BEHIND THE BREAKING NEWS
A Briefing From
The Institute For The Study Of Conflict, Ideology And Policy
Volume II, Number 3 (July 25, 2000)
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Once a Chekist ...
By MIRIAM LANSKOY
The Institute For The Study Of Conflict, Ideology And Policy
Since his inauguration, Russian President Vladimir Putin has waged an
ever-widening assault on every potential source of political opposition --
the media, the governors, big business. Although far from perfect, these
institutions do represent the rudiments of a pluralistic society, the
development of which is threatened at present by the vast powers of the
presidency and Putin's growing reliance on the security forces.
Some recent commentary on Russian politics no longer stigmatizes an
association with the bloodiest organization in human history. Quite the
opposite: Joining the KGB is likened to studying at a prestigious American
university -- the natural destination for the brightest and best.
Some have gone far beyond such comparisons, arguing as Tatiana Tolstaya
did in her review of Putin's biography (May 10 issue of the New York
Review of Books, p. 10) that KGB oversight was indispensable for
democratic governance. "At a time when everyone was in a rush to
declare
his changed views, Putin remained true to the discipline of the
Corporation," she writes approvingly. "One can only think that his
unprecedented rise to the position of deputy mayor under Sobchak meant
that the Corporation trusted him with this high position, anticipating
that the inexperienced democrats were likely to botch things up."
In its flight of fantasy about the wise KGB agents looking out for the
social good, the review neglects to analyze the book in question, which
contains some very interesting insights into Putin's unapologetically
chekist views, the implications of which are now becoming operational.
AFGHANISTAN Putin was a KGB agent for 16 years, from 1975 to 1991. He
first became interested in this work as a teenager after seeing the movie
"Sword and Shield" which glorified Russian spies. Having
recently joined
the KGB, the young idealistic Putin, whose feelings for everything
connected with the war in Afghanistan are "one big hurrah!,"
meets a more
seasoned colleague who has returned from a tour there.(1) Putin asks the
agent how he would judge the results of his work. The man responds that
he judges his own performance by the quantity of documents he didn't sign.
Putin explains that every bombing mission required the signature of a KGB
agent. (p. 61)
Putin uses this anecdote to paint his fellow spies as the advance guard of
liberal reforms, but a different point is of greater import: If KGB
officers in Afghanistan were overseeing military operations, this is an
astounding revelation. The institution of political commissars had been
eliminated after World War II, and even then the political officer looking
over the shoulder of the military commander was a representative of the
party, not of the KGB. It could be that Putin is mistaken and the KGB did
not have that degree of responsibility for military operations in
Afghanistan, but the very fact that this level of KGB intrusion can be
presented in such an offhand way raises a related issue: Last February,
when Putin's decree assigned FSB agents to every military unit in
Chechnya, what role did he grant them? Are those agents performing
counterintelligence or are they there in a decision-making capacity?
STASI The chapter devoted to Putin's stay in the GDR is the most
emotionally and politically charged part of the book. Consider the gulf
between the sensibility of most reformers and that of the Putins revealed
in the following comment from Vladimir's wife, Ludmilla: "[W]hen the
Berlin wall was being destroyed and it became evident that this is the
end, there was this terrible feeling, that the country which almost had
become your own would no longer exist." (p. 68)
While Ludmilla grieved over the passing of the GDR, Vladimir pitied the
fate of his Stasi colleagues to whom he was deeply devoted. Even when he
became the deputy mayor of St. Petersburg, he used the position to lobby
in their interest by warning the German consul, "Keep in mind that I am
getting letters, these are my personal contacts. I understand you have a
campaign against former state security agents -- they are hounded for
political reasons -- but they are my friends and I will not abandon them."
(p. 67)
Putin comments that the GDR was decades behind the Soviet Union in its
rigid adherence to communism but later he had to watch, powerless and
furious, as this seemingly doctrinaire society undid the police state,
disbanded the Stasi, and imposed lustration laws. Seeing his Stasi chums
suffer public humiliation, Putin considered the odds of having to undergo
a similar fate.
ST. PETERSBURG ADMINISTRATION Shortly after his return to St.
Petersburg, Putin, whose credentials don't seem to have any particular
relevance to city administration, applied for a position with Anatoly
Sobchak's team at the urging of an unidentified acquaintance. Putin
barely knew Sobchak, although he took the mayor's course at the law
department of St. Petersburg University. The "corporate"
representative
presented himself at Sobchak's office, explained that he was on staff with
the KGB, asked for a job with the mayor, and was hired on the spot. (pp.
78-79)
At present, we have no way of evaluating the accuracy of that story, but
what we are being asked to believe is fairly incredible: That it is
entirely natural for one of Russia's leading democrats to hire a chekist
as his right-hand man. At the same time Putin suggests that some members
of Sobchak's team were uncomfortable with Putin's KGB employment and had
threatened to expose him. This prompted Putin to disarm his opponents
skillfully by making a televised disclosure.(2) Putin portrays these
opponents, the persons trying to keep a chekist out of the city
government, as corrupt, intolerant, and opportunistic.
AUGUST COUP Then came the August 1991 coup attempt, which dissolved
against the wave of democratic enthusiasm. These events gave Putin the
jitters. "Do you remember the situation in which the security organs
found themselves then? That wave wanted to destroy [the KGB], break [it]
apart, rip [it] to shreds. There were suggestions to open up the lists of
agents, to declassify files. " (p. 129) Putin's savior was a
democratic
figure, a former policeman, Sergei Stepashin, who became the new head of
the St. Petersburg FSK (heir to the KGB and predecessor to FSB).
"Stepashin behaved in a completely unexpected way. In effect, he used
his
democratic credentials to shield the security services," thereby winning
Putin's eternal gratitude.(3)
The storm passed, "our Cheka" remained intact, and Putin survived to
repay
his debts. When Putin was working in the presidential administration he
suggested that Stepashin be appointed justice minister.
When Putin became president, he nominated Stepashin to be the head of the
Audit Chamber-- a nightstick with which to beat the oligarchs.
NOTES: (1) All the quotes represent my translations from Ot pervogo
litsa: razgovory c Vladimirom Putinym (Moskva: 2000); the page numbers
refer to the Russian book. The Russian text can be obtained from
www.vagrius.com. There is an English
translation available in bookstores
by Catherine A. Fitzpatrick, First Person: An Astonishingly Frank
Self-Portrait by Russia's President Vladimir Putin.
(2) The incident recalls an earlier passage in the book where Putin
describes how the KGB would undermine dissident activists by preempting
them. The KGB would sponsor an event identical to the one the dissidents
were planning, thereby robbing the dissident event of any news value.
(pp. 43-44)
(3) Putin also mentions personalities who obstructed the progress of his
career. In 1996 Putin needed a job because Sobchak had lost the
gubernatorial elections. First, he was promised a diplomatic post but
this fell through, apparently due to Yevgeni Primakov's hesitations. (p.
110) As foreign minister and previously head of Russia's foreign
intelligence, Primakov would have been able to obtain and evaluate Putin's
professional record. That rejection must have hurt. Subsequently, Nikolai
Yegorov, then-head of the president's administration, intended to make
Putin his deputy. But Yegorov was removed before he could make good on
the promise and his replacement, Anatoli Chubais, eliminated the
position.(p. 120) Of course, Putin professes to hold no grudges.