INTRODUCTION
The task of this article is threefold: first, to describe the main leadership factions in Revolutionary Iran; second, to present an empirical analysis of trends in Iranian foreign relations with the Great Powers in the first crucial decade of the Revolution; and third, to discuss which trend best explains Tehran's current foreign policy in the second term of the Clinton administration.
One of the themes of the paper is the interaction between internal/domestic and foreign/external variables in foreign policy analysis. In this regard, the theoretical framework utilized is based on "linkage politics," which is a concept coined by James Rosenau. He examined "linkages" between national and international structures and studied "penetrated" political systems whose domestic policies are affected by events outside their borders.l In the 1980s, however, Rosenau himself questioned the adequacy of such concepts in an international system described by its "cascading interdependence."2 In this respect, this paper gives consideration to the general level of tension at the global and regional stages, which are the pretexts for Iranian foreign policy. Emphasis is placed on the intricacies of Iran's foreign relations with the Great Powers in the last period of the bi-polar structure, as well as the implication of the contemporary uni-polar international system on Tehran. Moreover, special attention is given to the significant changes in regional politics which have influenced the Iranian political stance, including the demise of the Soviet Union, the emergence of new Muslim republics in Central Asia and the Caucasus, the Arab-Israeli peace process, and the Gulf War.
Another theme of the paper deals with the influence of the "leadership factor" on the policy process. This analysis is theoretically based on the topic of "domestic sources of foreign policy," which is a common perspective among many current foreign policy analysts.3 In this regard, the assumption is that domestic/national factors or variables take precedent over foreign/international ones in influencing foreign policy. Two types of leaders are identified based on their beliefs, characteristics, leadership style, and world view. The impact of each type on Iranian foreign relations is explained in detail. Such theoretical and empirical considerations should provide us with a more clear understanding of Tehran's contemporary and future behavior.
THE ESSENCE OF IRANIAN FOREIGN POLICY
Early on, the revolutionary government declared that Iran would pursue policy based on the principle of non-alignment This was a strategy initiated by prominent leaders of the developing world in order to pursue a foreign policy independent of the Great Powers at the start of the Cold War.4 In pursuit of this policy, Iran soon abandoned the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), joined the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM), and cancelled many weapons orders from the West. The assumption of revolutionary leaders was that non-alignment would meet the foreign policy goals of the Islamic Republic as a Third World state, whereas an alliance with either the East or the West would not fit the Iranian religious, cultural, or historical context. Moreover, an alliance with one bloc would restrict policy options in establishing and maintaining beneficial ties with states from opposing blocs or with certain developing countries.
Iranian non-alignment strategy, enhanced by its independent stance, is a new chapter in the history of an ancient country which gained a new spirit as a result of the 1979 Revolution. Some experts discounted the effects of the Revolution on Iranian foreign relations by emphasizing the impact of certain geopolitical, historical, or economic factors which show signs of continuity in the pre- and post-revolution policies. In this fashion, one scholar concluded that Revolutionary Iran's strategy was not a radical departure from the past.5 Despite some similarities between Tehran's strategies pre- and post- revolution eras, the two were fundamentally different. This was mainly due to the structural differences between the old and the new regimes-Imperial Iran and the Islamic Republic. Thus, Tehran's declaration of non-alignment was a radical policy move that challenged the regional status.
The declaration of non-alignment was the result of Tehran's four major policy goals: (1) to achieve autonomy in foreign policymaking, (2) to avoid direct involvement in the American-Soviet rivalry, (3) to end Iran's dependence on one ideological camp, and (4) to improve its ties with all nations (except Israel and the former South African regime). These policy goals were rooted in Iranian history, politics, and economy. Among these factors, however, the foreign policy choices of the Shah was the main factor in shaping the foreign relations of Revolutionary Iran.
Regime stability dominated the Shah's policies from 1953,6 and its pursuit created a vicious cycle: it required an alliance with the United States, fostering a public image of military and economic dependence on America. Emphasizing such images, Ayatollah Khomeini characterized the Shah as a weak, illegitimate, and dependent leader. This ultimately resulted in weakening the regime both psychologically and politically. In sum, the revolutionary leaders claimed that their decision to follow a non-alignment strategy was taken mainly because dependency the trademark of the Shah's regime-was culturally an anti-Islamic and anti-Iranian notion. The foreign policy of Revolutionary Iran was not only a reaction to the Shah's regime, but was also influenced by revolutionary leaders. Thus, the next section illustrates how different types of leaders influenced the policy process.
TYPES OF LEADERS
Foreign policy making is done mostly by institutions in developed countries but mainly by the leaders in developing nations, especially revolutionary regimes.7 Thus, foreign policy analysis of the developing world always involves a close examination of the leadership.8 While not all revolutionary leaders participate in the decision-making process to the same degree, they all exhibit agreement about the need for change in foreign ties, signifying a break with the past.
It is not clear what makes an individual, especially a leader, become revolutionary.9 We are not sure why such individuals prefer to overthrow the government rather than work to reform it from within the system.lo Based on their approach to foreign policy, however, we can divide revolutionary leaders into two general categories: the idealists and the realists.11
Revolutionary Idealists
Revolutionary idealists are those who see the success of the revolution as a stepping stone in a series of upheavals against enemies, both inside and outside the country. With their outward looking perspective, many revolutionary idealists challenge their international environments. Their anti-status quo rhetoric often poses a threat to the national security of other states, especially in the first decade of the revolution. Idealists include revolutionary leaders like Ali Akbar Mohtashami, who does not believe in an interdependent world. For idealists, the revolution must persist in its convictions and in using its values in its foreign relations. They believe that time is working to their advantage and that sooner or later their revolution will spread elsewhere. Generally, leaders of this type tend to romanticize the nature and effects of their revolutions. They are also optimistic about their ability to orchestrate similar revolutions elsewhere, especially since they have gained experience in executing a successful revolution. Idealists tend to be impatient when their ideas take more time than anticipated or when the ideas in practice stray from their original goals.
This romanticism and optimism can, however, blind the idealist to essential facts. One can also argue that revolutionary idealists, an ingredient of any revolutionary leadership group, are rather simplistic and gullible in assuming that their revolution is exportable. They consider the export of the revolution the goal of any true revolutionary. They forget that a revolution which is to be legitimate, decisive, and successful must also be deeply rooted in the society.
One sub-category of idealists is radical revolutionary idealists, who have an extreme sense of mission for exporting their revolution by any means. In fact, what separates this group from the rest of the idealists is that they do not confine themselves to employing rhetoric and spiritual support as do most idealists. Rather, their goal is to send material, particularly military, support to groups abroad with similar ideologies. An example of such an individual was Mehdi Hashemi, whose militia activities abroad eventually led to his execution.12
Revolutionary Realists
Revolutionary realists are those leaders who understand realpolitik and the limits to the power of their revolutionary states. This group is more familiar and concerned with the reaction of the international environment to their revolution and its consequences. Like idealists, realists also aim to export the revolution, albeit with a different strategy. Instead of channeling resources to support national liberation movements abroad, their priority is building their own country as a model revolutionary state. They also realize that their country needs outside assistance for modernization. Consequently, they understand the importance of maintaining healthy diplomatic and economic relations with other countries, particularly with Great Powers for their technology. They are also more inclined to deal with problems of national rather than international concern.
Moreover, Realists are pragmatic enough to realize that internationally isolating the country does not pay off. Hojatolislam Ali Akbar Rafsanjani is an example of a revolutionary realist who worked against the isolationist tendencies within the new leadership. Concerned with mounting pressures of economic development and war reconstruction efforts, Rafsanjani even advocated hiring foreign experts and contractors-a controversial issue-when similar services are not available domestically.13
Regardless of their differences, both revolutionary realists and idealists agree on the need for a fresh approach to the foreign relations of the new regime. Considering the pervasive image of the Shah's regime as dependent on American power, Iranian revolutionary leaders found a non-alignment strategy to be a suitable alternative not only for their domestic image but also for their international reputation. Thus, non-alignment serves the national and international needs of Iran.
TRENDS IN IRAN'S NON-ALIGNMENT STRATEGY
While all Iranian leaders have endorsed non-alignment, they interpreted it differently based on domestic and international circumstances. This led to three major trends of foreign relations in the first decade of the Revolution: a two-track policy (1979-mid- 1982), a conflictual policy (mid-1982-mid-1985), and a conciliatory policy (mid-1985-1989).
A Two-Track Policy
This began when Mehdi Bazargan's government took charge in February 1979 and ended when Iranian forces moved the War into Iraqi territory in July 1982. Moving from a defensive to an offensive position in the Iran-Iraq War led some observers to argue that Tehran was exporting its revolution. Although some Iranian leaders have insisted that exporting the revolution would be by word and not by sword,l4 there is evidence indicating that the nature of Iranian policy became less cooperative and more conflictual after Tehran gained the military initiative in the War. Thus, this action signified the start of a less accommodating and a more conflictual policy period.
The two-track non-aligned strategy consisted of one track oriented towards distancing Tehran from Washington and the other toward establishing more cooperative relations with Moscow. To distance itself from the United States, Iran took three major political measures including withdrawing from CENTO, cancelling the 1959 U.S.-Iran Defense Agreement, and declaring itself a non-aligned country. Although Tehran also revoked Articles 5 and 6 of the 1921 Iran-USSR treaty, some claimed that Moscow achieved its historic goal of neutralizing Iran when Tehran joined NAM. The Soviet Union also saw the regional balance moving more to its advantage as Iran severed ties with some Western allies such as Israel, while it established closer relations with some Soviet allies like Syria, and cancelled many Western military contracts. In general, non-alignment during this period was interpreted by many Iranian leaders as primarily a policy to reduce foreign, particularly Western, influence in Iranian affairs-a policy similar to Mossadegh's "Negative Equilibrium."15 Since the Soviets did not have a presence in pre-revolution Iran, they hoped to expand ties with the new regime.
Who was in charge of this interpretation of non-alignment? Although the new regime experienced several changes in official heads-of-government during this stage of the revolution, the actual source of power was Ayatollah Khomeini, who enjoyed the luxury of legitimizing their bids for leadership as they courted him for approval. In summarizing the issue of leadership during this period, one may argue that Ayatollah Khomeini headed a coalition of secular and clergy leaders. The clergy soon consolidated its power base and began to eliminate its rivals, starting with the moderates in November of 1979 and ending with members of the Tudeh in 1982.
Tehran began media campaigns against regional pro-Western states although pro-Eastern ones were also not immune. Iran was soon blamed for a number of regional incidents which varied from demonstrations and acts of sabotage to hijacking and even an attempted coup. Considering the freedom that radical idealists enjoyed at the beginning of the revolution, such as establishing and operating centers like the Liberation Movement Office,l6 it is conceivable that some incidents received more than just a blessing from Tehran, despite the denial of top officials.17
How genuine was the non-alignment in this period? The behavior of the regime initially seemed to be anti-Western and pro-Eastern. In fact, some suggested that Iranian non-alignment meant an American loss and a Soviet gain, but history showed that this conclusion was too simplistic.
Thus, for Tehran, non-alignment did not serve as a cover to hide an alliance with Moscow. The latter had a questionable image in Iran because of the negative connotation of Marxism in socio-political values of revolutionary Islam, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, its ties to the Tudeh Party, and its military assistance to Iraq. In practice, Iran's non-alignment strategy used an equidistance approach by keeping the Soviet Union at bay while distancing its ties with the United States.
However, the anti-American slogans of Iranian demonstrators did not necessarily signal an end to relations with the United States although their actions should have served as a signal to allow a cooling off period. Evidence indicates that secular leaders did not wish to cut off diplomatic ties with the United States since they knew that Tehran needed the West to balance the influence of the East. In fact, on occasion these leaders showed their positive intentions toward America.18
In contrast, the clerics were suspicious of American intentions and feared a 1953-style coup, especially after the admission of the Shah to the United States on 22 October 1979. For the clergy, the takeover of the American Embassy was an opportunity to consolidate its power by eliminating secular leaders as well as deterring a U.S. intervention by keeping Americans captive. The clergy ended the hostage crisis after it gained an American pledge not to interfere in Iranian affairs through the Algiers Agreement. The fact that the crisis ended four months after the Iraqi invasion began also indicates that international concerns were secondary to the leadership.
On the second anniversary of the revolution, the clergy was pleased with its overall performance and confident that, unlike the Shah, it could lead the country without dependence on America. When it seemed that the West was united against Iran, Ayatollah Khomeini began emphasizing self-reliance in his views of non-alignment.l9 Self-reliance was the main reason behind the significant growth in the Iranian domestic arms industry.20
A More Conflictual Policy
In the second phase of its non-alignment strategy (July 1982 to June 1985), Iran's policy toward the superpowers was more conflictual and uncompromising, particularly regarding the settlement of the War. Tehran's demand for the removal of President Hussein added to earlier suspicions about Iran's intervention in the domestic affairs of others and its attempts to export the Islamic revolution. This rigid position put Iran under a spotlight and isolated the country while it was already under a great deal of domestic pressure tI To remedy this pressure, the leadership emphasized self-reliance and interpreted nonalignment as being similar to isolationism.22
Contrary to the earlier period, the clergy was in full control of all policymaking institutions after Khamenei became president. With the approval of Ayatollah Khomeini, the clergy put a rigid tone on the non-alignment policy. The reason for a more conflictual posture was a combination of some domestic and foreign successes which led the leadership to become more adamant in pursuing its foreign policy goal towards the Great Powers.
Three issues negatively affected Tehran-Moscow relations: the dissolution of the Tudeh Party, Soviet troops in Afghanistan, and Soviet support for Iraq. During 1982 and 1983, the coalition between the ruling clergy and the Tudeh Party ended when Tehran outlawed the Tudeh Party and arrested its leading members. The latter confessed to being agents of the Soviet Union during a highly publicized trial. Soon Tehran purged the military,23 and Moscow severely criticized Tehran.24 Iran then expelled 18 Soviets in a diplomatic showdown. On the Afghan Crisis, both states advocated an end to foreign intervention in Afghanistan, but they were certainly in opposite camps. More than 100,000 Soviet troops remained in Afghanistan, while Iran assisted certain Mujahedin organizations25 and housed more than two million Afghan refugees.26
Finally, close military ties between Moscow and Baghdad were another source of irritation in Iran-Soviet relations. According to Ayatollah Khomeini, President Hussein was an atheist equipped with Soviet and Western arms.27 In 1983, the Soviets alienated Iran even more by resuming arms shipments to Iraq. Soon Iran-Eastern Bloc trade declined to its lowest level since the revolution. In addition, natural gas negotiations between Tehran and Moscow broke down.
Tehran-Washington relations hinged on three issues: the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, support of the Afghan Resistance, and the Iran-Iraq War. These issues had adverse affects in the relations between the two countries. For example, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon contributed to a more conflictual relationship between Tehran and Washington. The invasion convinced some leaders that it was not enough merely to create a distance between Tehran and Washington and that it was time to confront America in the region. The Ayatollah resented the United States not only for its support of the Shah, but also for the traditional American support of Israel.28 Soon after the Israeli invasion, Tehran sent a contingent of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to Lebanon. The IRGC began the indoctrination and training of Lebanese Shias in the Bekka Valley. Thus, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, like the Iraqi invasion of Iran, provided the Islamic Republic with the opportunity to project its power, export its revolutionary message, and challenge the regional status quo which favored America.
The bombings of the U.S. Embassy in Lebanon, U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut, the U.S. Embassy in Kuwait, and the 1984 Kuwaiti hijacking should all be seen as part of this new confrontational policy of the leadership toward America. On 23 January 1984, the United States put Iran on the list of terrorist states and soon began to control its exports to Tehran.
Revolutionary idealists applauded this confrontational non-alignment strategy. Ayatollah Khomeini acknowledged its success by noting that the Lebanese Shia had forced America to withdraw its Marines from Lebanon (February of 1984), although he did not mention who had inspired and trained the Lebanese Shia. The tone and words of the revolutionary idealists confirmed their confidence in the success of this strategy and their determination that they would not be intimidated by America.29
Afghanistan, Washington and Tehran were, in effect, strategic allies because they were pursuing similar goals including the withdrawal of the Soviets and the destabilization of the communist regime in Kabul. Nevertheless, the idealists distinguished between American and Iranian support for Mujahedin by claiming that Washington only aimed at promoting a pro-American Islamic movement;
On the Iran-Iraq War, Tehran saw Washington and Baghdad as allies whose goal was to destroy the Islamic Republic. For Iran, the proof of such allegations was the support of Iraq by pro-American Arab Gulf states. Moreover, certain American actions convinced Iran that the United States was actively siding with Iraq, despite its declaration of neutrality in the war. The 1992 revelations about the Bush administration's indiscriminate support of the regime of Saddam Hussein showed that Iranian leaders were justified in this stance on the alliance between Washington and Baghdad against Iran before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.
As international initiatives to bring about a cease-fire failed, Tehran became more isolated from the superpowers30 despite its improved position to negotiate a settlement with Baghdad. Thus, Iranian confrontational non-aligned foreign relations antagonized the superpowers and lined them up against Iran, as radical leaders had prophesied.
A More Conciliatory Policy
The need for a more conciliatory approach in Iranian non-alignment strategy was rooted in Tehran's failure to capture Basrah-Iraq's second largest city and major port. Despite inflicting heavy losses on the Iraqis, Iran lacked the hardware to break through the Iraqi defenses. The leadership realized that the conflictual non-alignment position had limited Iran's ability to end the war on its terms.31
From late 1984, the realists began to emphasize that non-alignment did not mean isolation from the rest of the world and aimed at changing the international image of the Islamic Republic. Iranian foreign policy began showing conciliatory signs,32 including Tehran's efforts to resolve the TWA hijacking and end the radio propaganda war with the Soviets.33
A survey of Iranian diplomatic actions during this period shows that the emphasis was more on dialogue and less on defiance, although the rhetoric may have suggested otherwise. From 1985, Iran-Eastern bloc ties began to expand again. A year later, Iran's diplomatic relations with Western nations significantly improved despite the short-term downturn which occurred during the Salman Rushdie affair. The improvement of ties with the East and the West was an indicator of the realists' growing influence in policymaking following signs of moderation in Ayatollah Khomeini. Furthermore, the Ayatollah's death and the emergence of Rafsanjani smoothed some of the rough edges of the Iranian non-alignment strategy.
Relations with the Soviet Union
The improvement in Moscow-Tehran ties was due to a change in the perspective of Iran's leaders and a new Soviet approach by Gorbachev. Soon the propaganda war softened and negotiations began.34 From 1986, Iran-Soviet trade and diplomatic activities showed major improvement. This improvement again allowed Tehran to play its Russian card against America, particularly at the United Nations. For instance, after Foreign Minister Velayati's visit to Moscow in February of 1987, Moscow delayed the U.S. proposed U.N. embargo on arms sales to Iran. Nevertheless, relations were not immune from mishaps. In early 1988, Iranian demonstrators assaulted the Soviet Embassy, but both states soon began a process of damage control.
By 1989, the three contentious issues in Tehran-Moscow relations either became moot or lost their significance. The suppression of the Tudeh was an issue that both sides refused to discuss; Soviet support for Iraq during the War also became a non-issue after Iran accepted U.N. Resolution 598 and the Soviets insisted on assisting Iranian reconstruction efforts to make up for their support for Iraq during the War?35 and the Afghan crisis lost its urgency in the late 1980s as the Soviets began to withdraw. Nevertheless, the emerging revolutionary realists kept the growing cooperation with the Soviets in check by increasing their contacts with the West.
In sum, Revolutionary Iran succeeded in resisting Soviet pressures after 1979 despite its lesser military capability and lack of protection by the Western alliance. This success was caused in part by the opportunity that the breakdown of detente produced and in part by challenging the Soviets with an equally revolutionary ideology. The Islamic component of the non-alignment strategy provided Iran with an opportunity to put the Soviets on the defensive. In fact, Moscow became vulnerable to the agitation of Islamic movements in the Muslim-dominated republics when ethnic conflict intensified.36 This did not lead to an ideological or military conflict between the two states, but it provided Tehran with more time and less foreign policy constraints while the Russians stopped their southern expansionist trend to bring a new order to their republics.
Relations with the United States
Since the emergence of the revolutionary realists was the main factor behind a more conciliatory policy toward the United States, one may ask whether the emergence of this group was the result of external or internal pressures on Iran. It was due to both, although most experts agree that the domestic factors contributed more.
The roots of the revolutionary realists' bid for leading the non-alignment strategy go back to public grievances in the pre-June of 1984 Majlis (Parliament) election. An increase in public criticism of the government and a decline in support for the War indicated public dissatisfaction with the policies and priorities of the Islamic government. A main target of criticism was the Iranian offensive strategy in Iraq which forced the Ayatollah to defend the Iranian military position by claiming that the revolutionary units were defending Islam and Iran and not attacking Iraq. The public pressure finally led to a division within the leadership into idealist and realist camps.
These camps disagreed not only on certain domestic issues, but also on an appropriate approach to non-alignment, particularly on how to act toward America. For instance, realist Foreign Minister Velayati voiced a formal objection to the U.S. veto of the UN Security Council resolution on the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon in September of 1984. Revolutionary idealists, however, went a step further in showing their opposition by applauding the bombing of the U.S. Embassy compound by the Lebanese.
Inviting the West German Foreign Minister to Iran served as a trial for the realists, who were awaiting a signal from Ayatollah Khomeini so they could begin to act. The signal came on 28 October when the Ayatollah declared that Iran must have relations with all countries and that severing relations with other governments was against the wisdom and law of Islam.37 This was a major change in Iran's interpretation of its foreign relations. The need for a cooperative non-alignment strategy became even more apparent after Baghdad and Washington formally reestablished diplomatic ties in November of 1984, but Tehran made no concrete gesture toward the United States until mid-1985.
To change the international image of Iran, Majlis Speaker Rafsanjani initiated a tour of several countries in June of 1985 when, coincidentally, the hijacking of TWA Flight 847 took place. While in Syria, Rafsanjani met with Hezbollah members, and his efforts quickly and peacefully ended the incident.38 Rafsanjani's success served to boost the emerging realists. From 1985 to 1986, Tehran facilitated the release of three American citizens held in Lebanon, but this cooperative signal became a part of the Iran-Contra Affair.
Both realists and idealists had contributed to "Iran's America initiafive." According to the Tower Report, the Americans negotiated with the Iranians through two intermediaries -Manuchehr Ghorbanifar and Albert Hakim. The former played a major role in the arms-for-hostage deal.39 This does not suggest, however, that the idealists had a change of heart about the "Great Satan." They only wanted American arms, the shortage of which had severely limited the capability of the Iranian military and became the main obstacle to a victory against Iraq. The goal of the idealists seemed clear from the questionable tactics of Ghorbanifar. The idealists must have viewed this initiative as a one-time deal with the "Great Satan." On the other hand, the realists' aim was to come to an informal but cooperative understanding with Washington, although they did not have a mandate from the Ayatollah.
Albert Hakim was the intermediary between the realists and U.S. officials. He was "the second channel" through which the Americans found out that Tehran did not have influence with all the Lebanese factions who held American hostages. This information contradicted Ghorbanifar's exaggerated claims. The realists, however, did not meet with McFarlane in Tehran for two reasons. First, with no mandate from the Ayatollah, the realists were afraid of the wrath of the idealists. Also, Ghorbanifar (not Hakim) had arranged the trip.40
On 3 November 1986, the Lebanese magazine, Al-Shira, revealed the story of McFarlane's visit to Tehran and hampered further contacts. The idealists' radical elements had leaked the news and had two goals. The first was to keep Tehran and Washington apart by preventing further contact between the Americans and the realists, and the second was to retaliate against the realists who had arrested the leaders of the radical revolutionaries in October of 1986. In reaction to the disclosure, the realists pulled back, but Rafsanjani tried to salvage the process by giving positive signals to the United States until December of 1986.41 Nevertheless, the Reagan Administration was not receptive since the disclosure had created a major domestic crisis in the United States.
In Iran, the idealists launched a campaign to blame the realists for the whole affair, and eight Majlis deputies demanded an investigation of the government's conduct, similar to Iran-Contra Hearings in the U.S. Congress. The growing tension between the idealists and the realists prompted a call from Ayatollah Khomeini for unity. In addition, he blamed the whole affair on the United States and declared its result a victory for Iran.42 In fact, it was a victory for the realists who survived the idealists' campaign and succeeded in silencing the most radical idealists.
The year of 1987 was a turning point in Tehran-Washington relations. Iran was becoming militarily weaker and diplomatically more conciliatory. On the contrary, U.S. foreign policy started to become confrontational towards Iran as Washington became convinced of the limited capability of Iranian military responses. In June of 1987, the American lobby at the UN. succeeded in passing Security Council Resolution 598.(43) Iran did not reject the diplomatic solution as the idealists demanded, but worked towards negotiating more favorable pre-conditions . On the war with Iraq, a significant symbol of the realists' setting the policy agenda was their promise of a final offensive. This was in response to a decline in both public support for the regime and in Iranian military capability after a few large-scale operations.
From 1987 to 1988, American reaction to initial Iranian moves was cautious, but Washington took bolder actions as it became evident that Tehran did not have either Soviet military backing or an adequate military response. Despite harsh rhetoric, Tehran's responses to American retaliations soon became diplomatic complaints and protests at the United Nations. Iran began to use international organizations as a place where it could score politically against Washington, since it could not match U.S. military muscle.44
Ayatollah Khomeini's July 1988 decision to approve the UN cease-fire solidified the position of the realists, who soon accepted UN Resolution 598 without any preconditions. This event not only ended the direct influence of the idealists on setting the foreign policy agenda, but it also closed the chapter on Iran-U.S. naval clashes. After Resolution 598 took effect on 20 August of 1988, the United States reduced its naval presence in the Persian Gulf. The reduction led the realists to claim a victory because Iranian leaders had been concerned that U.S. forces might remain in the area to destabilize the Islamic Republic.
Although the diplomatic environment was encouraging in August 1988, the Republican administration shied away from engaging in a dialogue with Iran which could have interfered with Vice President Bush's bid for the presidency. On the contrary, the diplomatic scene was active in Tehran where the realists were on the rise while the idealists were losing leverage over policymaking. For instance, Premier Mosavi resigned mainly because he lacked influence on Iranian foreign policy.
The publication of Satanic Verses in early 1989 provided the idealists with an opportunity to shake up Iranian foreign policy and had the potential of changing the direction of the non-alignment strategy. The Rushdie affair turned out to be a short-lived crisis, contrary to the idealists' expectation.45 The realists maintained their power as the idealists lost their source of inspiration when the Ayatollah died.' Three domestic events also solidified the position of the realists: Khamenei's succeeding Khomeini as the Vilayat-e Faqih, Rafsanjani's successful bid for the presidency, and the 1989 amendment of the Constitution.
As the realists secured their positions, Tehran began to show more positive signs toward the West, including the United States. In mid-1989, Iran's political approach toward the United States was so positive that on the tenth anniversary of the storming of the American Embassy, only a small number of demonstrators turned out to listen to former Minister Mohtashemi who was the main speaker at the celebration.47 Two days later, the United States agreed to free $567 million in frozen assets to Iran.48 Moreover, the State Department's legal adviser held unannounced talks with Iranian officials to inform them that Washington wanted to compensate the families of the passengers killed in the July of 1988 airbus incident.49 Another positive gesture by Tehran was the decision to allow a U.N. inspector to investigate human rights practices and abuses So By the following year, the realists felt so secure that President Rafsanjani commented that Ayatollah Khomeini's call for Salmon Rushdie's death was the view of one expert and thus, it could be debated.
In sum, Iranian non-alignment strategy towards the United States generally became more cooperative beginning in 1985. Contrary to earlier uncomplimentary comments about the United States and its hegemonical influence at the United Nations, President Khamenei visited New York in 1987 to address the U.N. General Assembly on the anniversary of the Iraqi invasion. Iran also began to use international organizations, some of which it lobbied for condemnation of the United States after the airbus incident in 1988. This in itself indicated a softening in the nature of Iranian policy, whose goal in the confrontational period would have been to settle the score with the United States by engaging American or pro-American forces in the region instead of using diplomatic means to settle the issue.
FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR IRANIAN FOREIGN RELATIONS
The international context of Iranian foreign policy significantly altered in the 1990s. These changes provided both opportunities and challenges for revolutionary leaders and led to questions about assumptions regarding international politics. These shifts include the end of the bi-polar structure, the reduction of the American and Russian nuclear arsenals, the demise of the Soviet Union, and the emergence of three major global economic spheres - the North American Free Trade Agreement, the European Union, and the Japan/East Asia region.
These changes lead to the question: Does a non-alignment strategy, the cornerstone of Iranian policy as explained earlier, apply to a world with only one superpower? The quick answer is affirmative. One can find the reason for this in the nature of the Non-Alignment Movement, which was a reaction to policy limitations that developing countries faced in the post-World War II period. The main goal of NAM's founders was to have policy options in their decision making process regardless of the number of poles in the international system. In the post-Cold War era, developing countries have to contend with only one superpower, but they still aim to formulate and implement their foreign relations independently from the United States as well as from other Great Powers. This is why NAM is still going strong and a non-aligned strategy continues to be popular among developing countries, especially the Islamic Republic.
Despite changes in the international arena, some old strategies are still applicable to the new emerging global order. Like NAM countries during the Cold War, Iran continues to balance the influence of one Great Power with that of another. But, instead of focusing on the global ideological divisions, Tehran takes advantage of natural economic and political rivalry among the Great Powers. In this respect, it has diversified its trade partners, sources of international investments, adopted foreign technologies, and diplomatic supporters at the U. N. By doing so, Iran is increasing its policy maneuverability and decreasing its dependency upon any particular Great Power for economic, diplomatic, political, or military necessities.
For a student of Iranian foreign relations, the other important question is: Which one of the three policy trends discussed above best explains the current non-alignment strategy of Iran? At first, in response to this question, one could argue that the current nature of Iranian policy depends upon one's perspective. For instance, while Tehran is perceived as hostile by the Clinton administration, it is viewed as friendly by Islamabad. Still some, like London, look at Tehran as pursuing a two-track strategy. A closer examination by focusing on the actions rather than the rhetoric, however, indicates that a behavioral pattern is detectable, regardless of one's perspective. In order to test which trend more accurately explains contemporary Iran, the first focus will be on the American view of Iranian policy; then, the two-track method; and finally, the conciliatory pattern.
From an American perspective, the nature of Iranian foreign relations has not shifted in a positive direction, and Washington considers Tehran's policy conflictual in the world, especially towards the United States. Washington refers to Tehran with a variety of negative labels, including an outlaw, backlash, or rogue state, despite the suggestions of experts to the contrary.51 In this respect, the Clinton Administration has reached a new height in demonizing the Islamic Republic.52
According to the Administration, Iran represents a threat to the whole international community in the following areas. First, it is speculatively engaged in sponsoring international terrorism in order to destabilize some American allies. Second, it opposes the Arab-Israeli peace process and supposedly aims to derail it. Third, it is allegedly attempting to acquire nuclear weapons. Fourth, Tehran is presumably rebuilding its military machine with offensive equipment and technology, which poses a threat to the Persian Gulf region. Finally, Tehran's record of human rights is spotlighted and evaluated as dismal at best.53 These points leave no doubt that Washington perceives Tehran as a hostile international actor although Tehran categorically denies such charges. In fact, Iranian leadership reaction to such accusations is best summed up by President Rafsanjani's reply to an American correspondent who asked whether Tehran can prove its innocence. President Rafsanjani emphasized that in a court one is innocent until proven guilty and that it is the responsibility of the accuser to prove the guilt, not the accused.54
From another perspective, one might argue that Iranian foreign relations towards Great Powers can be best described as a two-track policy: (1) maintaining distance with the United States and (2) showing more conciliatory gestures towards Europe and Japan. Concentrating on the descriptive aspect of diplomacy, this outlook describes the dichotomy between Tehran's improving relations with the European Union, Japan, and Russia, contrary to its demoralized association with America. Nevertheless, this perspective does not provide an explanation for why American-Iranian relations have not improved in the post-Cold War era, while Iranian ties with other Western powers have. The shortcoming of this view is, then, due to its focus on the effect(s) of Iran-U.S. relations and not on its cause(s). Thus, there is a need for a causal model supported by evidence.
Finally, another perspective suggests that Iranian foreign policy in the New World Order has shown conciliatory gestures to Great Powers, but they have not similarly responded to such positive diplomatic signals. As the old saying goes, "it takes two to tango." In this respect, Iranian conciliatory gestures serve as the necessary, not the sufficient, condition for improving relations with a Great Power, because the latter must reciprocate for renewing ties. Thus, since the United States has not reciprocated Iranian conciliatory gestures, their bilateral ties have remained stagnant. Perhaps the best recent example of Iranian conciliatory gestures was the 1995 Conoco case, in which President Rafsanjani signaled that reconciliation with the Clinton administration would be through economic interaction. In pursuit of this goal, Tehran sought an American company, Conoco Oil (instead of one from another Western nation), to develop the gas field near Sirri Island, in the Persian Gulf. Faced with increasing domestic energy demands, revolutionary Iranian leaders unprecedently made many concessions to lure Conoco Oil to Iran during months of negotiations. President Clinton, however, stopped the whole process by a stroke of his pen.
Another significant conciliatory example is Tehran's 1993 decision to approach Boeing (instead of its European competitor, Airbus) to purchase 16 civilian airplanes for Iran Air, the Iranian national airline.55 This negotiated deal was also sabotaged by the Clinton administration. Despite positive Iranian signals, Washington expressed increased hostility towards Iran by imposing a trade embargo in 1995 and approved legislation in 1996 aimed at punishing nonAmerican companies that trade with the Islamic Republic. This last measure, in fact, infuriated most Western nations whose citizens and firms are affected by the extraterritorial nature of this American law.
While, a cursory view of Iranian foreign policy might lead one to assume that Tehran is pursuing either a conflictual or two-track policy, a closer examination highlights evidence to the contrary. Such an assertion, however, requires a discussion of Iranian relations with other Great Powers besides the United States. Thus, a review of contemporary Iranian ties is in order.
One of Iran's growing relationships is with the Russian Federation. Since the end of the Cold War, the two states have come a long way by fostering friendly and diplomatic ties and cooperating in different political arenas. Iran and Russia maintain similar positions on a number of issues, most notably the legal status of the Caspian Sea. Furthermore, Tehran has refrained from asserting influence in Russian domestic affairs, particularly the Russian military campaign in the Muslim republic of Chechnya. In a gesture of reciprocity, Moscow has resisted blaming Tehran for the growth of political Islam in Central Asia, contrary to Washington's actions. Consequently, Russian good will has resulted in Iranian good will. For example, Tehran has played a constructive role in encouraging and facilitating negotiation among opposing camps in the Tajik Civil War.
Beyond dynamic diplomatic ties, commerce and technology transfer between the two states have expanded since the end of the Cold War. Statistics from international organizations suggest that the volume of trade between Iran and Russia has escalated.56 Moreover, with Russian technology, Tehran is gradually rebuilding its ailing armed forces, which were devastated during the IranIraq War and are comparatively weaker than those of Iraq or Saudi Arabia. Recent examples of technology transfer include the delivery of two Kilo Class Russian submarines to Iran and the decision to provide Tehran with nuclear reactors.
Iran has also maintained friendly ties with Western nations, especially the European Union (EU). The Europeans, particularly Germany, pursue a "critical dialogue" with Tehran.57 On 5 August 1986, Reuters reported that a French government spokesman stated that the EU's "critical dialogue" with Tehran has already produced positive results.58 With the exception of Japan, Iran's major trade partners are the European states, especially Germany, France, and Italy. Although Europe avoided exporting military hardware to Iran, the volume of trade between the EU and Iran boomed in the post-Khomeini era.
Moreover, "critical dialogue" has been politically fruitful by uplifting the diplomacy with Tehran and decreasing European concerns. Symbolically, the most significant development is an improvement in the safety of British author Salman Rushdie. Tehran recently assured EU officials that its government would do nothing to enforce the death sentence on Rushdie.59 Another salient development is the role that Iran and Germany played in negotiations for a cease fire between Israel and Lebanese Hezbollah in April of 1996.
In August of 1996, a new political development brought Iran even closer to the EU position. President Clinton signed the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, although the EU states, Japan, and Canada had made their opposition to such measures clear to the United States at the Group of Seven Summit in Lyon. This Act gave him extra-territorial powers to penalize non-American companies that invest $40 million or more a year in the oil and natural gas sectors of the two states. President Jacques Chirac responded that France would retaliate immediately if the United States applied sanctions to French companies under the new act.60 Soon Canada joined the critics of American policy by condemning the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act. In fact, the Canadian International Trade Minister, Art Eggleton, was quoted saying, "The extra-territorial effects of this latest act represents once again an attempt by the United States to dictate trade policy to its allies." He added that Canada would defend its national interest against such legislation.61 Similarly, Tokyo, which has taken a "constructive engagement" policy towards Tehran expressed its concerns to Washington about the implication of this Act. These reactions to the United States illustrate the significance of the ties between Tehran and the Western capitals. Indeed, Iranian ties with Canada and Japan have noticeably expanded in the post-Cold War era.
Great Powers, like Russia, Japan, and Canada are not the only targets of Iranian conciliatory gestures since Tehran has also projected an accommodating policy to its neighbors despite Washington's perception to the contrary. Iran has maintained its close bonds with Turkey and Pakistan both within and outside the structure of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO). According to Iranian leaders, Tehran is linked to Ankara and Islamabad for commercial as well as for cultural, historical, and religious connections. The most impressive example of the vital link with these states is the finalization of Iran-Turkey natural gas supply deal worth $23 billion, despite strong U.S. opposition.62
The young Muslim republics of the former Soviet Union have become Tehran's new diplomatic and commercial frontier and another target of Iran's more pragmatic foreign policy. Contrary to earlier concerns about Iranian missionary activity in Central Asia, Tehran has taken a politically realistic and economically constructive approach towards its northern neighbors.63 There are major improvements at the bilateral and multilateral levels between Iran and the Central Asian states. In fact, these states joined ECO in 1992 and are in the process of connecting their roads and railroads to those of Iran so they can reach the international market via the Persian Gulf ports.64 There were also a number of proposals for natural gas and oil pipelines from Central Asia through Iran to international markets. Strong American opposition and economic pressures on Tehran, however, have spoiled most such plans. One critic of the Clinton Administration attempt to weaken Iran by crippling its economy suggests that the side effect of this U.S. policy is a more destabilized Persian Gulf, which is contrary to American national interest He adds that a durable regional stability requires that Iran be incorporated into, not isolated from, the regional economic and political arrangements.65
As far as the southern neighbors are concerned, Iranian ties with the Gulf Arab states have improved since the end of the Iran-Iraq and Gulf Wars and can be best described as cordial. Long gone are the days that the Revolutionary Guard's naval forces retaliated by harassing Kuwaiti or Saudi ships for their financial, logistic, and military support of Iraq. While the end of the IranIraq War made the Arab's support of Iraq a moot issue, the Gulf War proved that Iraqi regime is potentially more threatening to them than that of Revolutionary Iran. In fact, Baghdad's threat is militarily more significant for Kuwait and Saudi Arabia considering that they border Iraq and that the latter still enjoys a sizable and effective military machine despite its losses in the Gulf War.
This improved diplomatic environment between Iran and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members has led to some growing business and economic exchanges, especially with the United Arab Emirates and Qatar. The volume of business activity between the northern and southern shores of the Gulf is symbolically important, although it is not comparable to that of Iran and the West. There is a logical explanation for the limited economic interaction between Iran and GCC states. Both are major oil producers, and petroleum constitutes most of their exports. Therefore, their single-commodity economies are tied more closely with those of the industrialized societies rather than with one another.
In sum, this discussion indicates that Iranian foreign relations has generally taken a more accommodating posture, especially since President Clinton came to office. The five previously stated American accusations, however, indicate that the Clinton administration does not perceive Tehran as a friendly regime. Thus, it is time to briefly address each one of the American concerns about Revolutionary Iran: sponsoring international terrorism, opposition to the Arab-Israeli peace process, seeking nuclear weapons, pursuing military dominance, and poor human rights record.
Regarding the alleged connection to international terrorism, Tehran has challenged Washington to present its evidence in an international judicial forum and prove the accusation. Most experts agree that publicizing such accusations without presenting the evidence is damaging to U.S. foreign policy not only in the region, but also at the global level.
Concerning Iranian opposition to the Middle East peace process, one should consider the following points. First, Tehran is not against any peace initiative, but it holds that timing is not right for the Arabs from a bargaining perspective to negotiate with Israel, considering that the latter is enjoying a superior diplomatic position due to unconditional American support. Second, despite its reservations about the asymmetry of the Arab-Israeli position, Iran has stated for the record that it will go along with any agreement that Syria and Israel might conclude. Finally, it is doubtful that Iranian opposition to the peace process would make any significant difference in the actual interaction between the Arabs and Israelis. Since the revolution, Tehran has opposed rapproachment between the Arabs and the Israelis, but that has not stopped either side from negotiating with the other.66
In response to Iran's alleged attempt to develop nuclear weapons, there are three basic points to consider. The first is that Islamic Republic is a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has made several unannounced inspections of Iranian nuclear facilities. IAEA has never found any evidence of a disguised nuclear weapons program. Secondly, Russian intelligence does not support the CIA's assertion that Iran is actively seeking the bomb.67 Finally, Tehran has neither the financial resources, nor the technology to develop such a program.68
In Washington, there are also rumors about an ambitious Iranian military build-up in order to dominate the Persian Gulf region. Such allegations, however, should be taken with a grain of salt, since facts are mixed with fiction. From China and Russia, Iran has purchased military equipment that has provided it with some politically prestigious arms like missile systems and submarines. Nevertheless, the Islamic Republic has neither the quality nor the quantity edge over its regional rivals. In order to put this into perspective, we should examine Iranian military purchases in comparison to its Arab neighbors. According to CIA estimates, the Gulf Arab states (mainly Saudi Arabia and Kuwait) spent a total of about $157 billion on their military machines in the period of 1989 to 1992, while Iran purchased approximately $2 billion annually.69 In light of the newly established U.S. Fifth Fleet in the Persian Gulf to police the Islamic Republic, Iranian leaders are not under any illusion of being able to militarily dominate the region by spending about $2 billion a year on technologically inferior Chinese and Russian equipment. Finally, considering that the Iranian ailing economy has weakened by rampant inflation,70 Tehran has no financial resources to undertake a major military build-up for the foreseeable future. As one military expert observed, "Unless Iran's regime gets its economic act together or the price of oil rises unexpectedly, truly effective [military] forces will be many years in the making."71
The most relevant Washington criticism of Tehran is about Iranian human rights practices. Undoubtedly, the Islamic Republic's human rights record falls well short of Western expectations, considering the censorship of the media, restraint of some political opposition, and certain limits on minority's and women's rights. In order to put this issue into perspective, three observations must be made about Iranian human rights practices. First, revolutionary Iran's record on human rights is generally not much worse than that of the Shah's regime. Second, the rights of minorities and women in Iran are no worse than those of some of Washington's staunchest allies in the region, Saudi Arabia in particular. Finally, as one expert clearly stated, there has been a major improvement in women's rights since the Revolution, and such positive domestic developments should not be simply ignored.72
In conclusion, my discussion suggests that a conciliatory trend best explains contemporary Iranian foreign policy, despite allegations by the Clinton administration to the contrary. If Tehran is practicing a more accommodating policy, then one might ask: What explains the stagnant and demoralizing Iranian-American relations? This analysis illustrates that American policy choices are the cause of such stagnation. This assertion is particularly true about the Clinton Administration which has dropped the "carrot" from the Bush Administration's "carrot and stick" strategy towards the Islamic Republic.
NOTES
1. See James N. Rosenau, (ed.), Linkage Politics: Essays on the Convergence of National and International Systems. (New York: The Free Press, 1969). Also, see James N. Rosenau, "Compatibility, Consensus, and an Emerging Political Science of Adaptation," American Political Science Review, LXI, No. 3 (December 1967), pp. 971-982.
2. James N. Rosenau, "A Pre-Theory Revisited: World Politics in an Era of Cascading Interdependence," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 2, 1984, pp. 245-305.
3. For a good example of this type of approach to the study of foreign policy, see Charles W. Kegly, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, (eds.). The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence. (New York: St Martin's Press, 1988).
4. Richard L. Jackson, The Non-Aligned, the UN., and the Superpowers. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983).
5. For example, See Shirin T. Hunter, Iran and the World: Continuity in a Revo
lutionary Decade. (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1990). 6. Robert Graham, Iran: The Illusion of Power. (New York: St. Martin's Press,
1980), pp. 245-254.
7. See Charles W. Kegley, Jr., and Eugene R. Wittkopf, (eds.). The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988). Also see John T. Rourke, Making Foreign Policy. (Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, 1990). 8. For example, see Ahmad Ashraf, "Theocracy and Charisma: New Men of Power in Iran," International Journal of Politics and Society, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1990, pp. 43-52. Also, see Dilip Hiro, Iran Under the Ayatollahs. (London Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985). On other Third World leaders, see Philip Bonsal, Cuba, Castro, and the United States. (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1971). Robert S. Elegant, Mao's Great Revolution. (New York: World Publishing, 1971).
9. Lawrence Stone, "Theories of Revolution," World Politics, Vol. 17, January
1966, p.168.
10. James E. Dougherty & Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Contending Theories of International Relations, 3rd. ed., (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1990), p. 330.
11. See R. K. Ramazani, "Iran's Foreign Policy: Contending Orientations," in R. K. Ramazani, (ed.), Iran's Revolution: The Search for Consensus. (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1990), pp. 52-64. 12. For information on the activities of Hashemi, see Eric Hooglund's section on "Concept of Export of Revolution" in Helen Metz, (ed.), Iran: A Country Study. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1989), pp. 222-224. 13. Richard Cottam, "Inside Revolutionary Iran," in Ramazani, Iran's Revolution: The Search for Consensus, p. 21.
14. Ayatollah Khomeini's 9 August 1980 speech in Sahife-i Nur, Vol. 12, Tehran: Ministry of Islamic Guidance, January-February 1983, p. 283. Also see Hojatolislam Khamenei's speech on 28 March 1980 in Dar Maktab-e Jom'eh, Vol. 2, Tehran: Ministry of Islamic Guidance, January 1986, p. 87. 15. Sepehr Zabih, The Mossadegh Era. (Chicago, IL: Lakeview Press, 1982), pp. 88-96.
16. Metz, Iran: A Country Study, pp. 222-224.
17. Hojatolislam Rafsanjani has denied Iranian intervention in such affairs. For example, see his 18 December 1981 speech in DarMakaab-e Jome'h, Vol. 4, Tehran: Ministry of Islamic Guidance, Summer 1988, p. 152. 18. Gary Sick, All Fall Down: America's Tragic Encounter with Iran, (New York:
Penguin Books, 1986), pp. 168-169. 19. Sahife-iNur, Vol. 14, p. 194.
20. Middle East Economic Digest (MEED hereafter), 19 July 1986, Vol. 30, No. 29, pp. 4-6. MEED, 2 May 1987, Vol. 31, No. 8, p. 11. Jane's Defence Weekly, 23 July 1988, pp. 126-131.
21. Metz, Iran: A Country Study, pp. 271-278. 22. Sahife-iNur, Vol. 17, pp. 151-155.
23. Washington Post, 26 February 1984, p. A25. 24. V. Komarov, "Reign of Terror Against Patriots," New Times, No. 21, May
1983, pp. 10-11.
25. "Afghan Rebels Describe Training in Iran," Foreign Broadcast Information Service/International Affairs (FBIS hereafter), 1 June 1988, p. 11; "Afghan Resistance Groups, " Defense Journal, Vol. 12, No. 12, 1987, pp. 43-44. 26. MEED, Vol. 30, No. 4, 25 January 1985, p. 5. 27. Sahife-i Nur, Vol 14, p. 155.
28. Hunter, Iran and the World: Continuity in a Revolutionary Decade, p. 59. 29. "Prime Minister Views Elections, U.S. Bullying," Tehran Domestic Service in Persian, FBISlNear East/South Asia, Vol. VmI, 19 April 1984, p. 11. 30. Some also argue that Iran alienated others by its non-discriminatory, harsh, and rigid diplomatic posture (see A. H. H. Abidi, "Iran & Non-Alignment" International Studies, Vol. 20, Nos. 1-2, January-June 1981, p. 357). 31. Washington Post, 27 November 1986, p. A25. 32. For a discussion on the shift toward an accommodating gesture, see Sahife-i Nur, Vol. 19, p. 73.
33. James Bill dates the rapprochement to the recent Iranian attempts to get Westem hostages freed see J. Bill, "The New Iran: Relations with Its Neighbors and the United States," Asian Update, August 1991. 34. "Iran-Soviet Cooperation to Start," Keyhan, 21 February 1985, p. 2. 35. MEED, Vol. 32, No. 47, 9 November 1988, p. 19. 36. On the Soviets' concerns about the impact of revolutionary Islam on their Muslim republics, see "Mullahs, Mujahedin, and the Soviet Muslims," Problems of Communism, November/December 1984, pp. 28-44. 37. Sahife-i Nur, Vol. 19, pp. 72-74.
38. Robin Wright, Sacred Rage, (New York: Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1986) (first published in 1985), p. 277.
39. The Tower Commission Report, The Full Text (Tower Report hereafter), (New York: Bantam Books & Times Books, 1987), p. 40. 40. Ibid., p. 298.
41. "Hashemi-Rafsanjani Cited on U.S. Arms Sale," Paris Agence France Presse in English, FBIS/Near EastISouth Asia, 5 December 1986, p. 12. 42. "Khomeyni Speaks on Disgrace of U.S. Leaders," Domestic Tehran Service in Persian, FBIS/Near East/South Asia, Vol. VIII, 20 November 1986, pp. 11-12. 43. On 20 July 1987, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 598 which called for an immediate cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq war and the release of prisoners of war. For the text of the resolution, see New York Times, 21 July 1987, p. A8.
44. On the International Civil Aviation Organization faulting the U.S. for grave negligence in the July 1988 USS Vincennes downing of an Iran Air passenger aircraft, see "World Aviation Panel Faults U.S. Navy on Downing of Iran Air Jet," New York Times, 4 December 1988, p. A3. 45. At its height, the crisis lasted from February 20, when the EEC members decided to recall their top diplomats from Tehran (New York Times, 21 Febru
ary 1989, p. Al), to 20 March, when EEC foreign ministers agreed that their diplomats could return to Tehran (Washington Post, 21 March 1989, p. A12). 46. Washington Post, 4 June 1989, p. Al. 47. Washington Post, 5 November 1989, p. Al. 48. Washington Post, 7 November 1989, p. A14. 49. New York Times, 8 November 1989, p. A14. 50. New York Times, 3 December 1989, p. A8. 51. For example, see Gary Sick comments at "U.S. Policy Toward Iran: From Containment to Relentless Pursuit?," a symposium organized by the Middle East Policy Council, 25 May 1995. The edited text transcript was printed in Middle East Policy, Vol. IV, Nos.. 1 & 2, Sept 1995, p. 9. 52. Adam Tarock, "U.S.-Iran Relations: Heading for Confrontation?," Third
World Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. 1, March 1996, p. 149. 53. These five American concerns were outlined by Martin Indyk in "Symposium on dual containment: US Policy Toward Iran and Iraq," Middle East Report, Vol 3, No. 1, 1994, pp. 10-26.
54. For the complete text of President Rafsanjani's interview, see Kayhan Havia, 24 May 1995, p. 2.
55. Jo-Anne Hart, "A Spiral of Hostility, US-Iran Relations Since the Revolution," Middle East Insight, Vol. XI, No. 5, July-Aug. 1995, pp. 23-25, especially p. 25.
56. See IMF, Directions of Trade, (Washington, DC: IMF Publications,1994 and 1995).
57. On Germany's foreign policy towards Iran and its differences with American foreign policy, see C. Lane, "Germany New Ostpolitik," Foreign Affairs, vol. 74, no. 6, Nov.-Dec. 1995, p. 77.
58. Reuters news release (Reuters hereafter), 5 August 1996, on America Online
(AO hereafter). 59. Ibid.
60. Reuters, 8 August 1996, AO. 61. Reuters, 6 August 1996, AO. 62. Reuters, 13 August 1996, AO.
63. Nader Entessar, "Iran, Central Asia, and the Caucasus," paper presented at the Fourteen Annual Conference of the Center for Iranian Research and Analysis, Coventry (U.K.), 28-31 March 1996. 64. Wall Street Journal, 11 July 1996, p. 1. 65. Hooshang Amirahmadi, "Iran's Development: Evaluation and Challenges," Third World Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. 1, March 1996, pp. 123-147, especially pp. 144-146.
66. For a comprehensive analysis of Iranian-Arab relations, see Hooshang Amirahmadi and Nader Entessar (eds.), Iran and the Arab World, (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1993).
67. Testimony of CIA Director and Russian Federation Foreign Service Intelligence Report, Hearing of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, 103rd Congress, First Session, 24 February 1993, pp. 51-56 and pp. 97-98.
68. For more information about Iran's nuclear program, see Sharam Chubin, "Does Iran Want Nuclear Weapons?," Survival, Spring 1995, pp. 7-24. 69. Tarock, "U.S.-Iran Relations: Heading for Confrontation?," p. 155. 70. For the effect of inflation on the Iranian economy, see Hamid Zangeneh, "Inflation in Post-Revolution Iran: An Empirical Analysis," paper presented at the Fourteenth Annual Conference of the Centre for Iranian Research and Analysis, Coventry (UK), 28-31 March 1996.
71. Thomas L. McNaugher, "Iran's Military Posture," Middle East Insight, Vol.
XI, No. 5, July-Aug. 1995, pp. 30-32, especially p. 31. 72. Nesta Ramazani, "Women in Iran: The Revolutionary Ebb and Flow," Middle East Journal, Vol. 47, No. 3, 1993, p. 412.
*Assistant Professor for International Relations, University of Central Florida, Orlando, FL 32816-1356.
Copyright Association of Third World Studies, Inc. Spring 1998
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