given to regulate religion in their territories, and to repair all that had been done contrary to its interests since i6i8. Those bishops or clergy who left Catholicism to embrace the confession of Augsburg, should have the right to preserve their territories and their jurisdictions unaffected by their change of faith.41
Such demands, which involved an equality between the two religions, were little relished by the Catholics either of Germany or of France. That renouncing one's religious creed and profession worked the loss of his dignity and ecclesiastical revenues, they answered, was a principle established in all Catholic states, recognized by the Peace of Augsburg, and regarded by the Imperial Chamber in all its judgments. Frauds and false professions had been resorted to by the Protestants to obtain these prelatures and other dignities; they could not now complain that their conscience was forced, because no tenderness of conscience compelled any renegade ecclesiastic to take with him his broad lands and liberal tithes. Let him leave the lands and wealth that ancient piety had devoted to the true church, and confess himself a Protestant priest, without trying to hold, also, the income and dignity of a Catholic bishop. Instead of complaining that they had been despoiled by unjust judgments, the Protestants had best return to the Catholics all that they had filched from them since the treaty of Passau. Ferdinand's edict of restitution, of which they complained, was intended to terminate the quarrels and disorders which raged in Germany over ecclesiastical lands, and the Emperor's power to issue it could not be denied. If any changes were needed in the administration of justice, it was a matter to be discussed in a German diet, and it should not be used to embarrass the Congress by its manifold difficulties. 42
While the negotiations for peace with the Emperor were dragging over years, still less progress was made towards peace with Spain, and its accomplishment at last became hopeless. Ambassadors from Spain had met at Munster, but they had done little except wrangle over their titles and their protocols. 43 ' The Emperor had been obliged to proceed in the negotiations without his Spanish cousin, but the Spaniards, who were in danger of losing the support of the Empire, had devoted their energies to alienating Holland from France. 44 The negotiations at Munster had been quickened by the victories of 1646, but the Hollanders, who were apprehensive of too great an increase of the power and territory of France, were only strengthened in their desire for peace with Spain. By 1647 it was apparent that they would soon make separate terms.
The loss of such allies seemed to be counterbalanced by the defection of the Duke of Bavaria, the chief supporter of the Emperor and of the Catholic powers. The French had long endeavored to detach Bavaria from the imperial cause, but the duke had been constant to his friends. He was alarmed, at last, for the safety of his own domains, and in 1645 he sent his confessor to Paris to carry on negotiations in his behalf. 45 Mazarin would have been glad to treat with him, but such dealings were sure to be known, and to excite suspicion among the allies of France. The cardinal knew that in duplicity he was not superior to the Duke of Bavaria. 46 The coming of this secret ambassador had been shrouded in mystery, and it had been insisted that it must be carefully concealed from Bavaria's allies, but as the secret had also been disclosed to Austria, the alleged intention to desert the Empire was not free from suspicion. The duke was therefore told that his negotiations must be carried on at Mtinster, and there he reluctantly sent a representative.
After Condé's victory at Nordlingen, his desire for peace became stronger. He was especially obnoxious to the Swedes, for they regarded him as the bitterest enemy of the Protestant party, and a man equally able, wily, and unscrupulous. They were eager to drive him to the wall, but the French were careful not to overthrow the leader of the Catholic party. Avaux wrote Mazarin after the battle of Nordlingen, that while continuing the war against Bavaria exposed the interests of France to a chance of injury from defeat, a victory would cause the duke's ruin, and increase the hardihood of the Protestants and Swedes. 47 But no sooner had Turenne fallen back after this unproductive victory, than the duke eluded all demands of the French, and persevered in his alliance with the Emperor. The next year again saw his territories ravaged by the enemy, and at last, on March 14, 1647, he made a treaty with France and Sweden, by which he was to abandon the support of the Empire, and be freed from the invasions of the allies. 48 The Imperiarists declared that Maximilian's desertion was perfidy and high treason, but the Swedes distrusted his sincerity, and begrudged his immunity from the ravages of the war he had provoked and fostered. 49 Still, it seemed that the loss of so great an ally would compel the Emperor to conclude a peace, but Bavaria soon returned to the cause that was dear to him.
The summer of 1647 was not a fortunate one for the allies. Holland withdrew her cooperation, and though she did not make peace with Spain, she became practically neutral. Encouraged by this, in the autumn of 1647, the old duke, now seventy-four years of age, broke the truce he had so recently made, and his troops again joined those of Austria.
But the end of the long negotiations was approaching. Early in 1648 Holland made its separate peace, but the effect of this was overcome by Condé's victory at Lens, which showed that France, single-handed, was more than a match for Spain. The troubles and dissensions between the regent and the Parliament were beginning, but their extent was not foreseen, and Wrangel and Turenne led the allies into Bavaria, and laid waste that province. 50 Infirm and terrified, the old duke fled from Munich, and saw his capital in peril, and his possessions wasted by fire and sword. The war seemed to be ending where it began. The Swedes invaded Bohemia, and Little Prague was captured by them. Twenty-eight years after the defeat of the Elector Frederick at Weissenberg, and the conquest of Prague by the Catholic army of Ferdinand, the new city was in turn pillaged by the Protestant army of Konigsmarck. Twelve million francs' worth of booty, it was estimated, was stolen or destroyed by a rapacious soldiery. 51 The old city was besieged by the Swedes, and it was said that Charles Louis, the Prince Palatine, would be declared King of Bohemia in its ancient capital, where his father had been crowned almost thirty years before. 52
The effect of such successes was to hasten a conclusion of the treaty, and both the Emperor and the Duke of Bavaria were at last eager for peace. Avaux was not allowed to see the end of the work in which he had taken so active a part. After twenty years of diplomatic service, he was recalled in disgrace, and ordered not to appear at Court. No public reason was assigned for this act, but alleged neglects of duty and his ill-concealed hostility for Mazarin had caused his overthrow. 53 Longueville, soon wearied of every thing, and he had already returned to France, hardly concealing his belief that the cardinal did not wish that any peace should be made. If such had ever been Mazarin's views, they were not his views now. In 1648 he wrote to Servien, to whom the entire negotiation was then entrusted: "It is impossible that at any time I should desire peace more than I always have, but it may well be that the state is in more need of it than heretofore. You know the former, and you can perceive the latter by reflecting on what has occurred in this kingdom during the last few months. * * * The exterior seems fair, but the interior is corrupted, and we shall do ourselves the harm that the enemy has not accomplished." 54 Servien pressed the negotiations with energy and skill. The demands of Sweden were satisfied. France exerted herself to obtain satisfactory compensation for the Elector of Brandenburg, whose successors were to become more dangerous enemies than the House of Austria.
The Protestants demanded 1618 as the date to determine the relative position of their faith and that of the Catholics. The latter desired 1630, when the victories of Ferdinand had obtained for them so great gains. 1624 was at last agreed upon as a compromise. The conflicting claims of Bavaria and the Elector Palatine were satisfied. When terms had been fixed at Osnabruck, where the representatives of the Protestants were assembled, and where negotiations at the last were chiefly carried on, they were submitted to the plenipotentiaries of the Emperor for signature.
Though peace was now decided on, they delayed completion of the great work. Responses from the Imperial Court were waited for, and when they came it was announced that by some accident they were in a cipher to which the ambassadors had not the key. Let them apply to the nuncio of the Pope, said the ambassador of Savoy, to get for them the key of St. Peter. 55
The nuncio was unwilling to confirm the result of his long mediations. Innocent X., indignant at what he deemed the sacrifice of the interests of the church to the ambition and greed of the Protestants, ordered Chigi to enter a solemn protest against the treaty. He himself afterwards declared that the treaties of Munster and Osnabruck, which allowed to heretics the full practice of their heresy, and abandoned to them the lands which had belonged to the true faith, were infinitely prejudicial to the Catholic religion, to the divine worship, to the privileges and immunities of the Apostolic Roman See, and of the churches of the Empire, and were to be forever null, void, and reprobate. 56
The Spanish had made separate terms with Holland, and the endeavor failed to
restore peace between France and Spain as a part of the treaty of Westphalia.
Notwithstanding this, on October 24, 1648, the two treaties of Munster and Osnabruck
were signed by the representatives of the Emperor, of France, Sweden, Bavaria,
Brandenburg, Hesse, and all the German states who had taken part in the negotiations.
57 On October 25th, the streets of those cities were alive with soldiers and
citizens in festival array. Flags floated from every important place. The booming
of cannon, the ringing of the peals of bells in the old German churches, and
the chanting of the Te Deum within, announced that the Peace of Westphalia had
closed twelve years of negotiations and thirty years of war.
By the two treaties, which were regarded as forming but one, it was sought to regulate the political and the religious status of the Empire, as well as the claims, not only of France and Sweden, but of almost every prince, count, and free city, for compensation and redress, or for new acquisitions. France received Alsace with some reservations, and with an acknowledgment that certain parts of it still depended on the Empire. The French rule was there established, and under Louis XIV. the entire province became wholly French. For two centuries Alsace remained a portion of France, extending that kingdom to the coveted line of the Rhine, and becoming as thoroughly French in feeling as Orleans or Dauphiny.
Brisach and Philipsburg were added to the cession of Alsace. The bishoprics of Metz, Toul, and Verdun had been seized by France in 1552. Her full and complete sovereignty over them was now formally recognized.
Sweden received even more valuable accessions. Western Pomerania and the bishoprics
of Bremen and Verden gave her an extensive and valuable territory on the Baltic
and the North Sea. It commanded the mouths of the Oder and the Weser. It was
broken by large and safe harbors, and occupied by many flourishing commercial
cities. With it Sweden seemed in position to become the great maritime power
of Northern Europe. Such she was not to become, but from other causes than unfavorable
position. Unlike France, Sweden held her German possessions as a member of the
Empire, and was entitled to representatives in the German diets.
Brandenburg was liberally compensated for the surrender of its rights over Pomerania,
by what it received from the spoils of the church. It was given the bishoprics
of Halberstädt, Minden, and Camin, and the reversion of the archbishopric
of Magdeburg, and its position was strengthened as the first Protestant power
in Northern Germany. Saxony, Hanover, and the Palatine had all lost in power
or prestige during the war, but the aspiring House of Brandenburg was slowly
developing into the power, which two centuries later would succeed to Austria
as the head of Germany.
Few questions had been more discussed during the thirty years of war than what should be done with the Palatine. By the ill-judged ambition of the Elector Frederick in accepting the crown of Bohemia, the war had first assumed large proportions, and his entire overthrow and the conquest of the Palatinate had been its earliest stage. His electorate and the possessions of which he had been despoiled had been given the Duke of Bavaria, and to them he clung obstinately, while their return had long been demanded by Frederick and by his son, Charles Louis. It was settled by the treaty that the Duke of Bavaria should retain the Electorate and the Upper Palatinate, but for Charles Louis a new and eighth electorate was created, and the Lower Palatinate was restored to him.
In the internal changes of the Empire, the desires of Richelieu were largely
fulfilled, and the hopes of Ferdinand II. were disappointed. Such power was
granted the members of the Empire that it became, not a centralized kingdom,
but an assemblage of independent cities and princes. To the electors, princes,
and states of the Roman Empire, was secured the right to deliberate and vote
on all matters of the Empire, on questions of declaring war, imposing a tax,
providing for soldiers, constructing fortresses, making peace, or forming alliances.
All these matters must be arranged in a free assembly of all the members of
the Empire, and the right was preserved to them of making separate treaties
and alliances with each other or with strangers. Frequent diets were to be held,
in which the free cities were also to have a voice and vote. The abolition of
some of the duties and tolls between these innumerable states afforded some
relief to commerce, which had suffered almost as much from the ill-advised greed
of petty sovereigns as from the plundering armies of Mansfeld and Wallenstein.
As the war had arisen from long-smouldering religious controversies, these were regulated with the most minute detail. January I, 1624, was fixed as the day which should determine the rights and limits of the two religions. What the Catholics possessed then they should be allowed to hold, and what the Protestants held then they might keep in peace. The treaties of Passau and Augsburg were confirmed, but the endeavor was made, by a division of many offices and courts, and by regulations for mutual toleration, to establish the two religions on an equal footing. Calvinists and Lutherans were protected equally with the Catholics. The principle was still recognized, that it was for the prince to choose the faith of the country he governed, a right which belonged, also, to the free nobles and cities, and to all who depended directly upon the Empire. 58
But the exercise of this right was not to be accompanied by endeavors to proselytize the subjects of others, or by unreasonable impositions upon those who adhered to a different creed. Even in those countries where, on January 1, 1624, a Protestant or a Catholic had no right to practise his religion, should any one hereafter adopt the offending faith, he should have at least five years in which to leave, and he should be free from exactions on his property. It was agreed that, in the future, any ecclesiastic abandoning his faith must leave behind him his ecclesiastical revenues and possessions. In other words, what the Protestants had obtained of the lands and wealth of the Catholic Church they could keep, but they should take no more, and the ecclesiastical lands or offices which those of either party had gained from the other since January, 1624, were to be restored to the former faith. With what each religion then had it must rest content.
Restitution was to be made to those who had taken up arms with France or Sweden, except so far as personal property, crops, or buildings, might have been destroyed or taken for the purposes of the war. A gift of five million reichsdalles to the Swedish army to satisfy their greed; a recognition of what had long been a fact, that the Swiss no longer formed part of the Empire; together with a vast number of regulations for individual and local rights of property, jurisdiction, or religion, composed the other provisions of the treaties, which were of such length as to form a moderate-sized book of themselves.
The Peace of Westphalia is a turning-point in modern history. Its importance consisted more, perhaps, in the changes it recognized then in those it made. Like most treaties, it simply accepted a position of things which was due to the results of the war and the condition of public feeling. It marked the end of the religious wars in Europe, but that end had been reached, either by the entire success of one or the other creed, or because each had become too wearied or too indifferent to care for further controversy. In France, the Huguenots had become too weak to excite distrust; Spain was wholly Catholic; the United Provinces were wholly Protestant. In Italy there was no Protestant movement of strength at any time. In Germany the zeal for proselytizing had ceased. Ferdinand II. had been the last of the monarchs who cared to lead crusades for the extirpation of heresy. The first earnestness of the Reformation had abated. It had spread with such rapidity that it bade fair to embrace all of Germany. Then the Jesuits had led a counter-movement, and recovered much that had been lost. Now, both parties were exhausted with their struggles. Each was willing to tolerate, for neither feared any aggressive movement from the other. Freedom of conscience was not enforced by the treaty. Such an idea was equally distasteful to all. In Protestant or Catholic countries, those of the other faith could be required to abandon their creed or their country, but probably the desire to enforce such a right had ceased. The majority were willing to tolerate a minority, which desired peace and not proselytes. This situation was recognized and ratified by the treaty of Westphalia, and it was to remain the permanent condition of Germany. Neither party obtained by the treaty all the advantages that had been hoped. Enormous gains that had been made by the Catholics from 1624 to 1630 had to be surrendered. On the other hand, the Protestants were obliged to submit to the great losses they had suffered before that time. Bohemia was left a Catholic state. Ferdinand's work of conversion in his hereditary dominions was not undone. In the College of Electors, the Catholics had now five electors instead of four, and the Protestants still had only three. If there had ever been hopes of that political and religious anomaly, a Protestant Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, they were now abandoned. As beginning an era of toleration and of religious tranquillity; as the end of a century of relentless warfare over religion, the Peace of Westphalia seemed to usher in an epoch of comparative peace and good-will.
But its effect upon the political life of Germany was far less beneficial.
The establishment of the power and separate rights of a multitude of petty sovereigns,
meant that Germany's opportunity to become a nation was gone. Tyrannical and
selfish as were the ambitions and purposes of Ferdinand II., his political views
were wiser than those of his opponents. Had Ferdinand gained supreme power,
he might, perhaps, have succeeded in extirpating Protestantism in Germany, and
that would have been the greatest evil the land could have, suffered; but, apart
from that danger, if Germany must suffer from despotism it was far better for
her development that she should have one despot than that she should have three
hundred. For Richelieu to check the power of Austria and neutralize the strength
of the Empire, was wise according to his light. For Germany itself this result
was long fatar to its progress. In a country already depopulated by thirty years
of war, a horde of little princes ruling over petty principalities restrained,
and checked, and choked all national growth. For a hundred years Germany could
hardly claim to have a history, either political or intellectual. Nor did any
universal well-being atone for the lack of more stirring achievement. There
was no fowl in the pot ; there was no fresh thought in the brain there was only
a princelet aping Louis XIV., and a peasant starving on half a black loaf. Austria
was perhaps a less dangerous factor in European politics than she might have
become, but this advantage was dearly bought by retarding the growth of the
nation. 59
Footnotes
1. 'The formal separation of the Netherlands from the Empire had not then been acknowledged, but the relation was too faint to be of any practical importance.
2. See p. 151, supra.
3. Richelieu, col. Michaud, xxiii., 125. Bougeant, "Histoire du Traite' de Westphalie." vol. i., 408-414.
4. Despatch of Chavigni to Avaux of March 4, 1642. "On puisse differer le jour des ouvertures des assembles . . . et rejeter sur les Suedois ce retardement," etc.-Lettres de Richelieu, vii., 904.
5. Bougeant, i., 472-481. Corps Dip., vi., 631-633.
6. Grotius wrote in 1643 and 1644 that peace was desired by France, but not by those who ruled it. Epistolae, 718, 720, 975, et passim. The same views are expressed in the despatches of Nani, the Venetian ambassador.
7. Dis. Ven., c., Des. Oct. 10th.
8. Bougeant, i., 563-572. Dumont, Corps Dip., vi., 292-296. Lettres de Mazarin, i., 208, 382, 426, etc.
9. Bougeant, i., 577, 578, contains Avaux's address.
10. Letter of Mazarin to Avaux. Lettres, i., 656, 683, 690, 691. Servien was also reprimanded for this speech, which was regarded as authorized by both ambassadors, but he claimed, and probably with truth, that Avaux had made this appeal from excess of Catholic zeal, without his approval. Lettres de Mazarin, i., 683, 684. Servien's reply is found in Le Barde" De Rebis Gallicis," lib. ii., p. 77. Nég. Sec., ii., 194-196.
11. Despatch of Avaux. Neg. Sec., ii., 5, 25. Dis. Venez., 1644
12. Letter of plenipotentiaries to Brienne, Sep. 10, 1644. Nég. Sec.. ii., 136.
13. Neg. Sec., iii., 13.
14. Bougeant, ii.. 52-54. Nég. Sec., i., 247-250, 597, 606. It is also printed in Gazette for 1644, 354-360. Grotii Epis. Ined., 138.
15. An appeal to the states of the Empire, and especially to the free cities, was strongly favored by Mazarin. The imperial cities" he wrote, are now what is most important in Germany, because they principally have money, lands, and munitions of war." Lettres de Mazarin, i., 619 . Letters of similar effect to those of the ambassadors were sent by Mazarin, himself, to many German cities. Letters, i., 708-712. Nég. Sec., 250-273.
16. Negociations Secretes, i., 144-152, 274-280, etc.
17. Ibid., 318, 321
18. Ibid., i., 303, 309.
19. Nég. Sec., ii., 186.
20. Ibid., et passim.
21. Nég. Sec., t. ii.. 2d part, 229.
22. See Correspondence of Brienne, Avaux, and Servien, 1644-5. Nég. Sec., t. ii., 1st and 2d parts, passim, and especially t. ii., part 2, despatch of Ambassadors, May 13, 1645, 257-261.
23. Bougeant, ii, 269-285 ; Négociations Secretes, 372-374.
24. Negociations Secretes, i., 400-405.
25. Lettres de Mazarin, i., 709, 710.
26. These bickerings are constantly referred to in Mazarin's letters, and their correspondence on their controversies is found in Négociations Secretes, i., 75-109, et passim. See also Dis. Ven., ci., pp. 138, 193, etc.
27. Carnets, i., 114; vi., 54. Nég. Sec., ii., 2d part, 87.
28. Nég. Sec., ii., 87, 90.
29. Carnets, supra.
30. For this see Gazette, 1646, page 690, and Voyage a Munster, July, 1-78
31. Response of Servien to the Memoir of Mazarin of August 21, 1648
32. Neg. Secretes, t. iii., 1-300, 450-456.
33. Lettre des Plenipotentiaries a la Reine, 17 Septembre, 1646. Nég. Sec., t. iii., 300.
34. See Grotii Epistolae, 742, and many references in the correspondence of Richelieu and Mazarin.
35. Neg. Sec., t. ii., 2d part, 109 ; iii, 297, et pas.
36. Despatch of Longueville, Nég. Sec., t. iv., 76, January, 1647.
37. See letters and despatches contained in Neg. Sec., t. iv., for 1647-8. Contarini was written at Mazarin's request: "Che la guerra intrapresa per solo interesse de Stato, non potra per quello de Religione rendersi lunga. Dis. Ven., cv., 26th Sept., 1646.
38. Lettres de Mazarin, ii., 308. See also ii., 292 and 293.
39. Mazarin wrote at the treaty of Ulm: "We must take care that the Duke of Bavaria is not so much enfeebled that he will be of no more importance to his friends than his enemies, and you know how important it is to hold in check the Swedes and the immoderate plans they have in favor of the Protestant religion. "-Lettres, ii., 871.
40. Lettres de Mazarin, ii., 392-400. In a letter of April 20th, vol. ii.,
425, Mazarin speaks of the favorable effect produced upon the Swedes by these
remonstrances, and that they had consented to an arrangement of the affairs
of the Palatine.
41. Bougeant, vol. ii.. 428-434.
42. Bougeant, ii., 435-445.
43. "You should make the King of Poland and the Duke of Bavaria," Mazarin wrote the ambassadors, "detest the obstinacy of the Spaniards, who cannot resolve on peace, and who continue deaf to the voice of heaven, which plainly declares its wish by the ill success it gives their arms. "-Lettres de Mazarin, iii., 110
44. Lettres de Mazarin, ii., 293-298, 835.
45. Lettres de Mazarin, ii., 140, April 7, 1645.
46. "Prencipe molto sagace, poco sincero," the Venetian ambassador says of Bavaria.--Dis. Venez., xcviii., 549.
47. Avaux to Mazarin, August 27, 1645. Mazarin, in a letter of April 26, 1647, Lettres, ii., 889, recapitulates all that France had done for the Duke of Bavaria to secure him his Electorate and the Upper Palatinate.
48. Lettres de Mazarin, ii., 417-421. Dumont, Corps Dip., vi., 377-386.
49. Nég. Sec., iv., 83
50. The French had been reluctant about again attacking the Duke of Bavaria, but the Swedes insisted, and Mazarin did not think after his last perfidy that they need offend their allies to spare him.--Turenne, 417. Let. de Mazarin, iii., 64, 78, 86.
51. Bougeant, iii., 424.
52. Bougeant, iii.. 490.
53. Aff. Etr. All., 98. Letter of Lionne to Servien, Jan. 28, 1648. Let. de Maz., iii., 108.
54. Lettres de Mazarin, iii., 173. Letter of August 14, 1648. He writes further
: "It is a miracle that affairs can proceed with the obstacles we make
ourselves. Credit is gone, our resources destroyed, the public purse closed.
You must see the necessity we have for peace at once, and if the things that
are important and essential are established, we must not in future be so particular.
It is not the enemy that gives me apprehension, but the French themselves."
See Lettres de Mazarin, ii., 440, June 22, 1647. In this letter Mazarin claimed,
with much emphasis, that his desire for peace had been consistent and constant.
On June 8, 1647, vol. ii., 437 438, he presses the Duke of Longueville to continue
in the embassy, but without success. In May, 1648, he tells Servien to make
a peace as soon as possible. Lettres, iii., 123.
55. Bougeant, iii., 488, 489.
56. Bougeant, iii., 631, 632. Vol. xvii., Bullarium. Corps Dip., vi., 463, 464. Mr. Bryce has referred to the importance of this treaty on the Empire in his interesting and valuable " Holy Roman Empire," 344.
57. The treaties of Munster and Osnabruck are found in Corps Dip., vi.. 450-490, and in Bougeant, t. iii., 507-631.
58. See articles as printed in Bougeant, iii., 578-590.
59. 'The authorities from which the negotiations at Munster and Osnabruck can
be traced are numerous. A vast amount of diplomatic correspondence, containing
almost all the despatches and instructions of the French ambassadors down to
1648, and the most of the official proceedings of the Congress, is contained
in four volumes called "Négociations Secretes Touchant la Paix de
Munster et d' Osnabrug." The three volumes of Bougeant, "Histoire
du Traite de Westphalie," are chiefly founded on the despatches of Avaux,
and contain the most important propositions he submitted during the congress.
Lettres de Mazarin, t. i., ii., and iii., contain all his letters on this subject
which are not found in " Negociations Secretes." The despatches of
the Venetian ambassadors, t. c.-cvii., contain much valuable information. These,
with a few unpublished letters and despatches at Paris, furnish the authorities
on which I have relied for the negotiations about this treaty, so far as they
concern the history of France.