WIRELESS FILE
UNITED STATES INFORMATION SERVICE
STOCKHOLM SWEDEN
08/01/96
TEXT: AMBASSADOR PRESEL TESTIMONY ON CAUCASUS CONFLICTS
(Discusses U.S. effort to help resolve region's conflicts) (3090)
Washington -- The ethnic conflicts that have erupted in the newly independent Caucasus
republics of the former Soviet Union "are primarily an expression of the bottled-up
nationalism that is unleashed when an empire collapses," according to the U.S.
diplomat most directly involved in international efforts to resolve them.
In July 30 testimony to the House International Relations Committee, Ambassador John
Presel, U.S. special negotiator for Nagorno-Karabakh, compared the passions involved in
these disputes to those that caused World War I and the current tragedy in the former
Yugoslavia.
He noted that since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the South Caucasus has experienced
"five full-fledged wars, numerous near-conflicts and countless ethnic conflicts"
which have created over 1.3 million displaced persons in a region with a total population
of about 17 million.
Presel, whose office has been concerned with the Abkhazia and South Ossetian disputes
involving Georgia as well as the Nagorno-Karabakh war between Armenia and Azerbaijan,
outlined the dynamics of these conflicts for the committee.
He pointed out if the nations of the region could settle their differences and develop a
cooperative, peaceful relationship, they could use the extraction and transport to market
of the area's rich oil resources "as an engine for development of the entire
region," and "maintain their independence and resist Iranian encroachment."
Presel described for the committee U.S. efforts to help resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict by participation in the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE) "Minsk Group" mediation effort, and through encouragement of a
confidential direct dialogue on the problem between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
He also said U.S. representatives at the United Nations and in Tbilisi are active in the
unofficial "Friends of Georgia" group of major Western powers and Russia
"which serves some of the same functions as the Contact Group does for Bosnia."
Following is the text of Presel's testimony as prepared for delivery and provided by the
U.S. Department of State:
(Begin text)
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, thank you for giving me the opportunity to testify
today about the conflicts that still plague the Caucasus region. It is now nearly five
years since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The three countries of the Caucasus have
established themselves as independent, sovereign nations. With the help of the United
States and others, that independence and sovereignty will endure and develop. The
persistence of tragic regional conflicts is the greatest threat to their independence and
sovereignty, as well as to U.S. interests. That is why these conflicts in a faraway corner
of the world are important to us.
We know much more today about the nature of those conflicts than we did five years ago.
Then, the Caucasus was a nearly closed book, hidden behind an iron curtain, veiled in
Soviet propaganda. Now, we have embassies in Tbilisi, Yerevan and Baku. In 1980, an
American scholar studying in Baku was forbidden to leave the city or see any other part of
Azerbaijan. Today our scholars, diplomats, members of Congress, journalists, businessmen,
relatives and just plain tourists go to every corner of all three republics.
With the perspective of five years, we can see clearly that the ethnic conflicts in the
Caucasus are primarily an expression of the bottled-up nationalism that is unleashed when
empires collapse. These same unleashed passions caused World War I at the beginning of the
century and the tragedy of the Former Yugoslavia today. We cannot ignore their potential
for harm in the collapsed Soviet Empire.
If we include the North Caucasus, which is part of the Russian Federation but with a skein
of close ties to the South Caucasus, the region has seen five full-fledged wars, numerous
near-conflicts and countless ethnic separatist movements since the collapse of the Soviet
Union. My office works directly on three of these, Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia,
and Nagorno-Karabakh, which involves both Azerbaijan and Armenia.
Most of this conflict derives from the collapse of the Soviet Empire. Moscow had always
kept potential ethnic rivalries down with an iron hand; when Moscow's hand grew rusty, the
rivalries escaped its grip. The peoples of the Caucasus historically lived mixed in with
one another; you often hear that it was Stalin who drew arbitrary boundaries. This isn't
true. Armenians and Azeris, for example, lived side by side. It would have been impossible
for anyone to draw rational boundaries. For instance, in the 1896 census, 55 percent of
the population of Yerevan District were Muslims.
More importantly, the Soviet Union was a country ruled from Moscow, not local capitals
such as Yerevan, Baku or Tbilisi. For example, Robert Kocharyan, the leader of the
Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians, told me that in 1923 it didn't matter to the people of
Nagorno-Karabakh whether they were part of Azerbaijan or Armenia. After all, these were
just two small units in a vast country. And at the time, Yerevan was a village, while Baku
was a large, cosmopolitan city whose population included more Armenians than in all of
Nagorno-Karabakh. (By the way, as recently as 1990, far more Armenians lived in Baku than
in Nagorno-Karabakh.)
Once the Soviet Empire weakened, however, rule devolved to the provinces and the
independent states they became. It was one thing to be a minority if everyone was equally
oppressed by Soviet rule from Moscow; it was quite another to be a minority in a small
republic run by and for its dominant ethnic group.
The result was a number of ethnic separatist movements -- most of which never reached
point of conflict. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, too, started out small. The tragedy of
Nagorno-Karabakh is that the collapse of empire and the ambitions of crowd-baiting
politicians allowed it to turn into a full-scale war. The government in Moscow,
preoccupied with the collapsing Soviet Union, was unable or unwilling to understand or
cope. Four years of attempts by Moscow to control the situation, from 1988 to 1992,
resulted only in an increasing cycle of violence, punctuated by anti-Armenian pogroms in
Sumgait and Baku in 1988 and 1990, the massacre of civilians in Baku by Soviet troops in
1990, and the massacre of Azerbaijani civilians in the Karabakh town of Khojaly in 1992.
In mid-1992 both sides inherited large arsenals from the defunct Soviet army, and a real
war had begun in earnest. Since then, Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians have expelled all Azeris
from Nagorno-Karabakh and have occupied about 20 percent of Azerbaijan, expelling Azeris
from the lands they seized.
The wars in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, too, had their origins in the same mix of ethnic
tensions, instability of new states, and the collapse of the Soviet empire. The Georgian
warlords who achieved power in the nationalist struggle against the Soviets, and who
deposed President Gamsakhurdia in January 1992, did not give up power to Eduard
Shevardnadze when he took office in March 1992. Fragmented and unstable, the new
government was unable to pursue its campaign against separatists who had been active for
some time in Ossetia, and accepted a cease-fire in June which left Russian troops in
control with OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) monitoring.
Defense Minister Kitovani then decided to "solve" Abkhazian demands for
independence by military means, touching off a war which ended, in September 1993, with
Georgian forces -- and the entire population of ethnic Georgians, once the majority in the
region -- driven out of Abkhazia with great loss of life.
Let us look at what these wars have done to the region. First, the human tragedy.
Thousands have died in the conflicts. Azerbaijan has the burden of caring for 780,000
refugees and internally displaced people -- 200,000 who were expelled from Armenia between
1988 and 1990, 40,000 who lived in Nagorno-Karabakh, and the rest from ethnically Azeri
areas in Azerbaijan now occupied by Nagorno-Karabakh Armenian forces. Roughly 300,000
Armenians who fled Azerbaijan after 1988 now burden the impoverished Armenian economy.
Over 250,000 ethnic Georgians are internally displaced after their expulsion from
Abkhazia; another 40,000 people fled Ossetia. Thus, over 1.3 million people have been
displaced in a region whose total population is around 17 million; hardest hit is
Azerbaijan, both in sheer numbers and as a percentage of its population. The Caucasus is a
humanitarian disaster of proportions comparable to some that have received more publicity.
Second, the economic tragedy. Prosecuting the wars has diverted scarce resources from the
weak economies of all three countries. Even higher are the opportunity costs -- the
commercial and industrial development these countries have had to forego, most especially
the development they might have achieved by cooperating economically on a region-wide
basis.
This is especially true in the area of transportation and communications. We often hear
this problem described as one of "blockades." More accurately, it is a series of
interlocking trade embargoes. These are crippling to all three countries. The rail lines
of the region, built during Czarist and Soviet times, crisscrossed what are now
international borders. In 1991, all these lines shut down, seriously reducing access to
the outside world of Armenia and parts of Azerbaijan. Each side blamed the other, but what
we can say is that it is the conflicts which shut down these lines. Likewise,
transportation between Turkey and Armenia remained as it had been under the Soviet Union,
one train a week, until the Turks closed the border in April 1993, to protest the
Nagorno-Karabakh Armenian seizure of the Azerbaijani province of Kelbacar.
The point I want to make is that it is the conflict that caused the embargoes, not the
other way around. Solving the conflicts will help end the disruption of communications and
allow these new states to develop economically. The longer the conflicts go without a
resolution, the harder it will be for these countries to integrate into the world economy
and develop the type of economic independence every viable country needs.
That brings us to the third type of damage these conflicts cause. In addition to the human
and economic costs, there are political costs. The U.S. rejects the notion of spheres of
influence. We believe that the countries of the Caucasus, like other parts of the former
Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe, should be outward looking. They should
participate in the world market and in international political and security structures.
Above all, the countries of the region should cooperate with one another.
The conflicts in the Caucasus, however, prolong the life of 19th century-style
"sphere of influence" thinking. They make it harder for the countries to think
of themselves as independent. They promote the type of zero-sum thinking which would pit
Russia, Turkey, Iran, and other countries, including the U.S., against one another in a
new "Great Game" struggle.
Our goals in the Caucasus depend upon resolution of these conflicts. What are they? We
want the region to develop as a whole. That takes cooperation. The region is rich in oil
and has a large, though backward, industrial base. The development, extraction and
transport to market of energy resources can and should be the engine for development of
the entire region, with the participation of U.S. companies and investment -- if the
countries live in peace and cooperation. The region is bordered by three major powers, one
of which, Iran, is a rogue state. The countries of the region can maintain their
independence and resist Iranian encroachment -- if they settle their differences and live
in peace with one another. The countries of the region should integrate into the world's
political and security structures; they are members of the U.N. and OSCE, and we would
like them to participate in other organizations, such as the Partnership for Peace. Right
now, the ongoing conflicts make regional exercises difficult. The countries can integrate
into the world -- if they can cooperate with one another.
That is why the United States is active in resolving these conflicts. In Nagorno-Karabakh,
we play a leading role in the OSCE Minsk Group, which is mediating a solution. A
cease-fire was negotiated under Minsk Group auspices in may 1994, which has held, with
minor violations, until now. Further progress has been slow. We are pressing Armenia,
Azerbaijan and the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians to make the compromises that will be
necessary to forge a permanent peace.
The principal problems to be resolved include the final status of Nagorno-Karabakh,
including permanent guarantees for its security; the withdrawal of forces from occupied
territory and the return of refugees to their homes; the question of Lachin, the
Azerbaijani province through which runs the road between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh; and
the fate of Shusha and other places inside Nagorno-Karabakh that were historically
inhabited by Azeris.
Our efforts are grounded in the Minsk Group and the OSCE. We are working with other Minsk
Group members, including Russia, to develop plans to place a peacekeeping force on the
ground as soon as possible after a solution is reached. The Minsk Group and the OSCE are
crucial for recruiting and organizing a monitor force. Our efforts over the coming months
will lead up to the December OSCE Summit, which will have on its agenda what we do next on
Nagorno-Karabakh.
In addition to the multilateral peace efforts, we have facilitated and encouraged a
confidential direct dialogue between Armenia and Azerbaijan which, we hope, will generate
the political will needed for progress. I travel to the region regularly; Ambassador
Collins has been there several times; and this March, Deputy Secretary Talbott and Deputy
National Security Advisor Berger visited Baku and Yerevan to further the search for a
stable peace. Of course, our efforts are not confined to special trips to the region. Our
experienced and talented ambassadors are in constant contact with the leaderships of
Armenia and Azerbaijan.
The United States has taken a leading role as well in the search for peace in Georgia.
Both in Tbilisi and at the U.N., our representatives are active in the "Friends of
Georgia," an unofficial group of major Western powers and Russia which serves some of
the same functions as the Contact Group for Bosnia. Our ambassador in Tbilisi has recently
made two trips to Abkhazia, one with other members of the Friends of Georgia and one a
U.S.-only visit. Our efforts are devoted to getting the parties to negotiate seriously and
realistically; Russian-mediated negotiations under U.N. sponsorship have to date been
unproductive. U.S. diplomats are serving in the OSCE Mission in Georgia, which monitors
the cease-fire in Ossetia; we have four military officers in UNOMIG, the U.N. force which
monitors the cease-fire in Abkhazia and the activities of the CIS (Commonwealth of
Independent States) Peace-Keeping Force, which is entirely Russian.
Mr. Chairman, there have been persistent questions about the role of Russia in these
conflicts, as in the region. The parties, especially the Azerbaijanis and Georgians,
accuse Russia of fomenting the conflicts and of destabilizing the region. Both Azerbaijan
and Armenia have broadcast televised shots of Russian mercenaries captured fighting for
their opponents. Georgia has pointed to the Russian role in the Abkhazia conflict,
including Russian military support for the Abkhaz seizure of the town of Sukhumi.
Certainly, Russia's role in the conflicts requires comment.
Russia is the direct heir to the Soviet Union and, before that, Czarist Russia -- the
colonial power that conquered the region. The process of decolonization of the other great
European empires in the 1950s and 1960s was complex and emotional; we should expect
nothing different today.
Rather, the fact that the Caucasus is adjacent to Russia, instead of half a world away,
makes the process of decolonization even more problematic. For example, there was no
"colonial office" in the Soviet Union whose portfolio could be neatly turned
over to the Foreign Ministry. If you picked up the phone in KGB headquarters in Baku or
Yerevan, it rang in Dzerzhinskiy Square in Moscow. Similar links existed between the
central and republican Communist Party apparatuses, the Ministries of Internal Affairs,
the militaries, the network of industrial and economic ministries, and so forth.
This distortion in the relationships had a clear effect on the conflicts of the region.
For instance, in September 1992, Russia's then Defense Minister Pavel Grachev tried to
impose a peace plan on Armenia and Azerbaijan at a meeting in Sochi. He did not inform the
Russian Foreign Ministry about the meeting, and when the Foreign Ministry's negotiator for
the conflict tried to attend, Grachev barred him from the meeting.
Five years along, this situation is changing. The new state institutions in the
Trans-Caucasian republics are slowly developing their own identities and weaning
themselves away from Russian institutions. More and more, relations are conducted on a
state-to-state basis between ministries, and less through an old-boy network.
This development, too, is reflected in the Russian approach to the conflicts. The Russian
Peace-Keeping force in Abkhazia, for example, has stuck to its mandate and not become the
lever of expansionism that some feared. Georgia has been dealing extensively with Russia
on the Abkhazia conflict, and has demanded not only that the Peace-Keeping force remain,
but also that its mandate be broadened.
It is our hope and our policy to promote the development of friendly, equitable and
mutually advantageous relations between the independent states of the Caucasus and the
Russian Federation as part of their relations with the wider world. We believe that good
state-to-state relations between the Caucasus and Russia will have a positive effect on
the search for peace. It is our policy to consult closely with the Russians on all aspects
of our efforts to resolve conflicts in the region, and to press Russia to play a
constructive role in the search for peace.
Mr. Chairman, that search will not be over tomorrow. In these conflicts all parties make
maximalist demands, and in each conflict the parties are far apart. Progress is slow. We
have put in a lot of hard work, but there is plenty more -- slow, patient and unglamorous
-- that lies ahead before we will have any progress to report. The Caucasus is a volatile
area; the dangers of instability are clear; the rewards of regional cooperation are
equally clear. It's worth the effort.