Foreign Policy Research Institute
QUIET QUAKE IN EUROPE: THE FRENCH AND THE GERMANS DIVIDE
by William Anthony Hay
Volume 1, Number 9
October 2000
William Anthony Hay, Executive Director of FPRI's Center for the Study of
America and the West, holds a Ph.D. in Modern European and International
History from the University of Virginia.
QUIET QUAKE IN EUROPE:
THE FRENCH AND THE GERMANS DIVIDE
by William Anthony Hay
Successive Balkan crises, NATO expansion, and Russian economic reform have
dominated U.S. policy toward Europe during the Clinton years. These
preoccupations may have distracted American leaders from the past decade's
most significant development: the quiet (and occasionally not so quiet)
quake at the center of the European Union. German unification and the
Soviet Bloc's collapse changed the balance of power and ended what Raymond
Aron called the Europe of "dual hegemonies." Nearly a decade later,
France and Germany have begun debating the future of their relationship.
Concerns about their position in Europe have driven the French in
particular to reassess their strategy. Painfully aware that a united
Germany might challenge France's dominant political role within the
European Union, Francois Mitterrand moved to deprive Germany of the
deutschmark, its major symbol of national independence and strength, and
in due course the euro appeared. His successor, Jacques Chirac, attempted
much more with a strategic initiative to renegotiate the Franco-American
relationship. But his overtures found no takers in Washington and did not
outlast the defeat of Chirac's preferred government in 1996. Forced into
an uneasy cohabitation with Socialist Premier Lionel Jospin, Chirac
reverted to Gaullist lines that often publicly irritated Washington,
particularly on Iraq.
These developments left the French with few options when Chancellor
Gerhard Schroeder broke with his predecessor Helmut Kohl's policy by
allowing a public debate on the future of the EU. The new "Berlin
Republic" created by reunification thus has brought the future of the
Franco- German relationship to the fore. Differences between Paris and
Berlin promise a degree of uncertainty that doubtless has affected the
euro's downward trend and carries important implications for both Moscow
and Washington.
A PATTERN OF DIVERGENCE
Several events since January 2000 highlight a broad pattern of divergence
between France and Germany, beginning with economic strategies. Where
Schroeder's Social Democrats have accepted a degree of economic and
regulatory reform, French leaders across the political spectrum distrust
such neo-liberal policies. Jospin's Socialist party stands out on the
European center-left by rejecting them entirely, and the EU's "dot.com"
summit in Lisbon last March brought differences on economic policy into
sharp focus. Jospin pointedly opposed deregulating energy and transport
markets despite the meeting's purpose of promoting growth through
technology. Admitting that "the liberalization of telecommunications is
in line with creating the conditions for a new economy," he warned
against drastic moves and insisted that transport and energy issues be
discussed only as part of "the evolution of public services in Europe."
While other European leaders saw modest deregulation as a precondition for
growth, Jospin feared the domestic repercussions of threats to entrenched
interests. France's economy, especially its agricultural sector, has
benefitted immensely from transfer payments under programs like the Common
Agricultural Policy. As a net contributor to EU spending, Germany draws
fewer subsidies than other members. France's ability to gain waivers from
onerous EU regulations has limited outside competition. Rhetoric aside,
France has made the preservation of social peace through protection and
subsidies a higher priority than achieving a single European market.
The euro's drop in value in April drew attention once more to economic
policy. Although Chirac joined Schroeder in defending the euro, French
officials privately criticized the Germans for pressing the European
Central Bank to weaken monetary policy. With 3.7 percent growth, French
leaders have little incentive to adopt the artificial stimulus of
inflation. Schroeder, for his part, acknowledged that a weak euro helped
German exports.
WAR OF WORDS
A month later, on May 12, Germany's Foreign Secretary Joschka Fischer
sparked a deeper controversy by urging Europe's leaders to plan
aggressively for EU integration. With the Soviet Bloc's collapse, he said,
expansion cannot be avoided, and integration must accompany it to avoid
reviving old lines of conflict. Fischer therefore proposed strengthening
EU institutions and resolving the "democratic deficit," left by their
secrecy and conspicuous lack of public accountability, through the direct
election of a president and parliament.
The structural reforms to create this leaner European Federation would
also clarify the responsibilities of various levels of government within
the EU. Fischer would reassign power among European institutions,
nation-states, and various sub-national bodies. While agreeing that
nations could not be abolished, he would shift much of their authority to
directly responsible European and regional governments. Arguing that
delay would only weaken the present structure, Fischer urged a vanguard
group of states to create a "center of gravity" that other members could
join later.
While Fischer insisted that he spoke only for himself, Schroeder later
endorsed his basic view. Moreover, his homage to French pioneers of
European integration like Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet highlighted the
gulf between his federalist plan and the Gaullist vision of "l'Europe des
patries." Fischer's remarks predictably stung the French. Gone are the
days when warm relations between Kohl and Mitterrand smoothed over
differences on such divisive matters as the Balkans and German
unification. A deeply offended French Interior Minister Jean Pierre
Chevenement charged publicly that Fischer's proposal revealed a Germany
still not recovered from the "derailment" of Nazism and still seeking to
dominate a modernized version of the Holy Roman Empire. Although
Chevenement later apologized, these were fighting words the likes of which
have not been heard since the Thatcher government's barely veiled
criticism of the EU as a German scheme to erase the results of World War
II.
CLARIFYING THE DISPUTE
It fell to French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine to formulate an official
response to Fischer in an open letter dated June 8. Vedrine welcomed
Fischer's initiative, but warned that the speech raised more questions
than it answered. France's EU presidency was due to begin in June 2000
and Fischer's proposal weakened French efforts to promote cooperation
among governments on immediate, practical concerns. Vedrine spoke warmly
of bringing the French and German positions together, but warned that the
French and other Europeans saw nation-states as the framework for their
identity and democratic life. We should remember, he continued, "that
unlike in the United States, there are nations in Europe." Thus it would
be best to avoid "theoretical controversy" and work instead on immediate
problems.
So far as truth lies in the details, Vedrine's cordial tone belied serious
differences in the two countries' views of Europe's future. Both sides
back integration and a "pioneer" group of states willing to lead the way,
but the structure for the process remains in dispute. The fundamental
problem involves how Europe is to be governed. At a tenth anniversary
celebration of German unification on October 3, President Johannes Rau
pointedly declared that "European and German unity are two sides of the
same coin." The German view of a "federal" Europe conflicts with France's
opposition, deeply rooted in its statist tradition, to any cession of
power to regional and European authorities that would weaken the national
government. Chevenement's resignation in August over concessions to
Corsican separatists gave a dramatic example of this sentiment.
Echoing Vedrine, Chirac described France's goal as a United Europe of
States rather than a United States of Europe. Neither side of the debate,
he told the Bundestag on June 27, envisioned the creation of a European
superstate "which would supplant our national states and mark the end of
their existence as players in international life."
PUTIN STIRS THE POT
Chirac's entry into the debate during his Berlin visit followed a
three-day summit between Schroeder and Russian President Vladimir Putin
that raised another contentious issue. Paris has been among the West's
leading critics of Moscow's policy toward Chechnya, and Vedrine has called
Russia a "Potemkin democracy." As a result, Putin's state visits to
Britain, the U.S., and Germany pointedly excluded France. Moreover, Putin
publicly subjected NATO to a sharp Soviet-style critique while in Germany
as he pursued Russia's traditional policy of using ties with Germany to
anchor itself in Europe and divide the U.S. from its allies. Despite their
frustration with Russian reformers, German leaders still view ties with
Russia as an insurance policy against instability in Eastern Europe.
Schroeder advisor Michael Steiner said Germany acted for Europe in
building a "strategic partnership" with the new Russian government.
Although Schroeder balked at Russian demands for debt forgiveness, Putin
won considerable investment in Russia's energy sector. The Russian leader
also enjoyed a relentlessly positive welcome despite his recent crackdown
on media opposition and outspoken criticism of NATO. Given France's
long-standing fear of facing Russia and Germany alone in Europe, the
prospect of a return to Ostpolitik cannot be heartening in Paris. Chirac
thus tried to remind the Germans of their ties with the French while he
chided their penchant for "theoretical controversy."
FRENCH OPTIONS
Reports of a breakdown in Franco-German relations are premature, of
course, but the machinery for cooperation runs less smoothly than before,
which raises historic issues not far from the surface. French security
policy since 1871 has struggled to contain Germany, and France adopted the
"European idea" after 1945 as a solution. France gained an enduring
preeminence over a diplomatically enfeebled West Germany, and the ensuing
relationship made possible the Gaullist project of securing French
independence through leadership in Europe. De Gaulle and his successors
were able to exert influence beyond the limits of French power and thereby
occupy an independent ground between the Soviets and Anglo-Americans.
France acted as the political and diplomatic engineer for Germany's
post-war economic growth. That relationship, often described by the
metaphor of a French rider on a German horse, allowed both French
unilateralism and the smooth working of the European Economic Community.
Even in the 1950s, however, French leaders hesitated to push the European
idea too far lest they face Germany and Russia alone. They responded to
West Germany's gradual recovery of sovereignty by pushing for European
integration, and Konrad Adenauer and his successors accepted it to
reconcile Germany's neighbors to its growing strength. The 1963 Elysee
treaty signed by De Gaulle and Adenauer cemented the Franco-German special
relationship, and that cooperation provided Western Europe's only
consistent source of leadership.
The conditions that fostered the Gaullist combination of European
cooperation and French unilateralism ended with the Soviet Union in 1991,
raising the prospect of a German challenge to French leadership. Hints of
the change appeared in January 1988, when Mitterrand rejected Kohl's
proposal of a joint overture to the Soviets that cast France as the junior
partner. Nor could personal friendship hide a divergence between France
and Germany on Yugoslavia and other issues.
Reviving an older strategy, Mitterrand and Kohl thereupon moved in April
1990 to regain momentum toward European integration by adopting a single
currency. Ignoring public opinion and bankers' concerns, German leaders
appeased France by giving up the deutschmark for the euro, which debuted
in January 2000. Significantly, the shift to the euro marked the first
instance in which public opinion resisted the political elites' agenda for
European integration.
CHIRAC'S INITIATIVE
By 1995, Chirac had concluded that France could only remain independent by
abandoning Gaullism to preserve a favorable European balance with American
support. His advisor Pierre Lellouche had outlined the policy two years
earlier in Foreign Affairs, where he wrote that France must "consolidate
[Europe's] only poles of stability: the EU and the alliance with the
United States." As neither Britain nor Russia could aid effectively in
containing Germany, France must develop a new partnership with Washington.
Chirac differed from recent French leaders in his genuine sympathy for the
United States and his willingness to break with Gaullist precedents that
guided even Mitterrand.
It remains unclear whether the Clinton administration understood Chirac's
intent, but the moment for action quickly passed. Americans resented the
way Chirac's pressure forced the Clinton administration's hand on Bosnia.
Not long thereafter, French domestic politics limited Chirac's ability to
undertake an aggressive new foreign policy in the short term. Unlike De
Gaulle, Chirac failed to coordinate his foreign and domestic policies to
reinforce one another. Without the deal he had sought from Washington and
bereft of domestic success, Chirac's chance of securing a favorable
European realignment faded.
GROWING UNCERTAINTY AND THE QUIET QUAKE
With the significant exception of the euro's fluctuations, the European
scene is unlikely to produce headlines in the near future. But underlying
trends show a quiet quake that deserves attention. Whether or not Germans
free themselves from their past, they will probably feel the need to
liberate themselves from France. European integration, which once
promised a solution to France's security dilemma, now poses an
uncomfortable challenge. The Gaullist enterprise of harnessing Europe
behind France has played out, and the strategy to replace it remains
unclear. For the first time, moreover, further European integration faces
public skepticism in most countries. Ties that once stabilized the
post-war French economy and eased its modernization now force tough
choices on taxes and social programs. Germany faces similar problems as
reunification has imposed economic and social strains. Schroeder's Berlin
Republic no longer follows France's lead readily and Germany now takes its
own view of Europe's future. Competition between France and Germany,
however restrained, may supplant cooperation in the EU.
A more assertive Germany and a less confident France suggest a different
future from the "united Europe" so long assumed to be the continent's
destiny. Are current disputes merely background noises or a prelude to
serious differences? Vladimir Putin clearly is testing the waters. The
next American president will have to consider the situation and ascertain
how changes in Franco-German relations affect vital U.S. interests,
including NATO. Assumptions from an earlier generation may no longer
provide a useful guide for policy.
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