THE
WHITE HOUSE
Office
of the Press Secretary
(Seoul,
Republic of Korea)
________________________________________________________________________
For Immediate Release
November
21, 1998
PRESS BRIEFING BY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR SANDY BERGER, 21 November 1998
Shilla
Hotel
Seoul,
Republic of Korea
5:40 P.M. (L)
MR. LOCKHART: Good afternoon, everyone. The
President's National
Security Advisor, Samuel Berger, will brief you, give you a read-out on
the President's bilats with President Kim and answer your questions.
And then I'll come up afterwards if you have any other questions.
Thanks.
MR. BERGER: Good afternoon. Let me just quickly
go through my
notes of the bilat and summarize them for you. President Kim began by
talking about the APEC meeting from which he just returned. He said
that he was, of course, disappointed that the President had not been
able to attend but was very impressed by the contribution of the Vice
President to the meeting, and said that there was a clear consensus at
APEC that the American leadership was indispensable to the solution of
the Asian financial crisis.
He expressed disappointment that there was not consensus on
the
trade initiative. As you know, there was refusal in the final analysis
of the Japanese to agree with one element of that, but a decision by the
ministers to refer it to the WTO, but he was pleased that the APEC
leaders had agreed to other steps to deal with the crisis.
The President talked in general about his ideas about the
international financial crisis, the need in the short term for both
dealing with individual situations, setting up a precautionary facility,
the work that we've done with Japan in providing money for Asian
businesses and Asian banks that need work-out assistance.
They talked a bit about Japan and the economic challenges.
President Kim asked President Clinton about the trip to Japan and the
meetings with Obuchi. The President said that they had talked about the
economic challenges laid before Japan and recounted for President Kim
the discussion that they had had specifically about Korea and KEDO and
the North Korea problem.
The discussion then turned towards North Korea. President
Kim laid
out what he basically described as the three principles of the South
Koreans towards the North: One, they will not tolerate provocations
that undermine or threaten the security of South Korea; two, they will
not seek to undermine North Korea; and three, they seek co-existence
with North Korea. And he described his conversations with President
Jiang recently and the convergence between South Korea and China on
handling of North Korea.
The President said he strongly supported the policy of President
Kim -- the engagement policy -- and the challenge was to continue that
policy in the face of actions by the North that are provocative. He
told President Kim, as he indicated at the press conference, that we
have asked former Secretary Perry to be a special advisor to the
administration in dealing with North Korea, helping us assess our North
Korea policy.
Talked about the agreed framework. The President said that
he
believed that we had gotten a good deal out of the agreed framework.
Again, as he said in the press conference, that without the agreed
framework, North Korea would have spent the last several years producing
a good deal more plutonium that would have been available for nuclear
weapons than without it, but that now we needed to deal with the
underground site in the North, the suspect site, where there are
suspicions about its intended use but not conclusive evidence, a view
that was shared by President Kim.
Also talked about the North Korean missile program and the
importance of containing that missile program, which really now upsets
the balance not only in the Korean Peninsula but in the region, as the
Japanese look with apprehension at the launching of missiles over its
head. And clearly indicated, as we have in our conversations with the
Japanese, that these matters are matters that need to be dealt with very
closely between the South Koreans -- so very disconcerting to watch you
all watch television -- can you just fill me in from time to time what's
going on? I mean, is it a soap opera?
Q It's a fashion show.
MR. BERGER: A fashion show, oh -- I just wanted to know
what I was
competing against, that's all. I mean, your eyes are riveted,
particularly the male eyes. (Laughter). I think I've just undermined
my own briefing here, but anyhow.
President Kim said that he agreed with the President 100 percent
on
what he had said about the North, the importance of dealing seriously
with our concerns about whether the agreed framework is in fact being
complied with, that we must require access; if it is a nuclear-related
site, we should call for it to be shut down. That he had been briefed
on Ambassador Kartman's recent discussions with the North Koreans in
Pyongyang, and while those discussions did not produce a resolution they
also leave room for further discussions.
President Kim then talked about the positive -- he said, would
you
like my assessment of North Korea and gave kind of the same rack-up that
he gave in the press conference, the positive steps being -- the
negative steps being the infiltration of the Northern submarines into
South Korea's waters, the suspected underground site, the missile
launching. Those are all sources of considerable concern.
At the same time, conflicting signals, the tourism project that
he
referred to with President of Hyundai and the North Koreans now taking
South Korean's up to see some natural sites in North Korea; the fact
that Kim Jung-il had specifically been engaged in the development of
that project; the fact that there were journalists now and more cultural
and political leaders who were going to the North, he saw that as a
slight change; the talks that are going on with the United States, both
on missiles and on the nuclear program; and the changes in the DPRK
constitution, which provide for limited private property and market
economy; and the expanded number of North Koreans that are now permitted
to go abroad for training.
And he basically described this as kind of a mixed picture that
he
sees in the north, but that his objective is to promote security and
cooperation at the same time, essentially to offer the North the kind of
choice that the President I thought put quite starkly at the end of the
press conference, either a choice of trying to -- a fruitless decision
to try to dominate the situation militarily or a choice to try to reach
accommodation with President Kim, who is clearly reaching out to the
North should they be prepared for some kind of reconciliation.
On the bilateral relationship, they both agreed it was in strong
condition, which after six years I've never been in a bilateral in which
the leaders agreed it was in a weak condition. The President urged
completion of the cost-sharing agreement with the South on the cost of
our forces. The strains on the South Korean economy have caused a delay
in completing the cost-sharing arrangement, renewing it.
And then the conversation went to the economic area. The
President
said that he had been very impressed by the economic recovery program
that had been persistently pursued by President Kim. Don't forget,
President Kim arrives in office and finds that the roof has fallen in
before he has had a chance to really unpack his crates. The President
said he hopes that we have been helpful through the various things that
we have done in the IMF, our bilateral assistance, OPIC, Ex-Im.
They talked about the one remaining -- or perhaps the most
serious
remaining problem in the South Korean economy, and that is restructuring
the so-called chaebols, the large conglomerates, particularly the five
large conglomerates. Now, in order to understand the magnitude of that
problem, you have to understand that 40 percent of the Korean economy
are these five companies. So the restructuring of these five companies
and streamlining them and the economic efficiency and world
competitiveness of these companies is very important to the economic
recovery. And this is an area where I think President Kim agreed they
have made the least progress.
There was some discussion of trade issues -- beef,
pharmaceuticals,
steel, the investment treaty. On all of those issues, President Kim
indicated that they would try to be forthcoming. We then went into an
expanded bilateral, which basically, since the limited bilateral had
covered everything, was somewhat truncated. But there was mainly a
discussion of the economic situation and the desire of the South Koreans
now to begin to attract again foreign investment. We're trying to
negotiate a bilateral investment treaty with the South Koreans.
There was some discussion of Y2K, something that we've been
working
on with the South Koreans, and they've now formed a working level
public-private committee. And it's interesting, this is an issue that
really -- totally obscure issue that no one had even heard about or
understood a year ago, which is now increasingly on the bilateral agenda
between the United States and the countries that we deal with.
Finally, they talked about a Forum on Democracy that was
announced
at the press conference. This is a joint project that will be
undertaken between the United States and Korea to start something which
will basically ultimately evolve, hopefully, into something like our
National Endowment for Democracy.
Talked about Burma, where President Kim has been a stalwart
supporter of Aung San Suu Kyi, and a very outspoken critic of the
government; and a bit of a conversation about climate change, where
Korea has signed the Kyoto Protocol, and although it has not yet agreed
to mandatory targets, has agreed to voluntary targets.
So that's basically not as attractive as the show, but that's it.
Q Don't sell yourself short.
MR. BERGER: Okay, thank you.
Q Sandy, President Kim used the words -- and you echoed them
today
-- will not tolerate these provocations. President Clinton didn't use
those terms. I'm wondering what it means from the United States' point
of view, how far you go in terms of will or will not tolerate
obfuscation on this inspection issue. Would the United States, for
example, consider taking this issue to the U.N. Security Council seeking
some sort of resolution demanding inspections?
MR. BERGER: These are very serious matters, and I think we
consider them very serious. Let me take first the nuclear issue, and
then the missile issue.
In the nuclear area, we reached an agreement with the North
Koreans
in 1994, after a long negotiation and quite a confrontational period in
which we were about to go to the U.N., as you will recall, for sanctions
against the North, by which the North Koreans agreed to freeze and
ultimately dismantle its nuclear graphite reactors in Yongbyon, a five
megawatt reactor and a 50 megawatt reactor that it was also
constructing, plus a reprocessing plant. Essentially, this was, from a
nuclear weapons point of view, an engine for nuclear material -- a
factory for nuclear material -- even though it had, presumably,
electrical generating capacity.
Now, that agreement has been complied with. And we know
that
because there are IAEA inspectors who are at the site and who are
physically monitoring the site. The five megawatt reactors have been
closed down; the reprocessing plant is under seal; the spent fuel rods
have been canned; the construction has stopped on the 50 megawatt
reactor. So, by and large, that's been a good thing, because were that
not stopped, for the last three years they would have been continuing to
generate these fuel rods, reprocessing them, presumably creating the
fuel that goes into nuclear weapons.
Now, we have had information more recently on, in particular one
site in the North, the purpose of which is not absolutely clear, but
raises questions, raises serious questions. Serious enough that we
believe that we need to have the opportunity to inspect the site. And
that is the request that we have made to the North. We need to
determine in the first instance whether it is inconsistent with the
agreed framework in which the North agree that they will not build other
nuclear graphite reactors or reprocessing facilities.
If this turned out to be a facility inconsistent with the agreed
framework, obviously that would be a serious matter and we would demand
the site be closed, but it would call into question obviously the
viability of the agreed framework. But I think it's premature to reach
that conclusion. We need to press forward with the North Koreans to
gain access to the site.
Q Sandy, there has been a published report that plutonium has
been
found in the soil and water around these sites in Korea. Can you
confirm that?
MR. BERGER: As far as I know, the report that you're
referring to
is a South Korean -- is based upon a South Korean press report. The
South Korean government has said that is an incorrect report. Beyond
that, these are obviously intelligence matters, and I can't comment.
Q I have a question on the same subject. If that suspect
site is a
hole in the ground, as the President just described it, how would going
to inspect it help resolve the question of what its purpose is -- if
there is nothing there?
MR. BERGER: Well, it's a complex hole in the ground -- put
it that
way. (Laughter.) It is -- I don't want to describe the site, but we
believe physical inspection of the site would help us ascertain its
purpose, and presumably not only once, but over a period of time. So
let me leave it at that.
Q When the subject is the missile test, the administration says
--
correct me -- that's not covered by the agreed framework. When it's the
challenge inspections to see the site, that's not covered by the
framework.
MR. BERGER: The fact is we don't know what the -- we don't
have
conclusive evidence with respect to the intended purpose of the site.
If the intended purpose of the site were to build a graphite reactor or
to build a reprocessing plant, it would be inconsistent with the agreed
framework.
Q I meant the inspection. But the question is, why do you
point to
the agreed framework as a centerpiece of all policy if it doesn't cover
these problems -- these additional problems with North Korea?
MR. BERGER: I'm not sure that I used the term
"centerpiece" of all
policy. I mean, let's back up here. North Korea is not a benign
government. We have lots of problems with North Korea. They have had a
nuclear weapons program that we have been concerned about, that we have
controlled at least to some extent. They have a missile program both
with respect to its own development and with respect to exports, which
is destabilizing -- destabilizing in Asia, destabilizing to the
countries to whom it is selling technology. So we have many problems
with North Korea, and we have to deal with North Korea I think on a
realistic basis.
What President Kim has said, and I think what President Clinton
was
agreeing with, is that North Korea now is at a crossroads. On the one
hand, it can seize the opportunity afforded by the fact that the
President of South Korea, President Kim, is extending a hand to North
Korea and is probably more inclined to engagement and reconciliation
than any President in South Korea's history. It can choose that path,
rejoin the international community, perhaps build an agricultural
economy that is not based on starvation. This is an economy that -- an
agricultural economy that fails year after year. We're the second
largest food donor to North Korea. That's one path. Or it can continue
to be a totally isolated, self-contained entity which obviously is
failing economically and seeks to preserve its place in the world only
through military means.
I think the President was saying, given our security relationship
with South Korea, the latter course is not a successful course for North
Korea -- because we will come to South Korea's defense. If North Korea
believes that it can ever gain military dominance or somehow prevail
against South Korea, it is ignoring a bilateral security treaty that
South Korea has with North Korea.
So I think the President was saying, here is another option.
It's
an option that is embodied in that tourist ship going up the coast; it's
an option of re-engaging with the world; it's an option of re-engaging
with the South; it's an option that has a lot more promise than the
other one.
Q Can you explain why President Clinton supports President Kim's
sunshine policy of engagement when the White House does not support it
for other hostile governments such as Iraq, or even to a lesser extent,
Cuba? And secondly, could you also explain what is the special
relationship between President Clinton and President Kim that gives
President Kim's engagement policy extra cachet? People have talked
about a special trust that Clinton has.
MR. BERGER: I don't think it's a question of cachet; I
think it's
a question of strategic judgment. I mean, President Kim has made a
strategic judgment that he is going to pursue an engagement policy, but
it's an engagement policy undergirded by strength. It's a policy that
basically says, we seek reconciliation with the North, but we are also
not going to tolerate provocations from the North, and we're also
obviously going to remain strong; we're also obviously going to sustain
our security relationship with the United States. It's a very sensible
policy.
To try to draw comparisons between this and Iraq or Cuba I think
is
very difficult. In terms of why does President Kim have moral authority
or -- I'm rephrasing your questions, obviously -- President Kim is a
remarkable man. I think we're living in a time when you look around the
world and you look at Nelson Mandela and Vaclav Havel and Kim Dae-Jung,
three men who spent most of their lives fighting their governments, went
to prison over the authoritarian policies of the government, were
brutally punished for the stands they took, and now these are three men
who are, in fact, the Presidents of their respective countries. I think
that's a remarkable set of stories.
And Kim Dae-Jung is someone who I think deserves respect for two
reasons: one is because of what he stands for, and the second is
because he has been able to make a transition from being a leader of a
movement to a leader of a government under the most adverse
circumstances. I mean, we all know that one of the hardest transitions
for people to make is being leaders of opposition movements suddenly to
be thrust into power. History is filled with failed episodes -- with
people in that situation that have failed.
Kim Dae-Jung not only has led a life -- a principled life that
has
been instrumental in his country obtaining of democracy, he has then
come into the government, ironically, at the time when the economy
collapsed. I'm sure that when he was sitting in jail he did not think
that he was going to spend his first two years, if he ever got to be in
power, trying to rebuild a collapsed economy. But he's done that. He's
taken on some very hard decisions. And Korea, as with Thailand, as with
other countries, is beginning now to see the benefits of the very tough
decisions that he made. So I think he deserves a lot of respect for
both reasons.
Q Sandy, did the issue of the convicted spy Robert Kim in the
United States come up at all during the bilateral meeting?
MR. BERGER: It did not come up.
Q Sandy, both you and the President have outlined some of the
sticks in the U.S. and the South Korean policy toward the North, but can
you outline some of the carrots that would be available if North Korea
follows the course that you're talking about?
MR. BERGER: We have a wide range of sanctions against the
North
Koreans, the easing of which, I suppose, become carrots. But those
require, obviously -- some of those relate to their support of
terrorism, some of them relate to their human rights record. In some
cases, these derive from particular elements of the North Korean regime.
But I think, clearly, if North Korea chose a different path -- chose a
path of reconciliation with the South, chose to deal with its missile
development program and export program in a responsible way, chose to
forgo clearly and unequivocally a nuclear weapons program, obviously
that would make it possible for us to improve our relationship with
North Korea.
Q Sandy, North Korea's record for the last four years is not to
choose A or B, but to have a little bit -- sort of salami tactics of
giving a little bit but not as much as you want. What makes you think
that they're going to make this choice?
MR. BERGER: I think there is -- I suppose saying a fork in
the
road is a bit, perhaps, too dramatic. But there are some basic paths
here that they can choose. They can choose a path, essentially, of
reconciliation or a path of confrontation. At the time that they
decided to enter into the agreed framework and give up the programs at
Yongbyon, that was obviously a step towards accommodation with the rest
of the world.
But again, this is a very impenetrable government, a very
impenetrable leadership. I think we know less about what really takes
place in Pyongyang than almost any other capital in the world.
Q What happens next, in terms of our policy to North Korea?
President Clinton has made this kind of public comments on it, but do we
have a diplomatic initiative that's going there? How do you get off the
dime when it comes to North Korea?
MR. BERGER: There are at least three venues here, three
avenues to
pursue. Number one are the four-party talks which President Clinton and
President Kim Young Sam launched about three years ago, which include
China, North Korea, South Korea, and us. We have met several times. At
this last meeting there has been a modest agreement to set up
subcommittees to deal with various issues involved with improvement in
relations, confidence-building measures. So that's one path we want to
pursue.
Second, we've had now, I believe, two rounds of discussions with
the North Koreans with respect to this suspect site. Ambassador Kartman
just completed his last discussions. They were not -- certainly were
not conclusive in terms of progress, but they will lead to further
discussions.
And, finally, there are the missile talks with North Korea in
which
we've raised a range of issues relating to their missile programs.
Q Will the U.S. ever be willing to give millions of dollars to
the
North Koreans to allow for the inspection of the hole in the ground?
MR. BERGER: No, I think we certainly would not pay for the
right
to inspect these sites.
Q Sandy, North Korean -- to allow inspections of these sites.
How
are you going to selling the agreed framework to Congress?
MR. BERGER: Well, let me not jump ahead. We've
insisted upon
access. We hope and expect the North Koreans to give us access. And
I'm not going to speculate beyond that.
Q Sandy, can you talk a little bit about the difference in the
atmosphere now versus when President Kim was in the United States this
summer? At that point there was lots of talk about the Korean President
pressing the United States to lift sanctions. Now the talk seems a lot
less advanced, or a lot less about progress and more about pushing back.
MR. BERGER: Well, there was, I think, too much made when he
was in
Washington of him pressing us to lift sanctions. But putting that
aside, there was no disagreement whatsoever between President Clinton
and President Kim with respect to the two elements, essentially, of the
policy that President Kim is pursuing, that we support -- that is
consistent with our policy with respect to North Korea.
Q You described it as a complex, suspicious hole in the ground in
North Korea. What is it about this hole that makes it suspicious? What
is it about this hole that makes it complex?
MR. BERGER: Well, those again are intelligence matters
which I'm
not going to get into.
Q Can you give us any guidance as to what it is that raises your
antenna about this stuff?
MR. BERGER: No, I will simply say that there is information
that
we have that raised questions that we believe require answers.
Q Sandy, how much time did the two Presidents spend relatively on
economic issues and on the security -- North Korea matter?
MR. BERGER: I would say a little more than half the time on
security issues, the rest of the time on economic -- maybe 60/40
security/economics.
Q Why was the President so tentative this morning or this
afternoon
in his remarks? Isn't this the kind -- the Air Force document and the
other things the Iraqis are balking at, isn't this the kind of defiance
that we have said would be met with action on short or no notice?
MR. BERGER: Well, first of all, I don't think the President
was
tentative. The state of play is as follows. UNSCOM is now back in the
country. They are beginning to restore their cameras; they're beginning
to do inspections. Now, at the same time, they sent, I believe, three
letters to the iraqis requesting certain documents.
They received back a letter from the Iraqis -- probably 9:00 p.m.
or 10:00 p.m. last night our time. That letter is -- that answer is
insufficient in the judgment of UNSCOM. UNSCOM has outlined its
insufficiencies in a communication to the Security Council and intends
to seek further production and further clarification from the Iraqis.
We have been consulting -- either today or yesterday, depending
on
where you are -- with other members of the Security Council. We
obviously back UNSCOM in this request and its inspections. We believe
that there is an affirmative obligation, as the President said, on the
Iraqis to comply with their obligations under the resolutions.
But we just received the letter. Butler has just analyzed
the
letter. He's gone back to the Security Council. But clearly, in our
judgment, Iraq has an obligation to produce the documents that UNSCOM is
seeking and we will support UNSCOM in that effort.
Q Does the same warnings of military action apply now as applied
before?
MR. BERGER: We've said all along that the issue here is
whether
Iraq will meet its obligations under the Security Council resolutions
and whether UNSCOM is able to do its work. If we reach the conclusion
that the answer to those questions is negative, we obviously are
prepared to act.
Q Sandy, did the North Koreans really just try a blunt shakedown
with relation to this inspection, or was there something more
complicated than that? It almost boggles the mind that a country would
say, give us X million dollars to inspect this site. Was there some
other, more complex system they wanted to set up, or was it just a blunt
shakedown?
MR. BERGER: Can I say "yes"? I'm looking at
Ken here to see
whether I start a war if I say "yes." I would not choose that phrase.
(Laughter.) But I don't think there was much more to it than that.
Q The reported figure of $300 million that North Korea has
demanded
coincidentally is similar to the reported figure that North Korea had
been demanding to stop its missile export program. Is there any
relationship --
MR. BERGER: Let me say, having now been engaged for almost
six
years in negotiations with the North Koreans, this is not untypical of
North Korean negotiating tactics, but it is not -- there is nothing much
more to it than, you know, we'll let you see the site if you give us
$300 million.
Q Sandy, the basic choice that the administration has presented
to
North Korea, either gradual steps towards engagement or continued
isolation and the United States pursuing a containment policy -- that
basic choice has been laid out for at least four years, since '94,
right? Wouldn't we know if the experiment was working?
MR. BERGER: Look what President Kim said. Basically
he said there
is a mixed picture here. Again, this is a very complicated regime with
a very complicated leadership picture, and you see conflicting signals.
On the one hand, you see North allowing South Koreans to travel up to
visit North Korea. You see a greater degree of cultural exchanges. You
see the other things that President King indicated.
On the other hand, recently, in particular, since the launch of
the
Taepodong missile and with questions that have been raised about this
site, you see the other side as well. I don't think you're going to see
for some time perhaps a clear picture of which way North Korea goes.
But ultimately -- listen, ultimately North Korea is a society, is
a
country in trouble, a country in internal -- certainly with serious
internal problems -- is a country that can't feed itself, is a country
that is isolated from the world. It is a country whose economy is in
miserable shape. It's a country where tens of thousands of people are
hungry, if not starving, depending on what reports you listen to.
And it's also a country that has roughly a million forces posed
along the DMZ 17 miles from where we're sitting, and that makes it
rather dangerous. And we have to bear that in mind.
We have 37,000 troops in this country. We have a security
relationship with this country. I think this is a problem that we have
to deal with in a very steadfast, deliberate, steady, firm way.
Q I'm confused by your reticence about talking about the site
that
you call suspect. Large elements of your own intelligence community say
that it's not suspect, but that it is in fact intended to help produce
nuclear weapons. The people who have seen some of this evidence on the
Hill -- not just Republicans -- basically agree with that assessment.
The North knows, itself, what it is doing. Why shouldn't we
conclude that your reluctance to talk about it is essentially intended
to cover up your own embarrassment at what's happening?
MR. BERGER: The fact that there is not conclusive evidence
here is
a judgment not only that I have made but is a judgment that the
intelligence community would also concur in.
Q Why can't you share a little bit of this discussion with us?
MR. BERGER: Because these involve sources and methods, in
terms of
how we know what we know. And there's no particular advantage -- I'm
sorry, with all due respect -- to sharing that information with you.
That's not you, personally. (Laughter.). You I would
share it
with, but nobody else.
END
6:13
P.M. (L)
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