In the years leading up to the outbreak of the First World War, many European powers, great and small, engaged in considerable naval building programmes. The problem facing states that did not already possess a significant naval force was a lack of expertise at all levels in how to equip, organize and successfully run a modern fleet. In 1908 the Ottoman Empire was in such a position and so the Porte turned to Great Britain and requested the loan of a naval adviser to supervize the reorganization of the almost extinct Turkish navy. Between February 1909 and September 1914 Britain sent three consecutive naval missions to Turkey, the first led by Admiral Douglas Gamble (Feb. 1909-March 1910); the second by Admiral Hugh Williams (April 1910-April 1912); and the last led by Admiral Arthur Limpus until he was posted to Malta in September 1914.
Although the continuous service of the British missions was to be the most significant naval assistance Turkey had received, foreign naval advisers were not an entirely new breed for the Ottoman Admiralty. In 1868 British Admiral Hobart Hamden joined the Turkish navy as a serving officer and, after two separate periods of active service, became the Sultan's naval adviser in 1885.(1) In this instance, however, the officer had joined the Turkish navy of his own volition and had been removed from the Royal Navy list during his period of service. More recently in 1904, the Turks had hired two American officers, Admiral Bucknam and Captain Ledbetter, as naval advisers. Although successful at uncovering corruption at the shipyards of Kiel and Germania where Turkish vessels were being built, the Americans achieved little progress to the Turkish navy.(2)
After years of neglect, by 1908 the Ottoman navy was in a desperate position. In the late nineteenth century Sultan Abdul Hamid, fearing that a coup would spring from the fleet moored in the Bosphorus, disbanded the fleet and allowed the ships to disintegrate. The conflict with Greece in 1897, however, was a painful lesson in how vulnerable the Turkish coast was without a navy; although Turkey won the war her coastline suffered several bombardments. Minister of Marine Admiral Hasan Pasha was, therefore, charged with rebuilding the fleet. Hassan, though, was corrupt and stole most of the credits issued for shipbuilding and falsified plans and reports: `every year beautiful coloured plans were submitted to the palace showing the progress made and what remained to be done; little or nothing was ever done.'(3) Hassan was exposed in 1904 and the Sultan adopted closer control over the programme with the help of the American officers, but corruption was rife and little was achieved. Despite some purchases from Italy, France and Germany, of the Ottoman fleet of 52 vessels, 24 (including two submarines) were unseaworthy.(4) Many of the remainder could not be used owing to a shortage of experienced officers:
None of the modern vessels has ever left the Golden Horn since
delivery and with a very few exceptions not an officer or man in the
Turkish navy has ever seen a gun fired or a torpedo run ... the only
sea training the officers obtain is in the rotten steamers of the
Mahousse fleet.(5)
This was the size of the task facing Admiral Gamble and his successors. With a coastline of some 11,000 miles(6) including a large number of strategically vital islands, it was absolute folly for the Ottoman Empire not to maintain a competent naval force. As a yardstick, Turkey needed to have a fleet `superior to that of Greece',(7) her main strategic threat in the Eastern Mediterranean, but in 1908 the fleet would barely be able to defend the country against even a minor attack.
Although Britain's strong naval tradition made her a good choice for Turkey to approach for assistance, the fact that the Royal Navy would supply the mission was by no means guaranteed. Other elements of the Turkish state were in need of reform also and other Great Powers had their fingers in the pie, most notably Germany in the army and France in the customs service. Influence with the Turkish government was of significant value to the Great Powers owing to Turkey's strategic importance as a potential ally, and her economic importance as a gateway to the East. Since there was no shortage of countries offering to assist Turkey and court her favour, an intense rivalry developed for influence in Constantinople. The Young Turk revolution of 1908 helped the British position but the intrigues continued and the objective of the British Government was to supply a naval mission before Germany was invited, especially since it was rumoured that a number of Turkish officers were to be `admitted to the German navy for training'.(8)
On the wider international stage the British position in the Ottoman navy was to affect Britain's relations with her Entente partner Russia, and was to be a crucial element in Britain's approach to other events that were to throw the focus of international attention on the Eastern Mediterranean: the Tripoli war, the Balkan wars and the Liman von Sanders crisis. The activities of the mission were to become important elements in Britain's relations with other powers, the Ottoman Empire most significant among them.
Vice Admiral Sir Douglas Gamble was appointed as Naval Adviser to Turkey at the end of 1908 and arrived in Constantinople on 2 February 1909. Of the three admirals who led the mission, Gamble was to serve the shortest term, yet he was to make the most favourable impression on his hosts, receiving from the Sultan the prestigious Grand Order of the Imperial Ottoman Empire of the Medjidieh.(9) He did not enjoy his posting however, and in his 15-month struggle to begin the reorganization of the Turkish fleet he was faced with the disorganization, technical inadequacies and financial limitations that characterized the Ottoman admiralty and also with the political turmoil in Constantinople that further hindered his work. The difficulties were considerable and within a week of the Admiral's arrival, Lowther was reporting to Grey: `Gamble is quite horrified at the indescribable mess he finds here and the empty coffers are not encouraging for his work.'(10) Gamble was further demoralized by his failing health: the climate did not help and by the time he left in April 1910 there remained `a large amount of work to be done'(11) and Gamble was greatly disheartened: `This is such heartbreaking work ... I am sick of the whole business and I feel very seedy.'(12)
Even so, by the summer of 1909 Gamble had achieved a striking success. In July the fledging Turkish fleet of some 21 combat vessels began a three and a half month cruise in the Aegean. This was the first time in decades that any major Turkish naval operation had taken place; the Annual Report for 1909 describes the progress as `gratifying' given that `few Turkish officers had seen any sea service and that the men had practically no training.'(13)
Gamble's replacement, Vice Admiral Hugh Pigot Williams, found the job no easier, and furthermore did not enjoy good relations with the Turks. In his two years in Turkey from 1910 to 1912, Williams achieved little; this was partly attributable, according to Williams, to the fact that his demotion in status from Vice to Rear Admiral on arrival in Turkey made it more difficult for him to assert his authority.(14) (The Foreign Office had been aware of the change but thought it did `not appear to be of much consequence.')(15)
More serious, however was the confusion over whether Williams was to function as a `naval adviser' or as a mere `technical adviser', on which point the British and Turkish versions#of the contract were contradictory. Clearly a naval adviser would have more far reaching powers than a technical adviser. A `naval adviser on all matters'(16) would have more authority within the navy as a whole than just a technical adviser on the restructuring of the fleet; Williams clearly felt his limited powers restricted his ability to make progress. His task was made yet more difficult, however, by the diplomatic battle for influence that was taking place at Constantinople between Great Britain and Germany.
The Young Turkish Revolution had helped British influence in Turkey to blossom during 1908, and had reduced the influence of Germany. However, the Committee of Union and Progress lacked strength and knowledge in depth and many of the old, pro-German faces were able to reappear in important government positions. Foreign intrigues and political instability fed each other and became a considerable problem for the British Naval Mission. Britain had sent the mission in the first place partly to stop Germany from supplying one, and Williams' work was unsettled by intrigues before he had even started: during the delay between Gamble's departure and Williams' arrival, Lowther telegraphed London:
Admiral Williams is urgently required here to deal with technical
advice in order to overcome opposition which is being organised
especially from German sources against the Armstrong Vickers
combination.(17)
Soon after Williams arrived in Turkey, the Anglophile Mustechar (Under Secretary) at the Admiralty, Halil Pasha, was replaced (possibly as a result of intrigue) by the pro-German Rustem Pasha; and the two Ministers of Marine under whom Williams served, Salih Pasha and Mahmoud Mouktar, were both trained in the army under German command.
It is true that Williams responded to the problem of ministerial instability (between 1909 and 1910 the, average tenure of each Minister was less than three months),(18) by attempting to standardize the Naval reform programme to cope with domestic political upheavals.(19) The fact remained, however, that a naval adviser could only be effective if he had good relations with the Minister of Marine who was the `sole source of motive power ... every trifling matter is dealt with by him personally'.(20) In the event, he found the pro-German biases of the Ministers a considerable obstacle.
True, it was hardly surprising that such men should be pro-German. Since there had been no navy to speak of for over a decade, most of those at the Admiralty had to be drawn from an army background, where the Germans had been active in training Turkish officers for many years. Even so, Williams complained that Mahmoud, in particular, made life difficult for the mission. For example, on occasions he would appear unannounced on board ships, grilling the crew on specific details of their jobs. Furthermore, Williams had apparently agreed with the minister the procurement of new staff, including a chief engineer, only to travel all the way to London to recruit them before he discovered that permission had been withdrawn.(21) By April 1911 the `personal'(22) problems between admiral and minister had become so acute that Lowther feared that Turkey `would not appoint any other senior naval adviser'(23) from Britain.
The German link with the Turkish Admiralty manifested itself in other ways as well. Although the Turks had employed a British admiral to supervise the fleet, that did not prevent them from turning to Germany to hire other officers or purchase vessels, especially since the Germans seemed more accommodating to Turkish wishes. For in their naval race with Greece, the Ottoman Empire wanted to purchase prestige vessels: high tonnage battleships and Dreadnoughts. Williams thought this was unnecessary and wanted to amend the naval programme: `In view of the confined waters of the Mediterranean ... [the size of proposed] destroyers could be reduced' by about 30 per cent.(24) He had to admit, however, that the `ignorant Turks were clamouring for Dreadnoughts in the shortest possible time',(25) and if Britain would not provide them Germany would. Already in July 1910 when Britain refused to sell to Turkey the battleships Swiftsure and Triumph, offering only a smaller class of vessel, the Turks bought German ships instead; and in the autumn the Turks purchased a further four German destroyers. Moreover, British hopes of maintaining their position of advantage in the Turkish navy were exposed to the constant threat that, lacking experienced men of her own, Turkey would employ German officers to man these ships.
By 1912 the poor relations between Williams and the Turkish Admiralty were leading to speculation about the very future of the naval mission. On 26 January the Berliner Morgenpost reported that `The Turkish Embassy here are negotiating with the German Admiralty to secure the services of a well known senior naval officer ... in place of Admiral Williams.'(26) The report proved to be little more than idle speculation and was denied by another German paper the Likal-Anzeiger,(27) by which time it was clear that Turkey intended to apply for the return of Admiral Gamble. Nevertheless, such speculation aroused-fears in the Foreign Office that their valuable asset in Turkey might be lost, and did nothing to smooth relations between Williams and the Ministry of Marine in the final months of his term.
As far as the Foreign Office were concerned, Williams had to take some of the blame for his own difficulties, and indeed for the effect they were having on the British position in Turkey. Williams went absent for long periods of time from Constaptinople and Lowther reported that the `Naval authorities here do not seem to care whether he is here or not.'(28) Grey was very concerned about the situation and throughout the spring and summer of 1911 there was ongoing discussion between Grey, Lowther and the Admiralty as to whether Williams should be asked to resign his position. Only the fear that the Turks might not replace him with a British admiral prevented Grey from taking this course of action. All the same, by September the Foreign Secretary was determined that `something must be done about Admiral Williams ... neglect of his work must be doing us increasing harm.'(29) However, Williams believed he had reached an understanding with his hosts and claimed that he `was never on better terms with the Minister [of Marine].'(30) Williams was thus able to see his term out until April 1912.
In his termination report to the Admiralty, Williams gave further indication of the specific difficulties he had with the Turkish navy. Although on the whole he found that the enthusiastic young officers were well disposed towards the English, they lacked initiative: `No Turkish officer will take any responsibility ... they consider that the entire responsibility rests with the Minister of Marine.'(31) Indeed it was the case that 95 per cent of the Turkish seamen were illiterate, causing further difficulty in training men to do technical jobs.(32) Furthermore the Turks' determination to order battleships of over 20,000 tons when Williams felt that 16,000 tons was sufficient caused policy disagreements with the minister. In their naval race with Greece the Turks wanted the high prestige vessels and other Countries were eager to assist. The commercial competition which seemed to `override every other consideration'(33) hampered Williams' objective efforts. Even the British government `so strongly represented English manufacturers'(34) that the Admiral was forced to concede.
When the time came to leave, Williams received great applause from his hosts;(35) yet he had not endeared himself to the Turks as Gamble had. This, combined with the difficulties he had faced with the foreign intrigues, his curtailed position and the culture of the Ottoman navy, meant that by his departure the mission had made very little progress in the reorganization of the Turkish fleet.
The Ottoman Empire's determination to build up its navy caused considerable unease in St. Petersburg and the Russians took a very dim view of Great Britain's assistance to Turkey in this regard. In the late summer of 1910 there was forthright discussion of the matter between the British and Russian governments. `Russia', Grey was reminded, `had no wish to see the Balance of Naval Power in the Levant altered by an increase in the Turkish fleet,'(36) and would `consider the maintenance of her supremacy in the Black Sea to be of such paramount importance that she will make whatever sacrifices are necessary to achieve it.'(37) Turkey's naval build up was to be regarded as a `gratuitous kind of challenge' and Izvolsky further warned that `the fact that the Young Turkish Navy is being organized by British Admirals will make an unfavourable impression in Russia.'(38) The Russians perceived that Turkish naval build up aggravated their problem with the Straits. Freedom of movement for Russia's warships in and out of the Black Sea was limited by the Straits ruling, whereas the Ottoman navy was limited only by resources. If those resources expanded Turkey would clearly be at advantage regArding the naval balance in the Black Sea, since in the event of a conflict with Russia only the Turks could reinforce their Black Sea fleet with other vessels, whereas Russia could not.
Press opinion in both Turkey and Russia was affected by the dispute. In the Ottoman Empire, the Young Turk paper Tanin carried an article in August 1910 suggesting that the Black Sea be neutralized.(39) In Russia the language was more bellicose. The semi-official newspaper Rossia reported that the Turkish officers would be `trained by experienced instructors, invited for this purpose from England' and demanded that the balance of power be re-established by an increase in the Russian Black Sea Squadron.(40) True, the Russians accepted that the current activity was directed against Greece, but at the same time they felt that `in dealing with the Young Turks an absolutely unknown quantity has to be considered', and the reorganization of the fleet and purchase of German ships had `caused a considerable amount of uneasiness in Russia.'(41) It was feared this `unknown quantity' might provoke revolution amongst the `discontented combination of races in the Caucasus, bordering on the Turkish frontier.'(42) Russia was therefore prepared to rebuild her fleet to the sum of 50-60 million [pounds sterling] since she no longer felt able to keep `maintaining her supremacy ... at comparatively little cost.'(43)
The British took the Russian concerns very seriously. Influence in the Ottoman Empire was indeed vital, but so was the 1907 Entente with Russia, and so the Foreign Office were keen to allay Russian fears. By the time Izvolsky objected, the missions had been active in Turkey for nearly two years. However, in reaction to O'Bierne's dispatches, Mallet highlighted the `new and very important considerations, namely the effect on Russian opinion of the regeneration of the Turkish Fleet with the active co-operation of Great Britain.'(44) On the issue of the Straits, however, Britain could offer little. Grey had, in 1908, offered a qualified acceptance of the opening of the Straits `on terms which would be acceptable to Russia, and to the Riverein States of the Black Sea, while not placing outside powers at an unfair advantage.'(45) The British stood by this principle in 1910 but its very terms demonstrate how difficult it would be to gain Great Power consensus on the issue.
Since the British could not offer Russia compensation, they had to convince St. Petersburg that the British Naval missions were justified. The British defence was twofold. Firstly they claimed that the Turkish navy did not present a realistic threat to Russian security. Turkey's aim was indeed to match Greek naval strength, and the Porte certainly had no interest in antagonizing the Russians. By 1910 the Turkish navy was still so weak that it could not pose an offensive threat to any power. Nicolson remarked: `At present the Turks have neither the officers to navigate and fight, nor the crews to man the ships which they have bought from the Germans, nor are they likely' to for some time to come.'(46) The view of the Turkish Foreign Minister, Assim Bey, was that if Turkey were even to try to engage Russia in a naval race, Russia would win because of her greater wealth, but that at least if Turkey had Dreadnoughts she could guarantee the Bosphorus against Russian attack.(47) Even as late as the end of 1913 a Turkish naval threat to Russia was regarded by Britain as `too remote a contingency to be considered at present.'(48) However, since relative strength was a variable factor which would inevitably change, probably in Russia's disfavour, this argument alone would not satisfy St. Petersburg that Britain should be helping Turkey arm its fleet.
The second argument with which the British Government defended its decision to send the missions was that Britain represented the lesser of evils for Russia. The choice, according to the Foreign Office, was a simple one: `If a British Admiral does not organize the fleet, a German admiral will be called in, who will push matters with greater speed'(49) and `German influence would quickly become as supreme in the Turkish fleet as it already is in the army.'(50) At least it would be better for Russia to have Turkey co-operating with her Entente partner than with a Triple Alliance power. After all:
Turkey means to have a fleet whether we assist or not ... [it would be]
advantageous that the [assisting] power should be Great Britain and
that the Turkish Fleet should not become Germanized like the Turkish
army.(51)
Aside from the diplomatic alignments, from the point of view of the speed of the naval race, Britain felt it was better that she, rather than Germany, help Turkey. Admiral Williams made some efforts to limit the extent of Turkish naval expansion, whereas it was felt that the intense commercial pressure from German shipbuilders would force the pace of building were Germany to control the Turkish fleet.(52) For Russia to want to prevent any country from helping to organize the Turkish fleet was unrealistic and the British clearly felt that they were the better option from Russia's point of view.
Ultimately there were more important matters for the Russians to concern themselves with than the work of Admiral Williams. They did not like the help that the British were giving to Turkey; but, bitter pill as it was, they had to swallow it. The Entente was important to St.. Petersburg also and not worth jeopardizing over what realistically remained the most minor of threats to Russian security. As a result the Russian protests died down by the end of 1910 and the Russians were never again to speak of the British assistance with the expansion of the Turkish navy as a direct and immediate threat to Russian security. The year 1910 was rather a quiet year diplomatically, so it is perhaps not surprising that this issue increased in significance at this time. From 1911 to 1912 issues of wider international importance erupted in the Eastern Mediterranean, some of which were to have an effect on the position of the Naval Missions in Turkey.
The weakness of the Ottoman Empire was cruelly exposed in 1911 and 1912 when she fought two wars and lost them both. The involvement of her embryonic fleet in both the war with Italy and the war against the Balkan League was virtually non-existent. The Tripoli War demonstrated the difficulty of trying to defend an extensive coastline without an effective navy. The Italians, with a comparatively better but by no means magnificent fleet, were able to keep their troops supplied in Libya. The Turkish navy on the outbreak of war was just off Chios and `returned at full speed to the Dardanelles' out of harm's way.(53) Those vessels that were trapped in the Mediterranean, such as the torpedo boats Tocad and Alpagot,(54) did not last long. Lowther concluded that `the disaster in Tripoli has been as a result of the weakness of the fleet.'(55) The need for continued improvement had been highlighted but it had been a costly lesson. There is similarly little to say about the naval campaigns of the first Balkan War; although at this time it was considered that `the Turkish fleet was, on paper, about a match for the Greek one and it is difficult to find an excuse for its inaction.'(56) A lack of experienced officers and strategic errors were suggested as causes. However, other issues did arise out of these two wars that affected the position of the British Naval missions.
Whilst working at the mission the British officers were effectively employees of the Turkish navy; they were contracted `sous les ordres du Ministre de la Marine' and it was even the case that `ils porteront l'uniforme Ottomane suivant leur grade.'(57) At the same time, all the officers remained on the lists of the Royal Navy and were British subjects. The Foreign Office in London had to work out what was to be done about the mission should Turkey go to war with another power. They were not entirely unprepared for such an event when it occurred in September 1911. In January 1910 the British Admiralty had filed precise papers on the matter. The Foreign Enlistment Act stated that it was an offence to `accept any commission or engagement in military or naval service of any foreign state at war with any foreign state at peace with Her Majesty' without the express permission of the government.(58) Since the mission was commissioned with the approval of the government, the Foreign Office had to ensure that the Admirals were contracted for peace time duties only. When war was imminent between Italy and Turkey, Grey was alert to the issue and telegraphed Constantinople:
Should hostilities break out between Italy and Turkey, British naval
officers in Turkish employ will doubtless remember that their
contracts are only for time of peace and that their services must cease
if war ensues.(59)
The difficulty with this was the high value the Turks placed upon the mission. If the Admiral's services had to cease altogether throughout the course of a long conflict then the future of the mission might be in jeopardy. The analogy was drawn with Admiral Hobart hamden who continued to serve as a naval adviser to Turkey during the 1897 Greco-Turkish war provided he `in no way aided or assisted either of those countries.'(60) An acceptable formula was thus created whereby British neutrality could be preserved yet the mission need not be terminated. In answer to a question by Noel Buxton MP during the Balkan War, Grey articulated the formula to the Commons: `British officers in Turkish employment might continue at their posts on the understanding that they took no part in hostilities and that their services were not calculated to assist the belligerents.'(61)
Naturally the Turks were dismayed by the British decision not to allow their officers to serve actively during war time and complained to Lowther that since they had been withdrawn from active service `the navy did not benefit to a sufficient extent.'(62) However, this did not result in a decrease in British influence at Constantinople. According to Admiral Williams, quite the opposite occurred: `The Italian War has caused a great improvement in the feeling towards England, and at the same time German influence has been greatly reduced.'(63) On the whole therefore the delicate position of the Admiral and his officers was handled well by the Foreign Office to avoid both a diplomatic crisis with the Triple Alliance and a dispute with the Turks over the future of the mission.
More serious, however, was the crisis that developed over the training of Turkish officers in English naval schools, a by-product of the British mission in Turkey. Fifteen Turkish officers being trained in Britain completed their training just before the outbreak of the Tripoli war and returned to Turkey to serve in the Navy. Others, whose training had not been completed, remained in Britain to finish their courses. The problem arose when three engineer lieutenants (Rechid bin Ahmed, Salih Gemal bin Ibrahim and Hikmet Ahmed) were due to complete their training and return to Constantinople whilst the war was ongoing at the end of May 1912. Grey felt that he could not allow these officers to return since they might use knowledge gained from Britain during the conflict, in use against the Italians in that same conflict; this would violate Britain's position as a neutral power. He therefore sent the following Aide Memoire to Assim Bey explaining his objections to allowing the officers to return:
Il ne serait pas compatible avec les obligations de neutralite du
Gouvernement de Sa Majeste Britannique de permettre, des a present,
la rentree dans L'Empire ottoman de ces trois officiers, s'ils devaient,
ou bien, s'ils pouvaient, utiliser contre l'ennemi les connaissances
speciales acquises par eux depuis le commencement des hostilitees.(64)
This memo was rather insensitively worded, since it suggested in `ils devaient' that the Turks wanted these officers back specifically to use against the Italians. This was probably true but nevertheless it was diplomatically careless of Grey to say so, especially since he was aware that Britain did not `have any statutory right to intern'(65) the three officers.
As a compromise the British offered to return the officers on the understanding that they would not be used in hostilities. The Turks were reluctantly prepared to agree to this on two conditions: firstly that `no publicity be given to the fact'(66) (which Britain did not object to) and secondly that this instance be regarded as `un cas tout special, ne saurait creer un precedent ni etablir une regle de Droit International dans la definition des devoirs de la neutralite.'(67) This was the point on which there was considerable disagreement. This was not a special case, an angry Grey contested, and a distinction was made between those officers who had been withdrawn before the outbreak of hostilities and those who had not.(68) The Turks seemed to get the message and they did not risk testing the precedent when war with the Balkan States became imminent: most Turkish officers still training in England were rapidly withdrawn and returned to the Ottoman navy.
It is impossible to know whether the officers who were returned to Turkey in the summer of 1912 fulfilled the agreement not to serve against Italy, but given the inactivity of the fleet in that conflict it is likely that they did. Grey's concern that a small issue `might become a very big one if the Italians took objection'(69) was addressed and a diplomatic crisis was avoided. However this friction between London and Constantinople, for which Grey was at least partly responsible, combined with the ongoing conflicts, provided a testing start to relations between the Turkish Admiralty and their new British Naval Adviser, Admiral Arthur Limpus.
Whatever damage the Williams Mission had done to the British position in Turkey had been tempered by the favourable legacy left by Admiral Gamble in 1910. As the time approached when Williams would depart, the Turkish government was `unanimously decided'(70) as to whom they wanted to replace him: `Gamble! Gamble! Gamble! Three times Gamble.'(71) One time, however, had been more than enough for Gamble who certainly did not want to go back, and Grey was not about to force him. All the same the Foreign Office wanted to keep the mission alive and decided `not to refuse them [the Turks] Gamble until we can offer them someone else.'(72) On 11 March 1912, after a frustrating delay while the Admiralty neglected the issue, Churchill, under pressure from Grey,(73) selected Admiral Arthur Limpus, a young officer with one year's experience as an admiral with the squadron at South Africa. The lessons of the Williams era had been noted and the criteria with which Limpus was to be promoted to the Turks was that he was a `fine fellow' who would make a `good personal impression'.(74) Since the relationship with the Minister of Marine was so vital, these would be factors essential to a successful term in the Ottoman Empire. With his secretary, Stack, Commander Ashby and Lieutenants Elliot and Hallifax, Admiral Limpus arrived in Turkey at the beginning of May 1912.
The ongoing Italian war followed by the Balkan war hampered Limpus' progress to some extent but the Admiral almost immediately set to work on a project that would bear fruit in November 1913. If the Turks were serious about having a good navy then they would also need good quality docks for the vessels to be moored and maintained in. Whilst the fleet had been allowed to languish at the turn of the century, so had the dockyards. It was decided to put the contract for building and maintaining a huge floating dock at the port of Ismid out to tender to foreign firms and the Naval Adviser Limpus was to supervise this process. To that end he set up the Societe Imperiale Ottomane Co-interessee des Docks et Chantiers.(75)
The Turkish government were persuaded, not without difficulty to put
their crumbling dockyards into capable hands ... the most
experienced and able firms in the world were persuaded not without
difficulty to take this work seriously in hand ... The parties were
brought together with my draft propositions before them after 16
months work.(76)
The fact that Limpus was English had, without doubt, a bearing on the outcome of the negotiations: the contract, which was `secured without payment of a penny of backsheesh in the face of formidable competition by the Krupp and Orlando Works,'(77) went to Armstrong Vickers Company on terms exceptionally favourable to the British. The contract, the like of which had never `been made in any country',(78) expressly stated that only Turkish or British workmen could be employed on the dockyards,(79) and gave the British a `practical monopoly of naval construction and repairs for thirty years.'(80) Combined with her involvement in the navy, the winning of this contract by a British firm was a very significant boost to Britain's influence in the Ottoman Empire. It also stood as Limpus' most striking achievement during his term in Turkey.
Limpus was prepared to agree that the arrangement of the dockyards contract was a great personal achievement, but purely in the context of his service to the Turks. What angered the Admiral, however, was the way the settlement was viewed in Britain as a landmark victory in the struggle for influence at Constantinople:
I am astonished to find this accomplishment looked upon not as a
tremendous gain for the Turks (which indeed it is) but only as a point
scored by the scheming British Government against the other Great
Powers! Whereas I know that the British Government had no hand in
the business at all, except of course that they sent me as naval adviser
when the Turks asked for such a man.(81)
It was perhaps a little naive of Limpus to think that the British would not be delighted with the result of the negotiations for their own ends. There is no evidence to suggest that Limpus deliberately discarded foreign bids for the contract, but even he must have had some idea of what reaction there would have been had a German or Italian firm won this crucial tender with the help of a British admiral.
Officially the British government was not taking credit for securing the contract for Armstrong Vickers and, in Parliament, Grey was distancing the Foreign Office from the whole business. Philip Morrell MP demanded in the Commons to know in March 1914 whether the concession was concluded with the `knowledge, assistance, or consent' of the British Government.(82) Not strictly answering the question, Grey informed the House that the agreement was `a result of private negotiations between the Turkish government and the firms interested'. Surely, Mr Morrell pressed, the government ought to be concerned that a British company was entering into a contract to `increase the armaments of a foreign power'. Grey conceded that he was concerned but stressed that the agreement was not `owing to any diplomatic representations or action'. True, Limpus was not a diplomat nor was he corresponding with the Foreign Office about the negotiations whilst they were in progress, so Grey was not lying; but at the same time he chose not to mention Limpus' role in the proceedings. Morrell, however, had one further question: did the government discourage such contracts? On this point Grey telegraphed the government's feelings about the outcome of the contract negotiations. Whilst not encouraging other states to increase their armaments, if such countries chose to anyway the government would `certainly do nothing to discourage contracts with British firms.'(83) As a result Limpus was, perhaps unwittingly, and (as he claims) unwillingly, acting as an agent of British interests so that Britain could achieve a major foreign policy success without compromising the Foreign Secretary on the embarrassing issue of arming foreign states.
By the time that the Dockyards contract had been settled, however, there was another storm brewing which threatened the future of the mission entirely. A new German Army Mission was being sent to Turkey under General Liman von Sanders, who was to have direct command of the first Turkish Army Corps at Constantinople. If the Russians had been upset when they learned of Britain's naval mission then their reaction to this news was considerably worse. Sazonov immediately tried to galvanize the Triple Entente to protest against the mission and ironically, as it would prove, he hoped it would be the English fleet that could persuade Turkey and Germany to withdraw the German general. He thought that `Germany might pay no regard to French and Russian remonstrances had she not before her eyes the fear of the British Fleet',(84) and suggested that if other measures to secure compensation or to stop the mission failed `the three powers must be prepared to take active steps such as the occupation of Turkish Ports.'(85) No specific British interest appeared to be threatened by the German mission and the Foreign Office was reluctant to stir up as much trouble as Sazonov was proposing; Vansittart minuted, `the Russians are full of talk of equivalents. Do we particularly want one?'(86) and recognized Sazonov's objective to `bluff the Germans out with the assistance of the French and especially ourselves.'(87) However, the British would be prevented from, applying even diplomatic pressure on behalf of their Russian partners.
On 5 December Sir Louis Mallet, now ambassador to Constantinople, informed Grey that Britain could not protest at Liman having command of an army corps because Limpus officially had command of the Turkish navy, `a point which is likely to be made much of by the Turks and the Germans and which is theoretically a good one.'(88) Indeed, the Germans and Turks did make much of the position, to the embarrassment of Britain and the indignation of Russia. The German Charge d'Affaires in London, Von Kuhlman, claimed that the positions of Liman and Limpus corresponded exactly,(89) and Jagow remarked that with command of the Turkish Navy, Limpus had the Straits more under his control than did Liman with command of the Constantinople Army Corps.(90) Similarly the Grand Vizier thought that `Limpus had a similar if not more extensive command'(91) since `Admiral Limpus had command of the whole Turkish fleet, whereas the German general was to have command of one army corps only ... the two commands could hardly be compared in importance.'(92) The British, however, looked on the matter with different emphasis: they felt that the `difference between the commander of an inefficient navy'(93) and Liman's position in charge of a well-organized army corps realistically gave the German more extensive power.
These revelations presented a major obstacle to a joint Entente protest and it infuriated the Russians that their interests had been compromised by the activities of their partner. Sazonov declared that `the work that the Admiral was doing was a serious thing for Russia.'(94) He even warned of a possible change in Russia's attitude towards Britain if she lacked sufficient support over the issue. He felt that anything short of Entente unity would see Turkey fall into the German camp: `If the three powers suffer defeat on the question of the German mission, the Turkish government will definitely conclude that the strength lies on the side of the Triple Alliance.'(95) for the British it was a question of the lesser evil: tolerating the German mission and losing Russian favour; or abandoning the British mission and losing Turkish favour; or finding some compromise.
Two mysteries surround the revelation of the Admiral's position in December 1913, however. The first relates to how much the British Government knew about the extent of Admiral Limpus' powers. When Mallet first mentioned Limpus' command of the fleet on 5 December, Nicolson reacted with complete surprise: `I had no idea that Admiral Limpus commanded the fleet, thought he was merely there as an adviser and instructor.'(96) Grey was equally unprepared: `I did not realise the nature of Admiral Limpus' command. We must certainly go very carefully.'(97) He further claims to O'Bierne that `Admiral Limpus, has actual command of the fleet ... an arrangement that has existed now for several years although I was not aware of it.'(98) This is not entirely true; although Grey may have forgotten, in April 1912 the Foreign Office took some interest in the details of Limpus' contract. Article one of that draft contract sent by Lowther to London stated:
L'Amiral Limpus est charge les reformes necessaires ... dans la flotte,
dans le Departement de la Marine et dans les ecoles navales ... Il est
commandant de la flotte et Conseiller naval.(99)
There was considerable discussion about this very article, but not about the crucial words `commandant de la flotte', only about `Conseiller naval'. Following the difficulties Admiral Williams had faced, the British were keen to ensure that his replacement would be a naval adviser and not merely a technical adviser. Lowther discussed this section of the contract with Turkish Foreign Minister Assim Bey before passing the document on for Foreign Office approval.(100) In the Foreign Office the contract was read by Mallet, Nicolson and Grey and, although agreeing that `naval adviser' was the preferable status and should be insisted upon, they made no comment about the Admiral's position as Commander, and left the bulk of the contract for the British Admiralty and Limpus himself to agree upon.(101) When the Admiralty read the contract they took the same view on Article One and again did not mention in the minutes the status of the Admiral as Commander.(102) Grey's surprise in December 1913 is genuine enough, however, and there is little evidence to suggest that he was lying. What is likely is that the earlier discourse over `conseiller technique' versus `conseiller naval' distracted the British so that they simply ignored the remainder of Article One. Furthermore, since in April 1912 the Turkish fleet was inactive during the Italian conflict and, hence, insignificant, the position of fleet commander might not have been considered as noteworthy as in December 1913. Although the Admiralty might well have noted the clause with more significance, since they only received the contract after the Foreign Office they had no interest in making an issue out of the point. What is clear is that, when the Liman von Sanders crisis erupted, the position of Limpus was very embarrassing to the British government and Grey was further embarrassed by his ignorance of the position.
The second mystery demonstrates just how little detailed knowledge the British Government did have, regarding the Naval Mission to Turkey from 1908. When the news broke regarding Limpus' position as fleet commander, Grey was informed that `Williams and Gamble had the same powers. He [Limpus] can do anything except break the law or exceed the budget.'(103) This is also not strictly true. In truth, all three Admirals who led the mission had slightly different terms of reference and positions. Lowther sent Williams' contract to Grey in February 1912. It states that the Admiral `acts in two capacities, Naval Adviser and inspector of the fleet'.(104) The contract further distinguishes between the English Admiral and the `officer in command of the fleet' who is not specified, to whom Williams reported, and with whom Williams was to make joint decisions on naval manoeuvres.(105) It is possible, of course, for Williams to have performed both roles and effectively made joint decisions with himself, especially since in 1910, when his contract was being discussed, the Foreign Office proposed that the Admiral's functions be the direction of the fleet `under instructions of the Turkish Admiralty ... in the quality of Commandant of the Turkish Fleet.'(106) Williams was not contracted, however, as a fleet commander. Furthermore, since the matter was not discussed there is no reason given for the change from `inspecteur de la flotte' to the more powerful and prestigious `commandant de la flotte'. This change, however, lies at the root of Triple Entente, and especially British, difficulties in December 1913, at which time Limpus' position prevented Great Britain from taking any action against the German missions without putting herself `quite in the wrong'.(107)
For the Germans, the British difficulties were a significant boost and the Limpus analogy was their strongest argument; naturally they `played [it] for all it is worth: and a good bit more.'(108) The German press stoked up anti-English opinion claiming that the issue demonstrated the Triple Entente cooperating with the aim of damaging German prestige.(109) The Germans went further in their claim that control of the navy was of more diplomatic significance than control of the army:
Since it was much easier from a technical point of view to create a fleet
than it was to form a great body of troops on the German model out of
Turkish material, the appointment of the British Admiral could, with
greater justice, give rise to political apprehensions than that of a
German General.(110)
This was, of course, not true, but as sea power, with the invention of Dreadnoughts, was becoming a crucial element once more in the balance of power, such political apprehensions were easily inspired. The Turkish fleet, as Britain reassured Russia, remained in its infancy and presented no offensive threat to any power. Yet the fact that Britain was helping to build and organize a powerful navy in a strategically sensitive zone was, in principle, a serious issue. The Foreign Office believed that `the analogy between Admiral Limpus and General von Sanders is quite inexact in practice, though it may look a good point in theory, and a sufficiently good point to be embarrassing to us.'(111) The British did not want to withdraw the mission just to please the Russians, however. Mallet felt that the British command of the Turkish fleet was `about our only asset in this country.'(112) The Germans also did not want to withdraw Liman von Sanders and would be forced to do so if the British retreated. In his negotiations, Sazonov had the impression that `the Germans were very much afraid' that Limpus might be recalled.'(113)
The first compromise proposal which was made by the Russian ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, Giers, was that Limpus should move the Headquarters of the Mission to the port of Ismid,(114) where Armstrong Vickers were building the new dockyards. Limpus would have to supervise the construction anyway, and this would at least distance the mission from the political hubbub of Constantinople. This move would also give Britain some diplomatic manoeuvrability in negotiating the position of General von Sanders. Grey indicated that the Foreign Office would support such a move, provided that it would be consistent with the Admiral's duties and would not hinder his work with the fleet.'(115) Mallet, however, believed that such a move would be impossible. Trying to run the fleet from Ismid before the new docks were completed would be pointless and Mallet reported that completion would `be a matter of some years, as the works are not even begun.'(116) Furthermore, since the admiral had to liaise with the Minister of Marine and the Turkish Admiralty, it was essential that he be based in Constantinople. This suggestion was not, therefore, explored further.
Greater consideration was given to the possibility that Admiral Limpus' status, either nominal or actual, could be reduced from `commander of the fleet' to merely `naval adviser'. London felt that such a move would prove a good bargaining chip that would cause little detriment to the mission.
If we maintain Admiral Limpus' title we give the Germans an effective
reply to our objections ... If it eventually becomes a condition of
Germany's consent to any modification of General Liman's status that
the British Admiral should also have a less comprehensive title, surely it
could be explained to the Turks that the `naval adviser' could and would
do every bit as much as the `commander of the fleet' and that the change
would save a dangerous situation.(117)
Limpus himself was not of this opinion:
Can the TURKS [sic] consent to such a curtailment of the British
Admiral's nominal powers without prejudice to the benefit hoped to be
gained from his employment? ... No; ... because such a change would
make still harder his already difficult task of insisting upon the reforms
which are necessary.(118)
Mallet agreed with Limpus that the Turks would not stand for a reduction in the Admiral's powers: it `would be regarded by the Turkish government as but one more proof of the want of interest taken by Great Britain in this country.'(119) Parker, a Foreign Office official, could not see any reason why Limpus should be less effective if his title were to be shortened: `it all depends on the man; Admiral Gamble could have done anything. Admiral Williams nothing.'(120) Limpus, however, remained `most strongly opposed to any degradation from his powers.'(121) The Admiral did not see the problem with either his position or that of Liman von Sanders. He thought it would be `undesirable' for all those advising the Turkish government to come from one country and felt that Liman, like himself, `must be given very full powers':(122)
If and when he, or any other adviser, is found to be misusing his
powers to the detriment of Turkey or any other country, it will be time
enough to seek his removal or the curtailment of his powers.(123)
Limpus felt that the most the British should offer would be to review his title when the contract came up for renewal in April 1914, and perhaps consider a reduction in status at that time.(124) The diplomatic realities, however, suggested that would not be enough to achieve a solution that would suit the Russians; notwithstanding Limpus and Mallet's objections, Grey still felt that the Admiral's powers might have to be curtailed.(125)
In the midst of this crisis a further difficulty for the Foreign Office developed. On 8 December the Turkish ambassador in London, Tewfik Pasha, wrote to Grey requesting the loan of a further 16 naval officers, mostly foremen, engineers and deck officers but also including one flag officer-or captain to command the active fleet in wartime and one captain or commander to be commodore of the torpedo flotilla in war and peace. According to Tewfik, this would be in accordance with `le projet elabore par L'Admiral Limpus.'(126) The Foreign Office were astonished; they genuinely knew nothing about any such project and it certainly would not do to go offering the Turks more naval assistance and officers at a time when the future of what support was already provided was in jeopardy. If it,became public, such a loan would surely inflame the already tense crisis over the German mission; furthermore to provide a Royal Navy captain to command the fleet in combat would violate the Foreign Enlistment Act (FEA). The proposal was therefore `legally impossible and politically inexpedient'.(127) Limpus received much of the criticism for his seemingly independent initiative: `It is regrettable that Admiral Limpus should have put forward these proposals without apparently consulting Sir L. Mallet.'(128) Limpus, however, had consulted with the Admiralty in November and a letter from there to the Foreign Office crossed with a letter from Grey to the Admiralty (also sent to Mallet) chastising Limpus for his action. The Admiralty, in their note, were passing on Limpus' request for retired British officers to control the fleet in wartime.(129) Tewfik's letter did not mention retired officers and the Admiralty had been sitting on Limpus's request (dated 15 November) for nearly a month, which explains the Turks' impatience.
The substance of Limpus' request was to ask whether British subjects in the Ottoman navy in wartime would have to become Turkish citizens to bypass the FEA and whether they would have to be retired or whether they could be `seconded for the period of Turkish service'.(130) The revelation of the delay cleared Limpus of Foreign Office indignation but the political climate of the Liman von Sanders crisis prevented anything coming from the idea. Limpus warned of the consequences that `the Turkish Government is determined to have a good fleet and if we fail them they will apply elsewhere,'(131) but Grey was determined to be cautious; whilst the plan was not entirely rejected it was certainly shelved and would not arise again before the outbreak of war.
The diplomatic ins and outs of the Liman von Sanders crisis are well documented elsewhere. Both the German and British missions escaped relatively unscathed as the storm blew over. The principles that British influence remained paramount in the Ottoman navy and that German influence prevailed in the army were unchallenged. General von Sanders was actually promoted to take direct control of Constantinople out of his powers, but he was allowed to stay; as was Limpus, whose position the British agreed to review, though not change. Although Germany had retreated, it was the Russians who were once more forced to swallow a bitter pill: unable and unwilling to go to war over the issue and with Entente solidarity fractured by the Limpus position, they were forced to accept the reality that Turkey needed outside help to organize and administer various limbs of her state and Germany, France and Great Britain were willing to share the responsibility.
Once again, however, the British Naval Mission had become a feature of international relations, this time with greater significance than before. The dockyards concession was a huge prize to the British; but the embarrassment of the Liman von Sanders crisis, and the divisions it exposed in the Triple Entente, demonstrated that there was also a price to be paid.
Like his predecessors, Admiral Limpus found the task of reforming the Turkish Navy a difficult one, much owing to the attitude of the Ottoman Admiralty and servicemen. He found that the Turks conceded that reform was necessary and that `they need Western help ... and advice to effect these reforms.'(132) However, he felt that since 1908 the Turks had failed to follow what advice they had received, identifying a number of reasons. Firstly the `oriental mind', according to Limpus was `intensely conservative' and not receptive to specific changes.(133) Furthermore, Turkish officials were antagonized by low pay and, as a consequence, inefficient through low morale. The naval advisers employed, answerable to the powerful Minister of Marine, lacked authority to enforce their judgments. The Turcophile Limpus felt that from a moral standpoint Britain was `bound to help a sorely stricken nation to regain health and reasonable prosperity',(134) yet when foreign assistance was given Turkish officials were suspicious that external advisers had ulterior motives; there existed considerable doubt over whether the Great Powers were actually trying to help Turkey, or let it collapse. Britain, Germany and France, Limpus warned, would gain nothing from this.(135) The Great Powers, however, including the British (but excluding Russia), were very keen to assist Turkey in building up her navy through the procurement of Dreadnoughts, and so fuel her naval arms race with Greece. Mallet thought this competition `deplorable' although Limpus said that the `Turkish government will not listen to advice on this subject.'(136) With the added burden of continual `external aggression'(137) as demonstrated by the Balkan War and, to an extent, by the Liman von Sanders affair, Limpus found his work hindered by many of the same difficulties that had plagued Admiral Williams.
Limpus, however, was more successful in his task than Williams had been. Not only did he arrange the dockyards contract but furthermore there was considerable advancement in the organization of the fleet during his term: `that the Turkish navy has made considerable progress in the last six months is the considered opinion of competent witnesses, and it is now on the high road to attaining efficiency,' reported Mallet in the summer of 1914.(138) The Turks themselves had begun to take notice of the progress made by the-end of 1913. In December a complimentary article entitled `La Marine Turque' appeared in the paper La Turquie, praising the work performed by Limpus, concentrating especially on the training of servicemen and the improvement in the naval schools.(139)
Naturally the Turks were not the only people to notice the improvement. The Russian naval attache in Constantinople was `greatly struck with the all round improvement recently effected.'(140) Ambassador Giers declared that the Russians `would be obliged to strengthen themselves in the Black Sea if the Turkish fleet became formidable.'(141) There was nothing new in these Russian soundings, and Mallet also observed that:
Whilst evidently attaching serious importance to what was happening,
his [Giers'] reference to the assistance rendered by British naval
officers ... was perfectly friendly and not in any sense in the nature of
a complaint.(142)
More heartening to the Turks was the report that the `Greek minister was seriously concerned at the progress.'(143) This was just the progress that the Turks were looking for and as Limpus' two-year contract drew to a close, the Turkish government officially requested, in a letter from Grand Vizier Said Halim on 5 March 1914, an extension to the loan of the Admiral: `il serait tres heureux de le garder a son service pendant une annee encore.'(144)
Admiral Limpus was, however, an ambitious young officer who, since becoming an admiral, had spent two-thirds of his time in Turkey. Whilst he was serving the Ottoman navy he felt that his career in the Royal Navy was going nowhere. He did not anticipate the importance which the British government placed on his work in Turkey, and Grey sought to reassure him: `Admiral Limpus was informed by me previous to taking the Turkish post that it would not prejudice his future career in the Royal Navy. Nor will it.'(145) Nonetheless, it became increasingly clear that Limpus had `no intention of staying beyond his two years,'(146) and would not remain in Ottoman service `unless pressed by HM government.'(147)
This would present the problem of replacing the admiral, which had proved difficult enough in 1912. Furthermore the constant changing of the mission staff was not beneficial to the continuation of the naval programme nor to maintaining good relations with the Turks. Mallet wanted to install an officer for a longer period than two years and since no young officer would ever accept such a commission, Mallet proposed that Limpus be replaced by an officer close to retirement.(148) Crowe disagreed, since he thought this would be misinterpreted by the Turks: `The Germans send the pick of their officers for services of this kind.'(149) Limpus, although reluctant to stay, felt that the mission should be fully maintained. If Great Britain were to reduce her presence in the Ottoman navy `it would be interpreted as a sign that His Majesty's-Government had abandoned all interest in this country.'(150) As a consequence the navy `might go to Germany which might lead to a very serious situation with Russia.'(151) Limpus was making a favourable impression in Turkey and the British Government were keen to maintain this position. The Admiral was reluctantly persuaded to stay beyond April 1914, at least until a suitable replacement (which was never sought) could be found. The mission, however, would not last another year.
Beyond the Liman von Sanders crisis the political rivalry in Constantinople between the British and the Germans continued to cause difficulties for the naval mission. Further government upheaval resulted in Enver Bey, a Germanophile, replacing Izzet Pasha at the War Ministry with Djemal Bey taking over at the Ministry of Marine. The Mustechar (UnderSecretary) at this department was also pro-German and reportedly involved in numerous intrigues. Admiral Limpus wanted to have him retired and replaced, but he was afraid that if he issued an ultimatum the Turks might call his bluff and Limpus might be `compelled to resign before his contract expires.'(152) Not only would this constitute a diplomatic crisis, it would also threaten the future of the mission and Limpus, had to exercise caution. Notwithstanding his earlier remarks, Limpus felt that German influence on the Ottoman Empire was unhelpful to his position and regretted that Russia had not become more involved in Turkey.
In a paper dated January 1914, Limpus, priding himself on his knowledge of foreign affairs, proposed that Turkey should be `persuaded to join Russia, and Russia to join and protect Turkey.'(153) This would be in the interests of the other Triple Entente powers and although Germany would oppose such a move, Limpus speculated, they would not go to war to prevent it. This vision was severely flawed and unlikely to occur, not least because the Russians were still regarding Turkey as a potential threat rather than a potential ally. An article in the French newspaper Le Temps announced that the French funds had helped Turkey purchase the Rio de Janeiro, a Brazilian Dreadnought built in Britain.(154) This caused Sazonov to express `considerable resentment at the action of the French banks in furnishing Turkey with funds(155) for an acquisition which Limpus regarded as `a great asset to Turkey.'(156) It had taken several years but the Ottoman navy was now able to crew and command two Dreadnoughts without serious disruption to the rest of the fleet.(157) Furthermore the Turks were determined to have such ships, regardless of what the Russians thought.
To what use these vessels might be put was of some doubt, although simply having Dreadnoughts, was a matter of high prestige. In the early months of 1914, as the dispute over the sovereignty of a number of strategically vital islands in the Eastern Mediterranean which had been captured by the Italians and the Greeks during the conflicts of 1911-12 reached its peak, there was some talk in Turkish press and political circles of using Dreadnoughts to capture Mitylene and Chios.(158) Limpus discussed the question of the islands with the Minister of Marine, although his suggestion that Turkey should accept the loss of the islands and give them up was not well received.(159) Overall, as the Great Powers became involved and the issue was tied up with the Albanian frontier question, the Ottoman government was dismayed by Britain's lack of support for the Turkish position. Once more Britain received warning that her predominance in the Turkey navy might be dependent on diplomatic support: `I am told, but cannot vouch for the truth of the report that the Porte are seriously considering the question of an Italian naval mission if we fail them.'(160) There was some evidence of increased Italian presence in Turkish naval circles: `The Italians want to get officers in the fleet ... there is an Italian Admiral here now ostensibly on non-naval business but who talks openly of his wish to enter the Turkish navy.(161) Once more these rumours came to nothing, but the islands question did draw Turkey slightly closer to the Triple Alliance who appeared more sympathetic to her demands.
When war did break out between the Entente and the Alliance in August 1914, the position of Turkey was crucial. The Triple Entente's chances of securing her support or even neutrality were not helped by the. British decision to confiscate the two Dreadnoughts that had been built by Armstrong Vickers in Britain and paid for by Turkey with public subscriptions. This was not the only reason that the Ottoman government signed an alliance with Germany on 2 September but it appeared that Turkey had joined the Triple Alliance camp. However, so long as Turkey was not actually at war with the Entente there remained hope that Russia's Black Sea coast might not be threatened by German warships. In the limbo period between the Turco-German Alliance and the Turkish declaration of war on 1 November the British Government had a dilemma as to what to do with Limpus and the naval mission. The Admiralty wanted Limpus to leave Turkey and command the squadron at Malta, but Mallet felt that even though the extent of what Limpus could do with the Ottoman navy was limited by the outbreak of war, the Admiral's presence was of immense diplomatic importance. Sending Limpus to Malta would `re-arouse the bitter indignation caused by HM Government's detention of the ships', anger which Mallet felt had receded by early September.(162) Withdrawal of the Admiral would be:
a grave mistake from a political point of view. It will be looked upon
by all Turks as a piece of sharp practice on our part to transfer an
officer from the nominal command of the Turkish fleet, for whose
training, direction and preparation for war he has been responsible, to
the command of our own fleet.(163)
Mallet believed that if Limpus left the Turks would suspect the British of posting him to the squadron outside the Dardanelles Straits and pose an actual threat to Turkey herself. Therefore he warned that
the Admiral's departure will provoke a crisis which we are trying to
avoid [and] ... would give the Germans another handle with which to
inflame opinion against England.(164)
The Admiral himself was said to be `very much against withdrawal.'(165) However, the Royal Navy required their best commanders to be on British ships and on 14 September 1914 Admiral Limpus was sent to Malta. Some of his staff remained until they were expelled in November to be replaced by a German mission. Limpus' term had been the longest and most successful of the three British missions but Turkey would not achieve her large and powerful navy, and Great Britain would not accrue the diplomatic benefits of her six years of assistance to the Ottoman Empire.
The British missions to Turkey were a significant element in Great Britain's Foreign Policy strategy towards the Ottoman Empire between 1908 and 1914. The missions led by Admirals Gamble, Williams and Limpus had two basic objectives. Firstly, to reorganize successfully the Turkish fleet; and secondly, the ulterior objective, of enhancing British influence in Turkey. Ultimately, since Turkey joined Germany in the war of the 1914, the British aim to reduce German influence at Constantinople and keep the Porte friendly towards Britain, of which aim the naval missions were a significant part, can be seen as having failed. However, this cannot be blamed entirely upon British diplomacy, let alone upon the naval missions.
Although Admiral Williams had encountered difficulties with the Turkish admiralty and the pro-German intrigues that were rife in the Turkish political system, his successor Admiral Limpus had endeared himself very much towards his hosts. That, by September 1914, Mallet was proposing that withdrawal of the mission would be a diplomatic blunder which might push Turkey into the arms of Germany is testament to the fact that the missions were very important to the Turks. This is much to do with the fact that by 1914 the admiral's first objective, to reorganize the Turkish fleet, was starting to bear fruit and the Ottoman government was very pleased with the progress.
Great Britain, however, did not gain the diplomatic reward that it was hoping for from the naval assistance provided. It should be remembered that, since Germany was very influential in the Turkish army and had been for many years, the naval mission never offered Great Britain a unilateral political advantage in Turkey: it merely provided a counterweight to German influence. Ultimately, in the event of war between the Great Powers Turkey would be influenced by whichever side was likely to win, as much as by any other factor. Russian weakness, and the lack of cohesion in the Triple Entente, made German strength seem very appealing and most likely to ensure the survival of the Ottoman Empire.
Between 1909 and 1914 the naval mission to Turkey also brought considerable headaches to the Foreign Office: the anger of the Russians at the assistance being given to a potential rival; the threat to Anglo-Turkish relations caused by Admiral Williams' sour relations with the Turks and by the refusal to return officers being trained in England during the Tripoli war; and finally the embarrassment of the Liman von Sanders mission and the revelation of Limpus' contract.
However, for several years the naval mission was seen as a great asset to both the British and the Turks: the dockyards concession was a huge boon to British prestige and industry, and the development of a decent navy was the Turks' great hope. The British government was determined to maintain its position and the Turks, in spite of frequent speculation and rumour to the contrary, were always keen to renew the services of an English officer. Since the outbreak of war in 1914 was unrelated to the naval mission, it has to be discounted in appraising the success or failure of the three admirals. The work of Admiral Limpus was not yet complete when he was posted to Malta in September 1914, but had war not occurred, one can only assume that the Turkish navy would have continued to progress, boosted by two more Dreadnoughts, which would surely not have been retained by Britain otherwise, to the continued satisfaction of the Ottoman government. Had the missions had less international implications, they may have been more successful; however, had the missions had less diplomatic significance they might never have existed at all.
NOTES
Abbreviations:
ADM Admiralty Archives (PRO)
BD British Documents on the Origins of the War 1898-1914, Gooch and Temperley (eds.).
BDFA British Documents on Foreign Affairs: reports and papers from the Confidential Print, Bourne and Watt (eds.).
BL Brotherton Library, University of Leeds
G. MSS Grey Papers. FO 800; Microfilm collection in Brotherton Library
FO Foreign office papers (PRO)
PRO Public Record Office, Kew
(1.) [Public Record Office] ADM[iralty Archives series] 1 [file] 8192; Admiralty Memo 1 Jan. 1910.
(2.) An[nual] Rep[ort for] Turkey 1907; chapter 4 [by Commdr. Taylor of HMS Imogene] in B[ritish] D[ocuments on the origins of War, G.P. Gooch and H.W.V. Temperley (eds.), volume] V, p.41.
(3.) Ibid.
(4.) Ibid.
(5.) Ibid.
(6.) Paul G. Halpern, The Mediterranean Naval Situation 1908-14 (Harvard 1971); p.319.
(7.) [Public Record Office. London] F[oreign] O[ffice Series] 371 [Volume] 1486 f[ile] 438 Adm. Williams to Turkish Ministry of Marine 11 Feb. 1912 encs. in Lowther to Grey 12 Feb. 1912 d[ispatch No.] 438.
(8.) An. Rep. Turkey 1907; chapter 4; BD V, p.41.
(9.) ADM 1/8099; Admiralty memo; 10 Dec. 1909.
(10.) B[rotherton] L[ibrary], G[rey] MSS, Lowther to Grey, pte, 8 Feb. 1909; M[icrofilm] 1684; R.29.
(11.) Ann[ual] Rep[ort for] Turkey 1909; Lowther 31 Jan. 1910; in B[ritish] D[ocuments on] F[oreign] A[ffairs: reports and papers from the Confidential Print; K. Bourne and D.C. Watts (eds.); Series B] Vol.20, p. 130 d.26.
(12.) ADM 1/8192; Gamble to Greene; 27 Jan. 1910.
(13.) Ann Rep Turkey 1909; Lowther 31 Jan. 19 10; BDFA Vol.20; p. 130 d.26.
(14.) FO 371/1487; Williams termination report to Admiralty; 29 April 1912; f.1330 d.22853.
(15.) ADM 1/8192; Foreign Office Memo to Admiralty, 5 March 1910; d.6650.
(16.) FO 371/1487 Williams paraphrased by Lowther to Grey; 2 April 1912, f.1330 d.14729.
(17.) ADM 1/8192 Lower to Grey; 23 April 1910.
(18.) Ann Rep Turkey 1910; Lowther 31 Jan. 1910; BDFA Vol.20; p. 189 d.28.
(19.) FO 371/1486 Williams to Minister fo Marine; 11 Feb. 1912; encs within Lowther to Grey; 12 Feb. 1912; f.438 d.438.
(20.) Ann Rep Turkey 1910; Lowther 31 Jan. 1910; BDFA Vol.20; p. 189 d.28.
(21.) FO 371/1487 Williams termination report to Admiralty; 29 April 1912; f.1330 d.22853.
(22.) BL, G. MSS, Lowther to Grey; pte, 23 April 1911; M 1684; R.29.
(23.) BL, G. MSS, Lowther to Grey, pte, 28 April 1911; M. 1684, R.29.
(24.) FO 371/1487; Lowther to Grey; 11 March 1912; f.1330 d.11454.
(25.) FO 371/1487; Williams to Admiralty 29 April 1912; f.1330 d.22853.
(26.) FO 371/1487; Goschen to Grey; 27 Jan. 1912; f.1330 d.3870.
(27.) FO 371/1487; Goschen to Grey 5 Feb. 1912; f.1330 d.4977.
(28.) BL, G. MSS, Lowther to Grey, pte, 16 Aug. 1911; M1684; R.29.
(29.) BL, G. MSS, Grey to Lowther, pte, 14 Sept. 1911; M1684; R.29.
(30.) BL, G. MSS, Lowther to Grey, pte, 25 Sept. 1911; M1684; R.29.
(31.) FO 371/1487; Williams to Admty; f.1330 d.22853, 29 April 1912.
(32.) Ann. Rep Turkey 1910; Lowther 31 Jan. 19 10; BDFA Vol.20; p. 190 d.28.
(33.) FO 71/1487; Williams to Admty; f.1330 d.22853, 29 April 1912.
(34.) Ibid.
(35.) FO 371/1487 Lowther to Grey; f.1330 d.19057; 30 April 1912.
(36.) FO 371/980 O'Bierne to Grey; 30 Aug. 1910 (r. 12 Sept. 1910) f.32988 d.32988.
(37.) FO 371/980 O'Bierne to Grey; 4 Sept. 1910 (r. 12 Sept. 1910) f.32988 d.32990.
(38.) Ibid.
(39.) FO 371/980 O'Bierne to Grey; 30 Aug. 1910 (r. 12 Sept. 1910) f.32988 d.32988.
(40.) FO 371/980 O'Bierne to Grey; 6 Sept. 1910 (r. 12 Sept. 1910) f.32988 d.32994.
(41.) FO 371/980 Military attache in St. Petersburg, Capt. Aubrey Smith to O'Bierne 24 Nov. 1910; enc. within O'Bierne to Grey; 30 Nov. 1910; f.32988 d.43985.
(42.) Ibid.
(43.) FO 371/980 O'Bierne to Grey; 4 Sept. 1910 (r. 12 Sept. 1910) f.32988 d.32990.
(44.) FO 371/980 Mallet's minute to O'Bierne to Grey; 6 Sept. 19 10 (r. 12 Sept. 1910) f.32988 d.32994.
(45.) FO 371/552 Grey to Izvolsky; 15 Oct. 1908; f.31738 d.35992.
(46.) FO 371/980 Nicolson minute to O'Bierne to Grey; 30 Aug. 1910 (r. 12 Sept. 1910) f.32988 d.32988.
(47.) BD IX (i) Findlay to Grey; 14 Sept. 1910; p.210 d.182.
(48.) FO 371/1847 O'Bierne to Grey; 9 Dec. 1913; f.49385 d.56342.
(49.) FO 371/980 Mallet's minute to: O'Bierne to Grey; 4 Sept. 1910 (r. 12 Sept. 1910) f.32988 d.32990.
(50.) FO 371/980 Grey to Lowther; 20 Sept. 1910; f.32988 d.32994.
(51.) FO 371/980 Mallet's minute to O'Bierne to Grey; 6 Sept. 1910 (r. 12 Sept. 1910) f.32988 d.32994.
(52.) Ibid.
(53.) Ann Rep Turkey 1911; Lowther, 31 Jan. 1912; in BDFA, Vol.20, p.332 d.52.
(54.) Ibid.
(55.) FO 371/1487 Lowther to Grey; 11 March 1912; f.1330 d.11454.
(56.) Ann Rep Turkey 1912; Lowther, 17 April 1913; in BDFA, Vol.20, p.389 d.59.
(57.) FO 371/1487 Lowther to FO; March 1912; quotes from Article three of Admiral Limpus' draft contract; f.1330 d.24541.
(58.) ADM 1/8191. Admty Papers 1 Jan. 1910; contains Foreign Enlistment Act 1870, Chapter 90, paragraph 4.
(59.) FO 371/1251; Grey to Lowther; 28 Sept. 1911; f.30691 d.37990.
(60.) ADM 1/8191. Admty Papers 1 Jan. 1910.
(61.) FO 371/1494; extract from Hansard 17 Oct. 1912; f.18695 d.44786.
(62.) FO 371/1487; Lowther to Grey; 22 Jan. 1912; f.1330 d.3938.
(63.) FO 371/1487; Williams' Termination Report; 29 April 1912; f.1330 d.22853.
(64.) FO 371/1494; Lowther to Grey 24 May 1912; enc. copy of memo passed on from Grey to Assim Bey. f.18695 d.22455.
(65.) FO 371/1494; Grey to Lowther 22 May 1912; f.18695 d.18695.
(66.) FO 371/1494; Lowther to Grey 16 June 1912; f.18695 d.25539.
(67.) FO 371/1494; Tewfik Pasha to Grey; 20 June 1912; f.18695 d.25251.
(68.) FO 371/1494; Grey's minute to: Tewfik Pasha to Grey; 20 June 1912; f.18695 d.25251.
(69.) FO 371/1494; Grey to Lowther 22 May 1912; f.18695 d.18695.
(70.) FO 371/1487; Lowther to Grey 31 Jan. 1912; f.1330 d.4469.
(71.) FO 371/1487; Lowther to Grey 30 Jan. 1912; f.1330 d.4959.
(72.) FO 371/1487; minute by Mallet; Lowther to Grey; 22 Feb. 1912; f.1330 d.7709.
(73.) FO 371/1487; minute by Grey; 4 March 1912; f.1330 d.9274.
(74.) FO 371/1487; Churchill to Grey; March 1912; f.1330 d.10647. Churchill stressed that these complimentary remarks were designed to impress the Turks and were not for domestic political consumption: `The Admiral must not be flattered' (ibid.).
(75.) FO 371/1847 Limpus to Mallet; 11 Dec. 1913; forward to FO 24 Dec. 1913; f.49385 d.57988.
(76.) Ibid.
(77.) Ann Rep Turkey 1913; H.D. Beaumont (Charge D'affaires in Constantinople); 4 Dec. 1914; in BDFA Vol.20; p.473 d.61.
(78.) Ibid.
(79.) FO 371/2117 Docks Contract, Article two, paragraph 5; f.367 d.3546.
(80.) Ann Rep Turkey 1913; Beaumont; 4 Dec. 1914; in BDFA, Vol.20, p.473 d.61.
(81.) FO 371/1847 Limpus to Mallet; 11 Dec. 1913; forward to FO 24 Dec. 1913; f.49385 d.57988.
(82.) Hansard 5th Series Volume LIX; 5 March 1914; pp.568-9.
(83.) Ibid.
(84.) FO 371/1847 O'Bierne to Grey; 1 Dec. 1913; f.49385 d.54365.
(85.) FO 371/1847 O'Bierne to Grey; 7 Dec. 1913; f.49385 d.55115.
(86.) FO 371/1847 Vansittart minute to: O'Bierne to Grey; 26 Nov. 1913; f.49385 d.54114.
(87.) FO 371/1947 Vansittart minute to: O'Bierne to Grey; 1 Dec. 1913; f.49385 d.54365.
(88.) FO 371/1847 Mallet to Grey; 5 Dec. 1913; f.49385 d.54955.
(89.) FO 371/1847 Grey to Mallet; 9 Dec. 1913; f.49385 d.55998.
(90.) FO 371/1847 Grey to O'Bierne; 15 Dec. 1913; f.49385 d.55671.
(91.) FO 371/1847 Mallet to Grey; 13 Dec. 1913; f.49385 d.56308.
(92.) FO 371/1847 Mallet to Grey; 15 Dec. 1913; f.49385 d.57406.
(93.) FO 371/1947 Nicolson minute to: Mallet to Grey; 5 Dec. 1913; f.49385 d.54955.
(94.) FO 371/1847 O'Bierne to Grey; 9 Dec. 1913 (r. 15 Dec.); f.49385 d.56342.
(95.) FO 371/1847 O'Bierne to Grey; 14 Dec. 1913; f.49385 d.56325.
(96.) FO 371/1847 minute by Nicolson: Mallet to Grey; 5 Dec. 1913; f.49385 d.54955.
(97.) Ibid. minute by Grey.
(98.) FO 371/1847 Grey to O'Bierne; 11 Dec. 1913; f.49385 d.55771.
(99.) FO 371/1487 Lowther to Grey; April 1912; f.1330 d.24541.
(100.) FO 371/1487 Lowther to Grey; 2 April 1912; f.1330 d.14729.
(101.) Ibid.: FO minutes.
(102.) FO 371/1487 Admiralty Memo; April 1912; f.1330 d.16211.
(103.) FO 371/1847 minute to: Mallet to Grey; 10 Dec. 1913; f.49385 d.55766.
(104.) FO 371/1486 Lowther to Grey; 7 Feb. 1912; f.438 d.7062.
(105.) Ibid.
(106.) ADM 1/8192 Foreign Office to Admiralty; 22 Feb. 1910; d.6650/10.
(107.) FO 371/1847 FO minute to: O'Bierne to Grey; 7 Dec. 1913; f.49385 d.55115.
(108.) FO 371/1847 Vansittart minute to: O'Bierne to Grey; 7 Dec. 1913; f.49385 d.56342.
(109.) FO 371/1847 Goschen to Grey; 15 Dec. 1913; f.49385 d.56359.
(110.) Ibid.
(111.) Ibid. FO minute.
(112.) BD XI; Mallet to Grey; 5 Dec. 1913; p.360, d.405.
(113.) FO 371/2112 Buchanan to Grey; 6 Jan. 1914; f.88 d.760.
(114.) Bombard to Doumergue; 14 Dec. 1914; in Documents Diplomatiques Francais 1871-1914 (DDF); 3eme Series; V61.8; p.785, d.626.
(115.) FO 371/1847; minute to: Mallet to Grey; 12 Dec. 1913; f.49385 d.56049.
(116.) FO 371/1847; Mallet to Grey; 12 Dec. 1913; f.49385 d.56310.
(117.) FO 371/1847; FO minute to: Mallet to Grey; 14 Dec. 1913; f.49385 d.56310.
(118.) FO 371/1847 Limpus to Mallet; 11 Dec. 1913 (forwarded to FO 24 Dec. 1913) f.49385 d.57988.
(119.) FO 371/1846 Mallet to Grey; 8 Dec. 1913 f.48901 d.56140.
(120.) FO 371/1847; FO minute to: Mallet to Grey; 14 Dec. 1913; f.49385 d.56310.
(121.) FO 371/1847; Mallet to Grey; 14 Dec. 1913; f.49385 d.56310.
(122.) FO 371/1847 Limpus to Mallet; 11 Dec. 1913 (forwarded to FO 24 Dec. 1913) f.49385 d.57988.
(123.) Ibid.
(124.) FO 371/1847; Mallet to Grey; 14 Dec. 1913; f.49385 d.56310.
(125.) FO 371/1847 Grey minute (27 Dec. 1913) to: Limpus to Mallet; 11 Dec. 1913 (forwarded to FO 24 Dec. 1913) f.49385 d.57988.
(126.) FO 371/1846 Tewfik Pasha to Grey; 8 Dec. 1913; f.48901 d.55348.
(127.) Ibid; Vansittart minute.
(128.) Ibid. minute by Crowe.
(129.) FO 371/1846 Limpus to Admty; 15 Nov. 1913 enc. in Admty to FO 11 Dec. 1913; f.48901 d.56002.
(130.) Ibid.
(131.) FO 371/1847; Mallet to Grey; 14 Dec. 1913; f.49385 d.56310.
(132.) FO 371/1847 Limpus to Mallet; 11 Dec. 1913 (to FO 24 Dec. 1913) f.49385 d.57988.
(133.) Ibid.
(134.) Ibid.
(135.) Ibid.
(136.) FO 371/1846 Mallet to Grey; 27 Oct. 1913; f.48901 d.48901.
(137.) FO 371/1847 Limpus to Mallet; 11 Dec. 1913 (to FO 24 Dec. 1913) f.49385 d.5798.
(138.) FO 371/221 Mallet to Grey; 8 June 1914; f.115 d.25448.
(139.) FO 371/1846 La Turquie, 7 Dec. 1913 enc. in: Mallet to Grey; 8 Dec. 1913 f.48901 d.56140.
(140.) FO 371/2114 Mallet to Grey; 11 May 1914; f.115 d.20759.
(141.) Ibid.
(142.) BL; G. MSS. Mallet to Grey 5 May 1914; pte. M1684 R.30.
(143.) FO 371/2214 Mallet to Grey; 11 May 1914; f.115 d.20759.
(144.) ADM 1/8365-4 Mallet to Grey; 8 March 1914.
(145.) ADM 1/8365-4 Grey minute (20 Jan. 1914) to Admty Memo; 7 Jan. 1914.
(146.) Ibid. Nicolson minute (20 Jan. 1914).
(147.) FO 371/1846 Mallet to Grey; 8 Dec. 1913; f.48901 d.56140.
(148.) Ibid.
(149.) Ibid. minute by Crowe.
(150.) BL G. MSS. Mallet to Grey (quotes Limpus); 4 Feb. 1914; pte. M1684; R29.
(151.) Ibid.
(152.) ADM 1/8365 Mallet to Grey; 3 Feb. 1914.
(153.) ADM 1/8365 Limpus Essay; 31 Jan. 1914.
(154.) FO 371/2114 Bertie to Grey; 31 Dec. 1913; f.115 d.115.
(155.) FO 371/2214 Buchanan to Grey; 3 Jan. 1914; f.115 d.206.
(156.) FO 371/2214 Mallet to Grey; 4 Jan. 1914; f.115 d.342.
(157.) Ibid.
(158.) Ibid.
(159.) BD X (i); Mallet to Grey; 21 Jan. 1914; p. 195 d.208.
(160.) FO 371/2112; Mallet to Grey; 6 Jan. 1914; f.98 d.754.
(161.) BL G MSS; Mallet to Grey; 4 Feb. 1914 pte. M1684 R29.
(162.) 131, G MSS; Mallet to Grey; 11 Sept. 1914; pte. M1684 R30.
(163.) Ibid.
(164.) Ibid.
(165.) Ibid.
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