Source: German Diplomatic Documents, 1871-1914, selected and translated by E.T.S. Dugdale, Volume III, "The Growing Antagonism, 1898-1910," (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1930), pp. 166-70.
[Since France was becoming each year on worse terms with Germany, the Franco-Italian rapprochement which culminated in an understanding reached later in 1902 was imperilling the continuance of the Triple Alliance. An attempt was however made to patch it up. (Cf. Brandenburg, p. 186 et seq.) By this mutual understanding France was to allow Italy a free hand in Tripoli, whilst Italy declared her neutrality in the event of a Franco-German war.]
XVIII. 522
COUNT KARL VON WEDEL, AMBASSADOR IN ROME, TO THE GERMAN FOREIGN OFFICE, January 9th, 1902
Extract.
In our conversation Signor Prinetti referred again to the renewal of the Triple Alliance. He had a free hand and had arranged everything with the King of Italy and Zanardelli. Count Bülow and Count Goluchovski had declared that political and commercial treaties bore no direct relation to each other, and he had been careful not to put forward a different opinion.
Since he had promised M. Barrère, if only in conversation, that the treaty was not to include France as an object of aggression, he would prefer, as the whole of the treaty could not be published owing to the Balkan clauses, etc. (although Count Nigra pleaded that such publication would be the best way to reassure the world), that a form of preamble should be found declaring its defensive character, which might be communicated to France...
XVIII. 746
MEMORANDUM BY COUNT VON BULOW, January 12th, 1902
I invited the Italian Ambassador to see me to-day and said to him that I hoped the misunderstanding about Tripoli was now removed. Nothing was further from our intention than to begrudge the Italians their possession of Tripoli or to place difficulties in the way of their acquiring it....
XVIII. 523
But about the Triple Alliance I said I had not much more to tell him than I had told him privately on January 1st and had declared publicly in the Reichstag. The treaty with Italy was no matter of life and death to us. Under certain circumstances we might very possibly find support, compensation, and a compromise elsewhere. For many reasons isolation would be less of a menace to us than for Italy. The Roman question was, in fact, more delicate and difficult than that of Alsace-Lorraine. For Germany I wanted the renewal of the Triple Alliance more as an act of piety towards a long standing arrangement, but for Italy I wanted it on account of her old friendship with this country, since for her the Triple Alliance was a question of existence, and she would otherwise fall into complete dependence on France. I was ready to renew the Affiance, but on two conditions:
(1) Italy must declare to us that she had come to no arrangements with other States, which might impair the defensive efficiency of the Triple Alliance treaties;
(2) The Triple Alliance must remain unchanged where it touched us, whilst we should probably agree to the arrangement made by Italy with Austria-Hungary regarding the Balkans or to any changes made in their treaty. I also insinuated that I could not escape the impression that Signor Prinetti had been very weak and all too trustful in M. Barrère, and that I was beginning to believe what was whispered to us about the Italian Royal couple's liking for France.
Finally I remarked that I did not press for the conclusion of the Triple Alliance, but would warn him that if the matter was urged by Italy it might easily make the Emperor suspicious. There was no saying what, if our Gracious Master seriously mistrusted Italy, might be the consequences for the future orientation of our policy and for the future of Italy.
[Early in 1902 General von Schlieffen, the Head of the German General Staff, completed his plan for invading France through Belgium. He also approached Italy on the subject of her sending 200,000 men to help Germany in a war. (Cf. Wilson, War Guilt, pp. 84-6, 101).]
XVIII. 702
MEMORANDUM BY KLEHMET, GERMAN FOREIGN OFFICE, September 7th, 1902
According to an oral statement by General Count von Schlieffen, Lieutenant-General Saletta, the Chief of the Italian General Staff, spoke and acted when he was here as though there were no change in any of the Triple Alliance arrangements and as if the military arrangements in particular were still in full force. But--so said Count Schlieffen--General Saletta was no longer in the mood to rejoice in the Triple Alliance as formerly he had been. In particular he had spoken of the agreement whereby Italy was to throw two Army corps into Germany in the event of war, and had said that for this purpose, if the road through Austria-Hungary were riot free, Italy intended when the time came to lead both corps under arms through Switzerland. He had also said that if both these Army corps were to be shut away from their homes he would have to see to obtaining the necessary munitions, etc., in Germany. Italy had deposited here the required models for the munitions. Now that these models had become out of date it would be necessary to send new ones. The boxes containing these were to be sent at once to the Italian Embassy in Berlin. General Saletta begged for provision to be made so that there might be no difficulties in the German Customs or in forwarding them to the Embassy.
[General Saletta's words, as reported in the following despatch, show that Germany's old policy of making Italy dependent on England in the Mediterranean and uniting the two against France was now turning to Germany's disadvantage.]
MAJOR VON CHELIUS, MILITARY ATTACHE IN ROME, TO GENERAL VON SCHLIEFFEN, December 1st, 1903
Extract. Secret.
I used the occasion of a visit to General Saletta for giving the conversation a political turn in order to ascertain, as I had meant to do for some time, what echo a mention of the political events of the preceding summer would find in the Chief of the Staff.
In speaking of King Victor Emanuel III's visits to Paris (October 14th-18th) and to London (November 14th-21st) I passed to the Italian third army and said that the events of the summer had left me with the impression that there was hardly any question now of the Italian army supporting the German army in the event of war against France. I gave this as my personal opinion in order to provoke a definite answer.
General Saletta was evidently disturbed by this, but he answered at once that for the King and himself nothing was altered in this matter; the King's visits to London and Paris had not affected these arrangements in any way. The General then said: 'We are obliged to maintain good relations with France and England on account of the Mediterranean, where lie our vital interests; I hope and believe, however, that the Triple Alliance will continue to be the basis of our foreign policy. The French friendship has been magnified incredibly by the Press in the pay of M. Barrère, and I can understand the doubts you express; but the intimacy between these two countries is far from being as it is represented in public. I always think that France merely wishes to exploit us, as for instance now in the Cuneo-Nice railway scheme, which would be built entirely for the advantage of France and which I mean to oppose with all my strength.'
On my suggesting that the former Ministry had made very extensive concessions the General said: 'I hope to reverse all that.'
I referred to the growing antagonism between Italy and Austria, and General Saletta said that in his view the only danger to the Triple Alliance came from that side and not from any Franco-Italian rapprochement; it could not be denied that the difference between Italy and Austria was growing ever more acute....
XVIII. 708
GENERAL COUNT VON SCHLIEFFEN TO BARON VON RICHTHOFEN, December 14th, 1903
In reply to Your Excellency's letter of the 11th I beg to state that I am convinced that not only can we not count on the Italian third army, but that we shall have to make up our minds to face the entire French army without any reinforcements from the Alpine frontier.
Notwithstanding this, all preparations are being systematically worked out each year jointly with the Austrian General Staff, such as are necessary for that army in accordance with the terms agreed upon.
German Note. XX. 37
On February 28th, 1904, Count Monts reported from Rome that for the visit which President Loubet was to pay in April in return for Victor Emanuel's visit to Paris (October, 1903) a great programme was contemplated including a naval review of the ships of both countries at Naples, whilst for the Emperor's approaching visit (whilst on his Mediterranean cruise), when he was to meet the King of Italy at Naples (March 26-7), a much more modest programme was arranged.
XX. 45
THE CHANCELLOR, COUNT VON BULOW, TO COUNT MONTS, IN ROME, March 15th, 1904
Cipher telegram.
I told the Italian Ambassador this evening I did not doubt the good will of the Italian Ministers, but that I must tell him frankly that the continuity of the Italo-German alliance depended on how Loubet's visit went off. The only reason I could notcontinue objecting to the naval exercises at Naples was because King Victor Emanuel seemed to be determined on them. But I presumed that all the ships, which were to greet Loubet later on, would be at Naples for the Emperor and remain on there. I considered it as a conditio sine qua non that the King's toast to Loubet should be very sobre and include the sentiment que l'Italie est fidèle a ses engagements qu'elle considère comme une garantie primordiale de la paix.