THE
WHITE HOUSE
Office
of the Press Secretary
________________________________________________________________________
For Immediate Release
November
6, 1998
TEXT
OF A LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT
TO THE SPEAKER OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
AND THE PRESIDENT
PRO TEMPORE OF THE SENATE
November
5, 1998
Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. President:)
Consistent with the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against
Iraq Resolution (Public Law 102-1) and as part of my effort to keep the
Congress fully informed, I am reporting on the status of efforts to
obtain Iraq's compliance with the resolutions adopted by the United
Nations Security Council (UNSC). This report covers the period from
September 3 to the present.
Introduction
On October 31, Iraq announced that it was ceasing all cooperation with
the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) including monitoring
activity. This announcement represents a serious escalation of Iraq's
August 5 decision to suspend cooperation with UNSCOM and the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). On October 31, the UNSC
issued a statement condemning Iraq's decision as a "flagrant violation
of relevant Council resolutions and of the Memorandum of Understanding
signed between the Secretary General and the Deputy Prime Minister of
Iraq" last February. Iraq's action followed its receipt of a letter
from the UK (as President of the Security Council) indicating a
willingness to conduct a comprehensive review, but only after Iraq
returned to full compliance. Since the October 31 statement, UNSCOM
has been able to conduct only very limited monitoring activity.
Earlier, on September 9, the UNSC unanimously adopted Resolution 1194,
which condemns Iraq's August 5 decision as a "totally unacceptable
contravention of its obligations," demands that Iraq rescind its
decision and resume cooperation, and suspends bimonthly sanctions
reviews until UNSCOM and IAEA report that they are satisfied that Iraq
has done so.
The resolution also notes the Council's willingness to hold a
comprehensive review of "Iraq's compliance with its obligations under
all relevant resolutions once Iraq has rescinded its ... decision [to
suspend cooperation] and demonstrated that it is prepared to fulfill
all its obligations, including, in particular on disarmament issues, by
resuming full cooperation with the Special Commission and the IAEA ..."
On September 23, the P-5 Foreign Ministers issued a statement
reiterating that Iraq's actions are "totally unacceptable," and
confirmed that "Iraq must respond immediately to Security Council
Resolution 1194 and resume full cooperation." The statement also noted
that the prerequisite for a comprehensive review was Iraq's
"unconditional resumption" of cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA.
Tariq Aziz spent several days at the United Nations in New York at the
end of September discussing the comprehensive review with Security
Council members and the Secretary General. The Secretary General's
Special Representative Prakash Shah is engaged in discussions in Baghdad
on the subject. Despite Iraq's lobbying efforts, the Secretary General
and all Council members remain united in judging Iraq's actions
unacceptable; all 15 Council members supported the Council President's
letter to the Secretary General that said Iraq must rescind its August 5
decision and resume cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA. We continue
to work with the Council to convince Iraq to reverse course, but we
have not ruled out any option should the Council fail to reverse Iraq's
decision.
We continue to support the international community's efforts to
provide for the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people through the
"oil-for-food" program. On May 27, 1998, Iraq presented a distribution
plan for the implementation of Resolution 1153, which had been adopted
on February 20. Under phase three of the "oil-for-food" program, which
ran from December 3, 1997, through June 2, 1998, $1.2 billion worth of
humanitarian goods were approved for export to Iraq. Under the current
phase, phase four, which began in June, the U.N. Sanctions Committee
has approved the purchase of over $1.2 billion worth of humanitarian
goods. United States companies can participate in the "oil-for-food"
program, and over $185 million worth of direct contracts for U.S. firms
have been approved since the program began.
Recent developments in northern Iraq demonstrate once again the power
of persistent diplomacy. On September 17, leaders of the two main Iraqi
Kurdish parties, Massoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani, met together for
the first time in over 4 years to sign a forward-looking joint statement
committing their parties to reconciliation. Their talks, held at the
Department of State under U.S. auspices, followed 6 months of intensive
discussions and close consultation with the Kurdish parties and with our
Turkish and British allies. The statesmanlike achievement of the Iraqi
Kurdish leaders signals a hopeful new chapter for all the people of
northern Iraq.
On October 31, I signed into law the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998. Work
also continues on the existing opposition program to help opposition
groups unify politically, and the new Radio Free Iraq service began
broadcasting in late October. These new programs will help us
encourage the Iraqi people to build a pluralistic, peaceful Iraq that
observes the international rule of law and respects basic human rights.
Such an Iraq would have little trouble regaining its rightful place in
the region and in the international community.
U.S. and Coalition Force Levels in the Gulf Region
Saddam's record of aggressive behavior forces us to retain a highly
capable force presence in the region in order to deter Iraq and deal
with any threat it might pose to its neighbors. The United States and
allied forces now in the theater are prepared to deal with all
contingencies. We have the capability to respond rapidly to possible
Iraqi aggression. We will continue to maintain a robust force posture
and have established a rapid reinforcement capability to supplement our
forces in the Gulf when needed. Our cruise missile force is twice the
pre-October 1997 level and can be augmented significantly within days.
Our contingency plans allow us the capability for swift, powerful
strikes if that becomes necessary.
Our forces in the region include land and carrier-based aircraft,
surface warships, a Marine expeditionary unit, a Patriot missile
battalion, a mechanized battalion task force, and a mix of special
operations forces deployed in support of U.S. Central Command
operations. To enhance force protection throughout the region,
additional military security personnel are also deployed.
Operation Northern Watch and Operation Southern Watch
The United States and coalition partners continue to enforce the no-fly
zones over Iraq under Operation Northern Watch and Operation Southern
Watch. There were no observed no-fly zone violations during the period
covered by this report. We have made clear to Iraq and to all other
relevant parties that the United States and coalition partners will
continue to enforce both no-fly zones.
The Maritime Interception Force
The Maritime Interception Force (MIF), operating in accordance with
Resolution 665 and other relevant resolutions, vigorously enforces U.N.
sanctions in the Gulf. The U.S. Navy is the single largest component of
this multinational force, but it is frequently augmented by ships,
aircraft, and other support from Australia, Canada, Belgium, Kuwait, The
Netherlands, New Zealand, the UAE, and the United Kingdom. Member
states of the Gulf Cooperation Council also support the MIF by
providing logistical support and shipriders and by accepting vessels
diverted for violating U.N. sanctions against Iraq.
The MIF continues to intercept vessels involved in illegal smuggling
into and out of Iraq. In late August, the MIF conducted stepped-up
operations in the far northern Gulf in the shallow waters near the
major Iraqi waterways. These operations severely disrupted smuggling
operations in the region. A new round of stepped up activity took
place in mid-October. Since the beginning of the year, over 40 vessels
have been detained for violations of the embargo and sent to ports in
the Gulf for enforcement actions. Kuwait and the UAE, two countries
adjacent to the smuggling routes, have also stepped up their own
enforcement efforts and have intercepted and detained vessels involved
in sanctions violations. Although refined petroleum products leaving
Iraq comprise most of the prohibited traffic, the MIF has also
intercepted a growing number of ships in smuggling prohibited goods
into Iraq in violation of U.N. sanctions resolutions and the
"oil-for-food" program. Ships involved in smuggling frequently utilize
the territorial seas of Iran to avoid MIF patrols. In September, Iran
closed the Shatt Al Arab waterway to smugglers and we observed the
lowest level of illegal gasoil smuggling in 2 years. Iran apparently
reopened the waterway in October. Detailed reports of these smuggling
activities have been provided to the U.N. Sanctions Committee in New
York.
Chemical Weapons
Iraq continues to deny that it ever weaponized VX nerve agent or
produced stabilized VX, despite UNSCOM's publicly stated confidence in
the Edgewood Arsenal laboratory finding of stabilized VX components in
fragments of Iraqi SCUD missile warheads. Tests by France and
Switzerland on other warhead fragments have been conducted to help
UNSCOM estimate the total number of warheads loaded with VX. On
October 22 and 23, international experts from seven countries met to
discuss all analytical results obtained in the course of UNSCOM's
verification of Iraq's declarations related to VX activities.
Ambassador Butler reported to the U.N. Security Council on October 26
that the international experts "unanimously concluded" that "all
analytical data" provided by the United States, Swiss, and French
laboratories involved were considered "conclusive and valid."
Ambassador Butler continued, "the existence of VX degradation products
conflicts with Iraqi declarations that the unilaterally destroyed
special warheads had never been filled with CW agents." The experts
recommended that UNSCOM ask Iraq to explain the origin and history of
the fragments analyzed by all three laboratories and the presence of
degradation products of nerve agents, and to explain the presence of a
compound known as VX stabilizer and its degradation product.
Iraq still refuses to turn over to UNSCOM the Iraqi Air Force document
found by UNSCOM inspectors that details chemical weapons expended during
the Iran-Iraq war. We understand that UNSCOM believes the document
indicates that Iraq's official declarations to UNSCOM have greatly
overstated the quantities of chemical weapons expended, which means a
greater number of chemical weapons are unaccounted for than previously
estimated.
Biological Weapons
Iraq has failed to provide a credible explanation for UNSCOM tests that
found anthrax in fragments of seven SCUD missile warheads. Iraq has
been claiming since 1995 that it put anthrax in only five such
warheads, and had previously denied weaponizing anthrax at all. Iraq's
explanations to date are far from satisfactory, although it now
acknowledges putting both anthrax and botulinum toxin into some number
of warheads.
Iraq's biological weapons (BW) program, including SCUD missile BW
warheads, R-400 BW bombs, drop-tanks to be filled with BW, spray devices
for BW, production of BW agents (anthrax, botulinum toxin, aflatoxin,
and wheat cover smut), and BW agent growth media, remains the "black
hole" described by Ambassador Butler. Iraq has consistently failed to
provide a credible account of its efforts to produce and weaponize its
BW agents.
In response to a U.S. proposal, the Security Council agreed on
October 13 to seek clarification from Iraq of statements made by Iraqi
officials on October 7 concerning the existence of additional
information on biological weapons still in Iraq's hands, and about
Iraq's refusal to turn over the Iraqi Air Force document on chemical
weapons expended in the Iran-Iraq War.
Long-Range Missiles
While Iraq continued to allow UNSCOM to witness flight tests of
nonprohibited Iraqi missiles with range under 150 km (this cooperation
has not been tested since the October 31 decision), there has been no
change in (1) Iraq's refusal to further discuss its system for
concealment of longer-range missiles and their components, (2) Iraq's
refusal to provide credible evidence of its disposition of large
quantities of the unique fuel required for the long-range SCUD missile,
or (3) Iraq's continued test modifications to SA-2 VOLGA surface-to-air
missile components, despite written objections by UNSCOM (reported to
the Security Council). These areas contribute to an Iraqi capability
to produce a surface-to-surface missile of range greater than its
permitted range of 150 km.
While UNSCOM believes it can account for 817 of 819 imported Soviet-made
SCUD missiles, Iraq has refused to give UNSCOM a credible accounting of
the indigenous program that produced complete SCUD missiles that were
both successfully test-flown and delivered to the Iraqi army.
Nuclear Weapons
The nuclear weapons situation remains as it was on August 11, 1998, when
IAEA Director General El Baradei wrote to the President of the Security
Council that Iraq's August 5 suspension of cooperation with UNSCOM and
the IAEA allows only "limited implementation of its ongoing monitoring"
and "makes it impossible ... to investigate ... remaining questions and
concerns ..." In its 6-month report to the U.N. Security Council on
October 7, the IAEA stated that it had a "technically coherent" view of
the Iraqi nuclear program. There are remaining questions, but IAEA
believes they can be dealt with within IAEA's ongoing monitoring and
verification effort.
But the report also stated that Iraq's current suspension of cooperation
with the IAEA limits the IAEA's right to full and free access. The IAEA
is currently unable to investigate further aspects of Iraq's clandestine
program or to ensure that prohibited activities are not being carried
out in Iraq, free from the risk of detection through direct measures.
Dual-Use Imports
Resolution 1051 established a joint UNSCOM/IAEA unit to monitor Iraq's
imports of allowed dual-use items. Iraq must notify the unit before it
imports specific items that can be used in both weapons of mass
destruction and civilian applications. Similarly, U.N. members must
provide timely notification of exports to Iraq of such dual-use items.
Given Iraq's current decision to suspend cooperation with UNSCOM/IAEA ,
we remain constantly vigilant for evidence of smuggling of items usable
in weapons of mass destruction.
The U.N.'s "Oil-for-Food" Program
We continue to support the international community's efforts to provide
for the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people through the
"oil-for-food" program. Under the last phase of the
"oil-for-food"
program, which ran from December 3, 1997, through June 2, 1998, $1.2
billion worth of humanitarian goods were approved for export to Iraq.
United States companies can participate in "oil-for-food," and $185
million worth of direct contracts for U.S. firms have been approved;
millions of dollars more have been earned through subcontracts. Since
the first deliveries under the "oil-for-food" program began in
March 1997, 7 million tons of food worth over $2.25 billion and $336
million worth of medicine and health supplies have been delivered to
Iraq.
Iraq is authorized to sell up to $5.2 billion worth of oil every 180
days, up from $2 billion in previous phases. Although Resolution 1153
was adopted on February 20, Iraq did not present an acceptable
distribution plan for the implementation of Resolution 1153 until
May 27, 1998; the plan was accepted by the U.N. Secretary General on
May 29. The U.N. Office of the Iraq Programme (OIP) has recently
released new estimates of the amount of oil revenues that will be
available during this phase of the program. Citing declining world oil
prices and the state of Iraq's oil industry, OIP now estimates that
income for the 6-month period ending in December will be around $3.3
billion. Discussions are under way within the Sanctions Committee and
OIP as to how best to meet the most immediate needs of the Iraqi people
in light of this projected shortfall in income.
Under the current phase (four) of the "oil-for-food" program, 622
contracts for the purchase of humanitarian goods for the Iraqi people
have been presented for approval; of these, 485 contracts worth over
$1.2 billion have been approved and 80 are on hold pending
clarification of questions about the proposed contracts. With regard
to oil sales, 58 contracts with a total value of over $2 billion have
been approved so far during this phase.
UNSC Resolution 1153 maintains a separate "oil-for-food" program for
northern Iraq, administered directly by the United Nations in
consultation with the local population. This program, which the United
States strongly supports, receives 13 to 15 percent of the funds
generated under the "oil-for-food" program. The separate northern
program was established because of the Baghdad regime's proven disregard
for the humanitarian needs of the Kurdish, Assyrian, and Turkomen
minorities of northern Iraq and its readiness to apply the most brutal
forms of repression against them. In northern Iraq, where Baghdad does
not exercise control, the "oil-for-food" program has been able to
operate relatively effectively. The Kurdish factions are setting aside
their differences to work together so that Resolution 1153 is
implemented as efficiently as possible.
The United Nations must carefully monitor implementation of Resolution
1153. As the current phase anticipates, infrastructure repairs in areas
such as oil export capacity, generation of electricity, and water
purification present increasing challenges to the U.N. monitoring
regime.
The Iraqi government continues to insist on the need for rapid lifting
of the sanctions regime, despite its clear record of noncompliance with
its obligations under relevant UNSC resolutions. Although the Iraqi
government maintains that sanctions cause widespread suffering among the
Iraqi populace, the Iraqi government is still not prepared to comply
with UNSC resolutions and thus create the conditions that would allow
sanctions to be lifted. Even if sanctions were lifted and the
Government of Iraq had complete control over oil revenues, it is
doubtful that conditions would improve for the Iraqi people. The Iraqi
government has for a number of years shown that meeting civilian needs
is not among its priorities. Humanitarian programs such as
"oil-for-food" have steadily improved the life of the average Iraqi
(who, for example, now receives a ration basket providing 2,000
kilocalories per day; a significant improvement in nutrition since the
program began) while denying Saddam Hussein control over oil revenues.
We will continue to work with the U.N. Secretariat, the Security
Council, and others in the international community to ensure that the
humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people are met while denying any
political or economic benefits to the Baghdad regime.
Northern Iraq: Kurdish Reconciliation
On September 16 and 17, Massoud Barzani, President of the Kurdistan
Democratic Party (KDP), and Jalal Talabani, Chairman of the Patriotic
Union of Kurdistan (PUK), met for the first time in more than 4 years
in talks held at the Department of State. Secretary Albright,
welcoming the two leaders, congratulated them on the courageous step
they were taking on behalf of their people. She expressed the United
States deep concern for the safety, security, and economic well-being
of Iraqi Kurds, Shias, Sunnis, and others who have been subject to
brutal attacks by the Baghdad regime. She also made it clear that the
United States will decide how and when to respond to Baghdad's actions
based on the threat they pose to Iraq's neighbors, to regional
security, to vital U.S. interests, and to the Iraqi people, including
those in the north.
While in Washington, Mr. Barzani and Mr. Talabani signed a joint
statement committing themselves to a timeline to improve the regional
administration of the three northern provinces in the context of the
1996 Ankara Accords. Over the next 9 months, they will seek to unify
their administrations, share revenues, define the status of their major
cities, and hold elections. A key component for the success of this
program will be continued meetings between the two leaders. To make
this possible, both parties have condemned internal fighting, pledged
to refrain from violence in settling their differences, and resolved to
eliminate terrorism by establishing stronger safeguards for Iraq's
borders.
The Washington talks followed 6 months of intensive diplomatic efforts
including a visit to northern Iraq by Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State David Welch and consultations in Ankara and London by
both Kurdish parties. Since the Washington talks, we have continued to
work closely on these issues with the Iraqi Kurds and with Turkey and
Great Britain. Both leaders met with U.N. officials in New York and
they were together hosted by members of the House of Representatives
Committee on International Relations.
The United States firmly supports the unity and territorial integrity
of Iraq. Supporting the rights and welfare of Iraqi Kurds within Iraq
in no way contradicts this position. In their joint statement, the
Kurdish leaders clearly enunciated this principle. The United States
is committed to ensuring that international aid continues to reach the
north, that the human rights of the Kurds and northern Iraq minority
groups, such as the Turkomen, Assyrians, Yezedis, and others are
respected, and that the no-fly zone enforced by Operation Northern Watch
is observed.
The Human Rights Situation in Iraq
The human rights situation throughout Iraq continues to be a cause for
grave concern. As I reported September 3, the regime increased its
security presence in predominantly Shia southern Iraq after the
assassinations of two distinguished Shia clerics -- deaths widely
attributed to regime agents. Since that time, the Iraqi army has
conducted a series of repressive operations against the Shia in Nasiriya
and Amara Provinces. In particular, the government continues to work
toward the destruction of the Marsh Arabs' way of life and the unique
ecology of the southern marshes. These events expose a callous
disregard for human life and the free exercise of religion.
Summary, arbitrary, and extrajudicial executions also remain a primary
concern. Baghdad still refuses to allow independent inspections of
Iraqi prisons despite the conclusion of U.N. Special Rapporteur for
Iraq, Max Van der Stoel, that "there is strong evidence that hundreds
of prisoners (were) executed in Abu Gharaib and Radwaniyah prisons"
late last year. The U.N. Human Rights Commission in April issued a
strong condemnation of the "all-pervasive repression and oppression" of
the Iraqi government. Nevertheless, sources inside Iraq report another
wave of executions in June, with about 60 people summarily killed.
Preliminary reports indicate that the killings continued into July and
August.
In the north, outside the Kurdish-controlled areas, the government
continues the forced expulsion of tens of thousands of ethnic Kurds and
Turkomen from Kirkuk and other cities. In recent months, 545 more
families were reportedly expelled from Kirkuk (al-Tamim province) with
7 new Arab settlements created on land seized from the Kurds. Reports
from the Kurdish-controlled areas where the displaced persons are
received indicate that they are forced to leave behind almost all of
their personal property. Due to a shortage of housing, they are still
living in temporary shelters as winter approaches.
The government also continues to stall and obfuscate attempts to
account for more than 600 Kuwaitis and third-country nationals who
disappeared at the hands of Iraqi authorities during or after the
occupation of Kuwait. It shows no sign of complying with Resolution
688, which demands that Iraq cease the repression of its own people.
The Iraqi Opposition
It is the policy of the United States to support the Iraqi opposition
by establishing unifying programs in which all of the opposition can
participate. We are working to encourage and assist political
opposition groups, nonpartisan opposition groups, and unaffiliated
Iraqis concerned about their nation's future in peacefully espousing
democracy, pluralism, human rights, and the rule of law for their
country. These committed Iraqis hope to build a consensus on the
transition from dictatorship to pluralism, convey to the United Nations
their views on Iraqi noncompliance with U.N. resolutions, and compile
information to support holding Iraqi officials criminally responsible
for violations of international humanitarian law.
On October 31, I signed into law the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998. It
provides new discretionary authorities to assist the opposition in their
struggle against the regime. This Act makes clear the sense of the
Congress that the United States should support efforts to achieve a very
different future for Iraq than the bitter, current reality of internal
repression and external aggression.
There are, of course, other important elements of U.S. policy. These
include the maintenance of U.N. Security Council support efforts to
eliminate Iraq's prohibited weapons and missile programs and economic
sanctions that continue to deny the regime the means to reconstitute
those threats to international peace and security. United States
support for the Iraqi opposition will be carried out consistent with
those policy objectives as well. Similarly, U.S. support must be
attuned to what the opposition can effectively make use of as it
develops over time.
The United Nations Compensation Commission
The United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC), established pursuant
to Resolutions 687 and 692, continues to resolve claims against Iraq
arising from Iraq's unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait. The
UNCC has issued over 1.3 million awards worth approximately $7 billion.
Thirty percent of the proceeds from the oil sales permitted by
Resolutions 986, 1111, 1143, and 1153 have been allocated to the
Compensation Fund to pay awards and to finance operations of the UNCC.
To the extent that money is available in the Compensation Fund, initial
payments to each claimant are authorized for awards in the order in
which the UNCC has approved them, in installments of $2,500. To date,
the United States Government has received funds from the UNCC for
initial installment payments on approximately 1435 claims of U.S.
claimants.
Conclusion
Iraq remains a serious threat to international peace and security. I
remain determined to see Iraq comply fully with all of its obligations
under U.N. Security Council resolutions. The United States looks
forward to the day when Iraq rejoins the family of nations as a
responsible and law-abiding member.
I appreciate the support of the Congress for our efforts and shall
continue to keep the Congress informed about this important issue.
Sincerely,
WILLIAM
J. CLINTON