Source: German Diplomatic Documents, 1871-1914, selected and translated by E.T.S. Dugdale, Volume III, "The Growing Antagonism, 1898-1910," (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1930), pp. 127-39..
[The principle of recognising that the Powers could claim spheres of interest in China for the development of their trade was mutually admitted by the end of 1897. (Cf. p. 19, also G. & T., I, p. 2.) On April 28th, 1898, Russia and England agreed formally to recognise them, and on September 9th, 1898, the British and German bankers did likewise. (Cf. M. J. Bau, The Open Door Doctrine.) The Powers, and especially the United States, expressed adherence with varying sincerity to the doctrine that trade in the ports within their spheres of interest should be open to all nations--in other words, the Open Door. (Cf. U.S. Foreign Relations, pp. 355, 373; Brandenburg, p. 147 et seq.)
The Yang-tsze Agreement between England and Germany was based on these lines, but its efficacy was destroyed by the German fear of annoying Russia. Count Bulow refused to admit that the principle of Chinese territorial integrity applied to the Russians in Manchuria; where the Russians were concerned he insisted on strict German neutrality. (Cf. Sir Eyre Crowe's Memorandum, G. & T., II, p. 152.)
The Boxer rising against foreign influence and the peril to the foreign Legations at Pekin were practically over by the time that the European contingents under Count Waldersee arrived in China, (Cf. Eckardstein, Ten Years, p. 174) and Count Waldersee's duties as Commander-in-Chief largely consisted in keeping the peace between the component parts of his army. He was anti-British in sympathy, and diplomatic pressure had more than once to be applied to restrain his tendency to allow encroachments on British rights.]
XVI. 20
COUNT HATZFELDT, IN LONDON, TO THE GERMAN FOREIGN OFFICE, June 26th, 1900
Cipher telegram.
Lord Salisbury's telegram of to-day to Berlin, directing the British Embassy to ask for our support in St. Petersburg regarding despatch of 20,000 Japanese troops to China is the result of urgent advice by Sir Frank Lascelles, as the latter informs me. The Ambassador represented to the Prime Minister, who had consulted him, that the distrust he met with in Berlin was greatly to be ascribed to the fact that he did not declare his intentions to Germany openly and frankly.
From St. Petersburg, whither a telegram on the same subject was despatched yesterday evening, no reply has yet been returned, and Salisbury tells me he fears that Count Lamsdorff will not have the courage to take either initiative or responsibility. He seemed to consider it settled that Japan should not send these troops to China until she received a guarantee that Russia would cause her no embarrassment on that account. When I suggested that Japan might perhaps demand another guarantee from England for the event of complications with Russia, the Prime Minister replied that I knew how unwilling England was to promise military support to another Power.
Lord Salisbury had enquired in Washington what they were prepared to do there for the protection of foreigners in China. The answer returned through the American Ambassador [Joseph H. Choate] was rather unsatisfactory, the Prime Minister said, for in Washington they wished to send no more than 300 men.
The report current here that Tientsin has been relieved rests so far only on private British information.
XVI. 21
TSCHIRSCHKY, IN ST. PETERSBURG, TO THE GERMAN FOREIGN OFFICE, June 27th, 1900
Cipher telegram.
I have been able to ascertain that the British Ambassador [Sir Charles Stewart Scott] invited the French Chargé d'Affaires [Count Vauvineux] especially in order to tell him of Lord Salisbury's telegram entrusting Japan with a mandate.
I am following Anglo-French relations on the Chinese crisis with special attention, because I think it not improbable that England is trying here also to draw France to herself by means of a direct understanding on the delimitation of the Yang-tsze territory--as well as other subjects.
XVI. 27
THE EMPEROR WILLIAM, AT BRUNSBUTTELKOOG, TO THE GERMAN FOREIGN OFFICE, July 1st, 1900
Telegram.
Since a regular campaign against Pekin has become necessary the commander of the cruiser squadron is asking for an Infantry division. Please observe from my telegram of a fortnight ago to the Foreign Office that I considered it necessary to order not only mobilisation of the Marines, but also the immediate equipment of an Infantry division. Your Excellency advised strongly against this; it might have been ready to start to-day! I had long been expecting Bendemann's [Commanding the cruiser squadron in the Far East] telegram. It was bound to turn out so.
German Note.
....From Brunsbuttelkoog the Emperor went on the 2nd to Wilhelmshaven, where two telegrams from the Foreign Office met him with the confirmation of the news of the murder of Baron von Ketteler, German Minister at Pekin, of which rumours only had so far been received. Immediately under the impression of this, to which was added the news that the position of the closely besieged Ministers in Peking was well-nigh desperate, the Emperor made to the troops before embarkation the celebrated speech demanding 'exemplary punishment and revenge' for the deep insult suffered by Germany. 'I shall not rest until the German flag along with those of the other Powers waves victoriousiy over that of China and, planted on the walls of Pekin, dictates peace to the Chinese.'
XVI. 201
DERENTHALL, IN BERLIN, TO COUNT VON BULOW, July 27th, 1900
Telegram.
I may allow myself the following commentary on Count Hatzfeldt's message of to-day:
The question which governs everything is the Yang-tsze. Since we cannot count on monopolising it--at least for a long time to come--we should at least aim at preventing England from doing so. In this we are on the side of the other Powers who wish the Yang-tsze to be free for all nations.
The sooner the Russians learn that this is our view, the less inclined they will be to give in about it. Neither is it to be expected that the Americans, in their strongly developed egoism, will admit the Yang-tsze as a British sphere of influence, for it is obvious to assume that if too many non-British goods enter through the 'open door' the British may one day close it.
It is clear that in order to get the Yang-tsze England will concede much to Russia, and not in the Far East alone. For this reason Germany is not interested in this agreement. I think that there can be no better way of suppressing it than to strengthen the Russian side by associating ourselves with it in this and other similar questions, but only case by case.
German Note. XVI. 61
Baron Eckardstein's statement (Ten Years, pp. 173-4) [regarding the appointment of Count Waldersee as Commander-in-Chief at Pekin] is an exaggeration . . . The facts of the case were that first of all, the German Government extended an entirely personal feeler in London through Hatzfeldt, and then, on the strength of a British enquiry on July 21st, gave it out that Germany would accept the command in chief, if it were proposed by England. On August 5th the Emperor William, in a personal telegram to the Tsar, enquired about handing the command to a Russian--a subject already mentioned by Germany on July 25th--and proposed the appointment of Count Waldersee in the event of a Russian refusal. The first mention of Waldersee in the Records is in a telegram from Count Bülow to the Emperor on August 5th. It is out of the question that from the middle of July onwards William II regarded his own choice of Count Waldersee as Commander-in-Chief as an accomplished fact, as stated by Eckardstein . . . [Cf. British and Foreign State Papers, XCIV-V; also G. & T., II, p. 8.]
[The words used by the Emperor in his telegram to the Tsar on the subject of the chief command were as follows: 'The strongest corps only really worth speaking of will be the Russian, German and Japanese. Is it your special wish that a Russian should be commander-in-chief? Or would you eventually wish one of my generals? In the latter case I place Field-Marshal Count Waldersee at your disposal . . .' (XVI. 82.)
The Tsar replied: 'Having thought much about your proposition concerning the question of one commander-in-chief, I am happy to tell you that I fully agree to the nomination of Field-Marshal Count Waldersee to that post. I know him well; he is certainly one of your most able and experienced generals, and his name stands high in the Russian army. With full confidence I place my troops in Petchili under his command.'
The force consisted at that moment of 14,000 men, including 2,000 British, I,500 Americans, 500 Germans. (Cf. Rev. R. Allen, The Siege of the Pekin Legations, p. 235.)]
XVI. 71
COUNT HATZFELDT TO THE GERMAN FOREIGN OFFICE, July 27th, 1900
Cipher telegram.
Lord Salisbury's hesitation in adopting an attitude with regard to the chief command is explained, as I gather from remarks by his private secretary, Mr. Barrington, and similar ones by the Russian Chargé d'Affaires, by his wish that all military operations in the Yang-tsze territory should, with the consent of the Powers, especially of Russia, be reserved for England alone. This was why Lord Salisbury first proposed in St. Petersburg that each Power should act alone and independently in its own sphere of interest and that only the army destined to march on Pekin should be under one command in chief. It is indifferent to him which Power holds this command. If Russia agrees to his proposal of independent action in each Power's sphere of interest and thus recognises the British claim to the Yang-tsze territory, I am informed that the Prime Minister is prepared to accept a Russian or French command for the troops marching on Pekin and to recommend it to the other Powers. If Russia does not accept his proposal, he would under certain circumstances prefer a German commander. He does not claim it for England, since he would wish, under the pretext that the British troops are needed for the protection of southern China, to hold aloof as much as possible from the operations in the north and to leave it to the other Powers to settle the matter.
The Russian Chargé d'Affaires said confidentially that Russia would scarcely consent to the British proposal. Russia would operate more or less independently in Manchuria, whilst England hoped to obtain Russia's consent to her proposals and that Russia would recognise the Yang-tsze as exclusively a British sphere of interest. Russia would never consent to this, for she had no intention of handing the rich Yang-tsze country with its 220 million inhabitants to England alone.
XVI. 208
PRINCE VON RADOLIN, IN ST. PETERSBURG, TO THE IMPERIAL CHANCELLOR, August 2nd, 1900
A conversation with Count Cassini, the Russian Ambassador in Washington, at present on leave here, gave me an opportunity of learning his views on Anglo-American relations. The Count spoke very freely and said that, in spite of England occasionally currying favour with America and of Mr. Hay's predilection for England and his drawing President MacKinley along with him to some extent, there was bound in a short time to be a violent break in the relations between the two countries. A collision of interests could not be averted. England could not look on at America's enormous advance in shipbuilding without anxiety.
In the United States, says Count Cassini, there is, side by side with strongly expressed animosity against Germany on account of her great trade development, --notwithstanding the fact that they have to reckon with io millions of Germans--a definite and unmistakable hatred of England, which is fanned by 15 million Irish. Mr. Hay is playing a very bold game with public feeling when he gives free play to his British sympathies. The enthusiasm with which the Boer delegates were received in the States was a slap in the face for England.
Another and real point in favour of discord would, in the Ambassador's opinion, be England's policy on the Yang-tsze Kiang. In spite of the apparent temporary good feeling between the British and American troops at Tientsin, America would not long stand England's supremacy on the Yang-tsze, the right to which she absolutely opposed. Material American interests on that stream were too large for them to allow them to be controlled by British financial magnates. Count Cassini's views coincide with those of C. Tower, my American colleague here, for as against the contested British monopoly on the Yang-tsze, he regards a virtual Russian domination of Manchuria by means of railways and fortified settlements as entirely right and proper.
[The Prince of Wales, accompanied by Sir Frank Lascelles, visited the Emperor at Wilhelmshöhe on August 2 ist, 1900. The Emperor then proposed that Germany and England should agree to co-operate in maintaining the policy of the 'open door' on the Yang-tsze. (Cf. G. & T., II, p. 7 et seq.; also Eckardstein, Ten Years, p. 176.)]
XVI. 214
COUNT VON BUL0W TO COUNT HATZFELDT, September 1st, 1900
Telegram.
The British Ambassador, who undertook to report to Lord Salisbury His Majesty's words on the Yang-tsze question, has handed in here the following reply:
'The Marquis of Salisbury fears that he has not understood rightly the expressions which the Emperor used in his recent conversation with Sir Frank Lascelles.
'If Count Billow will be kind enough to telegraph to Sir Frank Lascelles or, should he prefer it, to Lord Salisbury the proposals regarding Chinese affairs which His Majesty desires to make, His Lordship will give them of course his most respectful consideration. Lord Salisbury is however not aware that the Emperor had proposed any course of conduct to her Majesty's Government which differs from that now being pursued and which for some time has been pursued by them.'
Lord Salisbury's grudging insouciance may be explained by his personal feeling, or by actual dislike of an agreement which would define, i.e., limit, the claims on the Yang-tsze.
I consider that the proper course now is to use the Prime Minister's general statement, which merely implies that the condition described by His Majesty as desirable is at this moment actually in force, as the starting point for a suggestion somewhat as follows
'The Government of His Majesty the Emperor consider that the unrest and insecurity, which is now making itself felt in China's relations with the Powers and--partly also as a result of this--in those of the Powers with each other, point to the desirability of an agreement between the Powers chiefly concerned in business with China on the principle that freedom of trade on the Yang-tsze is to the permanent joint interest of all, and therefore to be jointly and permanently protected.'
We should make this proposal simultaneously in London, Paris, Washington and
Tokio, but not in St. Petersburg, where they show characteristic indifference
to the Yang-tsze. In England it could be argued that it is merely a matter of
making permanent the existing conditions to which Lord Salisbury alluded with
satisfaction.
Before going further, however, I must ask for your views on the ideas given
above and on the method of carrying them out,--whether our suggestion to England
should be made through you in London or to Sir Frank Lascelles.
German Note. XVI. 218
Mr. Bertie, Assistant Secretary to the Foreign Office, [cf. G. & T., II, p. 11] made certain overtures regarding the railway lines Taku-Tientsin and Tientsin-Pekin, which had fallen into the hands of the Russians, notwithstanding that both lines had been constructed with British money. [The action was authorised by Waldersee, in his quality as Commander-in-Chief.] Mr. Bertie expressed a wish to Count Hatzfeldt that Germany should join with England to seek restitution of these lines, or at least take measures to prevent the Russians from capturing the Tientsin-Pekin line. (Cf. G. & T., II, p. 19.)
XVI. 221
COUNT HATZFELDT TO THE GERMAN FOREIGN OFFICE, September 14th, 1900
Cipher telegram.
I have just spoken to Lord Salisbury on the two points communicated by Mr. Bertie. The Prime Minister replied first that the extent of the proposals communicated to him by Sir Frank Lascelles was not clear to him, because the expression 'open door policy', so often used here, was very vague and capable of various interpretations. Just because of this vagueness he had chosen in his declaration to the Americans a more precise form admitting of no misunderstanding, and he thought we should both do well to choose this or a similar form when drafting the point in question. I replied to Lord Salisbury that we considered that his declaration to the Americans was too general and unsuited to the aims which all the participants must follow-- liberté de trafic on the Yang-tsze. The Minister remarked that this aim was quite in consonance with the policy always followed by England in connection with China, and he hoped therefore that we should be able to come to an agreement if a form could be found acceptable to both parties.
As regards the second portion--a mutual engagement to acquire no territorial advantages in China as a result of the present troubles--I said confidentially that I had laid this point before my Government in order to be able to deny the constantly recurring doubts as to German and British lack of self-seeking in China. Lord Salisbury answered that he had no objection to offer on this point, assuming that a suitable form was agreed upon. He added that such a declaration of altruism was not made easier by Russia's attitude, who had, as he understood, declared that she would take nothing unless forced to do so by other Powers. I thought it best not to discuss this charge.
As the above showed that Lord Salisbury had no objection on principle against the two points, I thought I might tell him that if an understanding about the Yang-tsze was to work properly it must apply to all interested parties and that I should eventually propose to him to invite their adherence. Again Lord Salisbury raised no objection on principle, merely remarking that this would mean France, Japan and Russia. I said only that as far as I knew Russia had shown no interest in how matters were arranged on the Yang-tzse.
Finally, in order to hasten the matter, I suggested to the Prime Minister that if he wished it I should like to submit to him a draft of the points in question to which I would first obtain my Government's consent. He was of course free to suggest modifications and changes in it. Lord Salisbury agreed with this, and I beg Your Excellency to let me have a suitable draft, which I would translate into French for Lord Salisbury.
I do not think it impossible that Lord Salisbury may raise difficulties about the drafting or impose fresh conditions, but my impression is that at present he is inclined to agree in general with the basis outlined by us.
[For the text of the Anglo-German Yang-tzse Agreement, as finally concluded on October 18th, 1900, cf. G. & T, II, p.15. Eckardstein (Ten Years, p. 176) wrote: 'Unfortunately Manchuria was omitted at the express desire of Count Bulow, and consequently, as is generally the case with half-measures in politics, the agreement resulted in the opposite of what was intended.' For the irritation which the Agreement caused in St. Petersburg, see G. & T., II, pp. 16-18.]
XVI. 250
BARON VON ECKARDSTEIN, IN LONDON, TO THE GERMAN FOREIGN OFFICE, October 22nd, 1900
Cipher telegram.
Various Cabinet Ministers, whom I met yesterday at dinner, spoke as follows on the Chinese Agreement:
They were glad that there was a certain amount of Anglo-German co-operation in China, and the Agreement had helped considerably to clear up the situation. Unluckily it was neither comprehensive nor precise enough and left many loop-holes, so thatif the parties chose they could escape from the engagements they had undertaken. They feared that in spite of the treaty Germany would never allow an energetic attitude to be adopted towards Russia, which would utterly frustrate the objects of the Agreement; Russia would then do what she pleased in China. Count Waldersee's attitude in the railway question, which was very soon going to cause a storm in British public opinion, was a proof of this.
I had the greatest trouble in satisfying the Ministers and especially the usually well-disposed Duke of Devonshire, that the British Government could rely on the Imperial Government's goodwill in producing a settlement in consonance with British wishes.
The Under-Secretary told me that Sir Charles Scott had been instructed by telegraph to hand in a very strong note in St. Petersburg on the railway question.
Statements by other Ministers give me the impression that the mistrust of Count Waldersee is greatly increasing, and I should not wonder if Russia has been and will be intriguing strongly in this respect.
Chamberlain was not against it, but his colleagues tell me he shares the opinions of the other Ministers regarding our Agreement and the railway question.
The Russian Ambassador, who was visited by Sir T. Sanderson at Lord Salisbury's desire, informed me that the Under-Secretary had come to him 'pour addoucir le choc'. Indeed the sudden publication of the Agreement had been a shock to him, especially as he had not had the slightest idea that negociations were in progress. He told the Austrian Chargé d'Affaires that his Government would make the best of a bad job. It could in fact hardly do otherwise, having already declared that it has no intention of annexing Manchuria...
[In November, 1900, Lord Salisbury handed the Foreign Office over to the Marquess of Lansdowne.
On December 26th, 1900, the German and Russian authorities agreed to remove the railway from the control of Mr. Kinder and his British staff to that of Count Waldersee in his quality as Commander-in-Chief. The agreement did not ignore the fact that the line had been constructed with British capital and the rights of property which this involved. Nevertheless the greatest suspicions were aroused in England. (Cf. G. & T., II, p. 22.)]
XVI. 273
MUMM VON SCHWARZENSTEIN, IN PEKIN, TO THE GERMAN FOREIGN OFFICE, January 9th, 1901
Cipher telegram.
Your telegram of yesterday received in time to postpone signature--to some annoyance on the Field-Marshal's part--after instructions to sign had at last been received from Kuropatkin.
R. Tower is awaiting instructions from London by return as to whether an objection is to be raised against the Agreement.
The same to the same, January 12th, 1901
Tower reports that last evening a telegram was received from the British Government, consenting to the Russo-German Railway Agreement, on condition that bondholders' rights are expressly recognised by it and the Agreement still more clearly described as being a purely military and provisional measure. Also an assurance is required that the whole line shall be given back to the Railway Company when the troubles are over, including the Shan-hai-kuan--Niuchuang section.
[The Agreement was signed on January 17th.]
XVI. 281
COUNT HATZFELDT, IN LONDON, TO THE GERMAN FOREIGN OFFICE, January 24th, 1901
Cipher telegram.
To-day the Under-Secretary showed me an instruction sent to Sir Frank Lascelles regarding the Russian and Belgian acquisitions at Tientsin and the intentions of France and Japan to enlarge their concessions there. . . . The Ambassador is instructed to sound the Imperial Government as to its intentions in the matter and to suggest a joint démarche by the Powers in the following sense: 'The Powers should arrive at a general agreement neither to recognise the pending agreements amongst themselves nor the validity of any concessions or settlements obtained since the outbreak of the Boxer disturbances and the siege of the Legations'....
XVI 288.
COUNT HATZFELDT TO THE GERMAN FOREIGN OFFICE, February 1st, 1901
Cipher telegram.
For several days I have had to struggle with Lord Lansdowne and other members of the Cabinet in order to remove a certain annoyance with us, (BULOW: 'After our attitude in the Boer War I--refusing to receive Kruger, and His Majesty's visit!') which I think rather serious, about the Russian acquisitions at Tientsin, and I regret to report that I have been so far unsuccessful.
Regarding these they still insist that in spite of all the St.Petersburg Cabinet's assurances to the contrary they are to be taken not as merely a concession, but as a territorial acquisition and contrary therefore to the Anglo-German Agreement. Russia, they say, who has hardly any trade in Pechili, has by private negociation with Li-Hung-Chang secured a concession nearly three miles long between the Pei-ho River and the railway, considerably larger than all the foreign settlements at Tientsin put together. There is no doubt that however innocent Russia professes to be now it is her intention (BULOW: ' There is no proof of it yet.') to use this territorial gain to bring the land and sea connections between Pekin and the sea under her control. Fortifications will very soon arise in this new concession, (BULOW: '!') and in a very short time Russia will attain to such a predominant position in Pechili, that it will hardly be worth while for other Powers to claim any influence in this province or in Pekin.(BULOW: '!')
The British Government regret that the Imperial Government did not at once join with London, as provided in Art. III of the Anglo-German Agreement, to discuss the nature of the Russian acquisitions, but got into touch instead with St. Petersburg by itself, without consulting the London Cabinet at all. (BULOW: (!) The British Cabinet, which has quite enough difficulties already with its own public opinion in passing over in silence the Russian action in Manchuria, will, directly Parliament meets, have to expect very sharp attacks regarding the Russian acquisitions at Tientsin in its relation to the Anglo-German Agreement.
I shall continue my efforts to remove the annoyance which has arisen in the British Cabinet and shall report progress to Your Excellency. (BULOW: 'It is all a (rather clumsy) attempt to embroil us with Russia without getting England into trouble.')
XVI. 300
SIR FRANK LASCELLES TO THE GERMAN FOREIGN OFFICE, March 17th, 1901
A telegram dated March 15th has been received from Sir E. Satow, reporting that on a piece of land near Tientsin, which is claimed as the property of the Chinese Northern Railway and where the British Military authorities were constructing a siding, sentries have been placed by the Russian Military authorities, in order to prevent the British from proceeding with the work. The piece of land in question forms part of a district recently appropriated as a concession by the Russians. Instructions have been issued to the General Officer Commanding to the effect that Count Waldersee as Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Forces in Chi-li, is the authority who can most conveniently settle the question of the right of the British and Russian troops to the occupation of certain points. General Gaselee has accordingly been directed to ask His Excellency to settle the immediate difference which has arisen in Tientsin between the British and Russian Mifitary authorities, but to reserve for future examination the question of the validity of the concession as a whole or of proprietory rights within it.
The British Commander has been instructed that in the meanwhile he should not
use force except to repel aggression, nor should he eject the Russian sentries.
Sir Frank Lascelles has been instructed by Lord Lansdowne to urge that immediate
instructions to act in the sense proposed may be issued to Count Waldersee.
XVI. 301
COUNT VON BULOW TO THE EMPEROR WILLIAM, March 19th, 1901
I have the honour humbly to report to Your Majesty as follows:
Sir Frank Lascelles has reported that the Commander of the British troops in Chi-li has been instructed to apply to Count Waldersee in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief to settle the recent dispute that has arisen between the British and Russian troops about the military right to occupy certain points at Tientsin, and that legal question regarding the status of the Russian concession at Tientsin and the rights of private ownership inside the concession are to remain over for further examination by other methods.
The British Government asks that Your Majesty's General-Field-Marshal shall be at once instructed from here to undertake the required decision.
I humbly consider that this British application in its present form be sharply rejected. The British cannot urge without reason given that it is a purely military task, part and parcel of the attributes and duties of a Commander-in-Chief, to provide for maintaining peace and order between the contingents under him and to stop or allay open hostilities, which are incompatible with military discipline. (The EMPEROR: 'So far the contingents have bothered very little about Waldersee. If we fulfil this wish of England's, England must favour us in the matter of indemnities!') If we simply reject the British application, there is a risk that the British Government may treat it as an announcement that we regard our command, at least over the British and Russians, as having expired.
For the rest, England now merely asks for the application of the principle followed by Count Waldersee in settling the question of military possession of the railway lines from Pekin to Tientsin and from Tientsin to Shan-hai-kuan.
I therefore beg to propose to Your Majesty to send to Field-Marshal Count Waldersee the telegram of which I enclose a draft.
[For Count Bülow's announcement in the Reichstag that the Anglo-German Agreement did not include Manchuria, since Germany possessed no interests there, see G. & T., II, p. 26. The German Government did offer its good offices in St. Petersburg, as the following telegram shows.]
XVI. 303
COUNT HATZFELDT TO THE GERMAN FOREIGN OFFICE, March 20th, 1901
Lord Lansdowne showed much pleasure at my communication. He requested me to convey to Your Excellency his heart-jest thanks for the efforts of His Majesty's Government in the interests of a peaceful settlement of the Tientsin incident and promised to treat as strictly confidential the step taken by the Imperial Government in St. Petersburg.
I have a decided impression that this communication will greatly stem the mistrust of German policy which has been again disseminated systematically here from various quarters.