Already, from before this time [June, 1945], the United States had frequently broadcast reports that Japan would sue for unconditional surrender. Japan, however, was in no state to surrender unconditionally-indeed, Japan maintained up to the end, up to the ultimate acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration, the position that she accepted the declaration unconditionally, but that that was not to surrender unconditionally. The unconditional surrender applied to the armed forces only (as was clearly stated in the declaration itself), not to the nation. This American propaganda and insistence on "unconditional surrender," therefore, hampered to no small extent the progress of the movement in Japan for peace.
By late June the war in every aspect had become critical. Production decreased drastically, on account of the air attacks and the breakdown of transportation facilities-not only did the production of aircraft dwindle, but even (for example) salt, essential to the manufacture of explosives, became scarce. The food shortage grew acute, and serious unrest of the populace by winter could be predicted. It seemed that informed quarters everywhere, official and private alike, were realizing the impossibility of going on with the struggle, and from every side the pressure to make peace mounted. Agriculture and Forestry Minister Ishiguro and Minister without Portfolio Sakonji called on me specially to confide their fears, as did other ministers. The feeling of non-official circles was expressed by Professors Nambara and Takagi of Tokyo Imperial University, who came to urge upon me the speedy achieving of peace--I told them that the moves which I was making were in exact conformity with their object, and added that I would appreciate it if Professor Takagi, an expert on American affairs, could suggest any plan by which to make direct contact with some quarter in the United States in order to try to bring about a negotiated peace. The politicians joined in, including even a Socialist Diet member who wanted me, despite the traditional bad relations between the Second and Third Internationals, to arrange for him to go to Moscow to get in touch with the United States. I found it strange that from former officials of the Foreign Ministry only had I no comunications concerning the necessity of ending the war.
During the early morning of 26 July, the day after Prime Minister Churchill's return to London for announcement of the result of the British general election, a joint declaration in the names of President Truman, Churchill and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek was issued at text of this "Potsdam Declaration" is as follows.
1. We--the President of the United States, the President of the National Government of the Republic of China, and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, representing the hundreds of millions of our countrymen, have conferred and agree that Japan shall be given an opportunity to end this war.
2. The prodigious land, sea and air forces of the United States, the British Empire and of China, many times reinforced by their armies and air fleets from the west, are poised to strike the final blows upon Japan. This military power is sustained and inspired by the determination of all the Allied Nations to prosecute the war against Japan until she ceases to resist.
3. The result of the futile and senseless German resistance to the might of the aroused free peoples of the world stands forth in awful clarity as an example to the people of Japan. The might that now converges on Japan is immeasurably greater than that which, when applied to the resisting Nazis, necessarily laid waste to the lands, the industry and the method of life of the whole German people. The full application of our military power, backed by our resolve, will mean the inevitable and complete destruction of the Japanese armed forces and just as inevitably the utter devastation of the Japanese homeland.
4. The time has come for Japan to decide whether she will continue to be controlled by those self-willed militaristic advisers whose unintelligent calculations have brought the Empire of Japan to the threshold of annihilation, or whether she will follow the path of reason.
5. Following are our terms. We will not deviate from them. There are no alternatives. We shall brook no delay.
6. There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest, for we insist that a new order of peace, security and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world.
7. Until such a new order is established and there is convincing proof that Japan's war-making power is destroyed, points in Japanese territory to be designated by the Allies shall be occupied to secure the achievement of the basic objectives we are here setting forth.
8. The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine.
9. The Japanese military forces, after being completely disarmed, shall be permitted to return to their homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives.
10. We do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation, but stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals, including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners. The Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people. Freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights, shall be established.
11. Japan shall be permitted to maintain such industries as will sustain her economy and permit the exaction of just reparations in kind, but not those which would enable her to re-arm for war. To this end, access to, as distinguished from control of, raw materials shall be permitted. Eventual Japanese participation in world trade relations shall be permitted.
12. The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as these objectives have been accomplished and there has been established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people a peacefully inclined and responsible government.
13. We call upon the government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces, and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action. The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction.
My first reaction to the declaration upon reading through the text as broadcast by the American radio was that, in view of the language, "Following are our terms," it was evidently not a dictate of unconditional surrender. I got the impression that the Emperor's wishes had reached the United States and Great Britain, and had had the result of this moderation of their attitude. It appeared also that a measure of consideration had been given to Japan's economic position; at a time when such Draconian retribution upon Germany as the "Morgenthau Plan" for her reduction to a "pastoral state" was being proposed, I felt special relief upon seeing the economic provisions of the declaration--the gist of them being that the function of Japan as a processing nation, as contemplated by Secretary Hull during the Japanese-American negotiations, would be recognized, and that to this end severe reparations would not be imposed.
The territorial provisions of the declaration I did not deem in the light of the Atlantic Charter to be fitting, for--putting aside the question of the independence of Korea--Formosa and our other territories would have to be surrendered in conformity with the edict of the Cairo Declaration, and our sovereignty would in effect be limited to the four main islands of Japan. As to the occupation, also, there were some doubts. The occupation seemed, it is true, to have applicability to designated points in our country, and it apparently was to be--unlike the treatment of Germany after her surrender--a guarantee occupation not involving extensive administration; there was a question, however, whether Tokyo and the other large cities would be included among the points designated. I considered, further, that there were some ambiguities concerning the eventual form of the Japanese government, and also that complications might result from the language relating to disarmament and war criminals. I therefore instructed Foreign Vice-Minister Matsumoto to make a careful study of the legal aspects of the declaration.
Simultaneously, I thought it desirable to enter into negotiation with the Allied
Powers to obtain some clarification, and revision--even if it should be slight--of
disadvantageous points in the declaration.
I was received in audience on the morning of the 27th, and reported to the Emperor
on recent happenings, including the negotiations with Moscow, the British general
election and the Potsdam Declaration. I stressed that the declaration must be
treated with the utmost circumspection, both domestically and internationally;
in particular, I feared the consequences if Japan should manifest an intention
to reject it. I pointed out further that the efforts to obtain Soviet mediation
to bring about the ending of the war had not yet borne fruit, and that our attitude
toward the declaration should be decided in accordance with their outcome.
At a meeting of the members of the Supreme Council for Direction of the War, held on the same day, I spoke to the same effect. On this occasion, Chief of Staff Toyoda said that news of the declaration would, sooner or later, transpire, and if we did [312/313] nothing it would lead to a serious impairment of morale; hence, he suggested, it would be best at this time to issue a statement that the government regarded the declaration as absurd and could not consider it. Premier Suzuki and I objected to this, and as a result it was agreed that for the time being we should wait to see what the response of the U.S.S.R. would be to our approach to her, planning to decide our course thereafter. On the same afternoon there was a Cabinet meeting, at which I reported on the negotiations with the U.S.S.R. which Mr. Hirota had been conducting, and on recent international developments in general. I went into detail concerning the Potsdam Declaration, and recommended that we should act on it after having ascertained the attitude of the Soviet Union. No dissent from this treatment of the declaration was expressed, though there was considerable discussion of the way and the extent of making it public. In the end it was agreed that it should be passed without comment by the government, the competent authorities releasing it in summary, while the Board of Information should lead the press to minimize publicity.
To my amazement, the newspapers of the following morning reported that the government had decided to ignore the Potsdam Declaration. I protested without delay to the Cabinet when it met, pointing out that the report was at variance with our decision of the preceding day. What had happened, I learned, was this. There had been held in the Imperial Palace, after adjournment of the Cabinet the day before, a conference for exchange of information between government and high command. This was a routine weekly meeting without special significance, and I had been absent because of more important business. One of the military participants in that meeting, as I heard it, had proposed the rejection of the Potsdam Declaration; the Premier, the War and Navy Ministers and the two Chiefs of Staff had hastily assembled for consultation in a separate room, and the Premier had been persuaded by the more militant elements to that course. He then stated at a subsequent press conference that the government had decided to ignore the declaration, and this announcement it was which the press had played up so sensationally. It was only after the affair had developed to this point that I first knew of it; despite my thorough dissatisfaction with the position, there was of course no way of withdrawing the statement released by the Premier, and things had to be left as they stood. In the result, the American press reported that Japan had rejected the declaration, and President Truman in deciding for use of the atomic bomb, and the U.S.S.R. in attacking Japan, referred to the rejection of it as justification for their respective actions. The incident was thus a deplorable one in its embarrassment of our move for peace, and was most disadvantageous for Japan.
Meanwhile, despite my repeated instructions to Ambassador Satö in Moscow to press the U.S.S.R. to act quickly on our request for mediation, he did not succeed in obtaining access to any of the Russian officials save Vice-Commissar Lozovsky, until finally he reported that Molotov was back in Moscow from Potsdam on 5 August, and would receive him at 5:00 P.M. (11:00 P.M., Japan time) on the 8th. That interview proved, however--as we learned only after the war--to have no relation to our request, but to be for the quite different purpose of notifying the Ambassador of the U.S.S.R.'s commencement of war against Japan.
At 8:15 A.M. on 6 August the United States Air Force released over Hiroshima the atomic bomb the detonation of which was to reverberate down through the history of the world. I was informed that the damage was vast. I immediately demanded of the Army the particulars; the American radio had announced that the bomb was one employing atomic fission, and if such a singular explosive had in fact been used, in violation of the international law of warfare, it would be necesary to lodge a protest with the United States. The Army replied to my inquiry that it could as yet say only that the bomb dropped on Hiroshima was one of high effectiveness, and that the details were under investigation. The United States and Great Britain launched large-scale propaganda on the atomic bomb, declaring that its use would alter utterly the character of war and would work a revolution in the life of the human race, and that if Japan did not accept the declaration of the three Powers the bomb would continue to be used until the nation was annihilated.
At a meeting of the Cabinet on the afternoon of 7 August the War and Home Ministers made reports on the Hiroshima bombing. The Army, pleading the necessity of awaiting the results of the investigation which had been ordered, obviously intended not to admit the nature of the atomic atack, but to minimize the effect of the bombing. On the 8th I had an audience, in the underground shelter of the Imperial Palace, with the Emperor, whom I informed of the enemy's announcement of the use of an atomic bomb, and related matters, and I said that it was now all the more imperative that we end the war, which we could seize this opportunity to do. The Emperor approved of my view, and warned that since we could no longer continue the struggle, now that a weapon of this devastating power was used against us, we should not let slip the opportunity by engaging in attempts to gain more favorable conditions. Since bargaining for terms had little prospect of success at this stage, he said, measures should be concerted to insure a prompt ending of hostilities He further added that I should communicate his wishes to the Premier. Withdrawing, I spoke to Lord Keeper Kido of what had passed at my audience, and I then proceeded to inform the Premier at once of the Emperor's wishes and to request him to call a meeting of the members of the Supreme Council for Direction of the War.
In the early hours of the 9th the radio room of the Foreign Ministry telephoned to inform me of the U.S.S.R.'s broadcast of her declaration of war on us and the large-scale invasion of Manchuria by her forces. (Ambassador Satö, when he met with Commissar Molotov at 11:00 P.M., our time, on the 8th, had been notified of the declaration of war; but the cable report of the interview--and consequently of the declaration--which the Russians had assured him would be cleared for dispatch never reached Tokyo.) I visited the Premier early in the morning and told him of the Russian attack. Again I pointed out that the war must stop immediately, and Admiral Suzuki agreed. It was arranged that Chief Cabinet Secretary Sakomizu who was present, should summon the members of the Supreme Council to an urgent conference. On the way to the Foreign Ministry I called at the Navy Ministry and reported to Admiral Yonai as I had done to the Premier. While at the Navy Ministry I encountered Prince Takamatsu, to whom also I explained why we must accept the Potsdam Declaration without further procrastination.
The members of the Supreme Council met at 11:00 A.M. I opened the discussion by saying that the war had become more and more hopeless, and now that it had no future, it was necessary to make peace without the slightest delay. Therefore, I said, the Potsdam Declaration must be complied with, and the conditions for its acceptance should be limited to those only which were absolutely essential for Japan. All members of the Supreme Council already recognized the difficulties in going on with the war; and now, after the employment of the atomic bomb and Russian entry into the war against us, none opposed in principle our acceptance of the declaration. None disagreed, either, that we must insist upon preservation of the national polity as the indispensable condition of acceptance.
The military representatives, however, held out for proposing additional terms--specifically, that occupation of Japan should if possible be avoided or, if inescapable, should be on a small scale and should not include such points as Tokyo; that disarmament should be carried out on our responsibility; and that war criminals should be dealt with by Japan. I objected that in view of the recent attitude of Britain, America, Russia and China it was greatly to be feared that any proposal by us of a number of terms would be rejected, and that the entire effort for peace would be in danger of failing. Unless, therefore, the military services saw a prospect of winning the war, any terms proposed by us should be limited to the minimum of those truly vital; thus, while it was in order to propose other points as our desire, the only condition as such which we should hold out for was that of inviolability of the Imperial house. I asked, then, whether the armed services could offer any hope of victory in case negotiations on terms should be undertaken and should fail.
The War Minister replied that although he could give no assurance of ultimate victory, Japan could still fight another battle. I pressed them to say whether they could be certain of preventing the enemy from landing on our mainland. The Army Chief of Staff answered that we might drive the enemy into the sea if all went very well--though, in war, we could not be confident that things would go well--but that even conceding that a certain percentage of the enemy's troops might succeed in establishing beachheads, he was confident that we could inflict heavy losses on them. I argued that this would be of no avail: according to the explanation given us by the Army, some part at least of the attackers might still land even after sustaining serious losses; but while it was obvious that the enemy would follow up with a second assault though the first was inadequately rewarded, we should have sacrificed most of our remaining aircraft and other important munitions in our efforts to destroy the first wave. There being no possibility of replenishing our supply of armaments in a short period, our position after the first enemy landing operations would be one of defenselessness, even leaving the atomic bomb out of account. My conclusion was that we had no alternative to stopping the war at this very moment, and we must therefore attempt to attain peace by limiting our counterdemands to the irreducible minimum.
The discussion became rather impassioned, but remained inconclusive, and it neared one o'clock, with a Cabinet meeting scheduled for the afternoon. The Premier stated that the question had to be submitted to the Cabinet also, and the Supreme Council adjourned without having come to any agreement how we should proceed.
The Cabinet met at two. Prior to the meeting, I said to Premier Suzuki that the Cabinet also was unlikely to arrive at a unanimous conclusion, in which event the only possible solution would be to request an Imperial decision; but it was necessary that the Premier take care lest the Cabinet be disabled, before that could be done-by the resignation of the War Minister, for instance. Also before the Cabinet meeting Vice-Minister Matsumoto came to me and said that the prevailing opinion of the Foreign Ministry likewise was that we should not present numerous conditions.
At the Cabinet, I again detailed the course of the negotiations with the U.S.S.R., the use of the atomic bomb and the Soviet attack on us. There was the same controversy--whether we should accept the Potsdam Declaration with the one indispensable condition only, or should add the others, as proposed by the War Minister, relating to occupation, disarmament and war criminals. The Navy Minister sided with me, saying that there were no expectations to be indulged if we went on with the war; the War Minister opposed on the ground that if it came to a final battle on Japanese soil we could at least for a time repulse the enemy, and might thereafter somehow "find life out of death," even though there was no certainty of victory. In rebuttal I observed that according to the opinion of the high command as made known at the meeting of the council members, the prospects of driving the enemy into the sea were by no means bright, while even if we managed to punish them severely during their landings, our relative position would be far worse in the sequel. Discussion reached no issue. The meeting had gone on for hours, and it was now late at night. The Premier asked the Cabinet members to state their conclusions; some equivocated, some agreed with the Army's view, but most supported me.
At that point the Premier stated that he wished to report to the Emperor with me alone. Leaving the Cabinet in session, we went together to the Palace. Upon our being received, the Premier requested that I outline to the Emperor the disagreement in the Supreme Council and the Cabinet, which I did fully. The Premier then asked the Emperor's sanction for calling at once, that night, a meeting in his presence of the Supreme Council for Direction of the War. The Emperor approved, and the Imperial Conference convened shortly before midnight of the 9th. It was a full meeting; in addition to the Premier, the service ministers, the two Chiefs of Staff and myself, Baron Hiranuma, President of the Privy Council, attended as a participant, and as secretaries there were the Chief Cabinet Secretary, the Director of the Combined Planning Bureau, General Ikeda, Director Yoshizumi of the War Ministry Military Affairs Bureau and Director Hoshina of the Navy Ministry Naval Affairs Bureau.
The Premier opened the conference by saying that, the deliberations at that morning's Supreme Council having failed to result in agreement on the accepting of the Potsdam Declaration, he wished to ask the Emperor to hear personally the opposing views. Thereupon two alternatives were submitted for consideration; one, to accept the Potsdam Declaration with the understanding that it comprised no demand which would prejudice the traditionally established status of the Emperor; the other, to attach in addition the three conditions before mentioned as insisted upon by the Army. I dilated upon the same points which I had argued at the Supreme Council members' meeting and that of the Cabinet, and contended that we must now end the war by accepting the Potsdam Declaration in accordance with the first alternative. The Navy Minister said simply that he fully concurred in the opinion of the Foreign Minister. But War Minister Anami reiterated his argument that we should propose the additional conditions, and the Army Chief of Staff anounced a similar conviction. Baron Hiranuma, after having asked a number of questions, called for amendment of the reservation in the first alternative to provide that the declaration "comprised no demand which would prejudice the prerogatives of the Emperor as a sovereign ruler"; this amendment being approved by all, Hiranuma agreed to that alternative.
There being still a division of opinion, the Premier said that he regretted that he must humbly beg the Emperor's decision. The Emperor quietly said that he approved the opinion of the Foreign Minister; the confidence of the services in ultimate victory, he said, could not be relied upon, their earlier forecasts having often been at variance with the realities. As to the prospects of resisting invasion, even yet, he pointed out, the defenses of Kujükurihama--for example--were far from completion. Now, bearing the unbearable, he would submit to the terms of the Potsdam Declaration, thereby to preserve the national polity.
The Imperial Conference thereupon ended, at about half-past two. The Cabinet met at 3:00 A.M., and unanimously adopted a decision in conformity with the Emperor's words.
I hastened to the Foreign Ministry and drafted the telegram of notification to the Allies on the basis of the Imperial Conference decision. Communication to the United States having to go through the government of Switzerland, the Power protecting our interests, the message which follows was dispatched to Minister Kase in Bern at 7:00 A.M. of the 10th. An identical note went to Minister Okamoto in Stockholm for communication through the Swedish government to Great Britain and the U.S.S.R., and steps were taken to have our decision conveyed to the Chinese government also, through Switzerland.
In obedience to the gracious command of His Majesty the Emperor who, ever anxious to enhance the cause of world peace, desires earnestly to bring about a speedy termination of hostilities with a view to saving mankind from the calamities to be imposed upon them by further continuation of the war, the Japanese Government several weeks ago asked the Soviet Government, with which neutral relations then prevailed, to render good offices in restoring peace vis-à-vis the enemy powers. Unfortunately, these efforts in the interest of peace having failed, the Japanese Government in conformity with the august wish of His Majesty to restore the general peace and desiring to put an end to the untold sufferings entailed by war as quickly as possible, have decided upon the following.
The Japanese Government are ready to accept the terms enumerated in the joint declaration which was issued at Potsdam on July 26th, 1945, by the heads of the Governments of the United States, Great Britain, and China, and later subscribed by the Soviet Government, with the understanding that the said declaration does not comprise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a Sovereign Ruler.
The Japanese Government sincerely hope that this understanding is warranted and desire keenly that an explicit indication to that effect will be speedily forthcoming.
August 10, the 20th year of Shöwa.
Shigenori Togo (1882-1950) was foreign minister of Japan at the time of Pearl Harbor and also at the end of the war. His diplomatic career included appointments as ambassador to Germany (1937) and to Moscow (1938-1941). Togo was identified with the anti-militarist faction in the Japanese government, and he was recalled from retirement in April, 1945, to participate in the cabinet formed by Admiral Suzuki which arranged the surrender. After the war he was convicted of war crimes; he later died in an American military hospital.