Source: German Diplomatic Documents, 1871-1914, selected and translated by E.T.S. Dugdale, Volume III, "The Growing Antagonism, 1898-1910," (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1930), pp. 74-81.
German Note. XV. 141.
On August 24th, 1898, the Emperor Nicholas sent out his famous Peace Manifesto. (See Staatsarchiv, LXIV, 107 et seq.)
It greatly surprised the German Government and was in sharp contrast with Russia's attitude up to that time and with the continuous massing of troops on the German eastern frontier during the Tsar's reign... The frequent assertion that even early in the nineties the Emperor William thought of inviting a European Conference for peace and disarmament (cf. W. T. Stead, La Chronique de la Conference de la Haye, 1899, p. 31) cannot be proved by reference to the Records. (Cf. G. & T., I, p. 215; Life of Lord Pauncefote, p. 226; Brandenburg, p. 129 et seq.)
XV. 149
BERNHARD VON BULOW TO THE EMPEROR WILLIAM, August 28th, 1898
I lay before Your Majesty a memorandum on the statement last evening by Lord Gough, the British Chargé d'Affaires, when he heard of the Russian disarmament proposal and of the accompanying report by the British Ambassador in St. Petersburg.
It appears that the British (The EMPEROR: 'They must have laughed hugely!') are anxious to avoid (The EMPEROR: 'How naïve.') hurting the Emperor Nicholas' feelings by a direct refusal, but that they already perceive the point chiefly interesting to England--the awkwardness of comparing land-forces with sea-forces for compensation purposes.
Regarding the question of disarmament, Prince Radolin adds that 'the Tsar hopes that the German Emperor regards with benevolent consideration (The EMPEROR: ' 'Yes, but not with observance') the idea described in the Russian Memorandum--that of restricting excessive armaments and thus working for peace.' (The EMPEROR: 'But it is there! We have had 28 years of peace!-I shall consider even more closely the intended expenditure of 90 million roubles on 8 new first-class battle-ships and 6 first-class cruisers / These are not included in the disarmament proposals!-The whole lucubration seems to me to come from Russia's grim necessity of escaping from her financial mess . . .')
XV. 182
COUNT MUNSTER, IN PARIS, TO THE GERMAN FOREIGN OFFICE, April 4th, 1899
Cipher telegram. Very confidential.
M. de Staal [Russian Ambassador in London. He was Russian representative at the Conference and became its President] wrote to me that he understood I was appointed to the Hague Conference, that he was delighted at this and was coming to Paris to talk it over with me. He arrived here yesterday.
He admits the difficulty of the task, but hopes it may be possible to get round the armament question and suggest a few alterations in International Law and the Statute of the Red Cross. We ought not to separate without some result. I agree with him in general.
Sir J. Pauncefote [British Ambassador in Washington] will represent England. We both know him well and could wish for no better British representative. M. de Staal thinks the Conference will last 6 weeks; he means to take a villa in the Hague or at Scheveningen and advises me to do the same.
German Note.
His selection by the British Government as its representative at the Hague is explained by the fact that he had already successfully conducted negociations with America for an Anglo-American Arbitration treaty and for the settlement of the Venezuela dispute by arbitration. Vice-Admiral John Fisher accompanied him as Naval Delegate, whose sovereign contempt for all arbitration and the like was displayed even at the Hague.
German Note. XV. 183
The American delegates took on the whole a progressive view of the peace question; they had Captain A. F. Mahan attached to them as Naval Delegate. [He died just at the outbreak of the Great War.] In Armaments and Arbitration (1912) he laid down 'that neither arbitration in a general sense nor arbitration in the more specific form of judicial decision based on a code of law, can always take the place, either practically or beneficially, of the processes and results obtained by the free play of natural forces. Of these forces national efficiency is the chief element, and armament, being the representative of national strength, is the exponent'. White, the Ambassador, in his Autobiography (II, 347) said of Mahan: 'He has had very little, if any, sympathy with the main purposes of the Conference, and has not hesitated to express his disbelief in some of the measures which we were specially instructed to press.'
XV. 219
COUNT HATZFELDT TO THE CHANCELLOR, PRINCE VON HOHENLOHE, May 25th, 1899
The British Government inform me in a note (copy enclosed) of May 19th that on the point of increased protection for private property in a naval war they see no reason at present to adopt any attitude, since the United States Government are not yet in agreement with them on the point.
They have received a resolution from the Chamber of Shipping of the United Kingdom in support of a Memorandum addressed by the New York Chamber of Commerce to the President of the United States on the subject.
According to reports from the British Ambassador in Washington, the Resolutions in question have been laid before the Senate and the House of Representatives, but no decisions have yet been taken.
On May 25th, 1899, Sir Julian Pauncefote surprised the Conference with his proposal to set up a permanent Court of Arbitration. Both Count Münster and Admiral Fisher spoke against it to Mr. Andrew White, basing their objections on similar grounds, namely that the German army and British navy were 'in a state of complete preparation for war, and that the truce afforded by arbitration proceedings would give other Powers time, which they would otherwise not have, to put themselves into complete readiness.' (Cf. Mr. White's Autobiography, II, p. 263.) It was hinted that this was Russia's own motive in calling the Conference (p. 265). (Cf. G. & T., I, p. 227.)
XV. 222
COUNT MUNSTER, FIRST GERMAN DELEGATE AT THE HAGUE, TO THE CHANCELLOR, June 12th, 1899
Mr. Andrew D. White, the American Ambassador and First Delegate, has just been with me. He said that the American Delegation was instructed to introduce a discussion on protection [inviolability] of private property at sea, and asked me what attitude my Government would adopt. It was above all things important to disarm the opposition of those who, under cover of the Russian Circular, wished to prevent a discussion. He considers that in a debate on a permanent Court of Arbitration, about which there is nothing in the Russian proposals, and by so creating a precedent, there might be a majority in the Assembly in favour of permitting the discussion. Even if--and Mr. White recognised this--no result came of it for the moment, as long as England and France entirely rejected it, it would be desirable to raise the question out of consideration for public opinion; I might be sure that in the whole world of commerce the question of protection for private property at sea is much more important and must, in the end, be more popular than one of a permanent Court of Arbitration.
I beg for immediate telegraphic instructions whether I am to support the Americans and vote for discussion on this question.
Up to now I have followed your despatch of May 27th and maintained an attitude of reserve.
Regarding this decided wish of the Americans, the point now is whether we mean to cling firmly to the already badly riddled Russian programme or to allow a discussion, and whether we are willing to go into this important question later.
As regards the other Powers, Sir Julian Pauncefote seems personally to go further than his Government, and even if public opinion in England favours protection for property at sea more than before, Lord Salisbury and the present Government are not prepared to consider an alteration.
The French are the most vehement opponents, and the Russians have promised to support them, although their Delegates lere seem to hold a different opinion. All the other Powers, articularly the smaller ones, are in its favour. A discussion at :he Conference cannot therefore lead to any practical result, but it may decidedly influence public opinion, and this counts for a great deal, as we saw in the Court of Arbitration question.
The negociations are dragging on because the Chairmanship lacks energy; long speeches are made in the Committees, so I fear we may be here till the middle of July. Finally we shall have to say: 'Much ado about nothing'.
XV. 279
BERNHARD VON BULOW TO COUNT HATZFELDT, June 14th, 1899
Telegram. Extract.
...We should have serious objections to a permanent court of Arbitration of this kind especially since the wish has been expressed in the discussion that the permanent Court should Eiave the right of initiating proposals to summon a Court after hostilities between States had broken out, and that a permanent Commission of five members should be chosen, all ready to arbitrate. Even if these ideas are not pursued at once, it is in :he nature of things that they will reappear again as soon as the Pauncefote proposal becomes a reality.
We think it questionable whether there would be sufficient security for independence and impartiality in a Court so formed.
Please enquire of Lord Salisbury whether Sir Julian's proposal comes from the British Government, and if not, what is the latter's attitude towards it.
XV. 279
COUNT HATZFELDT, IN LONDON, TO THE GERMAN FOREIGN OFFICE, June 14th, 1899
Cipher telegram.
Your telegram received.
Lord Salisbury replied that Sir J. Pauncefote's proposal was decided on when be was last here, and corresponded in essentials with a project for arbitration which had been discussed between England and America several years before. He could only explain our objections to it by some misunderstanding regarding the importance and extent of its operation. The idea here was that the permanent Court should only be entrusted with disputes of minor importance, particularly in cases dealing with claims for money compensations and not with decisions on more important and political questions. An appeal to it was not to be obligatory, but optional. Nor was it intended here to give the Court the right of initiative or of mediation. Lord Salisbury added that he hoped this would clear up the misunderstanding. He considered it absolutely out of the question that the Court of Arbitration, as proposed by Sir J. Pauncefote, would ever be called upon to intervene in great political questions, such as Egypt or Alsace.
[On June 28th, 1899, the German Naval Delegate reported that Vice-Admiral Sir John Fisher had given him his views on the question of private property at sea, emphasising the fact that they were his own personal views, and not necessarily shared by his Government.]
XV. 226
REPORT BY CAPTAIN SIEGEL, GERMAN NAVAL DELEGATE, June 28th, 1899
...Sir John Fisher believed that next to England, Germany was most interested in this question, as her merchant marine was the second largest in the world and was continually increasing. It was essential, therefore, that the two countries should be agreed about this matter...
Even if property was to be held generally inviolate, contraband goods still naturally remained liable to seizure.
The decision of what was contraband depended on the strength of the belligerent, and indirectly almost anything could be declared contraband. Thus it was quite possible--and no international convention, however clear and binding, could prevent it--that the ship itself could be declared contraband; so that one might consider the cargo and goods inviolable, and yet hold the ships which carried the goods to be contraband, on the pretext that they might be used as auxiliary cruisers, coffiers, munition ships, or in any capacity however far-fetched to help in carrying on the war.
After careful study, the British Admiralty had laid it down that the war fleet was strong enough to protect the whole of the merchant shipping. As things were now therefore, shipowners, being convinced that their ships were efficiently protected by the war fleet, would calmly go on trading and have no interest in changing their flag.
But if private property were declared inviolable at sea, the natural consequence would be that the former protection would be considered more or less superfluous. Timid shipowners and shippers ('and such are proverbially timid,' said the Admiral) would certainly believe that this protection was to all intents taken away...
[The result would be that] the trade of a belligerent would certainly be transferred to a foreign flag, and history taught that in this event it hardly ever returned...
There is still another point which we [in Germany] must consider:--If private property at sea were declared inviolable, voices would at once be heard in the land demanding a diminution of naval war material, particularly of cruisers, since the protection of trade would cease to be one of the fleet's duties; it would be said that in future only battle-ships would be needed.
The growth of this feeling in the country must under all circumstances be combated, for it would be the greatest mistake to diminish the cruiser fleet. It is by these alone that England is able to maintain her character as the strongest Power all over the world, and holds the position she requires...
America has very good reasons for proposing that private property at sea shall be inviolable.
The trade between England and America is enormous, and the Americans would like to get into their hands at a good opportunity not only this part of England's overseas trade, but also all the rest. They think this proposal offers them a good handle; for if England was at war with another Power, probably a part of the Anglo-American trade would adopt the American flag and stay under it...
I would mention as a curious fact that when a few days ago Professor Zorn and
Mr. Holls went to Berlin on the business of the Arbitration question, the Admiral
told me it was thought at the Hague that we had made an agreement with the Americans,
that they were to support us on the question of the Court of Arbitration, and
we should help them in the matter of protection for private property. I did
not fail to deny this suspicion with energy.
I noticed also that the Admiral attaches no importance to the present trend of British public opinion in favour of close connection with North America and thinks their artificial friendship cannot be permanent, as there are so many points on which their interests clash.
He said characteristically that he had been summoned as a Delegate, because his requirements and his views on naval warfare were known. He had been brought from the West Indies before the termination of his command, and he had forewarned the Admiralty that he knew of only one principle: Might is right.
He had informed Mr. Goschen 1 quite clearly as to his personal opinions, when he received his new appointment, and had left him free to choose another Admiral to command the Mediterranean squadron if his views were not agreed with.
German Note. XV. 298
Frederick W. Holls, the Secretary of the American Delegation, a German-American, who went with Professor Zorn to Berlin on June 17th--the mission, according to Mr. White, was arranged between Holls and Count Münster (Autobiography, II, p. 308)--made known to the Chancellor his wish, strongly supported by Mr. White, to be received by the Emperor. Although the Emperor was willing, this meeting did not come to pass. Even Bulow, the Foreign Secretary, to whom Holls was to deliver a detailed memorandum from White, does not seem to have seen him in spite of White's statement to the contrary (White, II, pp. 309, 317-I 8). But Bulow promoted a conference between the' very influential and correct thinker politically', Mr. Holls, and Holstein, Heliwig and other advisers in the Foreign Office, which took place on the 19th.
[Mr. Holls said that Germany's remaining out of the business of the Court of Arbitration did away with its usefulness. On another occasion he said this would not prevent the matter coming to pass, since four Great Powers (England, America, Russia and France) were for it, and it would be a great pity if Germany, and perhaps the other Triple Alliance Powers, kept aloof (XV. 299). It was very largely owing to the efforts of the American Delegation that an agreement was finally arrived at.]
XV. 304
BERNHARD VON BULOW TO THE EMPEROR WILLIAM, June 21st, 1899
Extract.
Your Majesty will allow me to summarise the result that I have achieved, when
all is said and done. The Arbitration Court idea is in itself utterly distasteful.
Your Majesty's firm and decided attitude has nevertheless succeeded in inducing
the other States to discard all the objectionable aspects of that idea. If the
plan, as now arranged, ever becomes awkward, it will be felt by other States
(The EMPEROR: 'England above all.') far more keenly than by Germany.
If we reject the whole idea of the Court, we shall risk again losing the fruits
of Your Majesty's far-seeing policy, especially in regard to Russia (The EMPEROR:
'It should not matter to me! But what about these childish dreams! What will
it come to as time goes on?') and the United States of America. But if we
join with the other States, I am convinced, if I may speak in all humility,
that it will make a fresh leaning of the Americans towards England difficult,
and the United States will rather turn towards us. (The EMPEROR: 'I hope
so.') The Triple Alliance remains unshaken, and above all, Your Majesty's
relations towards the Emperor Nicholas acquire a new strength, (The EMPEROR:
'I think it more than questionable!') which will not please them on the
Thames and give them much to think about...
XV. 345
COUNT MUNSTER, AT THE HAGUE, TO THE CHANCELLOR, PRINCE VON HOHENLOHE, July 30th, 1899
The Conference at last ended yesterday in a solemn meeting.
As regards disarmament and all that may diminish war strength, the badly drafted and undefended Russian proposals have been rejected.
The Brussels Convention is somewhat modified.
The Geneva Convention stipulations are to apply to naval warfare as well.
As for arbitration, a very complicated organisation has been adopted. A net full of large holes, but one in which one can get entangled nevertheless. From the beginning the German delegation has insisted that anything implying an engagement to submit to the Court of Arbitration must be cut out, and appeal to the Court must be strictly optional.
A number of declarations have been adopted, which may be harmful. I do not like the suggestion of further Conferences; nor that the Conferences should be perennial, like many a weed.
Therefore I have signed neither the Convention nor the Resolutions. (The EMPEROR: 'Correct.') . .