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Mohamed Elhachmi Hamdi, "Islam and Liberal Democracy: The Limits Of The Western Model," Journal of Democracy 7.2 (1996) 81-85
Robin Wright and Bernard Lewis have a number of sensible and positive things to say about what might be called the "democratic credentials" of Islam. To their credit, both seem to recognize that Islam is not necessarily opposed to representative and accountable government. I begin with these words of praise in order to situate my criticism of their essays in its proper context. My goal is not to diminish their work, but to broaden understanding between Muslims and non-Muslims, especially the non-Muslims of the West.
While Wright does not define democracy, Lewis pithily describes it as "a polity where the government can be changed by elections as opposed to one where elections are changed by the government." I accept this definition without reservation. The problem is that Westerners tend to associate this definition with their own model of democracy, which is difficult to accept universally. It is often deemed dangerous to question Western democracy for fear of being labeled an antidemocrat; still, at least half of the world's population does not adhere to this democratic model. Is it unreasonable to wonder if this suggests problems with the Western model itself?
Western intellectuals should take more seriously than they do the possibility that there are limitations to their brand of democracy. Consider the ever-increasing role that money plays in determining who can run for public office in the United States, let alone who can win. Money is so important in U.S. politics that it may in fact have more influence than the people themselves in choosing those who govern. Or [End Page 81] consider in how many countries Western democracy has failed to prevent racism toward blacks, or anti-Semitism. Anti-Semitism, in fact, is a European product that could never have come about in the Islamic world, which is built on belief in the three main messengers of divine revelation--Moses, Jesus, and Mohammed, peace be upon them.
Although most Western writers speak of democracy as a universal set of values, Western deeds tell a very different story. The French, for instance, behave democratically in France itself, but not in Algeria, where they have committed some of this blood-drenched century's most horrific atrocities. This has also been the case with the U.S. government's policies in parts of Central America and the Muslim world.
Nor are Western inconsistencies all that dampen the Western democratic model's appeal. Not all societies stand to benefit from a multiparty system, for in some circumstances such pluralism might only serve to deepen existing tribal or sectarian divisions (Rwanda, the Sudan, Liberia, and even Lebanon come to mind). It is also questionable whether the rule of 51 percent is a workable solution for many African and Asian societies, which need the efforts of all political groups, not only the one that gains victory in an election.
On certain moral questions, moreover, Western democracy appears--not just to outside critics but to many Westerners--to be running amok. It is hard to see why lax Western mores that weaken or destroy the family--that most crucial of all social institutions--should be exported to the rest of the world under the banner of democracy. Indeed, I cannot foresee any Islamic country under any circumstances accepting certain social practices that until recently were not generally accepted in the West either, but have now become common there.
There is no chance for a constructive dialogue among cultures and civilizations as long as those who dominate public discourse in the West continue to see themselves as the upholders of political and moral standards for the entire world. Unfortunately, a bit of this self-satisfaction is discernible in the way in which Wright and Lewis insist on comparing tendencies of thought in the Islamic world today to the Reformation in Christian Europe five centuries ago. This fails to account for the huge differences in concepts and movements, and drives home the point that only by seeing the limitations of their own standards can Westerners look more positively and objectively at the histories and cultures of other peoples.
A Voice or an Echo?
Five years ago in Washington, D.C., I translated while Robin Wright interviewed Rachid al-Ghannouchi about his views on the West in general and democracy in particular. I remember how impressed she was by his liberal views, and thus was not surprised to read her praise for [End Page 82] him as an Islamic reformist. Wright is an intelligent and hard-working journalist, unaffected by negative Western stereotypes concerning Arabs or Muslims.
There is a problem, however: Wright is mostly interested in Muslims who, in effect, speak her mind back to her in terms that she finds familiar, and who reassure her of the supremacy of her own Western values. Ghannouchi fits this role perfectly. As an exiled politician seeking support from Western circles against the regime that he wants to replace in Tunisia, his strategy has been to play the "democracy card." This is why he is one of the favorite Arab Islamists of Wright and others, such as Professor John Esposito of the United States and François Burgat of France. Westerners have not exactly been keen to engage in direct dialogue with the most prominent representatives of "Islamic fundamentalism" from Iran, Egypt, or the Sudan. Ghannouchi has held up a comforting mirror to the West amid what is generally seen as a dangerous field. Thus Wright and those like her have been ready to disregard those words and deeds of Ghannouchi's--and there are many--that clearly contradict his democratic rhetoric.
To present the West with a congenially "Westernized" version of Islam, whether for political or other reasons, has been a particular ambition of certain Islamic thinkers for the last two centuries. Albert Hourani summed it up neatly when he described the efforts of the famous Egyptian scholar and imam of the al-Azhar mosque, Mohamed Abduh (18491905):
He carried farther a process we have already seen at work in the thought of Tahtawi, Khair al-Din, and al-Afghani: that of identifying certain traditional concepts of Islamic thought with the dominant ideas of modern Europe. In this line of thought maslaha gradually turns into utility, shura into parliamentary democracy, ijma into public opinion; Islam itself becomes identical with civilisation and activity, the norms of the nineteenth-century social thought. It was of course easy in this way to distort if not destroy the precise meaning of the Islamic concepts, to lose that which distinguished Islam from other religions and even from nonreligious humanism. 1
Abduh was widely recognized as a scholar and thinker; Ghannouchi is primarily a politician who has different audiences to please, both inside and outside his party. Many of his critics think that he has failed to be coherent in his views on many important issues, including his [End Page 83] stance toward the West, the way in which to change the Tunisian regime, the status of women, and democracy itself. For them, this raises a huge question about the validity and sincerity of the "liberal" views that Robin Wright extols.
Concerning the "Christian Illness"
Bernard Lewis's essay, too, reflects the desire of many Westerners to praise whoever follows their preferred path. Perhaps that is why he overlooks the Egyptian regime's abysmal human rights record and rampant corruption in order to cite Egypt as one of the foremost Islamic countries to be "taking significant steps toward modernization and democratization."
What most requires clarification is Lewis's view that "it may be that Muslims, having contracted a Christian illness, will consider a Christian remedy, that is to say, the separation of religion and the state." There is nothing new about this "remedy," which is one that the West has tried before to impose on Islamic countries, albeit without major success. The heart of the matter is that no Islamic state can be legitimate in the eyes of its subjects without obeying the main teachings of the shari`a. A secular government might coerce obedience, but Muslims will not abandon their belief that state affairs should be supervised by the just teachings of the holy law. This is not to recommend autocracy, but to say that Islam should be the main frame of reference for the constitution and laws of predominantly Muslim countries. Even in the United States and Europe, there are supreme values that are embodied in the constitutions and the laws of those lands. Islam has been playing this role for the last 1,400 years, mostly for the good of Muslims, and there is no need to replace it with a set of Western values. As both Wright and Lewis mention, Islamic teachings condemn tyranny and corruption: these teachings always have been, are now, and always will be a beacon and a refuge for those oppressed by unjust rulers or invaders.
Why on earth should all the world convert to Western norms? Would it not be better to preserve a fruitful pluralism in the world, by which nations can express themselves in different ways, while respecting the basic values that are essential for all human beings?
The only way that secularism can be kept alive in the Islamic world is by local Muslim dictatorships, supported by Western power. Lewis is wrong to claim that most Islamic countries have gained independence from Western forces, and that their misfortunes on the road to democ-racy have been the result of their own mistakes. Every objective observer would admit that the West is still very much involved in the day-to-day affairs of most Muslim countries, especially those in the Arab world. This involvement takes the sad form of an unholy alliance with [End Page 84] corrupt, isolated elites who do not respect democracy in any form, Western or otherwise. What keeps all too many regimes in power in the Arab world is not their own legitimacy, but rather control over the armed forces and support from the Western nations whose interests they serve.
Here we see the true face of secularism in most of the Islamic world: a new form of submission to the same old colonial powers. These powers may have democratic polities, but it is democracy meant for Westerners only, and does not imply any moral duties toward other nations. Useful antidemocrats in the Muslim, and especially the Arab, world easily gain Western help. Ordinary Arabs know this, which is why they stand ready to support whoever raises the flag of true independence, including the Islamists of Turkey, Algeria, Egypt, the Sudan, and Iran.
Of course, secularism is not the the only obstacle confronting the cause of political liberty in the Islamic world. We had our own problems even before being dominated by the West. Islam may have been misused and may continue to be misused by corrupt and tyrannical rulers intent on legitimizing their policies by giving them what appears to be religious sanction. Here, indeed, lies one of the most formidable challenges facing contemporary Islamic thought as it strives to outline a regime that is Islamic but also representative and accountable. There is no doubt that we can benefit from the rich experience of Western democracy. I will go further: we Muslims not only can, but must learn from the West if we are to overcome the many problems prevalent in the Islamic world. But for this to be possible we need a dialogue between peoples in which the respective identities and interests of each are accorded equal respect. Muslims know this well, and are ready to extend the hand of respect to their Western counterparts. The question is: Are those in the West ready to do the same for Muslims?
Mohamed Elhachmi Hamdi is a Tunisian-born writer and a doctoral candidate at the University of London. He is the founder and editor-in-chief of the Arabic-language newspaper Al Mustakillah and the English and Arabic quarterly The Diplomat. He was a member of the Tunisian Islamic movement al-Nahda for more than ten years before his resignation in 1992.
Notes
1. Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 144.
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