THE
WHITE HOUSE
Office
of the Press Secretary
________________________________________________________________________
For Immediate Release
November
12, 1998
TEXT OF A LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND THE
PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE ON WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, 12 November 1998
November
12, 1998
Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. President:)
On November 14, 1994, in light of the dangers of the proliferation of
nuclear, biological and chemical weapons ("weapons of mass destruction"
-- WMD) and of the means of delivering such weapons, I issued Executive
Order 12938, and declared a national emergency under the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.). Under section
202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), the national
emergency terminates on the anniversary date of its declaration, unless
I publish in the Federal Register and transmit to the Congress a notice
of its continuation.
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of
delivery continues to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the
national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States.
Indeed, on July 28, 1998, I issued Executive Order 13094 to strengthen
Executive Order 12938 by, inter alia, broadening the types of
proliferation activity that is subject to potential penalties. I am,
therefore, advising the Congress that the national emergency declared on
November 14, 1994, must continue in effect beyond November 14, 1998.
Accordingly, I have extended the national emergency declared in
Executive Order 12938, as amended, and have sent the attached notice of
extension to the Federal Register for publication.
On July 28, 1998, I amended section 4 of Executive Order 12938 so that
the United States Government could more effectively respond to the
worldwide threat of weapons of mass destruction proliferation
activities. The amendment to section 4 strengthens Executive Order
12938 in several significant ways. The amendment broadens the type of
proliferation activity that subjects entities to potential penalties
under the Executive order. The original Executive order provided for
penalties for contributions to the efforts of any foreign country,
project or entity to use, acquire, design, produce, or stockpile
chemical or biological weapons; the amended Executive order also covers
contributions to foreign programs for nuclear weapons and for missiles
capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, the
amendment expands the original Executive order to include attempts to
contribute to foreign proliferation activities, as well as actual
contributions, and broadens the range of potential penalties to
expressly include the prohibition of United States Government assistance
to foreign persons, as well as the prohibition of United States
Government procurement and imports into the United States.
The following report, which covers activities on or before October 31,
1998, is made pursuant to section 204 of the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1703) and section 401(c) of the National
Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1641(c)), regarding activities taken and
money spent pursuant to the emergency declaration. Additional
information on nuclear, missile, and/or chemical and biological weapons
(CBW) proliferation concerns and nonproliferation efforts is contained
in the most recent annual Report on the Proliferation of Missiles and
Essential Components of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons,
provided to the Congress pursuant to section 1097 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (Public Law
102-190), also known as the "Nonproliferation Report," and the most
recent annual report provided to the Congress pursuant to section 308
of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination
Act of 1991 (Public Law 102-182), also known as the "CBW Report."
Nuclear Weapons
In May, India and Pakistan each conducted a series of nuclear tests. In
response, I imposed sanctions on India and Pakistan as required by the
Glenn Amendment. Beyond our unilateral response, world reaction was
pronounced and included nearly universal condemnation across a broad
range of international fora and a broad range of sanctions, including
new restrictions on lending by international financial institutions
unrelated to basic human needs and aid from the G-8 and other countries.
Since the mandatory imposition of U.S. sanctions, we have worked
unilaterally, with other P-5 and G-8 members, and through the United
Nations to dissuade India and Pakistan from taking further steps toward
creating operational nuclear forces, to urge them to join multilateral
arms control efforts, to persuade them to prevent an arms race and build
confidence by practicing restraint, and to resume efforts to resolve
their differences through dialogue. The P-5, G-8, and U.N. Security
Council have called on India and Pakistan to take a broad range of
concrete actions. The United States has over the past 5 months focused
most intensely on several objectives that can be met over the short and
medium term: an end to nuclear testing and prompt, unconditional
adherence to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT); a
moratorium on production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and
other explosive devices, and engagement in productive negotiations on a
fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT); restraint in deployment of
nuclear-capable missiles and aircraft; and adoption of controls meeting
international standards on exports of sensitive materials and
technology.
Against this backdrop of international pressure on India and Pakistan,
U.S. high-level dialogue with Indian and Pakistani officials has yielded
some progress. Both governments, having already declared testing
moratoria, indicated publicly that they are prepared to adhere to the
CTBT under certain conditions. Both withdrew their opposition to
negotiations on an FMCT in Geneva at the end of the 1998 Conference on
Disarmament session. They have also pledged to institute strict control
of sensitive exports that meet internationally accepted standards. In
addition, they have resumed bilateral dialogue on outstanding disputes,
including Kashmir, at the Foreign Secretary level.
In recognition of these positive steps and to encourage further
progress, I decided on November 3 to exercise my authority under the
Brownback provision of the 1999 Omnibus Appropriations bill (Public Law
105-277) to waive some of the Glenn sanctions. Through this action, I
have authorized the resumption of Export-Import Bank, Overseas Private
Investment Corporation, Trade and Development Agency, and International
Military Education and Training programs in India and Pakistan and have
lifted restrictions on U.S. banks in these countries. We will continue
discussions with both governments at the senior and expert levels, and
our diplomatic efforts in concert with the P-5 and in international
fora.
So far, 150 countries have signed and 21 have ratified the CTBT. During
1998, CTBT signatories conducted numerous meetings of the Preparatory
Commission (PrepCom) in Vienna, seeking to promote rapid completion of
the International Monitoring System (IMS) established by the Treaty.
On September 23, 1997, I transmitted the CTBT to the Senate, requesting
prompt advice and consent to ratification. The CTBT will serve several
U.S. national security interests by prohibiting all nuclear explosions.
It will constrain the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear
weapons; end the development of advanced new types; contribute to the
prevention of nuclear proliferation and the process of nuclear
disarmament; and strengthen international peace and security. The CTBT
marks a historic milestone in our drive to reduce the nuclear threat and
to build a safer world.
The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) held its 1998 Plenary in Edinburgh,
Scotland, March 30 to April 2, on the twentieth anniversary of the
publication of the Nuclear Suppliers Guidelines. With 35 member states,
the NSG is a mature, effective, and widely accepted export-control
arrangement. Over the past 7 years the NSG has established a Dual-Use
Regime (DUR), agreed to require full-scope safeguards as a condition of
nuclear supply, created an effective Joint Information Exchange, and
strengthened controls over technology and retransfers. The NSG is
considering further activities to promote regime transparency, following
the success of the 1997 Vienna transparency seminar, and is preparing
for a transparency seminar in New York during the run-up to the 1999 NPT
PrepCom.
The NSG is considering membership for Belarus, China, Cyprus, Kazakhstan
and Turkey. China is the only major nuclear supplier that is not a
member of the NSG, although China did join the Zangger Committee last
year and recently has expressed an interest in learning more about the
NSG.
The NPT Exporters (Zangger) Committee has demonstrated its continued
relevance to the multilateral nonproliferation regime as the interpreter
of Article III-2 of the NPT by the membership of China in October 1997
by recently agreeing to a statement deploring the Indian and Pakistani
nuclear tests. This is the first time the Zangger Committee has ever
issued a statement not directly related to publication of its
Guidelines. Furthermore, the Zangger Committee is considering a U.S.
proposal to add conversion technology to the Trigger List.
Chemical and Biological Weapons
The export control regulations issued under the Enhanced Proliferation
Control Initiative (EPCI) remain fully in force and continue to be
applied by the Department of Commerce in order to control the export of
items with potential use in chemical or biological weapons or unmanned
delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction.
Chemical weapons (CW) continue to pose a very serious threat to our
security and that of our allies. On April 29, 1997, the Convention on
the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of
Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (the Chemical Weapons
Convention or CWC) entered into force with 87 of the CWC's 165
signatories as original States Parties. The United States was among
their number, having deposited its instrument of ratification on April
25. Russia ratified the CWC on November 5, 1997, and became a State
Party on December 5, 1997. As of October 31, 1998, 120 countries
(including Iran, Pakistan, and Ukraine) have become States Parties.
The implementing body for the CWC -- the Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) -- was established at the entry
into force (EIF) of the Convention on April 29, 1997. The OPCW, located
in The Hague, has primary responsibility (along with States Parties) for
implementing the CWC. It collects declarations, conducts inspections,
and serves as a forum for consultation and cooperation among States
Parties. It consists of the Conference of the States Parties, the
Executive Council (EC), and the Technical Secretariat (TS).
The EC consists of 41 States Parties (including the United States) and
acts as the governing body for the OPCW between annual meetings of the
Conference of the States Parties. Since EIF, the EC has met numerous
times to address issues such as scale of assessments, CW production
facility conversion requests, facility and transitional verification
arrangements, and staff regulations.
The TS carries out the verification provisions of the CWC, and presently
has a staff of approximately 500, including about 200 inspectors trained
and equipped to inspect military and industrial facilities throughout
the world. The OPCW has conducted nearly 300 inspections in some 20
countries. It conducted nearly 100 such inspections in the United
States. The OPCW maintains a permanent inspector presence at
operational U.S. CW destruction facilities in Utah, Nevada, and Johnston
Island.
The United States is determined to seek full implementation of the
concrete measures in the CWC designed to raise the costs and risks for
any state or terrorist attempting to engage in chemical weapons-related
activities. The CWC's declaration requirements improve our knowledge of
possible chemical weapons activities. Its inspection provisions provide
for access to declared and undeclared facilities and locations, thus
making clandestine chemical weapons production and stockpiling more
difficult, more risky, and more expensive.
The Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998 was enacted
into law in October 1998, as part of the Omnibus Consolidated and
Emergency Supplemental Appropriation Act, 1999 (Public Law 105-277).
Accordingly, we anticipate rapid promulgation of implementing
regulations on submission of U.S. industrial declarations to the OPCW.
Submission of these declarations will bring the United States into full
compliance with the CWC. United States noncompliance to date has, among
other things, undermined U.S. leadership in the organization as well as
our ability to encourage other States Parties to make complete,
accurate, and timely declarations.
Countries that refuse to join the CWC will be politically isolated and
prohibited under the CWC from trading with States Parties in certain key
chemicals. The relevant treaty provision is specifically designed to
penalize in a concrete way countries that refuse to join the rest of the
world in eliminating the threat of chemical weapons. We anticipate
rapid promulgation of U.S. regulations implementing these CWC trade
restrictions.
The United States also continues to play a leading role in the
international effort to reduce the threat from biological weapons (BW).
We are an active participant in the Ad Hoc Group (AHG) striving to
complete a legally binding protocol to strengthen and enhance compliance
with the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production and Stock-piling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin
Weapons and on Their Destruction (the Biological Weapons Convention or
BWC). This Ad Hoc Group was mandated by the September 1994 BWC Special
Conference. The Fourth BWC Review Conference, held in November/December
1996, urged the AHG to complete the protocol as soon as possible but not
later than the next Review Conference to be held in 2001. Work is
progressing on a draft rolling text through insertion of national views
and clarification of existing text. We held four AHG negotiating
sessions in 1998, and five are scheduled for 1999.
On January 27, 1998, during the State of the Union Address, I announced
that the United States would take a leading role in the effort to erect
stronger international barriers against the proliferation and use of BW
by strengthening the BWC with a new international system to detect and
deter cheating. The United States will work closely with U.S. industry
to develop U.S. negotiating positions and then to reach international
agreement on: declarations, nonchallenge clarifying visits, and
challenge investigations. Other key issues to be resolved in the Ad Hoc
Group in 1999 are details on mandatory declarations, placement of
definitions related to declarations, and questions related to assistance
and export controls.
On the margins of the 1998 U.N. General Assembly, senior United States
Government representatives attended a Ministerial meeting hosted by the
Government of New Zealand and sponsored by the Government of Australia
to promote intensified work on the Compliance Protocol. I will continue
to devote personal attention to this issue and encourage other heads of
state to do the same.
The United States continued to be a leading participant in the 30-member
Australia Group (AG) CBW nonproliferation regime. The United States
attended the most recent annual AG Plenary Session from October 12-15,
1998, during which the Group continued to focus on strengthening AG
export controls and sharing information to address the threat of CBW
terrorism. At the behest of the United States, the AG first began
in-depth political-level discussion of CBW proliferation and terrorism
during the 1995 Plenary Session following the Tokyo subway nerve gas
attack earlier that year. At the 1998 plenary, at the behest of the
United States, AG participants shared information on legal and
regulatory efforts each member has taken to counter this threat. The AG
also reaffirmed its commitment to continue its active outreach program
of briefings for non-AG countries, and to promote regional consultations
on export controls and nonproliferation to further awareness and
understanding of national policies in these areas.
The Group also reaffirmed the participants' shared belief that full
adherence to the CWC and the BWC is the best way to achieve permanent
global elimination of CBW, and that all States adhering to these
Conventions have an obligation to ensure that their national activities
support this goal. The AG participants continue to seek to ensure that
all relevant national measures promote the object and purposes of the
BWC and CWC. The AG participants reaffirmed their belief that existing
national export licensing policies on chemical weapons-and biological
weapons-related items help to fulfill their obligations established
under Article I of the CWC and Article III of the BWC that States
Parties not assist, in any way, the acquisition, manufacture, or use of
chemical or biological weapons. Given this understanding, the AG
participants also reaffirmed their commitment to continuing the Group's
activities, now that the CWC has entered into force.
During the last 6 months, we continued to examine closely intelligence
and other reports of trade in CBW-related material and technology that
might be relevant to sanctions provisions under the Chemical and
Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991. No new
sanctions determinations were reached during this reporting period. The
United States also continues to cooperate with its AG partners and other
countries in stopping shipments of proliferation concern.
Missiles for Delivery of Weapons of Mass Destruction
The United States continues to carefully control exports that could
contribute to unmanned delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction
and to closely monitor activities of potential missile proliferation
concern. We also continue to implement the U.S. missile sanctions law.
In April 1998, we imposed Category I missile sanctions against North
Korean and Pakistani entities for the transfer from North Korea to
Pakistan of equipment and technology related to the Ghauri missile.
Sanctions imposed against two North Korean entities in August 1997 for
transfers involving Category II Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)
Annex items also remain in effect.
During this reporting period, MTCR Partners continued to work with each
other and with potential non-Partner supplier and transshipment states
to curb proliferation. Partners emphasized the need for implementing
effective export control systems and cooperated to interdict shipments
intended for use in missile programs of concern.
The United States was an active participant in the MTCR's highly
productive May 1998 Reinforced Point of Contact (RPOC) Meeting. At the
RPOC, MTCR Partners engaged in an in-depth discussion of regional
missile proliferation concerns, focusing in particular on South Asia.
They also discussed steps Partners could take to increase transparency
and outreach to nonmembers, and reached consensus to admit the Czech
Republic, Poland, and Ukraine to membership in the MTCR. (Reports on
their membership have been submitted to the Congress pursuant to section
73A of the Arms Export Control Act.)
In May 1998, the United States was an active participant in the
German-hosted MTCR workshop on brokering, catch-all controls, and other
export control issues. In June, the United States played a leading role
at the Swiss-hosted MTCR workshops on risk assessment in MTCR licensing
decisions. The workshops involved the participation of MTCR Partners,
as well as several non-MTCR members, and were successful in providing
practical insights on export control and licensing issues. In
particular, it helped participants identify risk factors and ways to
assess them. The MTCR held its Thirteenth Plenary Meeting in Budapest,
Hungary on October 5-9. At the Plenary, the MTCR Partners shared
information about activities and programs of missile proliferation
concern and considered additional steps they can take, individually and
collectively, to prevent the proliferation of delivery systems for
weapons of mass destruction, focusing in particular on the threat posed
by missile-related activities in South and North East Asia and the
Middle East.
During their discussions, the Partners gave special attention to North
Korean (DPRK) missile activities, expressing serious concern about the
DPRK's missile export practices and its efforts to acquire increasingly
long-range missiles. The MTCR Plenary Chairman issued a statement
reflecting the Partners' concerns, noting in particular that the
Partners urged the DPRK to refrain from further flight tests of
WMD-capable missiles and to cease exports of equipment and technology
for such missiles. The Partners also agreed to maintain special
scrutiny over their missile-related exports in order not to support
North Korean missile development in any way.
At Budapest, the Partners also discussed ways to further the MTCR's
efforts to promote openness and outreach to nonmembers, including by
sponsoring additional seminars and workshops for members and nonmembers.
The Partners supported a U.S. proposal for an MTCR-sponsored workshop in
1999 on "intangible transfers of technology," in order to develop a
greater understanding of how proliferators misuse the Internet,
scientific conferences, plant visits, and student exchange programs to
acquire sensitive technology and to identify steps countries can take to
address this problem. They also agreed to give further consideration to
a technical-level workshop for border guards and Customs authorities on
export control enforcement. In addition, the Partners noted China's
increased willingness to engage in meaningful dialogue on missile
nonproliferation and export control issues, and renewed their previous
invitation in principle to China to take the steps necessary to join the
Regime.
The Partners also made additional progress at Budapest toward
reformatting the MTCR Annex (the list of MTCR-controlled items) to
improve clarity and uniformity of implementation while maintaining the
coverage of the current Annex. They hope to complete this process in
the near future.
During this reporting period, the United States also worked unilaterally
and in coordination with its MTCR Partners to combat missile
proliferation and to encourage nonmembers to export responsibly and to
adhere to the MTCR Guidelines. Since my last report, we have continued
missile nonproliferation discussions with China and North Korea and
other countries in Central Europe, the Middle East, and Asia.
In October 1998, the United States and the DPRK held a third round of
missile talks, aimed at constraining DPRK missile production,
deployment, flight-testing, and exports. The United States expressed
serious concerns about North Korea's missile exports and indigenous
missile activities, and made clear that we regard as highly
destabilizing the DPRK's attempt on August 31 to use a Taepo Dong 1
missile to orbit a small satellite. We voiced strong opposition to
North Korea's missile exports to other countries and made clear that
further launches of long-range missiles or further exports of such
missiles or their related technology would have very negative
consequences for efforts to improve U.S.-North Korean relations. The
talks concluded with an agreement to hold another round at the earliest
practical date.
In response to reports of continuing Iranian efforts to acquire
sensitive items from Russian entities for use in Iran's missile
development program, the United States continued its high-level dialogue
with Russia aimed at finding ways the United States and Russia can work
together to cut off the flow of sensitive goods to Iran's ballistic
missile development program. This effort has netted some positive
results. For example, during this reporting period, Russia began
implementing "catch-all" provisions imposing controls over the export of
any material destined for a WMD or missile program, and provided
detailed implementing guidance on these controls for Russian entities.
Russia also agreed to meet regularly with the United States to discuss
export control issues. In addition, at the summit in September,
President Yeltsin and I announced the formation of seven bilateral
working groups -- nuclear, missile, catch-all and internal compliance,
conventional weapons, law enforcement, licensing, and customs -- for the
rapid exchange of information on the wide range of nonproliferation
issues.
In July, Russia launched special investigations of nine entities
suspected of cooperating with foreign programs to acquire WMD and
missile delivery systems. Russia subsequently took steps to end exports
to Iran by three of these entities and to pursue two of the cases as
smuggling issues. Consistent with the Russian action, the United States
took action against seven of the nine entities in July pursuant in part
to Executive Order 12938, as amended. We suspended all United States
Government assistance to these seven entities and banned all U.S.
exports to them and all of their imports to the United States.
Expenses
Pursuant to section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C.
1641(c)), I report that there were no expenses directly attributable to
the exercise of authorities conferred by the declaration of the national
emergency in Executive Order 12938 during the period from May 14, 1998,
through October 31, 1998.
Sincerely,
WILLIAM
J. CLINTON