Source: German Diplomatic Documents, 1871-1914, selected and translated by E.T.S. Dugdale, Volume III, "The Growing Antagonism, 1898-1910," (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1930), pp. 27-41.
German Note.
On June 6th Count von Tattenbach telegraphed from Lisbon that Luiz de Soveral, the Portuguese Minister in London, had been sent to England with instructions to obtain money by mortgaging the revenues of Mozambique, Angola, and other Portuguese colonies.
The German Government at once decided to bring pressure so as to be admitted as joint lender to Portugal, and introduced a condition that no other country should be permitted to offer a loan.
The motives prompting England and Germany in so doing were opposed to each other. The German Government pressed for a speedy conclusion of an agreement forcing a loan secured on Portugal's colonies in the thinly disguised hope of being certainly able to foreclose on the share of them which was to fall to Germany. The British Government, on the other hand, was genuinely anxious for Portugal's finances to recover to the extent of removing all danger of her losing her African possessions. The length of time occupied by the Anglo-German negotiations, and possibly also the fact that measures were in progress for the relief of Portugal's finances contributed towards their recovery. In July, 1899, Count Tattenbach admitted 'that a marked improvement had lately taken place', and 'that a loan under the Anglo-German Agreement was now out of the question'.
XIV. 259
BERNHARD VON BULOW, IN BERLIN, TO COUNT HATZFELDT, June 8th, 1898
Very confidential.
In your report of June 3rd you mentioned that--if it was of moment to us to receive concessions from England on the Colonial side--you would be able to indicate the points which can in your opinion be discussed in London with hopes of success.
I beg you to furnish me with a report on the subject.
The colonial party here has very confidentially expressed certain desires in that direction, which are given in detail in the enclosure. I beg you to pay special attention in your report to the desiderata described in it.
Just now especially we must watch the development suffered as a consequence of the financial situation in Portugal 1 by the Portuguese colonial question, upon which the enclosed copy of a telegram from Lisbon will give you further information.
You will see from His Majesty's marginal notes to your report of June 3rd that His Majesty holds that our objects for compensation against British territorial expansion in Africa do not themselves lie necessarily in Africa. (The EMPEROR: 'Agreed.')
Enclosure.
In West Africa:
1. A naval station in the Canaries or Cape Verde islands;
2. Fernando Po;
3. The Volta down to its mouth as the frontier between Togoland and the Gold Coast Colony;
4. Angola, including the southern part of Mossamedes and Benguella;
5. Walfisch Bay.In East Africa:
1. Zanzibar with Pemba;
2. The Zambezi and Shire as southern frontier of German East Africa.
In Asia:
1. Portuguese Timor;
2. The Sulu Archipelago;
3. At least one of the Philippine Islands (Mindanao).In the Pacific:
1. The Caroline Islands;
2. The Samoan Islands.
XIV. 261
COUNT HATZFELDT TO THE GERMAN FOREIGN OFFICE, June 14th, 1898
Cipher telegram.
I wrote down Lord Salisbury's reply to my communication of to-day in French, in order to avoid any misunderstanding, and it was admitted by him to be correct. it is as follows:
'Lord Salisbury m'a répondu que M. Soveral est revenu de Lisbonne pour chercher des ressources et lui en a parlé en exprimant le désir de faire un emprunt. Lord Salisbury ignore (The EMPEROR: '!') les conditions que le Portugal offrirait et ii a engage M. Soveral a s'entretenir a ce sujet avec Mr. Chamberlain." (The EMPEROR: 'It is always the same game. He wants to be taken by surprise by Chamberlain. He knows perfectly well what is demanded. Salisbury, and not Chamberlain, must decide this question, for it is a political one.')...
At the start of our conversation the Prime Minister once again declared that England was not only bound by old treaties, to which Lisbon was now appealing, to guarantee Portugal in her possessions, (The EMPEROR: 'That will hardly have been done in a Portuguese sense!') but is also greatly interested in preventing a collapse there. But he had declared to M. Soveral that the Chancellor of the Exchequer (Sir Michael Hicks-Beach) would hardly be ready to meet his wishes without quite substantial money guarantees, and had begged him to discuss the details of his proposals with Chamberlain. He added that this discussion was probably taking place to-day.
When I explained in friendly but emphatic terms that one-sided action in the matter here, involving actual or contemplated passing of Portugal's sovereign rights in those colonies into British hands, would make a very bad impression with us and also would not tend to produce the improvement in our relations which we both desired, and that the question was a political one, which he, Salisbury, and not Chamberlain, would have to decide (The EMPEROR: ' Very true') the Prime Minister answered that he continued to wish for the best relations with us, which was why he wished to tell me quite frankly and in good time everything that was done in the matter. But he could not, as I required of him, admit in principle that the British Government would not be justified in assisting the Portuguese Government financially without our previous consent. (The EMPEROR: It is the method and the form that matter! Those interest us greatly!')
During our conversation Lord Salisbury said that there was no interest here in Angola, but only in the Portuguese colonies in East Africa. He also indicated very confidentially that Chamberlain's desire to conclude a financial bargain with Portugal must be ascribed to the fear that we were intending to take Possession of Delagoa Bay. (The EMPEROR: '!')
My impression from Lord Salisbury's whole attitude to-day is that he is leaving this affair also for Mr. Chamberlain and Wishes to avoid getting in his way. He made me the curious proposal that I should myself talk to Chamberlain. (The EMPEROR: '!') and agree with him direct, but he withdrew this later on. His observations made it clear that a mortgage on the Portuguese revenue from these colonies is in the wind
I believe that Lord Salisbury will keep his word and inform me of any formal agreement negotiated here, but am not at all sure whether be will not merely communicate to me a decision taken here after its completion, (The EMPEROR: 'Yes') without making the carrying of it into effect dependent on our previous consent. (The EMPEROR: 'I decline anything of the sort! and it would be unloyal and contrary to the agreements.--This report and especially the last sentence, is evidence of the false and unreliable game Lord Salisbury is playing against us; this is not the way to lure us into an alliance! Dieu nous en garde!')
XIV. 266
BERNHARD VON BULOW, IN BERLIN, TO COUNT HATZFELDT, June 17th, 1898
Telegram.
The French Ambassador informed me that he had heard very confidentially from Paris that 'suspicious negociations' were in progress between England and Portugal. Apparently England was promising financial assistance and protection against dangers at home and abroad in the event of a mortgage on Delagoa Bay.
I answered the Ambassador in a deprecating tone, for I still at present hope that we shall attain more by negociation with England than by combining our South African interests with those of France.
Possibly, however, in the knowledge that France is looking for someone to help her against England, the British statesmen will be more accommodating towards such considerable claims as ours.
[The foregoing and following documents are an illustration of 'the peculiarity of diplomatic communication', which 'is that it avails itself regularly of two separate lines'.]
XIV.266
BERNHARD VON BULOW TO COUNT MUNSTER, IN PARIS, June 18th, 1898
Telegram.
The Portuguese Minister in London, M. de Soveral, started for London on the 3rd with instructions from his Government to obtain money by mortgaging the revenue from Portuguese possessions in Africa, his country's rights of sovereignty being included in the mortgage. From a confidential enquiry made to me yesterday by the French Ambassador, it is clear that the French Government has already heard of these plans and is strongly disquieted. If that Anglo-Portuguese agreement came into being, it would in fact cause a complete revolution to the disadvantage of the Powers with interests in Africa, or whose nationals are creditors of Portugal. In both these respects Germany and France possess an identical interest whether in preventing or having a say in such an alteration of the Portuguese status quo both in politics and business. If France is clearly still hypnotised by the trouée des Vosges and has in consequence no eye free for observing the questions of the moment, the Russian alliance will scarcely be able to prevent England from expanding everywhere outside Europe without considering French interests.
In the above event diplomatic co-operation between Germany and France would not be against England direct, but against Portugal, whose intention to mortgage the permanent sources of revenue of her colonies will quite considerably reduce the permanent sources of her own revenue, with no guarantee that the money obtained by the mortgage will be properly applied. Therefore it will have to be put to the Portuguese Government that the German and French Governments, whose nationals unfortunately have extensive interests in Portugal, are constrained to raise the question by what means of pressure, commercial or otherwise, it might be possible to introduce international control of the Portuguese finances.
Our gracious Master, the Emperor, commands you to speak to M. Hanotaux emphatically in this sense. The main object of the conversation should, I think, be to ascertain clearly whether all practical co-operation between Germany and France in all individual questions, whatever they may be, is out of the question as a principle, as it was at the time of the Jameson Raid. I need not tell you that the clearing up of this point will be of wide importance in the future shaping of our foreign policy.
German Note.
On June 14th, 1898, Méline's Ministry, in which Hanotaux was Foreign Minister, resigned and was succeeded by Brisson, with Delcassé as Foreign Minister ... On June 30th Münster reported to Berlin: 'I fear that the new Foreign Minister Delcassé will earn our distrust. He has written much about politics and been very busy behind the scenes as an amateur. He has all along tried to work for the Russian alliance.' The German Foreign Office soon came to the conclusion that under the new Brisson-Delcassé Ministry there was no hope of practical co-operation between France and Germany.
[The German Government was anxious to exclude France from participation in the loan to Portugal and from any benefits supposing Portugal were forced to renounce some of her territory. Lord Salisbury was very unwilling to agree that any loss of territory at all was involved in the question of a loan.]
XIV. 272
BERNHARD VON BULOW, IN BERLIN, TO COUNT HATZFELDT, June 22nd, 1898
Telegram. Extract.
For us as well as for England, in this matter as in all colonial matters in general, it is an affair not so much of provable rights, but of interests and the power available for establishing these interests, if need be. England is stronger on the water than we are. In so far as they have believed there is no need to consider Germany, British Governments have acted in the consciousness of their own maritime strength, and also in the belief that Germany will get no support from other sea Powers, for Russia favours the shifting of the British centre of gravity to South Africa, whilst for known reasons French public opinion would be disinclined for joining with Germany, as was shown at the time of the Jameson Raid.
But no proof is needed to show that the attitude of Russia and France would change at once if Germany proposed setting in order all African questions, including that of Egypt. You know quite well from your former conversations with Baron de Courcel that this statesman keenly desires to reach a general settlement of all African questions. It is equally well known that Russia considers driving the British away from the neighbourhood of the Suez Canal to be one of her most important political tasks. Austria and Italy would do little to prevent such a general settlement. Austria does not worry about Africa, and Italy could be bought off.
On Germany alone depend the measures for a general settlement in Africa, and up to now Germany alone has prevented it. And British policy banks on Germany's being inclined to consider a strong British Empire as a useful, if not indispensable element for constitutional stability in Europe and the world, and on her having hitherto formed her Egyptian policy on this basis. We saw England go into Egypt without envy and helped her to establish herself there. Since Germany is not in a position to render political services gratis, we expect a corresponding return, as the natural outcome of our action in cases where we have rendered important assistance. (The EMPEROR: 'Yes') If England, seeing that she is once again getting ready to seize silently a considerable portion of the African continent, is really disregarding the German claim for reciprocity, damage is involved, not only to German interests, but also to the prestige of the Government of His Majesty the German Emperor both at home and abroad; and against this Germany would be forced to react with energy.
Therefore England will certainly get cheaper out of this by first agreeing with Germany regarding her schemes for expansion in Africa. On our side we must now decide whether such an understanding with England is or is not possible, for Portugal's financial necessities are so great that the foreign loan, which was used the day before yesterday, will sooner or later have to be accepted subject to territorial guarantees. After our recent experiences, however, we could not justify sitting still up to the moment when England presents us with a fait accompli.
I have therefore, with the approval of His Majesty, our gracious Master, to instruct you to enquire of Lord Salisbury how he views the future partition of the Portuguese colonies between England and Germany and whether he is ready to include a binding agreement on this question now. Germany will take account of the facts that England already possesses interests of long standing in Africa, that she is the stronger sea Power, and finally that any opposition to British policy by means of a freshly constructed continental combination would present fewer difficulties at the present than dangers for the future, and therefore ought--as we need not conceal from the British Prime Minister--to be avoided by us, on the condition that he himself does not, by the immoderation and inconsiderateness (The EMPEROR: 'and falseness') of his attitude drive us in this direction.
[Here follow proposals in detail regarding the partitioning of the Portuguese colonies.]
Finally there is your question whether we should consent to an Anglo-Portuguese loan and should be satisfied with concluding a binding agreement with England, whereby England definitely recognises our claim to certain portions of the Portuguese colonies, supposing Portugal loses them or gives them up. An agreement of this kind would certainly be better than none at all but it would not offer the same security as an arrangement allowing us to share to a considerable amount in the loan to be granted to Portugal and to receive direct from Portugal certain territorial guarantees, which would have to be defined exactly and kept separate from those offered to England. The only correct means of obtaining the money needed for this purpose would be for the German Empire to guarantee it to the capitalists; but I have no doubt that in view of the important national interests involved, the Reichstag will later on grant the necessary guarantee. Up to the moment of concluding the treaty, the negociations would have to proceed secretly between Germany and England on the one side, and Portugal on the other. So long as England and Germany enjoy the prospect of agreeing together, both will do best to leave France out of it. (The EMPEROR: 'if the Francophil Salisbury is loyal enough to keep silence') France is clearly pursuing her own territorial aims in South Africa. This is shown by the great anxiety felt by French diplomacy over the Anglo-Portuguese agreement, and even more clearly by M. Rouvier's dislike of the idea of international financial control, which would at one stroke put an end to Portugal's financial stress and be the only practical method of relieving her from the necessity of selling or mortgaging her colonies. I cannot imagine that the British Prime Minister would welcome the formation of a French colonial empire opposite to Madagascar, and can therefore only repeat my conviction that England would do best through a private agreement with Germany. (The EMPEROR: 'Yes')
XIV. 278
COUNT HATZFELDT TO THE GERMAN FOREIGN OFFICE, June 24th, 1898
Extract.
I said to Lord Salisbury that under the existing circumstances I knew of no
other way of safeguarding our interests than to join in the loan, or to obtain
a binding assurance from England that if a certain eventuality, by no means
unwelcome to us, arose, she would adjudicate to us certain portions of the Portuguese
colonies.
Lord Salisbury replied that England's participation in the Greek loan (December,
1897) had caused such unpleasantnesses, that no one here would hear of another
such joint loan. He did not mean to say that we had not just as much right as
England to grant a loan to Portugal. I replied that if I understood him aright,
this was bringing us back to the idea of a parallel loan,' which, at our last
meeting, had seemed unwelcome to him. My personal impression was that our interests
could be secured by this means, assuming that the guarantees offered by Portugal
(Customs) referred to the objects we should have to claim, supposing Portugal
eventually gave up her colonies. With this in view an understanding between
ourselves and England about the eventual partition would have to come first.
Lord Salisbury did not deny this, although he did not definitely agree with
it. (The EMPEROR: 'He wants it all for himself')...
COUNT VON TATTENBACH, AT LISBON, TO THE GERMAN FOREIGN OFFICE, June 30th, 1898
Cipher telegram.
The King, who received me to-day, formally and emphatically repeated his promise to conduct no negociations with other Powers without informing us.
He considers the only possible solution of the financial question to be a loan based on territorial guarantees. He realises completely that Germany wishes to share in this and regards this participation as a guarantee for Portugal.
The King desired me to express his thanks for the communicatiob.
XIV. 281
COUNT HATZFELDT TO THE GERMAN FOREIGN OFFICE, July 6th, 1898
Cipher telegram.
In our conversation to-day Lord Salisbury himself began again upon the Portuguese
question and assured me that he was by no means refusing to come to an understanding
with us on it. His only fear was that the situation in the Iberian Peninsula
was at the moment too uncertain to pursue a definite plan on this basis just
now. Whilst he considered it advisable to await developments in the peninsula
for a while, it did not mean that he was rejecting the understanding with us.
He then asked whether we should be inclined eventually to give up our exterritorial
rights at Zanzibar and added that we might be able to agree concerning Angola
as well as Mozambique, where he considered it natural in us to desire eventually
to possess the northern part.
Report follows by messenger.
XIV. 282
COUNT HATZFELDT TO THE CHANCELLOR, PRINCE VON HOHENLOHE, July 6th, 1898
Extract
I told Lord Salisbury . . . that I had never concealed from him that the policy pursued by Sir Philip Currie in Constantinople has aroused the greatest suspicions throughout Europe as to England's intentions...
In reply to my remark about England's policy in the East Lord Salisbury as usual tried to show that the suspicions aroused by it were entirely groundless. But he must admit that Sir Philip Currie's continuously unfriendly attitude had twice obliged the Porte to ask for the recall of theBritish Ambassador, and added of himself that British policy had aroused very deep mistrust of England's intentions in the East, even in Austria, where a more friendly judgment might have been expected. Lord Salisbury then tried to attribute the ill-feeling between England and Germany to our having favoured the Boers (The EMPEROR: '!') and especially to our unfriendly attitude at Zanzibar, where we protected the pretender, who was hostile to England, and gave him an asylum in German territory. I did not fail to reply, representing very fitly that it was hard for German public opinion to forget the amazing personal attacks and insults which had been so often directed against His Majesty in the Press here and in public speeches and on public occasions. (The EMPEROR: 'Good')
XIV. 300
COUNT HATZFELDT TO THE GERMAN FOREIGN OFFICE, July 20th, 1898
Cipher telegram. Extract.
Finally, referring to the mouths of the Congo, Lord Salisbury remarked that he had only contemplated handing them to King Leopold because he thought he ought to reassure us regarding any possible British intentions at the mouth of the Congo or any special advantages that England might derive from acquiring it. He had never thought of claiming any return concession from King Leopold. Regarding the connecting strip he reminded me that an attempt to get a concession from King Leopold had been made in Lord Rosebery's time [May, 1894], in direct opposition to a memorandum which he had himself left behind him in the Records, when he retired from office; he had given his opinion that such an attempt was out of the question.
XIV. 316
COUNT HATZFELDT TO THE GERMAN FOREIGN OFFICE, August 8th, 1898
Extract.
As our conversation proceeded, I realised that the Prime Minister wishes at all costs not to appear at Lisbon in the light of an expectant heir, dividing the Portuguese heritage in advance with another; therefore he wishes to limit the published agreement with us to the loan, and to include in an agreement--to be kept secret--all points relating to the future transference of these colonies or their customs administration to England and Germany. . . . Under present circumstances, it is not impossible that France will make an attempt--very unwelcome here--to do a deal with Spain, similar to our intended one with Portugal, regarding Ceuta and the Moorish coast. With this in view we must avoid letting France know of our partition agreement, so enabling her to appeal to it as a precedent.
Although the delay caused by handing over further negociations to Mr. Balfour is undesirable, yet I think we must consent to it. The last time he represented Lord Salisbury, Mr. Balfour was honest and forthcoming towards us; when we come to discuss the matter with him it will probably be soon evident whether a quicker conclusion is to be expected in this way. Lord Salisbury says that Mr. Balfour will probably start discussing the matter by next Wednesday.
[On August i ith Count Hatzfeldt handed Mr. Balfour a memorandum which was an amplification of one read by him to Lord Salisbury on August 3rd.]
XIV. 317
BARON VON RICHTHOFEN TO COUNT HATZFELDT, August 12th, 1898
Telegram.
I consider the arrangement, as it stands now, to be quite acceptable. Free communication
from the lakes to the coast on the Zambesi and Shire is a geographical necessity
for us; this right will be best acknowledged as a natural consequence of our
entry, into the earlier Portuguese treaties.
There is an interesting communication from Lisbon, that the Portuguese attempt to secure a loan in France was rejected on the plea that 'the Portuguese guarantees were insufficient'. This sounds very much as if France also wants to demand territorial guarantees. The Franco-Portuguese negociations are to be resumed in October--a clear sign that England and Germany ought to lose no time. There can be no doubt as to the urgent character of the Portuguese need of money. The only question is whether France or England and Germany give it.
[On August 18th Mr. Balfour handed Count Hatzfeldt two draft Declarations, A and B. He told him that Lord Salisbury had made no definite arrangement about Timor.]
XIV. 321
BARON VON RICHTHOFEN TO COUNT HATZFELDT, August 19th, 1898
Telegram.
Please make it clear orally, direct to Mr. Balfour or through Mr. Bertie, that
an arrangement without Timor is unacceptable to us, and that we shall only continue
to negociate on the understanding that the promise made to us regarding Timor
from the start by Lord Salisbury, which has never been questioned throughout
the discussions, remains untouched. Say that Mr. Balfour's statement--which
has no doubt been inspired from without--that we do nothing but threaten and
neither concede nor promise anything, is incomprehensible at the moment when
we are letting England have South Africa and are ready to fulfil our promises.
In our eyes the agreement was the starting point of a joint colonial policy.
Our demands are the minimum for our leaving the Boers to themselves. Failing
this recompense we should be unable promptly to justify the agreement in the
eyes of our own public opinion, and should be forced to strike out another course
and to broaden the question by introducing other elements.
XIV. 328
COUNT HATZFELDT TO THE GERMAN FOREIGN OFFICE, August 20th, 1898
Cipher telegram. Private.
Timor is settled, and I am convinced that we owe it to Mr. Balfour alone, for he urgently desires a conclusion. I beg therefore that as few difficulties as possible be made for him regarding his draft, and that a secret note in explanation of the affair be agreed to in the manner I recommended.
[In an account of a conversation (XIV. 334) between himself and Sir Frank Lascelles on August 21st the Emperor wrote that he had told the Ambassador that 'unless the negociations in progress during the last few days between my Ambassador and Mr. Balfour lead to no more acceptable result than they had up to the present, the continued presence of my Ambassador in London would be superfluous just now'.]
XIV. 340
BERNHARD VON BULOW, AT SEMMERING, TO THE EMPEROR WILLIAM, August 24th, 1898
Cipher telegram. Extract.
Your Majesty's conversation with Sir Frank Lascelles was all the more opportune, since Balfour--who fears that if in the future France makes a protest against the Portuguese agreement, we shall buy her off with a part of the Portuguese territory assigned to us by England and so expose England to a forward movement on the part of the French--expressed the wish that Germany and England should engage that neither party to the treaty should give to France any part of the territories which come within its scope without the consent of the other. According to Your Majesty's directions there need be no more objection to such an assurance than against Declaration B.(I), which was reported by Count Hatzfeldt: 'Great Britain and Germany agree jointly to oppose the intervention of any third Power in the Provinces of Angola and Mozambique and in Timor, whether by way of loan to Portugal on the security of the revenues of these Provinces or by way of acquisition of territory, by grant, cession, purchase, lease, or otherwise.' . . . (The EMPEROR: 'Agreed ').
XIV. 359
BERNHARD VON BULOW TO COUNT HATZFELDT, September 3rd, 1898
Telegram.
The British Government's recent dealings with Portugal are a proof of either
stupidity or over-confidence. I prefer to assume the latter since the Anglo-Portuguese
negociations were nearly complete when the French and German protests brought
them temporary to a standstill. If Count Tattenbach reported rightly, the consent
of the leading Portuguese was already secured for the mortgaging of the colonies.
At any rate the British haste in giving to the world the news of the agreement
with Germany is doubly disadvantageous; first, the French opposition will now
make itself more felt than would have been the case after the agreement between
England and Germany, on the one hand, and Portugal, on the other, had been formally
established; also the German Government will have difficulty in defending its
action against attacks from its own Press, for we believe that too much publicity
will prejudice the conclusion of the agreement with Portugal. It would therefore
be to the greatest interest of Germany--and indeed of England--to end the uncertainty
of the position by a quick settlement with Portugal.
I leave it to you how far you can exert influence in this direction.
[For the text of the Convention, the secret Convention, and the secret Note,
signed by Mr. Balfour and Count Hatzfeldt on August 30th,1898, see G. &
T., I, p. 68.
It never came into operation, for the finances of Portugal showed signs of improvement,
and the German efforts to force a loan on the Portuguese Government in the hope
of gaining Control of the Portuguese Customs came to nothing.
Having failed to interest Russia in the South African problem, Germany turned to France.]
German Note.
In spite of Germany's appeals for 'speed and silence', the facts of the agreement were made public in England, and its carrying out was thus postponed indefinitely. The so-called Windsor Agreement of 1899 between England and Portugal which was carefully kept secret from Germany and was hardly in consonance with the Anglo-German one of 1898, makes us ask whether those indiscretions and their results were intentional
XIV. 360
BERNHARD VON BULOW, IN BERLIN, TO PRINCE VON RADOLIN, IN ST. PETERSBURG, September 2nd, 1898
Very confidential.
The present world situation calls on us to be ready for all kinds of surprises. Besides the possibility dealt with in my telegram of August 30th, there is another which it is my duty to discuss with you.
German Note.
This telegram (XIII. 191) discussed the possibility that Count Muravieff might offer, as 'honest broker', to try and arrange a rapprochement between Germany and France, which could only be obtained by giving up what had been gained in 1870-71. Prince Radolin was to forestall such a possibility by explaining that a Russian attempt on these lines 'might involve a swing towards the Anglo-Saxon group not only of popular feeling, but even of German policy'.
As you know, the future of South Africa repeatedly in January, 1896, and also this summer was discussed between the German and Russian Governments. You yourself reported on January 8th, 1896, that Prince Lobanoff had spoken of South Africa without interest and had even been rather inclined to excuse England's action against the Transvaal. This summer Count Muravieff spoke out even more clearly to Herr von Tschirschky, who was charged to sound him as to the attitude the St. Petersburg Cabinet thought of adopting towards England's notorious aspiration to use Portugal's financial need for the purpose of acquiring her colonies.' Count Muravieff's reply was that all that left him quite cold, as Russia luckily had no colonies in Africa.
In its anxiety to be informed as precisely as possible as to future prospects, the German Government also enquired regarding French diplomacy. By the French it was made clear that France was interested in the future of South Africa, but at the same time an idea came to light, which was expressed by the French Ambassador as follows: 'At present French opinion forbids the French Government to bind itself in respect of any joint action with Germany; between Germany and France it could therefore only be a matter of an accidental agreement--parallel action, so to speak.'This idea bears a certain family resemblance with Baron de Courcel's words to Lord Salisbury at the time of the Anglo-German conflict over the Transvaal : 'France has only one enemy, that is Germany. England may shape her policy on that assumption.'
Seeing that the conclusion to be drawn from our enquiries in Russia and France was that we were isolated against England in protecting German interests in South Africa, the only course left was to reach an understanding direct with England on the South African question. With this in mind we negociated with England, and have now made an arrangement having as its subject the possibility of a loan to be granted to Portugal on suitable security, and excluding intervention by a third Power. We and England stand together to protect this arrangement.
Seeing that the Russian Government, through Prince Lobanoff and Count Muravieff, declared that South Africa was a matter of indifference, this Anglo-German private arrangement is naturally not aimed, even indirectly, against Russia.
Whenever Count Muravieff mentions the Anglo-German South African agreement to you, please speak to him confidentially in the sense of the foregoing.