Source: The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition, Volume 4, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), pp. 624-625
Memo for the President: 22 January 1966
Statistics for the Military Situation in Vietnam:
June 1965, December 1965, June 1966, December 1966
Over those four dates, U.S. strength, respectively:
59,900 or nine battalions
178,034 battalions
277,846 battalions
367,875 battalions
VC over those four dates:
63 battalions
107 battalions
150 battalions
155 battalions
ARVN (excluding paramilitary):
128 battalions
133 battalions
168 battalions
173 battalions
Bombs Dropped--tons:
30,000
31,000
51,000
68,000
Total U.S. Sorties (nearest thousand):
9,000
16,000
20,000
24,000
. . . The enemy can be expected to level off at more than 150 battalion equivalents
by 1966. . . . The requirements have to be an expansion of enemy forces
to 150+ battalions at M66 should approximate 40-140 tons a day, depending on
the level of combat. There is evidence that the volume of infiltration the system
would otherwise handle has been halved by our bombing programs . . . Nevertheless,
the reduction in enemy initiatives in Laos may be attributable to their need
to husband their resources for their South Vietnam effort. Nevertheless, the
enemy can probably infiltrate between 50 and 300 (an average of 200) tons of
supplies a day depending on the season, considerably more than the 40-140 tons
a day they will need.
Final Evaluation
Odds are about even that, even with the recommended deployments (up to a total
of 95 combat battalions by December 1966) we will be faced in early 1967 with
a military standoff with a much higher level, with pacification still stalled,
and with any prospect of military success, marred by the chances of an active
Chinese intervention.