<DOC>
[105 Senate Hearings]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access]
[DOCID: f:48627.wais]
S. Hrg. 105-620
CRISIS IN SOUTH ASIA: INDIA'S NUCLEAR TESTS; PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR TESTS;
INDIA AND PAKISTAN: WHAT NEXT?
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND
SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MAY 13, JUNE 3 & JULY 13, 1998
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/
senate
48-627 cc U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1998
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
PAUL COVERDELL, Georgia PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming CHARLES S. ROBB, Virginia
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
BILL FRIST, Tennessee PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
James W. Nance, Staff Director
Edwin K. Hall, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas, Chairman
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon CHARLES S. ROBB, Virginia
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
India's Nuclear Tests--May 13, 1998
Ikle, Fred C., Ph.D., Former Director, Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency............................................. 32
Prepared statement........................................... 35
Inderfurth, Hon. Karl F., Assistant Secretary of State for South
Asian Affairs, Accompanied by Robert Einhorn, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for Nonproliferation, Bureau of Political
Military Affairs............................................... 5
Prepared statement........................................... 11
Solarz, Hon. Stephen J., Former U.S. Representative from New York 36
Woolsey, R. James, Former Director, Central Intelligence Agency.. 29
Pakistan's Nuclear Tests--June 3, 1998
Haass, Dr. Richard, Director of Foreign Policy Studies, Brookings
Institution, Former Senior Director, Near East and South Asia,
National Security Council, Washington, D.C..................... 76
Inderfurth, Hon. Karl, Assistant Secretary of State for South
Asian Affairs.................................................. 55
Schneider, Hon. William Jr., President, International Planning
Services, and Former Under Secretary of State for Security
Assistance, Science and Technology, Washington, D.C............ 72
India and Pakistan: What Next?--July 13, 1998
Inderfurth, Hon. Karl F., Assistant Secretary of State for South
Asian Affairs, Accompanied by Robert Einhorn, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for Nonproliferation, Bureau of Political
Military Affairs............................................... 94
Prepared statement........................................... 100
(iii)
CRISIS IN SOUTH ASIA:
INDIA'S NUCLEAR TESTS
----------
WEDNESDAY, MAY 13, 1998
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian
Affairs, Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:05 p.m. in
room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Sam Brownback,
chairman of the subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senators Brownback, Helms, Grams, Hagel, Robb,
Feinstein, and Biden.
Senator Brownback. I would like to go ahead and call the
meeting to order and thank you all for joining us. Good
afternoon. I should begin by saying I believe there is no way
to sugarcoat the events, the shocking events that have occurred
overnight.
The U.S. relationship with India has changed for the worse.
Our Ambassador has been recalled, sanctions have been imposed,
and our relationship that should have been blooming is in
crisis. Monday's, and now today's, developments underscore what
we have known all along, that our relationship with India
cannot be viewed in simply economic or political terms, but
must be evaluated in terms of larger regional security and
nonproliferation matters.
India's renewal of nuclear testing puts nuclear
nonproliferation front and center and is the overriding
bilateral foreign policy concern between the United States and
India today for three reasons. First, not a single nonnuclear
weapons State has overtly tested a nuclear explosive device
since 1974, and that was India that did that in 1974.
Consider also that Russia is helping India build a sea-
launched ballistic missile which will extend India's nuclear
reach beyond Southeast Asia to the world. The new Government of
India, a Government which has been in power less than 2 months,
committed to Ambassador Bill Richardson that there would be no
change in India's strategic posture for the time being.
Indeed, India did all it could to deny the international
community forewarning of these tests, and at this moment the
United States has to ask itself how we can ever trust this
government again.
Second, India's lack of restraint is a signal to the rogues
of this world that they, too, can flout international opinion
and international norms. I commend President Clinton for his
decision to sanction India under the Arms Export Control Act. I
hope that during the coming days at the G-7 meeting he will be
able to prevail on our allies to follow suit and
multilateralize the sanctions. The world must know that the
United States and all other peaceful nations will not tolerate
India's actions.
Third, we must alert India's neighbors to our concerns.
Neither Pakistan nor China should be provoked by India's
irresponsibility. India's neighbors know the terrible
consequences of any nuclear response to India's nuclear
testing. I believe Pakistan is strong enough of a nation unto
itself to avoid being sucked into an insane arms race with
India.
Now, there is a group of historians and thinkers that
believe we are at a point in the cycle of history where we will
see ongoing clashes of civilizations no longer in a bipolar
world of conflict built around government ideologies, that we
are proceeding into a period of history where civilization
centered around different core beliefs enter into cold or even
hot conflicts.
Let us hope and pray and do everything we can to prevent
this from being the case; and let us also prepare if, indeed,
it is the case. Now, to illuminate us on the consequences of
the actions this week taken by the Government of India we have
several excellent witnesses.
We will have two panels that will present the
administration's view, and there will be a significant number
of questions as well of the administration's response, and then
a panel of individuals very familiar with India to look at the
consequences for India, for India-U.S. relationships, and for
relationships throughout the region, and I look forward to
hearing from those panels.
I am very pleased that we have been joined by the chairman
of the committee, Senator Helms, who is with us today; and I
would like to turn to Senator Helms for his opening statement
as well.
Senator Helms. Mr. Chairman, if you will permit me, I would
prefer to yield to the distinguished Ranking Member of the
subcommittee, Mr. Robb, for his statement; and then I will
follow him, if you would.
Senator Brownback. I would be more than happy to. Thank you
for that gracious statement.
Senator Robb, the Ranking Minority Member of the
subcommittee.
Senator Robb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank the
distinguished chairman of the full committee for his courtesy,
and I will be very pleased to proceed.
I would like to join you, Mr. Chairman, in expressing very
serious, indeed, grave concerns about India's decision to
engage in this series of nuclear tests. If Indian officials
believe the decision to test bolsters their international
credibility and enhances national security of their country,
they are wrong. To the contrary, these nuclear tests
destabilize an already fragile subcontinent and undermine
global efforts at nuclear nonproliferation.
The administration has moved swiftly, slapping
comprehensive sanctions on India; and I strongly support these
punitive steps, notwithstanding my longstanding support for
India and my reservation about the utility of sanctions in many
circumstances.
I hope President Clinton will seriously consider as well
canceling his trip to South Asia planned for later in the year,
a trip I had strongly encouraged until this series of nuclear
tests began.
Congress and the executive branch have worked assiduously
in the last few years toward achieving an international
moratorium on testing, culminating in the opening for signature
of the comprehensive test ban treaty in late 1996. Indefinite
extension of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty signified a
commitment by nearly every country in the world to limit the
scourge of nuclear weapons.
India's provocative actions strike a blow against those
important multilateral regimes. Pakistan's Ambassador to the
U.S. stated this week that India's actions show nothing less
than contempt for nuclear nonproliferation generally, and I
share that view.
Nationalistic fervor in India probably underlies the
decision to engage in nuclear testing. It raises a whole series
of concerns in my mind, including whether there will be an
interregnum in the ratification of CTBT by numerous signatory
countries, whether Pakistan and China respond with tests of
their own, with cascading effects to nuclear aspirants like
Iran, the increased likelihood of a conventional Indo-Pak war,
which would be the fourth since 1947, the possibility of either
country shifting from its embryonic nuclear status to overtly
deploying a weapon, accelerating the missile competition
already underway between Islamabad and Delhi and so on.
I have long considered myself a friend of India and enjoyed
a productive working visit to Delhi late last year. In my
meetings with senior Indian officials, including then-Prime
Minister Gujral, I received no hints of plans to move ahead
with testing.
In any event, in my judgment Indian officials have badly
miscalculated the overall effect and strategic implications of
moving forward with their nuclear program. Sadly, they have
moved India closer to being ostracized in the world community
rather than being welcomed as a member of the nuclear club.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today and in
the hope of further understanding Indian motivations and
identifying the new security risk evident in the subcontinent.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I thank you, and I look forward to
hearing first from our distinguished chairman of the full
committee and then from our witnesses.
Senator Brownback. Thank you very much, Senator Robb.
Senator Helms.
Senator Helms. Mr. Chairman, I thank you very much.
Let me begin with a confession. I am absolutely astonished
that the Indian Government was able to catch the U.S.
intelligence capability so sound asleep at the switch,
revealing the stark reality that the administration's 6-year
cosying up to India has been a foolhardy and perilous
substitute for common sense.
A small squadron of Cabinet officers had visited in the
past two years in India; and President Clinton, as has been
mentioned here, had been planning a trip later this year. Even
so, the Indian Government has not shot itself in the foot. Most
likely it shot itself in the head.
By conducting five nuclear tests India made a major
miscalculation, not merely about the United States, but about
India's own capability. The Indian Government has deluded
itself into the absurd assumption that the possession of
nuclear weapons will make India a superpower at a time when
hundreds of millions of India's people are in abject poverty.
The fact is that India is tangled in economic knots.
Disease and misery are rampant, hence the absurd assumption
that a big boom would make them a big power. Not so.
This mentality is not merely dangerous. It is incredible.
But the proliferation of nuclear weapons is certainly no
laughing matter; and, pursuant to the Nuclear Proliferation
Prevention Act of 1994, all manner of U.S. assistance to India,
ranging from foreign aid to U.S. support for India in global
financial institutions has been terminated.
For whatever it is worth, I had hoped that India would
march sensibly and with caution into the 21st century. I have
tried to be a friend to India, but for so long as there is
breath in me, Mr. Chairman, I will never support the lifting of
the Glenn amendments sanctions on India unless they abandon all
nuclear ambitions.
Now, regarding Pakistan in all of this, I understand the
position that Pakistan is in today. They are threatened
politically and militarily, and no doubt the Pakistanis feel
enormous pressure to act; and to Prime Minister Sharif I offer
my advice, for whatever it is worth. This is the moment of
truth for Pakistan as a nation as well.
This is the moment of truth, indeed. Pakistan can be a
partner to the United States in fighting nuclear proliferation,
or it can be a schoolyard rival to India and engage in the
folly of nuclear weapons testing; and I hope Pakistan will
choose to be our partner.
Additionally, Mr. Chairman, India's actions demonstrate
that the components of a test ban treaty from a
nonproliferation standpoint is scarcely more than a sham, and I
hope that the Clinton administration has learned from its
mistakes sufficiently to refuse to allow India to pay for its
actions by signing this CTBT; because I, for one, cannot and
will not agree to any treaty which would legitimize de facto
India's possession of these weapons just so long as they are
not caught further testing them.
The appropriate U.S. response must be vigorous
international sanctions against India to be lifted only after
India's nuclear attack had been rolled back; and mind you,
there are aspects of India's nuclear detonations which are
extremely troubling.
Today's two tests were clearly intended to fall below any
seismic detection threshold, which is a clear indication that
India intended to remain a nuclear power at all costs, which
demonstrates India's intent to exploit the verification
deficiencies of the CTBT by testing new designs in an
undetectable fashion. I will be particularly interested in what
former Director of Central Intelligence Jim Woolsey thinks
about this, because he always comes up with a sound
observation.
Indeed, if the administration plans to pressure India
regarding arms control treaties, it should focus on the nuclear
nonproliferation treaty, Indian ratification of that treaty as
a nonnuclear weapons State; and that will do infinitely more
than Indian ratification of the comprehensive test ban treaty.
We do not need to worry about the Indian nuclear test if India
has agreed not to have these weapons in the first place.
Now then, India's nuclear testing is compelling, additional
evidence pointing to the need for national missile defense to
protect the United States of America and the American people.
Because India has a space launch capability which can readily
be configured as an intercontinental ballistic missile, India's
actions clearly constitute an emerging nuclear threat to the
territory of the United States.
It is high time that the antiquated 1972 antiballistic
missile treaty which prohibits a national missile defense, and
which hamstrings even U.S. theater missile defenses, is
relegated to the ash bins of history.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, India's actions underscore how vital
the U.S. deterrent, nuclear deterrent, is to our national
security. What is needed at this time is not a scramble for an
arms control treaty that prohibits the United States from
guaranteeing the safety of the American people and the
reliability of its nuclear stockpile.
What is needed, Mr. Chairman, in the judgment of this
Senator, is a careful, top-to-bottom review of the state of our
own nuclear infrastructure, and there should be no delay
whatsoever in getting about it.
I thank the chair.
Senator Brownback. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
We now have Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and
South Asian Affairs, Karl Inderfurth, who will testify. With
him is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
Nonproliferation, Bureau of Political Military Affairs, Bob
Einhorn.
And Secretary Inderfurth, when we first set this hearing up
about a month ago we had a different topic in mind. It was
India, but it was about the booming relationship between the
United States and India and where the BJP party might take that
nation. I dare say this week has changed all of that. We have
changed the other panels after you and examine this
relationship, and what should be a growing relationship is in
crisis.
So we look forward to your testimony today, and then there
will be questions, obviously, from members of the committee.
Thank you for joining us.
STATEMENT OF HON. KARL F. INDERFURTH, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
STATE FOR SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS, ACCOMPANIED BY ROBERT EINHORN,
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NONPROLIFERATION,
BUREAU OF POLITICAL MILITARY AFFAIRS
Mr. Inderfurth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Helms,
Senator Robb, members of the committee. I do apologize for not
getting my testimony to you the required 24 hours in advance. I
think this was unavoidable, given the circumstances. I do
apologize.
You have introduced my colleague, Mr. Einhorn, who is our
top nonproliferation expert in the Department, and he has
graciously joined me for the opportunity to address the
committee and answer your questions.
Mr. Chairman, before I begin, I will, with your permission,
read the President's statement this morning that he made in
Germany announcing his decision to invoke sanctions against
India for conducting nuclear tests, and this is what he stated.
The President said:
I think it is important that I make a comment about the
nuclear tests by India. I believe they were unjustifiable. They
clearly create a dangerous new instability in the region and,
as a result, in accordance with the United States law, I have
decided to impose economic sanctions against India.
I have long supported deepening the relations between the
United States and India. This is a deeply disappointing thing
for me personally, but the nuclear tests conducted by India
against the backdrop of 149 nations signing the nuclear
nonproliferation treaty demand an unambiguous response by the
United States. It is important that we make clear our
categorical opposition. We will ask other countries to do the
same.
The President went on to say:
It simply is not necessary for a nation that will soon be
the world's most populous nation, that already has the world's
largest middle class, that has 50 years of vibrant democracy, a
perfectly wonderful country, it is not necessary for them to
manifest national greatness by doing this. It is a terrible
mistake.
I hope that India will instead take a different course now,
and I hope they will adhere without conditions to the
comprehensive test ban treaty; and, as I mentioned to the
Pakistani prime minister, Mr. Sharif, today, I also urge
India's neighbors not to follow the dangerous path India has
taken. It is not necessary to respond to this in kind.
Now, Mr. Chairman, let me return to my statement. As you
noted in your opening remarks, I, too, am deeply disappointed
that I am compelled to deliver testimony that is far different
than you and I had originally envisioned when we began planning
for this hearing. I had hoped and expected to talk about our
efforts to move forward with India across a full range of
issues and to establish a new relationship befitting the size
and strength of our two democracies.
As you know, however, recent events in India have altered
significantly the message that I am delivering today and will
affect far more than just our discussion. These events will
have a significant impact on the substance of our relationship
with India and our overall approach to the South Asia region.
On May 11, 1998, India announced it had conducted three
underground nuclear tests. An official Indian spokesman said
that these detonations occurred simultaneously, about 330 miles
southwest of New Delhi, some 70 miles from the Pakistani
border, at the Pokhran testing facility, the same location
where India conducted its first test in 1974.
On May 13, just this morning, the Indian Government
announced that it had conducted two more tests at Pokhran.
After the first test, the spokesman amplified that the tests
were of a fission device, a low yield device, and thermonuclear
device.
This morning, a spokesman said that two more subkiloton
nuclear tests were carried out. The official Indian spokesman
stated that the first tests were intended, and I quote, ``to
establish that India has a proven capability for a weaponized
nuclear program.''
He added that the government is deeply concerned, as were
previous governments, about the deteriorating nuclear
environment in India's neighborhood, and that these tests
provide reassurance to the people of India that their national
security interests are paramount and will be promoted and
protected.
After the second test, the spokesman said that the tests
have been carried out to generate additional data for improved
computer simulation of designs and for attaining the capability
to carry out some critical elements if considered necessary.
Indian officials in contact with us after the first test
have been more specific. They have cited a variety of issues as
a rationale for testing, all of which, I should add, we firmly
reject as providing sufficient justification for this most
unwise act.
Specifically, they have pointed out two unresolved border
problems with China, the great concern over China's ties with
Pakistan, and to what they view as continuing hostility from
Pakistan and Pakistani support for terrorism in the disputed
territory of Kashmir. We cannot see, Mr. Chairman, how any of
these concerns will be effectively addressed by testing nuclear
weapons.
We have also heard the argument from Indian officials that
Indian military capabilities are no longer respected in the
region and, thus, this series of tests were necessary. We find
that, too, to be unpersuasive as a rationale, despite the
reaction from India itself, where the decision to test has been
greeted almost universally within India with firm support, but
bordering on euphoria.
Mr. Chairman, the international community clearly rejects
India's decision to conduct these tests. Reaction by other
nations has been swift and uniformly negative, and it accords
with the sentiment that you expressed in the resolution that
you introduced last night condemning India's actions.
To give just a flavor of what has been said, Japan, the
largest bilateral donor of economic assistance to India,
denounced the test, urged India to stop development of nuclear
weapons immediately, announced a suspension of grant aid, and
undertook consideration of suspending loans and indicated its
intention to bring the issue before the G-8 meeting in
Birmingham.
China expressed its grave concern, and pointed out the test
would be detrimental to peace and security in South Asia.
Malaysia deplored the action, calling it a setback to
international efforts to ban testing.
Russian President Boris Yeltsin criticized the tests,
saying that India has let us down.
Ukraine invoked the tragic memory of Chernobyl to
underscore its view that the test was unjustified.
Canada's foreign minister called these tests a major, a
very major regressive step backward.
Both Australia and New Zealand have lodged official
protests with India and have recalled their ambassadors.
France voiced its concern, as did Denmark, Sweden, and
Finland.
South Africa, a long-time friend to India and a country
uniquely placed to comment, having given up its own nuclear
program, likewise expressed its deep concern.
United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan expressed his
deep regret and noted that the test was inconsistent with
international norms.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, the reaction of
the United States has been equally swift and determined. I have
already read to you the President's statement from this
morning. Yesterday, the President stated that he was deeply
disturbed by the nuclear test, and that he does not believe
that India's action contributes to building a safer 21st
century.
The President added that this action by India not only
threatens the stability of the region, it directly challenges
the firm international consensus to stop the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction. The President called upon India to
announce that it will conduct no further test, and it will sign
the comprehensive test ban treaty now and without conditions.
The Secretary of State exercised her authority to invoke
Eximbank sanctions and announced that we have recalled
Ambassador Celeste to Washington for consultations.
The President's action today places sanctions against India
pursuant to section 102 of the Arms Export Control Act,
otherwise known as the Glenn amendment.
These actions, which meet the terms that you, Mr. Chairman,
and your colleagues put forth in your resolution, will place
stiff penalties on India and will affect a wide cross-section
of our current activities in India, including development
assistance; military sales and exchanges; trade in specified
dual use goods and technology; U.S. loans, guarantees and
credits to India; loans and credits by U.S. banks to the
Government of India; and support for India within the
international financial institutions.
As this is the first ever instance in which we have invoked
the Glenn amendment, we are still in some respects entering
uncharted territory. We are working hard and will keep you and
your colleagues fully informed as we develop the mechanisms and
procedures for implementing these sanctions.
I am certain that India will soon understand the far-
reaching impact of the President's decision. For instance, our
current level of development assistance to India is
approximately $143 million. By global standards this is not a
particularly large figure, and a substantial portion of it is
PL 480 food debt, for which there is a specific exemption under
the law, but it does represent by far our largest program in
South Asia.
The requirement to oppose loans and assistance in the
international financial institutions could potentially cost
India billions of dollars in desperately needed financing for
infrastructure and other projects.
The prohibition on loans by U.S. banks to the Government of
India and on Exim and OPIC activities could cost hundreds of
millions of dollars, affect projects already approved or in the
pipeline, and could cause major U.S. companies and financial
institutions to rethink entirely their presence and operations
in India.
We are currently in the process of compiling a
comprehensive study of the programs and activities to be
affected, and the implementation process; and we will share
this information with you as soon as it is available.
Mr. Chairman, India's decision to conduct these nuclear
test explosions is a serious violation of international
nonproliferation norms and a repudiation of international
efforts to contain the further spread of nuclear weapons and
pursue nuclear disarmament. This action constitutes a dangerous
precedent for the international nuclear nonproliferation
regime.
India is the only country defined by the NPT as a
nonnuclear weapons state to have tested a nuclear explosive
device now, three times over a 24-year period, twice within the
last 3 days alone.
Clearly, India's nuclear tests are a serious setback. They
highlight the risks associated with the proliferation of
nuclear weapons, and raise the specter of further proliferation
on the subcontinent and in other regions of the world.
But while India's tests have created new challenges for the
international nonproliferation regime, we will continue to seek
ways to create new opportunities. We will use these
developments to call attention to the inherent risks associated
with nuclear weapons proliferation, and to mobilize
international support for all possible steps to guard against
an escalation of confrontation and tension in South Asia.
In announcing its decision to conduct these tests, India
indicated some willingness to show flexibility on a
comprehensive test ban treaty and to participate in a fissile
material cutoff negotiation, although its statements fell far
short of indicating any meaningful commitment to either accord.
In the post test environment we will need to move
energetically to strengthen the global nonproliferation regime
and to take full advantage of any Indian willingness to move
toward acceptance of international nonproliferation norms. In
particular, we will intensify our efforts to achieve entry into
force of the CTBT, to commence negotiations on and complete at
an early date a fissile material cutoff treaty, and to promote
nuclear and missile restraint in South Asia and beyond.
Mr. Chairman, I join the President and the Secretary and,
indeed, the sentiments that you expressed and other members of
the committee in our deep dismay over the recent events. In the
time since I assumed my position as Assistant Secretary for
South Asian Affairs, I have worked hard, in accordance with a
well-considered administration decision, to broaden and deepen
our relations with India and the rest of South Asia, and to
pursue our nonproliferation objectives vigorously within the
context of our overall relationship.
During my most recent trip to India, where I accompanied
Ambassador Richardson and Bruce Riedel from the National
Security Council, we were continuously reassured by the most
senior levels of the new BJP Government that India appreciated
our efforts to strengthen ties, and was looking forward to the
President's scheduled trip and a far-reaching dialog on a vast
array of issues.
At the same time, we were assured privately and publicly
that India would continue to show restraint in the
nonproliferation field, and would do nothing to surprise us.
As a direct result of India's decisions and actions, we are
now compelled to look again at our approach to India. Instead
of highlighting our cooperative efforts with India to promote
trade and investment, to work toward protecting the
environment, halting the spread of AIDS and other infectious
diseases, and to emphasize science and technology cooperation,
we will now need to put much of the cooperative side of our
agenda on hold and deal with the consequences of India's
actions.
We must focus anew on seeking a meaningful Indian
commitment to cease from further testing, to join the
comprehensive test ban treaty immediately and without
qualifications, and to respect other international
nonproliferation norms.
We will need to assess how we will deal with India in
accordance with the Glenn amendment and other U.S. laws which
require sanctions far more restrictive than those placed upon
Pakistan under the Pressler amendment.
Looking ahead, we will need to try to engage India on a
number of issues, aside from the immediate crisis, but I must
caution that India's actions have made such engagement far more
difficult than would otherwise have been the case.
At the same time, we will need to work closely and
cooperatively with Pakistan, whom we judge also to have the
capacity to test a nuclear device, and to show restraint in the
face of India's provocative actions.
Pakistan has the opportunity, now, to take the
statesmanlike course in South Asia and to demonstrate that, as
Chairman Helms said, it is committed to a peaceful future on
the subcontinent. This is, indeed, a moment of truth.
I know that Prime Minister Sharif is committed personally
to improving relations with India and understands that
Pakistan's long-term interests rest on regional stability
through increased cooperation. Although Mr. Sharif's task has
been made significantly more difficult with the events of this
week, we hope very much that he will persevere with the course
he has charted and avoid the temptation to demonstrate a
capability which the world already believes to exist.
Pakistan will earn the gratitude of the international
community and will actually enhance its own security by
following a policy of restraint.
Mr. Chairman, we have arrived at an historic juncture in
our relationship with India. We continue to respect India as a
complex democratic society, and we wish neither to diminish
India's achievements nor underestimate its potential; but we
regret, we deeply regret, that its current leaders believe that
they must detonate nuclear weapons in order to be taken
seriously as a nation.
There are reports from the Indian press which cite gleeful
claims that India has now become the world's sixth superpower,
a fact which is apparent only to those making the claim.
Clearly, the world thinks otherwise.
We deplore India's new tests not only because of the breach
they represent in global nonproliferation policy, but also
because of the harm that it does to India's reputation and
stature. We and, I trust, the international community, still
desire productive and cooperative relations with India; but we
are now forced to move ahead under the burden of these tests
and their inexorable consequences.
The Government of India has chosen to separate itself from
the responsible consensus of the world community on an issue of
critical importance, and we must act accordingly.
Let me end, Mr. Chairman, on a hopeful note, despite this
week's very bad news. Last year we were encouraged by the
resumption of high level dialog between India and Pakistan, and
we were equally encouraged earlier this year when both Prime
Minister Sharif and Prime Minister Vajpayee pledged to go the
extra mile to improve relations between their two countries.
I harbor no illusions about the difficult challenge that
the current environment poses to the resumption of the Indo-
Pakistani dialog, but let me emphasize that the future
prosperity and stability of the region depends upon it and we
remain hopeful that progress can and will be made.
I will now be happy to answer your questions and to hear
your views and recommendations, along with my colleague, Mr.
Einhorn.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Inderfurth follows:]
Statement of Karl F. Inderfurth
Mr. Chairman, before I begin, I will with your permission read the
President's statement this morning in Germany announcing his decision
to invoke sanctions against India for conducting nuclear tests:
Now, Mr. Chairman, let me return to my statement. I am deeply
disappointed that I am compelled to deliver testimony that is far
different than you and I had originally envisioned when we began
planning for this hearing. I had hoped and expected to talk. about our
efforts to move forward with India, across a full range of issues, and
to establish a new relationship befitting the size and strength of our
two democracies. As you know, however, recent events in India have
altered significantly the message that I am delivering today, and will
affect far more than just our discussion. These events will have a
significant impact on the substance of our relationship with India and
our overall approach to the South Asia region.
On May 11, 1998, India announced that it conducted three
underground nuclear tests. An official Indian spokesman said that these
detonations occurred simultaneously, about 330 miles southwest of New
Delhi some 70 miles from the Pakistani border at the Pokhran testing
facility--the same location where India conducted its first test in
1974. On May 13, just this morning, the Indian government announced
that it had conducted two more tests at Pokuran. After the first tests,
the spokesman amplified that the tests were of a fission device, a low-
yield device, and a thermonuclear device. This morning, a spokesman
said that ``two more sub-kiloton nuclear tests were carried out.''
India's Rationale
The official Indian spokesman stated that the first tests were
intended ``to establish that India has a proven capability for a
weaponized nuclear program.'' He added that, ``the Government is deeply
concerned, as were previous Governments, about the deteriorating
nuclear environment in India's neighborhood,'' and that, ``these tests
provide reassurance to the people of India that their national security
interests are paramount and will be promoted and protected.'' After the
second tests, the spokesman said that, ``the tests have been carried
out to generate additional data for improved computer simulation of
designs and for attaining the capability to carry out subcritical
elements, if considered necessary.''
Indian officials, in contacts with us after the first tests, have
been more specific. They have cited a variety of issues as a rationale
for testing--all of which, I should add, we firmly reject as providing
sufficient justification for this most unwise act Specifically, they
have pointed to unresolved border problems with China; to great concern
over China's ties with Pakistan; and to what they view as continuing
hostility from Pakistan and Pakistani support for terrorism in the
disputed territory of Kashmir. We cannot see, Mr. Chairman, how any of
these concerns will be effectively addressed by testing nuclear
weapons. We have also heard the argument from Indian officials that
Indian military capabilities are no longer respected in the region, and
thus these series of tests were necessary. We find that, too, to be
unpersuasive as a rationale, despite the reaction from India itself,
where the decision to test has been greeted almost universally within
India with firm support, bordering on euphoria.
International Response
Mr. Chairman, the international community clearly rejects India's
decision to conduct these tests. Reaction by other nations has been
swift and uniformly negative, and it accords with the sentiment that
you, Mr. Chairman, and your colleagues Senators Feinstein and Glenn
expressed in the resolution that you introduced last night condemning
India's actions. To give just a flavor of what has been said, Japan--
the largest bilateral donor of economic assistance to India--denounced
the tests, urged India to stop development of nuclear weapons
immediately, announced a suspension of grant aid and undertook
consideration of suspending loans, and indicated its intention to bring
the issue before the G-8 meeting in Birmingham. China expressed its
``grave concern,'' and pointed out that the test would be detrimental
to peace and security in South Asia. Malaysia deplored the action,
calling it a setback to international efforts to ban testing. Russian
President Yeltsin criticized the tests, saying that ``India has let us
down.'' Ukraine invoked the tragic memory of Chernobyl to underscore
its view that the test was unjustified. Canada's Foreign Minister
called these tests ``a very major, regressive step backward.'' Both
Australia and New Zealand have lodged official protests with India and
have recalled their Ambassadors. France voiced its concern, as did
Denmark, Sweden, and Finland. South Africa--a long-time friend of India
and a country uniquely placed to comment, having given up its own
nuclear program--likewise expressed its deep concern. United Nations
Secretary General Annan expressed his ``deep regret,'' and noted that
the test was inconsistent with international norms.
U.S. Response
The reaction of the United States has been equally swift and
determined. I have already read to you the President's statement from
this morning. Yesterday, the President stated that he was ``deeply
disturbed by the nuclear tests,'' and that he does not believe that
India's action ``contributes to building a safer 21st century.'' The
President added that ``this action by India not only threatens the
stability of the region, it directly challenges the firm international
consensus to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.''
The President called upon India to ``announce that it will conduct no
further tests, and it will sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty now
and without conditions.'' The Secretary of State exercised her own
authority to invoke EXIM bank sanctions, and announced that we have
recalled Ambassador Celeste to Washington for consultations.
The President's action today places sanctions against India
pursuant to Section 102 of the Arms Export Control Act, otherwise known
as the Glenn Amendment. These sanctions, which meet the terms that you,
Mr. Chairman, and your colleagues put forth in your resolution, will
place stiff penalties on India, and will affect a wide cross-section of
our current activities in India, including development assistance,
military sales and exchanges, trade in specified dual use goods and
technology, U.S. loans, guarantees, and credits to India; loans and
credits by U. S. banks to the government of India; and support for
India within the International Financial Institutions. As this is the
first ever instance in which we have invoked the Glenn amendment, we
are in some respects entering uncharted territory. We are working hard,
and will keep you and your colleagues fully informed, as we develop the
mechanisms and procedures for implementing these sanctions. I am
certain that India will soon understand the far-reaching impact of the
President's decision. For instance, our current level of development
assistance to India is approximately $143 million; by global standards,
this is not a particularly large figure and a substantial portion of it
is PLA8O food aid, for which there is a specific exemption under the
law. But it does represent by far our largest program in South Asia The
requirement to oppose loans and assistance in the International
Financial Institutions could potentially cost India billions of dollars
in desperately needed financing for infrastructure and other projects.
The prohibition on loans by U.S. banks to the government of India and
on EXIM and OPIC activities could cost hundreds of millions of dollars,
affect projects already approved or in the pipeline, and could cause
major U.S. companies and financial institutions to rethink entirely
their presence and operations in India. We are currently in the process
of compiling a comprehensive study of the programs and activities to be
affected and the implementation process, and we will share this
information with you as it is available.
Impact on Nonproliferation Efforts
Mr. Chairman, India's decision to conduct these nuclear test
explosions is a serious violation of international nonproliferation
norms, and a repudiation of international efforts to contain the
further spread of nuclear weapons and pursue nuclear disarmament. This
action constitutes a dangerous precedent for the international nuclear
nonproliferation regime. India is the only country defined by the NPT
as a non-nuclear weapon state to have tested a nuclear explosive
device--now three times over a twenty-four year period, twice within
the past three days alone.
Clearly, India's nuclear tests are a serious setback. They
highlight the risks associated with the proliferation of nuclear
weapons and raise the specter of further proliferation on the
subcontinent and in other regions of the world. But while India's tests
have created new challenges for the international nonproliferation
regime, we will continue to seek ways to create new opportunities. We
will use these developments to call attention to the inherent risks
associated with nuclear weapons proliferation and to mobilize
international support for all possible steps to guard against an
escalation of tension and confrontation in South Asia. In announcing
its decision to conduct these tests, India indicated some willingness
to show flexibility on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and a to
``participate'' in a fissile material cutoff negotiation--although its
statements fell far short of indicating any meaningful commitment to
either accord. In the post-test environment, we will need to move
energetically to strengthen the global nonproliferation regime and to
take full advantage of any Indian willingness to move towards
acceptance of international nonproliferation norms. In particular, we
will intensify our efforts to achieve early entry into force of the
CTBT, to commence negotiations on and complete at an early date a
fissile material cut-off treaty, and to promote nuclear and missile
restraint in South Asia and beyond.
Impact on U.S. Relations
Mr. Chairman, I join the President and the Secretary in my deep
dismay over the recent events. In the time since I assumed my position
as Assistant Secretary for South Asian Affairs, I have worked hard, in
accordance with a well considered administration decision, to broaden
and deepen our ties with India and the rest of South Asia, and to
pursue our non-proliferation objectives vigorously within the context
of our overall relationship. During my most recent trip to India, where
I accompanied Ambassador Richardson and Bruce Riedel from the NSC, we
were continuously reassured by the most senior leaders of the new BJP
government that India appreciated our efforts to strengthen ties, and
was looking forward to the President's scheduled trip and a far-
reaching dialogue on a vast array of issues. At the same time, we were
assured privately and publicly that India would continue to show
restraint in the non-proliferation field, and would do nothing to
surprise us.
As a direct result of India's decisions and actions, we are now
compelled to look again at our approach to India. Instead of
highlighting our cooperative efforts with India to promote trade and
investment, to work towards protecting the environment, halting the
spread of MDS and other infectious diseases, and to emphasize Science
and Technology cooperation, we will now need to put much of the
cooperative side of our agenda on hold and deal with the consequences
of India's actions. We must focus anew on seeking a meaningful Indian
commitment to cease from further testing, to join the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty immediately and without qualifications, and to respect
other international non-proliferation norms. We will need to assess how
we will deal with India in accordance with Glenn Amendment and other
U.S. laws, which require sanctions far more restrictive than those
placed upon Pakistan under the Pressler Amendment. Looking ahead, we
will need to try to engage India on a number of issues aside from the
immediate crisis, but I must caution that India's actions have made
such engagement far more difficult than would otherwise have been the
case.
At the same time, we will need to work closely and cooperatively
with Pakistan, whom we judge also to have the capacity to test a
nuclear device, to show restraint in the face of India's provocative
actions. Pakistan has the opportunity now to take the statesmanlike
course in South Asia and to demonstrate that it is committed to a
peaceful future in the Subcontinent. I know that Prime Minister Sharif
is committed personally to improving relations with India and
understands that Pakistan's long-term interests rest on regional
stability through increased cooperation. Although Mr. Sharif's task has
been made significantly more difficult with the events of this week, we
hope very much that he will persevere with the course he has charted,
and avoid the temptation to demonstrate a capability that the world
already believes to exist. Pakistan will earn the gratitude of the
international community, and will actually enhance its own security, by
following a policy of restraint.
Mr. Chairman, we have arrived at a historic juncture in our
relationship with India. We continue to respect India as a complex,
democratic society, and we wish neither to diminish India's
achievements nor underestimate its potential. But we regret deeply that
its current leaders believe that they must detonate nuclear weapons in
order to be taken seriously as a nation. There are reports from the
Indian press which cite gleeful claims that India has now become the
world's sixth superpower--a fact which is apparent only to those making
the claim. Clearly, the world thinks otherwise. We deplore India's new
tests not only because of the breach they represent in global
nonproliferation policy, but also because of the harm that it does to
India's reputation and stature. We, and I trust the international
community, still desire productive and cooperative relations with
India, but we are now forced to move ahead under the burden of these
tests and their inexorable consequences. The government of India has
chosen to separate itself from the responsible consensus of the world
community on an issue of critical importance, and we must act
accordingly.
Let me end, Mr. Chairman, on a hopeful note despite this week's
very bad news. Last year, we were encouraged by the resumption of high-
level dialogue between India and Pakistan, and we were equally
encouraged earlier this year when both Prime Minister Sharif and Prime
Minister Vajpayee pledged to ``go the extra mile'' to improve relations
between their two countries. I harbor no illusions about the difficult
challenge that the current environment poses to the resumption of Indo-
Pakistani dialogue. But let me emphasize that the future prosperity and
stability of the region depends upon it, and we remain hopeful that
progress can and will be made. I now will be happy to answer your
questions, and to hear your views and recommendations, along with my
colleague, Mr. Einhorn.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Brownback. Thank you very much, Secretary
Inderfurth. We will go back and forth on the committee with 5
minutes for each Member to either make a statement or questions
as we go through the process, if we have somebody run the time
clock so that people can know what time they have.
Secretary Inderfurth, I appreciate your statement. I
certainly agree with your push toward Pakistan and to urge the
Pakistan Government show all restraint possible in this
situation. I think that would be very appropriate.
I want to direct your attention to the need for a
multilateral response, the president's with the G-7 countries.
Now, the U.S. has automatic sanctions that kick in under the
Glenn amendment. I think we all know the history of unilateral
sanctions from the United States being less than a solid
response. I think it is the appropriate thing, but a lot of
times it does not get at what needs to be done.
Will the President be pushing strongly for multilateral
sanctions, and not just that India, say, sign on to the
treaties now, but rather, roll back its nuclear program from
where it has taken it today?
Mr. Inderfurth. Mr. Chairman, I would like to begin with a
response and also ask Mr. Einhorn, because this is very much
his bailiwick at the Department. We recognize this must be
multilateralized.
I my statement I gave to you the reactions of many
Governments around the world, all of whom have made strong
statements about the Indian nuclear test as well as several of
them taking strong actions, including our Japanese friends. We
expect other Governments to be taking similar steps as well
over the days ahead.
We are also working at this time at the United Nations and
the Security Council, where Britain and Sweden have taken a
lead in drawing attention to this, and work is progressing
there in the Security Council, and also the G-8 meeting in
Birmingham will be a further opportunity, so now that we have
made our determination nationally we will be working with
friends in other countries to see what can be done on the
international level.
Senator Brownback. Mr. Inderfurth, I would push, too, that
we not just push for India to sign these treaties, which I
think you will find different Members on this committee finding
of greater or lesser utility, but to roll back their nuclear
program from where they are today, that is our focus and that
is our effort, and I hope the administration takes an
aggressive position to push that, that they eliminate their
stockpiles and their nuclear program altogether.
Mr. Einhorn. Senator, it certainly is our ultimate goal to
have all nonnuclear weapons States join the NPT and give up the
nuclear option. We think it is important to be realistic about
what can be achieved in the near term.
In the near term, the highest priority is to try to put a
lid on the emerging nuclear and missile competition we see
developing in South Asia, so while we fully support your goals,
we have to set our sights on what is achievable, and we think
in the near term what is achievable is to ban all nuclear
testing and ban additional production of unsafeguarded fissile
material, that is, material that can be used to make bombs, and
to constrain missile programs in a variety of ways.
We have to take it a step at a time, and we think this is
the most realizable next step.
Senator Brownback. I appreciate that. I just think that if
we push that they join the CTBT, that this is not a verifiable
step on their part.
Now we have a Government that Ambassador Richardson was
just there 2 weeks ago, that the foreign minister was here very
recently, no clue that this was going to take place, and we did
not know of the two additional nuclear weapon, or nuclear type
of devices that were just exploded.
We were not able to test that or to verify that, and to ask
them to join a treaty that possibly we are not going to be able
to verify their actions, my question is, is there validity to
this treaty?
Mr. Einhorn. Senator, we do believe there is validity to
this treaty. Other administration officials have testified to
that effect and explained the reasons why we believe this
treaty is effectively verifiable and will protect U.S. national
security interest.
We believe it is important for India to join the treaty at
the earliest possible date and, if India does, we believe there
would be very good prospects for Pakistan to follow suit and to
enable this treaty to enter into force, so this recent
development in our view, as unfortunate as it is, could enable
us to generate increased momentum toward entry into force of
this agreement, which we think would be in everyone's best
interest.
Senator Brownback. But Mr. Einhorn, did we know that India
set off these additional two devices within the past 24 hours,
separate from their announcing it?
Mr. Einhorn. Senator, we read the announcement, as you did,
and our analysts are looking at the data now and assessing the
situation, and I do not have any more to say at this point as
they conduct their analysis.
Senator Brownback. We did not know about it ahead of time
on the additional two devices, not the first three, but the
additional two?
Mr. Einhorn. I understand the question.
Senator Brownback. Is that correct?
Mr. Einhorn. I understand the question, but as I say, we
are allowing our analysts to look at the data. I do not have
any further comment on it at this stage.
Senator Brownback. You did not know about it ahead of it
being announced by the Indian Government?
Mr. Einhorn. Again, I would leave it to the analysts to
sift through the data.
Senator Brownback. I understand, but you did not know about
it, did you?
Mr. Einhorn. I personally woke up this morning and I did
not know about it.
Senator Brownback. Neither did the rest of us.
Senator Robb.
Senator Robb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I might add that
I am not sure whether it is going to be an open or a closed
hearing, but there will be a hearing by the Intelligence
Committee tomorrow to look into some of those questions, and I
suspect that whether it is open or closed, that there will be
some announcements at least by the chairman and the vice
chairman about some of the questions that you raise and are
obviously on the minds of many.
Secretary Inderfurth, you indicated, and it was on the news
this morning, that the President had a phone call with Prime
Minister Sharif. Do you know if, in the course of that
conversation, Prime Minister Sharif was able to give President
Clinton any, either guarantee or reassurance that their
response to the testing by India would not be a testing by
Pakistan?
Mr. Inderfurth. He was not able, Senator, to give that
assurance. He told the President that he appreciated his call.
He told the President that he was under tremendous pressure to
respond to the series of tests by India. He said that he would
certainly take into account what the President had said to him.
The President also offered to send to Pakistan a high level
delegation to discuss this further with the prime minister and
other Pakistani officials, and the situation in South Asia as a
result of these tests.
That delegation will be led by Deputy Secretary of State
Strobe Talbott and General Zane. I will take part in that, and
we leave tonight. We hope we will be able to have those
discussions, and we hope that the Pakistani Government and
Prime Minister Sharif will not move ahead with the tests.
Senator Robb. We wish you well. I join the--the chairman
made a comment that I think is very important here, in
suggesting that Pakistan could enhance its stature in the
international community in a very significant way if it is able
to control what would be the natural, emotional reaction by the
people of Pakistan to what is obviously a very provocative act
on behalf of the Indian Government.
I mentioned in my opening statement that I hoped the
President would reconsider his planned trip to India this fall.
Do you happen to know at this point whether any decision has
been made, or whether any advice has been given to him by the
State Department with regard to that particular trip?
Mr. Inderfurth. That reconsideration is underway right now.
I am not in a position to tell you the outcome of that review.
Ambassador Celeste has been recalled. He is back at the
Department. We are discussing that now.
Senator Robb. What kinds of risks might the region, the
international community be subjected to if India were to move
forward beyond the stage that it is engaged with the first five
tests in this series of two groupings of underground testing?
Mr. Inderfurth. I would like to ask Mr. Einhorn to join me.
I will tell you from my standpoint, looking at the overall
relationship, what we are very concerned about is that we have
seen the briefest of hints that these two countries, after 50
years of hostilities and three wars, were beginning to move
away from that.
Last summer at the SAARC summit in the Maldives there was a
handshake between the two prime ministers and they set up a
mechanism at the foreign secretary level to start talking about
all issues. They set up eight different issue areas, the first
being peace and security, which is a way of talking about
nuclear and missile competition, second, Kashmir, which has
been the longstanding dispute between the two countries.
We were hoping that they were moving in that direction,
which is precisely why President Clinton met with the two prime
ministers at the United Nations in September last year to try
to give that very early process a nudge forward.
We are therefore greatly disappointed that rather than
pursuing talks they are pursuing tests, and that is a turn of
events which we think will have significant implications for
the region and for a global nonproliferation regime, but I
would like to ask Mr. Einhorn to discuss that as well.
Mr. Einhorn. The risk involved, Senator, in this testing
activity is that, if either India or Pakistan engages in this
kind of testing activity, the other feels strongly motivated to
follow suit in part for technical and strategic reasons, but in
part because of the strong domestic support to react in kind.
And with this kind of cycle of action and reaction it is
very difficult to break this chain of events and it continues
to escalate, not just in the nuclear area, but almost as
dangerous is you have the efforts by both sides to develop
longer and longer range missile delivery systems, which
increases instability.
Senator Robb. You mentioned domestic reaction. Could you
comment on that? In Secretary Inderfurth's testimony was one of
the most troubling in terms of, I believe you used the word
euphoria. I was following your text as you were delivering it.
Could you comment on the extent of that euphoria and how or
if it was promoted by the Government in any way, shape, or
form, either in immediate anticipation of the tests without an
announcement, or after the tests were completed?
Mr. Inderfurth. Well, it is a nationalistic response to an
achievement, as seen by the Indian people, which demonstrates
scientific and technological prowess. It indicates that India
has stepped onto the world stage, that it can do those things
which only the major powers have been able to do in the past.
We have five declared nuclear weapons States. It is an
indication that India has arrived on the world stage, that it
should be taken seriously, that along with China it is the
important player in Asia. It will become the most populous
nation.
It is all of those things tied together. It is, we think, a
mistake to be seen in those terms. Nuclear weapons do not make
a great power. The principles and values that India has we
think are far more important as a democratic society than the
number of weapons they have of a nuclear variety, but
nevertheless, it has created that reaction and it has probably
been a boost to the Government as opposed to a setback, which
will make our task of convincing them that this was a mistake
that much more difficult.
Senator Robb. Thank you. My time has expired. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
Senator Brownback. Thank you.
Chairman Helms.
Senator Helms. You know, Mr. Inderfurth, one of the sad
things that has not been mentioned, but I have been thinking
about it all day long, is how many Indians of dual citizenship,
U.S. and India, and there has been for several years a
concerted effort by these people with dual citizenship to build
the relationship between the United States and India.
Now, I myself visited with about 1,000 such people, good
citizens who are prominent in business and have--several
medical doctors right here in this area who are leaders in
their particular fields, and they have been working hard to
build this relationship, and I thought this morning when I was
getting dressed that all of this has been wiped out, at least
temporarily, all the work they have done, all the public
relations and all the working together and so forth. I hope
that something can come out of this that will be valuable to
them, and to us.
Now, having said that, it is my view that India at a
minimum must sign the nonproliferation treaty and roll back its
nuclear program completely prior to any lifting of U.S.
sanctions. Do you agree with that?
Mr. Inderfurth. Mr. Chairman, I want to first agree with
what you just said about the Indian-American community, over 1
million Indian-Americans in this country making an enormous
contribution to our society, and I hope that what you said at
least temporarily will prove to be the operative language.
I hope that we can get this relationship back on track. It
is too important to all of us for the future, which is
precisely the theme, if you will, of the President's visit that
had been planned for November, which is to look to our future
relationship for the 21st Century and those areas where we have
so many common interests.
On the question of the NPT and a roll-back, again I would
like to ask Mr. Einhorn to comment, but it is very clear that
significant concrete steps will have to be taken by India
before the administration will ever recommend to Congress any
action with respect to removing the sanctions.
This will be your action. We will have to recommend it, and
I think we have a long way to go before we see concrete steps
by India that would put us in a position of making that
recommendation.
Mr. Einhorn. Mr. Chairman, could I amplify a bit on that,
on Ambassador Inderfurth's answer? We think it is too early to
try to formulate the conditions under which these sanctions
would be terminated. They have just only been imposed today. It
is necessary to let them settle in, and we can begin to measure
their impact, but it is clear, and this was the intention of
the Congress in adopting this legislation, that these sanctions
would be very hard to lift.
In fact, the Glenn amendment does not even provide for the
lifting of sanctions. What you need is new legislation that
enables the administration to terminate, so this is a joint
effort. We need the affirmative action of both Houses of
Congress in order to terminate the sanctions, so you can be
sure that we will be consulting with you and your staffs, and
to figure out what are the appropriate conditions under which
the sanctions would be terminated.
Senator Helms. Well, I would say to you that, speaking only
for myself, this having come up of late, if anything less than
a roll-back happens I hope the administration will tell us that
they agree with some of us that nothing happens about
restoration of our relationship with them.
I am going to yield back the balance of my time so there
can be time for other Senators.
Senator Brownback. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Feinstein.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. May I
ask that my statement be entered into the record, please?
Senator Brownback. Without objection.
[The prepared statement of Senator Feinstein follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Feinstein
Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you for calling today's
hearing. When this hearing was first announced, it was intended to
provide an opportunity to discuss the growing U.S.-Indian trade
relationship, and strategies to give new momentum to what at times has
been a strained political and security relationship.
With the announcement of the three underground nuclear tests
conducted by India on Monday, and the two additional tests today,
however, I believe that we are now faced with the need not merely to
review, but rather to reexamine virtually every aspect of U.S.-Indian
relations. This hearing could not be better timed.
As someone who has considered herself in the past to be a friend of
India, I must say that I am somewhat saddened by this turn of events.
Indeed, freed by the constraints of the Cold War, the past few
years--until Monday--have seen several positive developments in U.S.-
Indian relations. It was my hope that our hearing today would provide
an opportunity to discuss how we could build on this record.
With these tests, however, I fear that U.S.-Indian relations may be
irretrievably damaged.
The three underground nuclear tests on Monday, the two additional
tests today, and the statement by the Indian government that ``[T]hese
tests have established that India has a proven capability for a
weaponized nuclear program'' are, to say the least, deeply troubling
signs for future cooperation and partnership on nuclear and missile
proliferation.
Mr. Chairman, I can hardly think of a more important issue to the
interests of the United States than preventing the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction. Each state that acquires nuclear weapons
creates additional complications in maintaining international security.
In South Asia today it appears to be too late to talk about
preventing the acquisition of nuclear weapons. India has demonstrated
her capabilities, and it is clear to all that Pakistan also has
achieved the capability to assemble nuclear weapons. Both India and
Pakistan are developing sophisticated ballistic missiles which can
deliver nuclear warheads as well.
The international community cannot successfully impose
nonproliferation policies on India. Ultimately, India must determine
for itself that its interests are best served by ridding South Asia of
weapons of mass destruction--and not by turning the region into a
potential nuclear battleground. We must seek ways to work with India to
help it reach that determination, and structure our policies to make
that outcome, even at this stage of the game, more likely.
Yesterday, the Chairman of this Subcommittee, Senator Glenn, and I
introduced a Resolution which expresses our condemnation, in no
uncertain terms, of the decision of the Indian government to conduct
these tests, and calls on the President to impose those sanctions
specified by the Nuclear Proliferation prevention Act of 1994. The
Resolution also calls on India to work to reduce tensions in the
region, and to work with the international community to lessen the
dangers of nuclear war in South Asia. It calls on the other states in
the region to act with restraint.
Earlier today the President announced that he would be implementing
the sanctions called for under the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention
Act. Although I believe that sanctions are sometimes too blunt a tool
to be effective in pursuit of U.S. interests, in this case the law is
clear, the violation is clear, and I applaud the President's actions.
I believe that the United States and India the world's oldest
continuous democracy and the world's most populous democracy--still
have the opportunity for a constructive partnership. Mr. Chairman, I
thank you for calling today's hearing, and I look forward to the
testimony and discussions with our witnesses.
Senator Feinstein. Let me just begin by saying this to both
of the gentlemen in front of us. I think it is well- known that
the two riskiest potential nuclear flashpoints in the world
today are, 1) North Korea and 2) India and Pakistan. North
Korea is being worked on, I hope successfully. So far, so good.
Mr. Einhorn, for whom I have a great respect, you have
briefed me on this situation between India and Pakistan on a
number of occasions now, and I think it is a fairly foregone
conclusion to the world that both these countries have nuclear
capacities and therefore there is extreme danger.
I, for one, think the President has done the right thing.
He has moved forcefully. He has moved rapidly. I would like to
thank him for that.
I would also like to respectfully suggest that the next
step ought to be American leadership in the organization of a
wide international effort at condemnation of this detonation.
Without it, I am afraid all is lost, because it is my deep
belief that this is a political kind of nationalistic effort
more than anything else.
I am very concerned about what Pakistan might do in
response and would be hopeful that Pakistan, whose Government
officials have reassured this country and many of us in
specific, that they have no nuclear intent and no intent on
developing these nuclear materials, would certainly show to the
world that they have not lied to us.
I think we would urge restraint in the strongest of terms
and, Mr. Inderfurth, I think in your comments you put it much
more diplomatically than I would. Pakistan has nothing but to
gain if they are restrained at this point in time, and this
comes from one who has been a longstanding friend of India, who
has tried in my small way to reconcile concerns with prior
Ambassadors to the two countries related to certain problems.
This explosion was a major shock and a major jolt to me. I
do not believe that if the Congress Party were in control this
would have happened, and so my first question to you is, to
what degree do you attribute these nuclear tests to the
domestic political weakness of the BJP Government?
Mr. Inderfurth. Well, I think whether it be domestic
political weakness or domestic political strength, the BJP has
had a long period of time making its way to leading the
Government in India, which it now is doing with Prime Minister
Vajpayee, so it has arrived, and I guess it has signaled its
arrival with these nuclear tests, which is extremely
regrettable.
There is no question that the decision to test had a very
large domestic political content we have also seen in the
statements, and that is why I wanted to read for you the
rationale that the Indian Government gave for the testing.
They see this as their security environment. They point to
China, which has clearly a much larger nuclear and missile
capability. They also point to what they refer to as the other
neighbor, and the concerns it has about its nuclear capability,
but I think that this was largely a domestic political
decision.
The BJP, in statements prior to taking office, had called
for nuclear testing at times, had called for inducting nuclear
weapons at times, had called for declaring formal nuclear
status, so the answer is very much a domestic political
consideration. We are hoping that the restraint that you said
we should call for in the strongest possible terms will be
followed.
I should tell you that in every meeting that I have
attended since taking office, in the meeting with the President
in New York, in the meeting that Secretary Albright had when
she traveled to India and Pakistan in November, in meetings
that Under Secretary Pickering has had in pursuing our
strategic dialog with India, in meetings that we attended with
Ambassador Richardson, we always talked about nuclear
restraint, not to move forward in nuclear programs, and with
the new Government in India we had proposed to both countries a
strategic pause.
As you know, there was a Pakistani missile test just a few
weeks ago. We had been saying, pause. Think about how to
respond to the new political environment before any further
actions are taken. Regrettably, that pause was not adhered to.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you. I have one other quick
question. I see the yellow light. Let me get it out there.
In addition to concerns which have been raised about
India's nuclear weapons potential there has also been concerns
about its development of advanced ballistic missiles. What is
your assessment of the capabilities of the Prithvi and Agni
systems, and what is the status of India's Russian-assisted sea
launch ballistic missile program? Does this program violate the
missile technology control regime?
Mr. Inderfurth. Mr. Einhorn can talk about both Prithvi and
Agni and the sea-launched.
Mr. Einhorn. The Indians have a very active ballistic
missile development program. Its most advanced system is the
short-range Prithvi. The Prithvi comes in three different
versions, a short-range Army version, about 150 kilometers in
range, a longer-range Air Force version, about 250 kilometer
range, and a sea-based version that the Indian defense minister
spoke about several weeks ago.
About 16 flight tests have been carried out of the Prithvi
missile. We do not assess that the Prithvi is operationally
deployed. We believe that the units that have been produced are
still in storage.
As far as the Agni program is concerned, this started out
as what the Indians called the technology demonstrator. They
conducted three flight tests. We would categorize this as a
medium-range ballistic missile. The last flight test was in
1994.
They have not flight-tested since then, but they have
continued to do developmental work on what they now call the
Agni-plus, and there have been official statements by the
Indian Government recently that, especially in the wake of the
Pakistani medium-range ballistic missile test, that the Indian
Government would pursue and even accelerate a follow-on to the
Agni. In other words, they will pursue the Agni-plus program.
India is also working on submarine-based missiles. There is
an Indian plan for a nuclear-powered submarine that would carry
missiles, but the submarine itself is a long way off. It is in
the development stage, and we do not anticipate operational
capability for quite some time.
They are also looking at missiles to be carried on that
submarine, but those, too, we think are a long way off.
Mr. Inderfurth. I think you can see, Senator, why I asked
Mr. Einhorn to join me for this.
Senator Feinstein. Yes. Thank you. Thank you very much.
Senator Brownback. Thank you. Senator Grams.
Senator Grams. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I also
have a statement I would like to submit for the record.
Senator Brownback. Without objection.
[The prepared statement of Senator Grams follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Grams
Mr. Chairman, I share my colleagues' anger and disappointment with
India's decision to conduct three underground nuclear tests near the
Pakistani border on Monday--and two more yesterday in the face of
widespread condemnation. This is obviously a destabilizing development
for South Asia--India has made it clear that these tests were conducted
to establish that India has a proven capability for a weaponized
nuclear program.
The regional Cold War between India and Pakistan, which up until
now has involved the development of missiles with increasing ranges,
could openly escalate to the nuclear realm. The Pakistani Foreign
Minister has already declared ``a headlong arms race,'' promising that
his country would keep pace with India ``in all fields.'' But Pakistan
is not the only country that is directly effected by this latest
development. India's Defense Minister identified China as the principle
military threat to his country, and we must ensure China keeps its
promises and commitments not to transfer nuclear weapons technology to
Pakistan.
While the geopolitical ramifications of India's actions must be
considered, I am particularly concerned about the failure of the
Administration to detect that these tests were about to occur. It's
hard to believe that our intelligence services were unable to detect
the preparations for tests on this scale--not once, but twice. The
possibility that India would take this path should have been on this
Administration's radar screen. Pakistan test-fired a missile capable of
carrying nuclear warheads that it claims has a range of nearly 1,000
miles. We should have expected that India would counter with such a
response.
Both the campaign platform and the stated agenda of the newly
elected Hindu nationalist party promised to ``exercise the option to
induct nuclear weapons.'' The nuclear tests were conducted at the same
site and on the same festival day as India's 1974 test. clearly, this
had symbolic importance for a nationalist party. Pakistan warned our
government last month about India's intentions So when a U.S. satellite
clearly depicted activity last week at the ``wellheads'' where devices
were ultimately detonated, I find it incredible that our analysts were
not put on alert, and were asleep in their beds when the tests
occurred.
Senator Grams. Thank you very much, gentlemen, for being
here today. While the geopolitical ramifications of India's
actions need to be considered, I am particularly concerned
about the failure of the administration to be able to detect
that these tests were about to occur.
I find it hard to believe that our intelligence services
were unable to detect the preparations for these tests not
once, but twice. The possibility that India would take this
path should have been on the administration's radar screen.
As you mentioned, Mr. Inderfurth, there was a test by
Pakistan just a couple of weeks ago of a missile with a range
of nearly 1,000 miles, and maybe we should have expected this
type of a response. In a letter to the President the Indian
prime minister stated that China's aid to Pakistan has helped
Pakistan become a covert nuclear weapons State.
I do not want to justify the actions by India this week at
all, but Congress has repeatedly called on the administration
to address this very concern. Is the administration willing to
step up to the plate and confront the proliferation of missile
and nuclear technology to Pakistan as well?
Mr. Inderfurth. Again, Mr. Einhorn--but I would say that
only in terms of the possibility of this. We were quite aware
of the possibility that there would be further steps by both
Governments in the nuclear missile field. We have been watching
that very carefully.
That is why, as I mentioned in the earlier response, we
have been raising it at every opportunity from the prime
minister, to the foreign secretaries, to the defense ministers,
in each of our meetings urging there to be no further steps.
The fact is, this could get worse, much worse, before it
gets better. They have not deployed nuclear-capable missiles.
They have certainly not exported nuclear missile technology
beyond their borders, India or Pakistan, and so there are a
number of things which could take place which would make this
situation even worse than it is today, so we have been
following it closely.
We think your questions about what we knew and when are the
right questions. I am afraid you have the wrong witnesses to
answer those questions, but I am sure you will pursue that.
But I would like Mr. Einhorn to say about the other
question.
Mr. Einhorn. Senator, the reality is that there is a lot of
momentum in the strategic programs, including the ballistic
missile programs of both India and Pakistan. I think it would
be in the interests of both of those countries to curb this
momentum and to put a lid on these strategic capabilities.
In terms of the U.S. effort, as Ambassador Inderfurth has
pointed out, we put a very high priority in trying to promote
restraint in the ballistic missile capabilities of both sides,
and I can say without fear of contradiction I believe that if
it had not been for the persistent efforts of the U.S.
Governments these missile programs would be much farther
advanced than they are now. I would suspect we would see
missiles operationally deployed today.
Because of U.S. efforts with other supplier Governments,
our multilateral efforts to constrain the export of missile
technology, we believe we have managed to inhibit these
programs because to varying degrees they depend on external
sources of supply, the Pakistani program more than the Indian
program.
Senator Grams. Despite the sanctions by the U.S. and world
condemnation, it appears both countries, Pakistan and India,
feel that it is in their best interest to continue to move
forward with these type of programs. Mr. Inderfurth, you
mentioned that the President placed a personal call to
Pakistan. Aside from threatening to impose the sanctions on
Pakistan that are now being applied to India, is there anything
else the administration is doing now to convince Pakistan that
it is not in its best interests to continue to pursue or
escalate its nuclear program?
Mr. Inderfurth. I mentioned the President offered to send a
high level delegation to Pakistan, which will depart this
evening. I think we have to try to make our way through the
next several days in terms of a possible Pakistani response and
to see where we are.
We will make the point that a test by Pakistan will bring
about the same sanctions on Pakistan that we have now placed on
India and, quite frankly, because of the already existing
Pressler amendment sanctions on Pakistan, these will be very,
very significant for Pakistan to have these sanctions placed
upon that country.
So we also--as I mentioned, we are working with others at
the United Nations and the G-8 as well as going out to other
capitals to see what can be done. We think right now the
international community is responding in a very unified fashion
to this. We want to see, as I think everyone wants to see, not
only words but actions. I think that is our primary focus.
The more fundamental issue is, why are they pursuing these
programs, which we in the international community find to be so
mistaken? It is because of their history.
It is because of 50 years of hostility going back--and this
is the fiftieth anniversary of both countries. One only has to
read about those early days of partition, what happened there,
and the lingering historical problems that that has created, to
understand something of why they feel compelled to move ahead
in these programs, including for India with the Chinese
program.
It is through those countries resolving their differences
themselves and lowering their own view of the threat that they
pose to each other that we will see a rolling back and
hopefully an elimination of their nuclear and missile
capabilities.
Senator Grams. Mr. Chairman, I have just a parting comment
about the bilateral sanctions. I think it is very important
that we get our allies or other world members to condemn this
as well. Is that something the administration also is working
on very hard right now?
Mr. Inderfurth. We are very much working on--in our
discussions with other Governments either bilaterally or
multilaterally we are working in that direction.
But I will also tell you, as a case study in sanctions,
there are 28 F-16's that are still sitting out in the desert
which have gone nowhere that have already been paid for by the
Pakistani Government and, despite their feeling that they have
fallen further and further behind on the conventional side,
they will not budge on their nuclear program to see those
aircraft released.
So sanctions can work to a point, but national security
considerations by countries will often override even the
harshest of sanctions.
Senator Brownback. Senator Biden.
Senator Biden. Thank you very much. Gentlemen, let me begin
where you just left off, Mr. Secretary.
You said until the mutual threat is perceived to have
diminished, you are not likely to see a rolling back of any of
these programs. I think that is what you said, the essence of
what you said. I think you are right, if that is what you said.
If you did not say it, you should have said it. It is a good
idea.
Mr. Inderfurth. We said we can have some impact.
Senator Biden. I agree with you completely, and I would
like to ask unanimous consent, Mr. Chairman, that my opening
statement be placed in the record, if I may.
Senator Brownback. Without objection.
[The prepared statement of Senator Biden follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Biden
Mr. Chairman, this has not been a good week for nonproliferation.
India's five nuclear detonations have reminded us in the most dramatic
terms of the continuing perils of nuclear weapons proliferation.
One would have hoped that the international outcry after Monday's
tests would have convinced the Indian government to behave more
responsibly. Instead, India has effectively thumbed its nose at the
international community by conducting two additional tests this
morning.
These tests are sure to alter fundamentally the U.S.-India
relationship which had begun to blossom in recent years after a lengthy
chill.
It is difficult to see what benefits India derives from its
irresponsible actions.
As required by law, the President has imposed sweeping sanctions on
India. Other important donor nations such as Japan and Germany have
also taken punitive economic steps.
These measures and others promise to set back an economy that has
only recently begun to show signs of improvement.
India's claim to global leadership and its bid for a United Nations
Security Council seat will certainly suffer because of an act that so
clearly violates an international norm.
If India thought that demonstrating its nuclear know-how would
enhance its prestige, it thought wrong. These tests have stained
India's reputation as a responsible member of the international
community.
It seems, Mr. Chairman, that a weak, minority government in India
has thrown good international citizenship by the wayside for the narrow
calculations of domestic political advantage.
Mr. Chairman, let me outline a series of steps that I think are
important at this point.
First, preventing a Pakistani test should be our top priority.
Pakistan faces enormous domestic pressure to respond in-kind. I commend
the President for engaging Pakistan at the highest levels.
The imposition of sanctions on India should be seen as an important
signal to Pakistan. But disincentives may not be enough for a country
that is already under a stiff sanctions regime for its own nuclear
weapons activities. It may also be necessary to consider extending
security assurances to Pakistan in order to dissuade it from conducting
its own tests.
Second, we need to coordinate our actions with key donor countries
and step up the pressure so that India will cease and desist from
further testing. If India is truly committed to promoting international
security it should immediately and unconditionally sign the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Third, we should talk to China to ease any anxiety in Beijing.
Recent comments by India's Defense Minister that China was his
country's number one security threat created tensions between the two
Asian giants. It is vital for Asian security that Sino-Indian relations
not deteriorate.
Fourth, we should step up our efforts to curtail missile
development in South Asia.
Fifth, and finally, we need to increase diplomacy to address the
underlying sources of tension in South Asia.
Mr. Chairman, in spite of our justifiable outrage at this moment, I
think it is important to keep in mind our long-term strategic
interests. We also need to make distinctions. Despite its grave
miscalculation this week, India is not a rogue state. It is not a
Libya, a North Korea, or an Iraq. It is the world's largest democracy
and it is a country with which we share much in common.
It is a country with which we should have good relations. But these
tests will make a better relationship much more difficult.
India should pay a steep price for its irresponsible acts, lest we
encourage others to follow the Indian example.
But a nation of India's size, importance, and stature cannot be
isolated forever. We will have to engage India. India can hasten that,
but only if it undoes some of the damage it has done. It can do that by
signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty immediately and without conditions.
Finally, Mr. Chairman let me conclude by echoing comments President
Clinton made this morning in Germany. India did not need to conduct
these tests in order to be considered a great country. It already is.
I only hope that it realizes this soon and comes to its senses.
Senator Biden. This is a big problem, and big problems
require big ideas, and we need a new idea. I support sanctions.
I think they are the only alternative available at the moment,
but you do not have to be--no pun intended--a rocket scientist
here to figure out that you can trace India's nuclear program
back to getting drubbed and humiliated in 1962 by China.
You do not have to be a rocket scientist to understand
Pakistan's lack of confidence when it is out numbered 100
million to a billion, roughly, in terms of population.
All you have to be is a plain old politician, an honest
politician in the Democratic or Republican Party of the United
States, to understand that when you have a real problem of
putting together a majority, the one thing that unifies a
country, that moves you from a minority position to a majority
mode, is to do something that your whole country is going to
rally around.
I do not think you have to be real smart to figure out what
that is. That may not have been the objective, but I would be
dumbfounded if that was not the objective. They are dumber
politicians than in most countries if that was not the
rationale, because why would you risk going from being a good
international neighbor to being a temporary and maybe long-term
pariah? Well, the answer is real simple: solidification of your
political position at home.
I do not know many international leaders who have concluded
that it is better to lose support at home in order to gain the
international recognition, rather than have it at home, even if
it is against your long-term interest. We have even seen that
in America once in a while.
So that all leads me to a couple of questions that I have
not resolved in my own mind because, to be honest with you, I
have been thinking in the traditional box that we have been
operating in, in terms of how we deal with India, Pakistan,
China, actually South Asia generally.
Afterall, it has always kind of worked. There is a whole
fiction associated with all of this. It is what we don't want
to acknowledge, that there are those other countries that have
nuclear capability. We all know they have it, but if they
acknowledge it and we bring them in, then somehow we are
encouraging other folks, the argument goes, to think they need
not pay a price for seeking nuclear capacity and capability. We
already know the countries that have the nuclear capacity and
capability. We can name the countries.
So I have two questions. Actually, three, and you might not
get a chance to answer all three. The first one is, has there
been any discussion--I am sure there has been no decision--
about whether or not there is a way in which the international
community, we being part of it, could essentially become some
form of a guarantor for Pakistani security in return for them
acting appropriately from our perspective--that is, not
testing, not matching, not dealing with India's tests? The
irony is that Senator Helms, I think, has been right about
this, although I think he is wrong on the test ban treaty, by
pointing out he was one of the ones hollering the longest and
loudest about China's sale of M-9 and M-11 technology to
Pakistan. I cannot believe that has not significantly impacted
upon the attitude in India about whether or not they should be
doing what they are doing now. I think China is the bigger
deal, but I cannot believe this does not feed on concern over
Pakistan, and there has got to be something to a tourniquet
here. Has anyone thought about or discussed the possibility of
guarantee for Pakistani security relative to India? Now,
granted, that then raises guarantees to India against China,
but Pakistan is where we are now.
The second question, and maybe you can answer them all at
the same time, is that one of the most imaginative guys I ever
served with is a guy who is going to testify next, Mr. Solarz,
and he is going to make a proposal, as I understand it, that
essentially says, hey, look, we know who they are. Let us bring
them in.
Now, regarding various countries, in this case particularly
Pakistan and India, we could bring them both in, get them to
sign the test ban treaty, get them to sign the nuclear
nonproliferation treaty, acknowledge them as nuclear powers,
and lock it down and be done with it, because South Asia is a
particularly unique circumstance.
You may not want to answer either of those, because I
realize this is pretty short notice, but do you have any
thoughts, even if there is no discussion now? What do you think
about those two notions? I have not made up my mind on them,
but it seems like we have got to move out of the traditional
box here to figure out how to deal with this.
Mr. Inderfurth. Senator, I think we do have to move out of
the traditional box. Quite frankly, we have tried that in a
traditional way, if you will, over the last several months by
trying to place our concerns about nuclear and missile
competition in the context of our broader relationship, tried
to make it clear that the United States has an interest in the
region that goes beyond the fact that they have fought three
wars and the fact that they have a nuclear capability.
We have been trying to focus on the economic dimension to
the relationship. With economic reforms in India in 1991, this
country is one of the big emerging markets.
Senator Biden. Beyond that, India is not China. It is a
democracy. This is a country that in the middle of the next
century is going to have a larger population than China if the
rates continue.
Mr. Inderfurth. And that is precisely why we have wanted to
establish a new relationship with India so they did not think
that the only thing we talked to them about was their nuclear
missile program, so we have tried to place in the context of
all of these things, hoping that they would almost sort of have
a drag effect, if you know auto racing, pulling things along.
We are now at a point that has not been a productive
approach with Pakistan. We also want to broaden that
relationship. With the end of the cold war and the end of the
Soviet occupation of Afghanistan we are trying to build a
relationship with Pakistan for the future that is not going to
be the one we had in the past, but we need new ideas, because
quite frankly they keep coming back.
We are now back in that box. We are now back in the
traditional box, and whether it be guarantees for Pakistani
security, or whether it be items that Congressman Solarz has
talked to me about as well, about bringing them in, these are
things that we I think will have to look at, because I also do
not believe that sanctions in and of themselves will bring
these countries around where we would like them to be. They are
necessary, but I do not believe they will be sufficient for
that purpose.
Senator Biden. As a technical point, the test ban treaty
does not speak to whether a country is nuclear or not, and were
India to agree to cease further testing, it seems to me, all by
itself, that would be a good idea, and so I disagree with
Senator Helms about the test ban treaty.
Mr. Einhorn. Senator Biden, that would be a good idea, also
agreeing on a commitment not to produce more unsafeguarded
nuclear material, so-called fissile material. Cutoff would be a
good idea, even though it does not go all the way in giving up
these nuclear options.
Let me just say, the traditional approaches to
nonproliferation in South Asia have helped. They have slowed
things down. They have complicated these programs.
Senator Biden. I am not criticizing.
Mr. Einhorn. I accept the premise, though, that these
traditional approaches have not succeeded. Clearly, this week
demonstrates they have not succeeded. We need to think outside
the box.
On the two ideas you mentioned, the first one I am not
going to comment on much, the question of security guarantees
to countries in South Asia. You all have come through a debate
on the expansion of the North Atlantic Alliance, where solemn
guarantees were extended. This is always a tricky matter.
Senator Biden. I agree. It is a big deal.
Mr. Einhorn. It takes a lot of careful thought.
On the more specific question, I have not seen Congressman
Solarz' suggestion. You mentioned, I think, what if----
Senator Biden. On what subject? [Laughter.]
Senator Brownback. If we could, we are going to need to
wrap this up. Senator Feinstein has one final question and
quite an excellent resolution that I would recommend for a lot
of Members to look at that I am cosponsoring on this issue.
And if we could, then I would like to go to the next panel.
Senator Feinstein. Just a final question that I did not get
an answer to was when I was talking about the missile programs
and you mentioned the submarine sea launch program. Do any of
these programs violate the MTCR?
Mr. Einhorn. The programs themselves do not violate the
MTCR, which has to do with importing or exporting goods and
technology. The question is whether any of the transactions
themselves have to do with it. For India, most of these
programs really are indigenous, very little outside assistance
at this stage.
We have raised questions about Russian cooperation, the
cooperation of certain Russian entities with the submarine
missile.
Senator Feinstein. Yes. This would be the one, the Russian
contributions to these programs.
Mr. Einhorn. This is what we are exploring. We are
exploring that now with the Russian Government. As you know, we
have been dealing with the Russians on missile technology
exports to Iran on a very intensive basis, but we also need to
talk about India.
Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much.
Senator Brownback. Thank you very much, and we may have
some additional written questions. We would appreciate it if
you could get back to us in a timely fashion, and any
statements any people want to put in will be included in the
record as well for the witnesses that testified.
I would particularly be interested in some of the dual use
technology that has flowed to India recently, in looking at
that, and also further into the future use of dual use
technology.
So I thank the panel very much. I appreciate you coming
here.
I thank the panel. I am sure we will have further
discussions.
Response to Additional Question Submitted for the Record by Senator
Thomas to Secretary Inderfurth
Question. One of the functions of the Indo-U.S. Economic
Subcommission, chaired on the U.S. side by Undersecretary Eizenstat, is
to address major policy issues that affect the bilateral realtionship.
In this regard, what steps is the State Department considering in
response to the two and one half year Indian embargo on U.S. soda ash,
one of this country's largest chemical exports.
The September, 1996, Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices
Commission injunction, which was requested by India's monopolistic soda
ash producers, remains in place. This highly protectionist and
anticompetitive action was taken by the local producers shortly after
the Indian Government reduced the import tariff on soda ash and after
one U.S. shipment entered the country. If the Commission's action isn't
onverturned, not only will tens of millions of dollars in U.S. soda ash
exports be lost but other Indian industries will see this as a
successful blueprint for circumventing new trade liberalization reforms
to keep out U.S. goods.
Answer. Following the decision by the Government of India in May,
1998, to test nuclear devices, the U.S. government implemented
Congressionally-mandated seanctions affecting our bilateral exonomic
relationship. The sanctionsresulted in indefinite postponement of the
next meeting of the Indo-U.S. Subcommission of Economic and Commercial
Affairs which had been planned for July, 1998, in New Delhi.
The Departments of State and Commerce and the Office of the U.S.
Trade Representative have and will continue to place the resolution of
the soda ash embargo at the top of our trade agenda notwithstanding
India's decision to test and the resulting change in our economic and
commercial relations. Most recently, Ambassador Celeste met with Indian
Minister of Industry Sikander Bakht on June 22 and forcefully raised
the soda ash issue. In a May 29, 1998 letter to Indian Minister of
Commerce Hegde, Ambassador Barshefsky stated that ``the facts in the
Soda Ash case demonstrate forcefully that there is no basis for the
Indian industry allegation of predatory pricing or for the Indian
Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Commission (MRTPC)
injunction, and that the Indian producers have sought this avenue of
restriction in the absence of being able to quialify for WTO-compatible
relief * * * I request your assistance in obtaining immediate relief
from the preliminary injunction and expeditious and objective review by
the MRTPC of the facts of the American Natural Soda Ash Corporation
petition.''
I now call up the next panel: the Hon. James Woolsey,
former Director, Central Intelligence Agency. The second
presenter will be Dr. Fred Ikle, former Director, U.S. Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency. And the final witness will be
the Hon. Stephen J. Solarz, the former U.S. representative from
New York and the former Chairman of the Subcommittee on Asian
and Pacific Affairs for the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.
Gentlemen, we very much appreciate you joining us today.
What I will do is I think run a time clock on 7 minutes, if you
do not mind, so that you can see how much time you have got
pending up here. I will not hold you too much to it, but do not
push me too much either, if you would not mind, so that we
could have your testimony and then go to a series of questions.
I appreciate you joining us on such short notice, Mr.
Woolsey.
STATEMENT OF R. JAMES WOOLSEY, FORMER DIRECTOR, CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Mr. Woolsey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I appreciate the
opportunity. If it is all right, I will, for the second time
this spring, speak extemporaneously under the circumstances.
Senator Brownback. That would be fine.
Mr. Woolsey. There are two points to make, I think, with
respect to the Indian test. First, their substantive effect;
and, second, the issue about warning and the role of
intelligence.
With respect to the substantive effect, clearly this was a
major and very negative development. Mr. Chairman, your opening
statement, I think, said it well in addressing the key issues.
It pushes the world toward proliferation and toward an arms
race in South Asia. I am glad that the President promptly
invoked sanctions.
We have been treated for some decades now to Indian
Government officials and diplomats dining out by striking very
moralistic stances with respect to the United States and a
number of other countries on weapons issues. And I believe that
memory, plus the fact that the world really expects something
better from Mahatma Gandhi's nation, adds a certain particular
poignancy and feeling of betrayal, essentially, to the world's
reaction to what India has done here.
Clearly, the impact on Pakistan and its possible move
toward nuclear testing is salient. My own view is that Iraq and
North Korea are likely to do whatever they are going to do
anyway and are not too likely to be affected by this. Over the
long run, Iran, however, may learn some lessons about how to
move into the nuclear club from India's tactics. And all of
these effects are ones that we should be concerned about.
The Speaker of the House appointed me to a commission
chaired by Don Rumsfeld that reports in July on ballistic
missile threats to the United States. And I am sure the issues
that are raised by these Indian tests, as well as the many
other things we are studying, will be more fully explained to
the Congress then. But it is, I think, important to note, as
the Wall Street Journal did today, that India was, in this
matter, taking a leaf from the book that was written by France
and China in 1995 and 1996. This did not come out of nowhere.
Ultimately, one of the serious problems, I believe, is
going to be the encouragement, directly and indirectly, of
other countries to move in the nuclear direction. That means
more fissionable material in the world. That means the
possibility of nations and also terrorist groups finding it
easier to get their hands on nuclear materials for weapons.
Part of the lesson here, I think, for the United States is
that to some extent weakness begets weakness. We have not taken
a strong stance up until the last two days or so with respect
to Indian proliferation, just as we have, I think, been too
weak with respect to dealing with Russia's aid to Iran, China's
aid to Pakistan, and others. And we signed on to an agreement
with North Korea that, although on balance probably was the
best we could have done, nonetheless led many in the world to
believe that a vigorous nuclear program could get you some
substantial benefits from the West.
I have testified before, before you, Mr. Chairman, on what
I have termed our flaccid and feckless policy toward Iraq since
1991, and I will not burden these hearings with any further
description of that.
So, substantively, I think we have a very negative
development. Part of it we can understand from South Asian
history. Part of it we can understand from some of our own
steps over the course of the last several years.
Let me turn to the issue of warning and the role of the
intelligence community about this particular event. You should
always divide warning into two parts. Fred Ikle will talk about
it in terms of strategic and tactical. One could talk about it
in terms of long term and short term. But long-term or
strategic warning is often given in rather vague indications,
which look clear when you look back with 20/20 hindsight. But,
nonetheless, if you assess it accurately, when you think you
should have had strategic warning events should have put you at
least on notice that something was likely to happen.
Here--and I want to stress this--the elements of strategic
warning with respect to what this Indian Government might do
were not matters of subtlety, not matters only available to the
intelligence community. Insofar as there has been a failure of
the U.S. Government or anyone else to understand what direction
the BJP might take, it is a failure of academics, of think
tanks, of the press--if I may say so--of the Congress, of the
executive branch as a whole, and is not just an intelligence
failure, per se.
The BJP has a platform which quite clearly issued a blast
at what they called nuclear apartheid. When Mr. Vajpayee was
Prime Minister-designate in mid-March he stated publicly that
he was not at all worried about American annoyance about
nuclear proliferation. The Economist magazine, one of my
favorites, on March 28th ran a lead article on India as a
nuclear power, and included the following:
What cause would be served by setting off a nuclear chain
reaction? The answer lies in the weakness of India's
Government. The new coalition will be fractious. With the
nuclear issues popular with voters, proud of India's
technological prowess, building nuclear weapons could be one of
the few policies the coalition can agree on, and thus the
easiest way for the BJP to trumpet its Hindu nationalist pride.
Another issue which should have given us all some strategic
warning is that the Indian Government has for many months, back
before the BJP became the governing party, been maintaining
their nuclear weapons test facility in a very high state of
readiness. They probably learned--in late 1995, early 1996,
when we protested--what we knew about their test program, and
decided to bring the test range up to a state such that they
could test with very, very little advance warning.
They probably learned something about our own
reconnaissance satellite capabilities by the way in which we
delivered our demarche. This often happens. I have had
demarches delivered over my objections when I was DCI. And, if
I am to be fully honest about this, I would have to admit that
I have delivered remonstrances to Soviet diplomats when I was
an arms control negotiator that disclosed indirectly
information from reconnaissance satellites; I did this when
Washington approved it, but I knew there was a debate in
Washington about whether or not it was a good idea. So I have
been on both sides of this argument. It is a natural tension.
But it is important to realize that insofar as we go around
delivering demarches to the world on what they should and
should not do, almost always the information comes from
intelligence, and it therefore reveals something about
intelligence sources and methods. It is also, I think, clear
that over the course of the last several years, beginning in
the late 1980's, the beginning of the nineties, we have been
through inflation, principally, cutting the intelligence budget
substantially.
I said when I was DCI that the number of reconnaissance
satellites were unfortunately going to have to be cut in about
half during the 1990's. I had many debates with Senator
Shelby's predecessor once removed, Senator DeConcini, about
cuts in reconnaissance satellite programs, which I did not
believe were wise. And reconnaissance satellites are a bit like
aircraft carriers. No matter how capable they are, if you go
from a large number to a small number, no one of them can be in
two places at once.
So, the fact that the intelligence community did not detect
the immediate event within a day or so of--when the Indians
were probably giving some type of last-minute indication that
they were going to do something on the range--I think should
not be particularly surprising. It is unfortunate, but we all
had some degree of strategic warning. If the intelligence
community had been tweaked to be watching specifically that
test range, day in, day out, 24 hours a day, they might have
given the government another day or so of warning.
My hunch is that would not have been enough time for the
United States to have dissuaded the BJP from the course of
action it was embarked on, certainly given the strength of its
position. It would have prevented a lot of people in Washington
from being embarrassed by having the announcement made by India
rather than by the U.S. Government, but that is a somewhat
different matter.
Let me close, Mr. Chairman--I know I am over time--with one
point that I know was of interest to Senator Helms. With
respect to these two most recent tests announced by the Indians
to be of sub-kiloton yield, it is important to realize that
once one gets down in the range of a kiloton, and certainly
below, the capacity to verify detonations from afar is limited
in the extreme--almost, I would say, to the vanishing point,
particularly if those detonations underground are isolated from
the Earth by taking place in caverns, either natural or
artificial--as it is called ``decoupled'' from the surrounding
geology.
Under those circumstances, seismic signals are really
virtually nonexistent that could distinguish these types of
low-yield detonations from normal seismic events. Consequently,
as one is thinking about a comprehensive test ban treaty with
an absolutely zero yield limitation--not a ton, not 20 tons,
not 100 tons, but zero nuclear yield is permissible under the
CTBT as negotiated--one has to realize that law-abiding nations
will of course, if they sign and ratify it, go along with it
and behave themselves under such a regime. But nations that are
willing to cut corners, whether it is India or any others, in
my judgment, would probably find it quite easy to have sub-
kiloton-yield detonations in secret, even after they have
signed a CTBT.
So if that should occur at some time in the future, I would
simply like to suggest to the committee that the cause will not
be an intelligence failure.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Brownback. Thank you very much, Mr. Woolsey. And I
look forward to some good questioning. And thank you for your
statement, and on short notice. Dr. Ikle, thank you for joining
us.
STATEMENT OF FRED C. IKLE, PH.D., FORMER DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL
AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
Dr. Ikle. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for inviting me.
I would like to draw some lessons from this experience we
are talking about today. My first one relates to intelligence.
I think Mr. Woolsey made the point so well I shall skip over
that essentially to save time, except to put down the other
side of the coin of strategic intelligence. As we gnash our
teeth and castigate the poor intelligence community for not
having given us tactical warning to make us feel better, we
should remind ourselves--Congress, the public--that we have a
lot of strategic warning about things for which we are not
making the effort properly to prepare ourselves.
What comes to mind here, just to mention one example, is
the many warnings about the loose nukes, the tens of thousands
of nuclear weapons, inherited from the Soviet Union, in various
areas, which may be stolen, diverted, get on a journey by a
ship or airplane, with the destination of this country, reach
this destination. Here is something to which we are woefully
unprepared.
But let me move on--the rest Mr. Woolsey said much better
than I could--let me move on to the second lesson learned. And
that is the inseparable entanglement of military and peaceful
uses of nearly all important technologies. High-powered
computers can be used for improving nuclear weapons or for
predicting the weather, plutonium to fuel reactors or to make
nuclear weapons. And there is ample evidence in the case we are
discussing today that India's nuclear weapons capability was
accelerated and enhanced by the assistance India received since
the 1950's which was intended for peaceful purposes--assistance
from Canada, the United States, Great Britain, and other
countries.
Now, in our lawyerly fashion, we usually ask the nations to
whom we give assistance, technological assistance intended for
peaceful purposes, to sign a promise that they will not use it
for weapons. And sometimes we even try to add an elaborate
verification system. But now, some 30 years later, we should be
wiser and should have realized that this can easily be
circumvented.
One of the clearest recent examples of course is North
Korea, which had an IAEA inspection, but they simply shoved the
IAEA inspectors aside; or Iraq, before the Gulf War, which got
a clean bill of health from the IAEA inspection. (The IAEA is
the International Atomic Energy Agency.) And this lesson will
be particularly serious for biological technology, where the
peaceful and the weapons applications are even more
inextricably intertwined, back in the laboratory.
So let us absorb this lesson. But somehow with a triumph of
hope over experience, we keep perpetrating the same mistake. In
his State of the Union Address this year, President Clinton
told Congress that he is seeking a treaty to verify the
existing ban on biological weapons, and thus ``enforce'' the
ban. But the administration's proposal provides for no
enforcement whatsoever. It provides for an elaborate
verification scheme, which every competent scientist will tell
you cannot work. So, that is going down a blind alley at best.
And this leads into the third lesson relevant for today,
that the global spread of technology is a force so powerful, so
elemental, that it cannot be stopped with dikes and dams made
of the parchment of arms control treaties. To be sure,
sometimes these treaties can keep the good intentions on the
right track. But they can also be bypassed, even by relatively
friendly nations, as is the case with India with the peaceful
assistance it got on nuclear reactors, or with impunity almost
openly by dictators.
Let us remember again what happened not too long ago with
North Korea. After they violated the Nonproliferation Treaty
that that country has signed, it got rewarded with the gift of
oil deliveries--and Congress is being asked this week, I think,
to make the appropriations for the reward to North Korea--and
with a gift of two reactors, costing billions, for which we put
pressure on our allies to put up the money.
And this leads to my last point, the lessons we ought to
teach, not the lessons we ought to learn. If halting nuclear
proliferation is really so high on our priority, as the
language here in Washington seems to suggest, then we should
seek to convince other countries that acquiring nuclear weapons
will cost more than it is worth. Instead, we often purchase
ambiguous promises from these countries for which we then pay
with handsome gifts. I mentioned the Korea example.
Now, I had made a prediction--and I wrote this in my
written testimony last night--that was a bit more pessimistic
than what Assistant Secretary Inderfurth mentioned today that
tentatively may promise a more effective response. But let me
give you the pessimistic prediction if the more effective
response does not materialize, which is quite possible because
our allies, our close allies, will not support us in the
sanctions, particularly in the World Bank, where it would
count.
I think then we will be under pressure to minimize the
economic sanctions. And I think Congress will be under
pressure. I would not be surprised if some of you, when you go
back to your office, already find lobbyists saying that we
should not be too harsh, it would hurt exports, it would hurt
business in your district. And the President has announced, of
course, as we heard, that he will try to induce India to sign
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. There is some differences
about the language. I could easily foresee some compromise will
be reached with New Delhi, and that the compromise will be
sweetened with the promise of then resuming U.S. technical
assistance, computer sales, aid, and get the Test Ban signed
with India and this will be presented by the spin masters as a
great victory in nonproliferation.
Now, if this happened, what will we have taught Pakistan
and Iran and other countries?
We will have taught them: ``go ahead, carefully design a
series of five or seven tests, accept the American tongue
lashing, let it roll off your back; then sign on to the
Comprehensive Test Ban; then hold out the tin cup for more aid
from the Japanese, from the Europeans, from the Americans
again; and by signing the Comprehensive Test Ban you are then a
member in good standing in the international nonproliferation
community and you will not be prevented from building a large
nuclear arsenal with the weapons that you had just tested.''
Now, maybe the fissile material restriction that Mr.
Einhorn mentioned would make a difference here. But maybe,
again, it would not. These materials are good for peaceful as
well as for military purposes. And you again get back into the
problem of that hard to define dividing line.
Well, that is a pessimistic prediction. Let me close with a
more positive note. Since the beginning of the nuclear age more
than 50 years ago, the United States policy has been to fight
against nuclear proliferation, in our own interests of course.
And it can be said with all our hindsight that we have
succeeded--we the United States--in slowing down the spread of
nuclear weapons significantly. Each administration has
contributed some successes and some mistakes to this long-term
policy.
I think if we can learn from our mistakes, stop repeating
them, we will be more successful in the future.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Ikle follows:]
Prepared Statement of Fred C. Ikle
The Lessons from India's Nuclear Tests
Mr. Chairman, we have important lessons to learn from India's most
recent series of nuclear weapons tests.
The first lesson is about our intelligence capability--or rather,
about our expectations that our fine intelligence services are so
omniscient that the United States will not have to wake up to
unpleasant surprises from time to time. To be sure, I agree with the
deep concern expressed by Senator Richard Shelby and other members of
Congress that in this instance we did not take advantage of long-term
strategic warning to use our capabilities for timely tactical warning.
But that is an old story, it goes back to Pearl Harbor.
A more important aspect of the intelligence lesson, I believe, is
our difficulty to respond to strategic warning, not necessarily by
trying to prevent every untoward happening--we are not so omnipotent--
but by being prepared to cope with the calamity when it occurs. We now
have strategic warning, plenty of it, that among the tens of thousands
of nuclear weapons left behind by the former Soviet Union, one (or
more) might be diverted by theft, by accident, or a combination of
mishaps, and then begin a journey--by ship, by airplane, or other
means--that ends in our country. We do have the strategic warning now!
But we are woefully unprepared. Likewise, for similar warnings about
biological weapons.
Our reliance on precise intelligence warnings must not become an
excuse for being unprepared should the feared event, one morning, come
as a surprise.
The second lesson to be learned, or re-learned, Mr. Chairman, is
the inseparable entanglement