Historical Background to the Non-Proliferation Treaty

The need to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons was evident from the first days of the nuclear era. On November 15, 1945, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada proposed the establishment of a U.N. Atomic Energy Commission for the purpose of "entirely eliminating the use of atomic energy for destructive purposes." The Baruch plan of 1946, offered by the United States, sought to forestall nuclear arms proliferation by placing all nuclear resources under international ownership and control.

But the early postwar efforts to achieve agreement on nuclear disarmament failed. The Soviet Union in 1949, the United Kingdom in 1952, France in 1960, and the Peoples Republic of China in 1964, became nuclear-weapon states. And increasingly it was becoming apparent that earlier assumptions about the scarcity of nuclear materials and the difficulty of mastering nuclear technology were inaccurate.

Other developments and prospects further underscored the threat of nuclear proliferation. In the early 1960s the search for peaceful applications of nuclear energy had brought advances in the technology of nuclear reactors for the generation of electric power. By 1966 such nuclear reactors were operating or under construction in five countries. It was estimated that by 1985 more than 300 nuclear power reactors would be operating, under construction, or on order. Nuclear reactors produce not only power, but plutonium -- a fissionable material which can be chemically separated and used in the manufacture of nuclear weapons. By 1985 it was estimated that the quantity of plutonium being produced worldwide would make possible the construction of 15 to 20 nuclear bombs daily, depending upon the level of the technology employed.

If the diversion of nuclear materials from peaceful purposes was not prevented by an international nuclear nonproliferation regime, and if a growing number of nations came to possess nuclear weapon arsenals, it was believed that the risks of nuclear war as a result of accident, unauthorized use, or escalation of regional conflicts would greatly increase. The possession of nuclear weapons by many countries would add a grave new dimension of threat to world security.

A succession of initiatives beginning in the 1950s by both nuclear and non-nuclear powers sought to check proliferation. Indeed the effort to achieve a nuclear test ban -- culminating in the Treaty of 1963 -- had as one of its main purposes inhibiting the spread of nuclear weapons. But much before that, in August 1957, the Western powers (Canada, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States) submitted a "package" of measures in the Subcommittee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, which included a commitment "not to transfer out of its control any nuclear weapons, or to accept transfer to it of such weapons," except for self-defense.

Although the Soviet Union opposed proliferation, it claimed that this Western formula would allow an aggressor to judge his own actions, and to use nuclear weapons "under cover of the alleged right of self-defense." It therefore sought to couple a ban on transfer of nuclear weapons to other states with a prohibition on stationing nuclear weapons in foreign countries.

In 1961 the UN General Assembly unanimously approved an Irish resolution calling on all states, particularly the nuclear powers, to conclude an international agreement to refrain from transfer or acquisition of nuclear weapons. In addition, the general disarmament plans which had been submitted by the United States and the Soviet Union during the period 1960 -1962 included provisions banning the transfer and acquisition of nuclear weapons.

The United States, on January 21, 1964, outlined a program to halt the nuclear arms race in a message from President Johnson to the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC). This program, unlike the 1957 proposal, was not a "package." It included a nondissemina-tion and nonacquisition proposal -- based on the Irish resolution -- and safeguards on international transfers of nuclear materials for peaceful purposes, combined with acceptance by the major nuclear powers that their peaceful nuclear activities undergo increasingly "the same inspection they recommend for other states."

An issue that was to be the principal stumbling block for the next three years was the proposed multilateral nuclear force (MLF) then under discussion by the United States and its NATO allies. The Soviet Union strongly objected to this plan and maintained that no agreement could be reached on nonproliferation so long as the United States held open the possibility of such nuclear-sharing arrangements in NATO. These arrangements would constitute proliferation, the Soviet Union contended, and were devices for giving the Federal Republic of Germany access to or control of nuclear weapons.

On August 17, 1965, the United States submitted a draft nonproliferation Treaty to the ENDC. This draft obliged the nuclear-weapon powers not to transfer nuclear weapons to the national control of any non-nuclear country not having them. Non-nuclear nations would undertake to facilitate the application of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or equivalent safeguards to their peaceful nuclear activities.

A Soviet draft Treaty was submitted to the General Assembly on September 24. In an accompanying memorandum, the Soviet Union declared that the greatest danger of proliferation was posed by the MLF and the alternative British proposal for an Atlantic nuclear force (ANF). The Soviet draft prohibited the transfer of nuclear weapons "directly or indirectly, through third States or groups of States not possessing nuclear weapons." It also barred nuclear powers from transferring "nuclear weapons, or control over them or their emplacement or use" to military units of non-nuclear allies, even if these were placed under joint command. The draft included no safeguards provisions.

In March 1966, the United States tabled amendments to its draft Treaty in the ENDC, seeking to clarify and emphasize the Western view that collective defense arrangements would not violate the principle of nonproliferation. The U.S. representative stressed that the United States would not relinquish its veto over the use of U.S. weapons. The Soviet Union objected that the amendments did not prevent the transfer of nuclear weapons through such alliance arrangements as the MLF, the ANF, or units placed under joint command. The U.S. retention of a veto, the Soviet representative argued, did not provide security against dissemination.

Despite strong disagreement on the issue of collective defense arrangements, it was apparent that both sides recognized the desirability of an agreement on nuclear nonproliferation. Moreover, the interest of non-nuclear powers in such a Treaty was increasingly manifest. It was shown in 1964 at the African summit conference and at the Cairo conference of nonaligned states and expressed in a series of resolutions in the General Assembly urging that nuclear non-

proliferation receive priority attention. In May 1966, the U.S. Senate unanimously passed a resolution sponsored by Senator Pastore of Rhode Island and 55 other Senators commending efforts to reach a nuclear nonproliferation agreement and supporting continued efforts.

In the fall of 1966 the U.S. and Soviet co-chairmen of the ENDC began private talks, and by the end of the year they had reached tentative agreement on the basic nontransfer and nonacquisition provisions of a Treaty, as well as on a number of other aspects.

There followed a long and arduous series of consultations between the United States and its allies. The allies raised a number of questions regarding the effect of the Treaty on NATO nuclear defense arrangements, and the United States gave its interpretations. The United States considered that the Treaty covered nuclear weapons and/or nuclear explosive devices, but not delivery systems. It would not prohibit NATO consultation and planning on nuclear defense, nor ban deployment of U.S.-owned and -controlled nuclear weapons on the territory of non-nuclear NATO members. It would not "bar succession by a new federated European state to the nuclear status of one of its members." The allies questions and the United States answers were provided to the Soviet Union, which did not challenge the U.S. interpretations.

On August 24, 1967, the United States and the Soviet Union were able to submit separate but identical texts of a draft Treaty to the ENDC. Other ENDC members proposed numerous amendments, largely reflecting the concerns of the non-nuclear states. In response to these, the drafts underwent several revisions, and the co-chairmen tabled a joint draft on March 11, 1968. With additional revisions, the joint draft was submitted to the U.N. General Assembly, where it was extensively debated. Further suggestions for strengthening the Treaty were made, and in the light of these, the United States and the Soviet Union submitted a new revised version, the seventh, to the First Committee of the General Assembly on May 31. The General Assembly on June 12 approved a resolution commending the text and requesting the depositary governments (the U.S., U.K., and Soviet Union) to open it for signature. France abstained in the General Assembly vote, stating that while France would not sign the Treaty, it "would behave in the future in this field exactly as the States adhering to the Treaty."

Source:  U.S., State Department, http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/npt1.html