Michael Radu is a Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute.
Americans and many Europeans are rightly confused over the
Clinton Administration's actions in Kosovo, for
those
actions neither amount to any sort of "policy" nor suggest a
willingness on our part to learn from past blunders (Somalia
and Haiti come to mind) and thus avoid repeating them.
Between 1992 and 1995 when Serbia and her then president,
Slobodan Milosevic, tried to create a Greater Serbia by
adding ethnically Serb territories from Croatia and Bosnia,
Washington condemned the action and ultimately bombed the
Bosnian Serbs into (temporarily) desisting from
such
attempts. American policy dictates that
borders of
recognized European states (Croatia's and Bosnia's) cannot
and should not be changed by force, regardless of the ethnic
composition of certain areas -- a
wise principle,
considering the alternative: a chain reaction of
mass
borders revisions (from Russia's Caucasus to Azerbaijan's
Nagorno Karabakh to Romania's Transylvania). Whether Bosnia
Herzegovina's enforced and artificial unity is a realistic
proposition in the long run is another question. Secretary
of State Madeleine Albright went so far as to openly (and
unsuccessfully) interfere in elections there -- by what
might properly be described as bribery -- when she implied
this past summer that aid to the Serbs would be conditioned
upon the victory of the U.S.-supported candidate during the
Serbia entity's presidential election.
The notion of inviolability of borders, unsatisfactory as it
may be, not only remains one of the few substantive and
generally accepted principles of what goes by the name of
international law, but also limits the number of non-viable
pseudo-states condemned to become international welfare
recipients (Bosnia, Macedonia) or lawless black
holes
(Chechnya). Furthermore, that very same principle helped
justify the Gulf War, U.S. support for the
Nigerian
government during the Biafra episode, and opposition to the
Soviet annexation of the Baltic States.
Today, as if walking in its
sleep, the Clinton
Administration disregards common sense and
American
tradition by its misguided actions in Kosovo. Indeed ,
largely because of media images of Albanian refugees and an
admittedly well-founded dislike and distrust of Milosevic,
American forces are on the brink of bombing Serbia because
it resists a change of its borders by force. Furthermore,
to claim, as the Administration does, that military action
against Serbia is not intended as support for Albanian
secessionism begs the point: it will help the secessionists
even if it not intended to do so.
To give Serbia an ultimatum requiring the withdrawal of
police and military forces from Kosovo is tantamount to
giving the aggressively secessionist Kosovo Liberation Army
(KLA) a free hand. Such a withdrawal means the de facto loss
of the province. Other key U.S. demands -- negotiations with
the Albanians and heavily intrusive
on-the-ground
international monitoring -- only further strengthen the
secessionists' position. No international forces could
control the Albanian border with Kosovo, and thus prevent
the KLA from rearming itself. What
passes for the
government of Albania has neither the interest nor the means
to do so either.
It is no secret that the KLA aims to create a
"Greater
Albania" from territories now within the internationally and
U.S. recognized borders of Yugoslavia (Serbia's as well as
Montenegro's), Macedonia, and probably Greece. As for the
Albanian moderates, Ibrahim Rugova's Kosovo Democratic
League will "negotiate" with Belgrade but only concerning
the timing and conditions of independence. In addition, a
campaign of selective assassinations by the KLA against the
few pro-Yugoslav Albanians, Rugova's people, and the 10% of
the population that is neither Albanian nor Serb (mostly
Gypsies) -- helped to make the separatist threat about the
only issue of concern for the Serbian people.
None of the above facts is unknown to the Administration --
or to the Serbs. Nevertheless, if NATO bombs are intended to
bring about negotiations that lead directly to autonomy for
Kosovo, as President Clinton desires, what is there to
negotiate if the Albanians don't seek autonomy in the first
place? Perhaps what the White House really
means by
"negotiations" is the postponement of any solution until
President Clinton leaves office.
The position of the United States in the Kosovo insurgency
represents an ironic reversal of roles vis-a-vis Vietnam.
There, we could not win in large part due to the safe haven
insurgents had in North Vietnam, itself protected by a
superpower. In Kosovo the Serbs cannot permanently defeat
the KLA because it has a safe haven -- Albania -- protected
by...us! Such a position would make perfect
sense if
Washington's goal were a KLA victory, but
it makes
absolutely no sense if we are serious about describing the
KLA as "terrorist" (as the State department did) or about
opposing its goal -- secession from Serbia. Thus we are
prepared to use military force in order to defeat our own
stated political and diplomatic goals.
Equally serious and puzzling is the
misconception in
Washington -- shared by the White House and the Republican
Congress alike -- that the "problem" in Kosovo is Milosevic.
If only we could get rid of him, goes the
inside-the-
Beltway wisdom, all would be fine. Really? The most popular
politician in Serbia is Voijslav Seselj -- now a deputy
Prime Minister. Unlike Milosevic, whose only creed is his
own political survival, Seselj is a true (if unsavory)
Serbian nationalist. No opposition politician in Belgrade
supports a NATO attack or an independent Kosovo, and for one
very simple reason -- virtually no Serbian citizen does so.
Who, then, are we going to turn to once Milosevic is out of
power? Unlike the Gulf War, in which only a minority of
Iraqis supported Saddam Hussein, an attack on Serbia would
mean war with the Serbian people, with or without Milosevic.
Is this something we want? Considering the implications
(the risk to American lives, the creation of a Greater
Albania), which the administration has not,
is this
something we are prepared for?
FPRI BULLETINS OF RELATED INTEREST
Managing Ethnic Conflict, I. William Zartman, September 1998
Who Wants a Greater Albania?, Michael Radu, July 1998
Kosovo Is Not Bosnia, Adam Garfinkle, June 1998
Bosnia: A Summing Up, Robert Strausz-Hupe, February 1998
Bosnia: Less Force, More Risk, Harvey Sicherman, January 1998