János M. Rainer, "The Road to Budapest, 1956: New Documentation on the Kremlin's Decision to Intervene," The Hungarian Quarterly, Volume XXXVII No. 142 Summer 1996
Part One
Some Soviet documents relating to the 1956 Hungarian Revolution were handed over by President Yeltsin on his visit to Hungary in the Autumn of 1992. As a consequence, the chronology of events has become clearer, and an insight into the kind of information the masters of the Kremlin had based their decisions on is now possible. However, one crucial link was still missing: no evidence was available on the discussions and debates in which the decisions were conceived.
The documents providing an answer to at least the majority of these questions are quite unparallelled of their kind. In the 1950s and 1960s, full minutes were not taken of the sessions of the Soviet Presidium. The head of the General Department of the Central Committee, Vladimir Nikiforovich Malin, however, was present at the discussions, and as a kind of aid to the formulation of decisions, he recorded who was present and made sketchy notes of what was being said. Through the efforts of Russian researchers, mainly of Vyacheslav Sereda, eighteen of these notes, including all those about discussions on the agenda concerning Hungary between 23 October and 4 November 1956, have been found in the Presidential Archives of the Russian Federation. The notes, in pencil and never actually used after the recording of the decisions, are fragmentary, making the work of the editors something of puzzle-solving. These rough notes nevertheless cast light on some major issues which were, up to now, pure guesswork for historians and laymen alike. [...]
[...]
Up to now, most information on the circumstances of the Russian intervention on October 23 was provided by Khrushchev's report of October 24. He had actually meant to invite the Hungarian First Secretary to Moscow when the latter told him over the telephone that "the situation in Budapest was serious, so he had rather not go to Moscow at this time. As soon as the conversation was over, Comrade Zhukov informed Comrade Khrushchev that Gerő had asked the military attaché of the Soviet embassy in Budapest for the intervention of Soviet troops to halt demonstrations which were taking on unprecedented dimensions." Thus, up to that point, according to Khrushchev, only two members of the Soviet leadership, he himself and the Minister of Defence, knew anything about the events in Budapest where, at that time, to their knowledge, only demonstrations were taking place. "The Presidium of the the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party did not approve the intervention," Khrushchev added next day, "because no request has come from leading Hungarian functionaries." In Malin's notes, however, there is no trace of such a decision. If what Khrushchev says was true, then he must have discussed the issue only with a few members of the Presidium personally or over the telephone. "Shortly afterwards I received a phone call from the Soviet embassy in Budapest that the situation was highly dangerous, and the intervention of Soviet units was necessary." As opposed to this account (written a day later), Malin's notes read as follows:
"Note on the October 23 meeting
On the situation in Budapest and in the whole of Hungary.
(Comrades Zhukov, Bulganin and Khrushchev)
Report by - Zhukov
Hundred-thousand-strong demonstration in Budapest.
The Radio building on fire.
The headquarters of the county party committee building and the county chief department of the Ministry of the Interior occupied in Debrecen.
According to Com. Khrushchev troops should move into Budapest.
Com. Bulganin agrees with Khrushchev's proposal - troops should move in.
Com. Mikoyan: Without Nagy, the movement cannot be controlled. In that way it will be cheaper for us, too.
He has doubts about the use of troops. What can we lose? Let the Hungarians themselves do the job of restoring order. If our troops intervene, we will only make things worse for ourselves. Let us make an attempt at political action first, and have the troops move in only afterwards.
Com. Molotov: By relying on Nagy, we will only undermine Hungary. Supports intervention.
Com. Kaganovich: The government is being overthrown. This cannot be compared to Poland. Supports intervention.
Com. Pervukhin: We must intervene.
Com. Zhukov: This is different from Poland. We must move in.
A member of the Presidium of the CC should go there.
A state of emergency should be declared in the country. A curfew must be imposed.
Com. Suslov: The situation is different from what happened in Poland. There must be intervention.
Com. Saburov: Intervention must be carried out in order to maintain order.
Com. Kirichenko: Supports intervention.
Coms Malinin and Serov should be sent to Budapest.
Com. Khrushchev: Let us involve Nagy in political action. But for the time being, let us not make him Prime Minister. Let us have Comrades Mikoyan and Suslov fly to Budapest."
[...]
Khrushchev must have thought that even worse than a split was the fact that, quite obviously, no one had any idea about what to do when the momentary situation was changing, and no one had a sufficient vision of the alternatives for action. That raised the danger of incapacity for action and/or precipitousness. His thoughts may have gone somewhat farther forward than those of the others: if Imre Nagy and the Hungarian leadership had already been brave enough to disregard the Soviet instructions (for instance, on October 26, they let Mikoyan and Suslov know that negotiations should be started with the rebels, the students and the intellectuals, that politicians from other parties should be included in the government) then, should Moscow support the declaration including a radical change, they might go even further. When he spoke next, Khrushchev, unlike the others, openly expressed the dilemma that was on everyone's mind:
"Com. Khrushchev: We are responsible for many things.
The facts [must be] faced. The question is whether there will be a government that is with us or one that is not with us, and will ask for the withdrawal of troops.
What is going to happen then?
Nagy said that if we take action, he will resign.
Then the coalition will disintegrate.
There is no firm leadership there either in the party or in the government.
The (uprising) may spread to the provinces.
The military may go over to the rebels.
Let us not insist too much on Hegedüs.
Two variants.
The government acts, we help.
That may end the whole thing fast.
Or Nagy turns against us.
He will demand a ceasefire and the withdrawal of troops, next there will be capitulation.
What are the possible variants?
1) The formation of a committee which takes over (that is the worst variant) when we […]
2) To keep this government.
Send officials of the government to the provinces.
A platform is needed.
Perhaps [to issue] an appeal to the population, the workers, peasants and the intelligentsia - because [without this] we are only shooting.
3) Ought not the Chinese, the Bulgarians, Poles, Czechs and Yugoslavs send an appeal to the Hungarians?
4) Let us firmly put down the rebels. Let us persuade the fraternal parties to turn with an appeal to the Hungarians. The documents should be drafted by Comrades Brezhnev, Pospielov, Shepilov and Furtseva. Should we support the present government when it issues declarations like this?
Yes, we should. There is no other way out."
[...]
Com. Shepilov: Developments have shown that our relations with the people's democracies are in a crisis.
There is now a widespread mood of anti-Sovietism.
The deeper causes must be disclosed.
The fundamentals must remain unchanged.
There must be no ordering about of others.
Let us not allow that the present situation be taken advantage of.
A whole set of measures must be worked out concerning our relations.
The Statement - the first step.
It is not necessary to make an appeal to the Hungarians.
On the armed forces: we profess the principle of non-intervention.
We are ready to pull out with the agreement of the Hungarian government.
An ongoing struggle must be fought against national communism.
Com. Zhukov: Agrees with what was said by Com. Shepilov.
Most important: to resolve [the situation] in Hungary.
There is a widespread anti-Soviet mood.
The troops should be withdrawn from Budapest; if necessary, from all of Hungary.
This is a military and political lesson for us.
The problem of the troops in the GDR and Poland is much more serious.
It has to be discussed in the [Political] Discussion Panel. The Discussion Panel must be convened. If we go on being stubborn, who knows what might happen?
A brief resolution must be passed; already today a statement must be made concerning the most important matters.
Com. Furtseva: A general statement should be accepted rather than an appeal to the Hungarians. It must not be long. The second:
important from the point of view of the internal situation. The relations maintained with the people's democracies should be investigated from other aspects as well.
On meetings with the leaders of the people's democracies (on the issue of relations).
A meeting of the CC must be convened (i.e. to inform the members of the CC).
Com. Saburov: Agrees on the issues of the Statement and the troop withdrawal.
We did a good job at the 20th Congress but afterwards we failed to take the lead in mass initiatives. We did not change over to the genuine Leninist principles of leadership.
We may find ourselves overtaken by events.
I agree with Com. Furtseva. Ministers, CC members are asking questions.
As for Romania: they owe us 5 billion roubles for property which was created by the people.
Relations should be reviewed.
Relations must be based on equality.
Com. Khruschev: [You spoke] unanimously.
The first step: to issue the Statement."
The "hardliners" had become confused, and the "liberals" went to the limit, not just in general but also with regard to settling the Hungarian situation. From the aspect of the final outcome, with hindsight, there is just one question that emerges in connection with that meeting: how was it possible for some of the Soviet leaders, including some in high positions, to use such words? How was it possible that some of them got to the point where they were actually thinking about giving up Hungary militarily? However, Marshal Zhukov arguing in favour of a troop withdrawal from Hungary will look a great deal less unlikely, if we place him into the ongoing, still unfinished process of decision-taking. No matter how little it was detailed or how uncertain the support for this was, one of the alternatives before the meeting, now into its third day, had indeed been, for some time, a partial reduction of the Soviet military presence in Eastern Europe. On October 30 that position also received open expression, rather belatedly, too, since the opposite alternative had been employed in practice in Budapest on the 23rd of October, and, on the 28th, a "scenario" had been constructed by Khrushchev for later use. The October 30 statement of the Soviet government may be regarded as a temporary victory - indeed, the last up to the mid-eighties - of the "liberal" view in the international area, the kind of thinking which dared to mention the withdrawal of troops. Even though the actual decision ultimately went the other way, that statement, when it was created, was by no means a cynical maneuver meant to mislead, but a genuine mirror of the debates and power struggles going on within the Soviet leadership, one of the rare moments when the Empire sent signals to the outside world that it might be opening up. The initiator, Khrushchev, must have still believed in the usefulness of the October Polish formula, if in very different circumstances.
[...]
(To be continued)
János M. Rainer's publications include pioneering statistical accounts of the reprisals following the 1956 Revolution (in samizdat 1986-89), and a book on the 1953-59 debates in the literary press. The first volume of his biography of Imre Nagy was published, in Hungarian, in 1996 by Századvég, Budapest.
Part Two
[...]
An Exchange of Views on the Hungarian Situation.
[Kádár:] Assessment. The intelligentsia is in the lead, the oppositionists: the followers of Nagy, party members are at the head of the armed groups. [...] When the uprising had ended, we spoke with rebels - they were workers - the leaders of the rebel groups,13 they joined the coalition government14 they did not want this, were for the removal of the Rákosi clique. They fought for the withdrawal of troops, for the people's democratic system. […] At first we failed to recognize this, identified it as counter-revolution, thus turning [the people] against us - they did not feel themselves to be counter-revolutionaries.
I personally attended a rally (discussion), nobody wanted a counter-revolution,15 when we spoke to the leaders of the armed groups. Within these groups, armed groups of counter-revolutionary character emerged.
It must be said that they all demanded the withdrawal of Soviet troops. We did not succeed in finding out how the counter-revolutionaries were able to spread this counter-revolutionary propaganda.
The strike - the demand for the withdrawal of troops - we will be hungry but the troops must be pulled out.
There was a debate yesterday.
The Declaration of the Soviet government and the declaration of neutrality were already discussed. It was announced that "we will go back to work".16 But the Soviet troop movements [began] - and news spread fast.
The authority of the government will not be taken into account17 because of its coalition character.
They will use all their strength to re- establish their parties. They all want to seize power themselves. That undermines the authority of the government even more. The social democrats are especially prominent. The social democrats were given one seat in the inner cabinet. But they refused to name their candidate, in other words, they do not want to accept solidarity with Nagy.18 There are counter-revolutionary elements in Nagy's policy. Cardinal Mindszenty was freed by soldiers. [...] The weak link: the HWP ceased to exist. Some functionaries have been killed19, others have escaped.
In 1/3 of the county committees: the leaders take part in the revolutionary committees (on a district, county level). The lower-level organizations have been destroyed. [...] The parties of the coalition don't want a counter-revolution. Tildy and other comrades20 are afraid of Ferenc Nagy. They are afraid of those who are in exile.21 [...] The position is shifting more and more to the right hour by hour.
Two questions: 1) the government's decision on neutrality, 2) the issue of the party.
How was the decision on neutrality born? Strong impression: the organized withdrawal of the troops. The declaration: [created] a good impression and had a reassuring effect. But tension in the masses is running high, they react vehemently. Soviet troop movements have taken place - they provoked the government and the masses. The government acts differently from the troops.22
It was announced that the Soviet troops had crossed the border using motor cars. The Hungarian units dug in. What should they do, shoot or not? We summoned Andropov.23 Andropov said these were railwaymen. The Hungarians at the border telegraphed that these were [not] railwaymen. Then came the news that Soviet tanks were on the move toward Szolnok. That happened at noon. The mood in the government was nervous. We summoned Andropov. He replied: regrouping. Then new reports came in: the airports were being surrounded by Soviet tanks. Andropov was summoned again. He answered: wounded soldiers were being . taken away. Nagy was convinced: a Soviet attack on Budapest was in preparation. Tildy asked for Hungarian tanks to move to the parliament.
In the army - Revolutionary Committee. Maléter, Kovács, Király do not obey the government.24 They do not want the bad ministers.
The entire government tended to the opinion that if the troops continued to push forward in the direction of Budapest, Budapest should be defended. It was in that atmosphere that the idea of neutrality was born. The initiator: Zoltán Tildy. He was supported by everybody. I was of the opinion that nothing should be done before we spoke to Andropov. With the exception of Kádár, the whole government declared that the Soviet government was deceiving the Hungarian government. It was postponed by two hours. 25 They were not calmed by the explanation of the Soviet government. They declared to Andropov that they would make that move. When Andropov was gone, they made their decision on neutrality, and [decided on] the issue that they would turn to the UN.26 If this was manoeuvres only, then they will withdraw their appeal to the UN. When Andropov was gone, then he (Kádár) too, voted for neutrality.
Changing of the name of the party: Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (a name from 1925)27 The HWP was discredited in the eyes of the masses. The prestige of the HWP was at its height in 1948 (fusion with the social democrats). The Rajk affair undermined its prestige.
On the future. Yesterday I cast my vote in favour of these two government decisions. If the Soviet troops were pulled out within a short time (two-three months) - the important thing is that there be a decision on the withdrawal of troops - then our party and the other parties could take up the struggle against the counter-revolution. But I am not altogether certain of success. There is no unity within the coalition. My opinion: if the Social Democratic Party and the Smallholders' Party will revive their old programmes, they will be disappointed. The people believe in nationalization, and regard it as their own cause. If the communists declare that they support nationalization, then the prestige of the other parties will not grow. The real danger: these coalition parties may eventually be swept away by the counter-revolution.
In my view: there is another way. To keep Hungary using armed force. But then there will be armed clashes. Crushing by military force equals bloodshed. And what will there be after that? The moral position of the communists will be nil. It will cause damage to the other socialist countries. Is there any guarantee that in such a case the same situation will not occur in other countries?
The counter-revolutionary forces are not inconsiderable. But that is a question of struggle. If the restoring of order happens by armed force: the prestige of the socialist countries (will be damaged).
[...]
It is clear from the long and detailed notes on Kádár's report that even if he had an inkling about why he had been "required" in Moscow, he still knew nothing for certain at the time. He was probably asked to describe the situation, to explain his view. A born politician, he set forth his view in a way so as to be "covered" for every possible outcome. He analysed the situation from an "outsider's" point of view, as an observer, a loyal subject simply briefing the leaders of the empire. He explained his own moves, cast light on the motives behind them as if he were giving some kind of action report to vindicate himself. At other instances he spoke as a genuine member of the Imre Nagy government and the party leadership, accepting the responsibility for their common decisions. He touched upon the possible "solutions", sketched out perspectives, taking a quite distinct position, too, but also making it apparent that he could imagine both solutions. Meantime he must have watched every move, every reaction to what he was saying, trying all the time to make out if the leaders of the CPSU had already come to a decision, and if so, what the decision was. However, this time his "hosts" remained silent; he was being scrutinized.
The disjointed character of his narrative must have been due to his anxiety, to the complex state of mind he was in. He had evidently meant to relate events in chronological order but halted time and again, sometimes to offer a political analysis, sometimes to add his own impressions as an illustration, and finally, to explain what had been done - and especially why - in the given situation by himself or the government. Another reason for the disjointedness may have been that he was being bombarded with questions, unrecorded by Malin, by the Soviets. An "interrogation" of this kind, however, is not really probable. The "leaps" in the notes were most likely due to the circumstance, unusual for Malin, that what Kádár, who could not speak Russian, said was coming through an interpreter.
[...]
Notes
[...]
13 * Kádár's description of the leaders of the revolution was based on his October 30 meeting with the largely reform-communist leaders of the Budapest Tűzoltó utca armed group. He did not meet any other leaders. That was, in fact, the only rebel group whose leaders included intellectuals close to the opposition wing of the party.
14 * The meaning of this part of the sentence is vague. It may concern the rebel leaders of whom Kádár has just spoken - in which case it is not their joining of the government that is meant but the fact that they sought out Kádár for the purpose of negiotiations. It is more likely, though, that Kádár was speaking about his own membership in the government, explaining why he had accepted a position in the Imre Nagy government, of which he had been a member as a Minister of State since October 30, the formation of the narrower cabinet.
15 * He was probably talking about his meeting with the leaders of the Tűzoltó utca group again.
16 * This must be an allusion to the November 1 meeting of the Budapest workers' councils and revolutionary committees with the members of the government, which finally passed an appeal for the resumption of work. Kádár was not at the meeting. The appeal was broadcast by Hungarian Radio at 11 p.m.
17 * The probable meaning is that the government will lose its prestige.
18 * On October 30, 1956, a narrower coalition (multi-party) cabinet which constituted a kind of presidium to the government was established by Imre Nagy within the government. Its members were: Prime Minister Imre Nagy, Ministers of State János Kádár and Géza Losonczy, representing the communists (then still under the name of HWP), Zoltán Tildy and Ferenc Erdei, representing the Independent Smallholders' Party and the Peasant Party, respectively. A seat was kept for the Social Democrats; however, their representatives, Anna Kéthly, Gyula Kelemen and József Fischer, would only join the transformed and extended cabinet that was established on November 3.
19 * In fact, only a very few HWP apparatchiks lost their lives during the revolution.
20 * Sic.
21 * Former Prime Minister Ferenc Nagy was in exile in the United States at the time. At the end of October he happened to be in Paris, and travelled to Vienna on hearing of the outbreak of the revolution. A day later, and at the request of the Austrian Government, he returned to Paris and subsequently to America.
22 * I.e. the Soviet government.
23 * On November 1, 1956.
24 * At the time of the departure of Kádár, Major General Pál Maléter was First Deputy of the Minister of Defence, Major General István Kovács was Chief of Staff and Major General Béla Király the President of the Revolutionary Law-Enforcement Committee and the commander of the National Guard. All were members of the Revolutionary Defense Commission established at the Ministry of Defense on October 31, and, quite to the contrary of what Kádár claimed, they carried out the instructions of the government.
25 * I.e. the decision on the declaration of neutrality.
26 * I.e. in order to inform the United Nations of the declaration of neutrality, and to ask the four permanent members of the Security Council (the United States, Britain, France and the Soviet Union) to guarantee Hungary's neutrality. The government also asked the Secretary General to put the Hungarian issue on the agenda of the imminent General Assembly.
27 * The radical party founded in 1925 by the leftist opposition who had been expelled from the Social Democratic Party was called the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party. Its leadership was in contact with the then illegal Communist Party.
[...]
János M. Rainer's publications include pioneering statistical accounts of the reprisals following the 1956 Revolution (in samizdat 1986-89), and a book on the 1953-56 debates in the literary press. The first volume of his biography of Imre Nagy was published, in Hungarian, in 1996 by the Institute for the Research of the 1956 Revolution, Budapest.
The Hungarian Quarterly, Volume XXXVII No. 143 Autumn 1996