The nuclear tests conducted in May reflect India's desire to acquire a wide range of weapons for its arsenal, ranging from low-yield to fusion weapons. The scientists also attempted to validate sub-critical testing, which would be useful for developing weapons even under a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) regime. Although there is some doubt whether all these objectives were achieved, the tests have provided crucial information relating to the shape and size of India's nuclear arsenal and the doctrine of its use. A sizeable arsenal?
India's nuclear weapon programme is primarily based on weapons-grade plutonium reprocessed from the irradiated fuel taken from the CIRUS and Dhruva research reactors located at Trombay. Based on the fissile material output of these two reactors alone, India's nuclear weapon stockpile is put at anything between at least 20 weapons to at most 65 weapons. However, India also has other commercial reactors that produce plutonium not considered ideal for weaponisation. While that is generally true, some countries, notably the UK, have successfully made nuclear weapons from reactor-grade plutonium. There are some indications that Indian scientists also attempted a similar feat in the two tests conducted on 13 May. Although they do not appear to have been entirely successful, the information gathered from these tests would go a long way in giving India the ability to build weapons from reactor fuel. This would also increase India's fissile material stockpile manifold. According to one estimate, if the commercial reactor plutonium is taken into account then India would possess enough fissile material to build at least 390 weapons and at best 470 weapons. This makes the potential Indian nuclear arsenal bigger than that of the UK and in the same league as the French and Chinese.
India's range of weapon types - from low-yield to thermonuclear - is also comparable with the arsenal of the other nuclear weapon states. In addition, India also has a uranium enrichment plant at Rattenhalli. However, it is not certain that this plant is in fact producing weapons-grade uranium at the moment. It is likely that this plant would produce the uranium needed to fuel India's proposed nuclear-powered submarine (see JIR, June 1998).
Delivery systems
The development of India's nuclear weapon delivery systems indicates that a classic nuclear triad force - with distinct land, sea and air components - will eventually be created. This is partly the result of the evolution of the nuclear weapon and delivery technology within India and partly the result of inter-service rivalry, with each service insisting on a piece of the nuclear pie. Although the nuclear forces are likely to be integrated into the individual service command structures, the overall military command of the nuclear units is likely to remain distinct and under the top-most civilian control.
In terms of actual delivery systems, the Anglo-French Jaguar was probably the first Indian aircraft geared towards a nuclear mission. It is no coincidence that this deep-penetration strike aircraft was acquired around the time of the first Indian nuclear test in 1974. This made the Indian Air Force (IAF) the first service to attain the ability to deliver nuclear weapons. Subsequently, both the MiG-27s and also the Mirage 2000s were adopted to carry nuclear gravity bombs. While all these aircraft could effectively cover Pakistan, none of them could deliver a nuclear payload deep into China. That capability came with the arrival of the Sukhoi Su-30s, which have the range to cover most of China. The range and flight time of these aircraft will be substantially enhanced on receipt of the six Ilyushin Il-78 flight-refuelling tankers ordered from Russia at the start of this year. At the moment, however, it is not certain whether the Sukhois have been adopted for the nuclear role.
While aircraft clearly provided the first delivery system for Indian's nuclear arsenal, their vulnerability to detection and interception limits their ability to safely deliver the weapons over long distances, particularly over China. Consequently, India embarked on a programme to build a missile-based delivery system which is expected to become the mainstay of the emerging nuclear force. The results were two, nuclear-capable missiles: the Prithvi (which first flew in 1988) and the Agni (which was first tested in 1989).
Initial reports suggested that the Prithvi, considered to be a Pakistan-specific weapon, was designed to carry only conventional warheads, even though its one-ton throw weight made it nuclear-capable. However, after the recent nuclear tests Dr A P J Abdul Kalam, the chief of the Indian Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), stated that the Prithvi could now be armed with a nuclear payload. The single-stage, liquid-fuelled Prithvi comes in three versions: the SS-150 with a range of 150km and a one-ton payload designed for the army; the SS-250 with a range of 250km built for the air force; and the SS-350, which is still under development. The army has placed an order for 75 SS-150s and the air force has asked for 25 SS-250s. By placing orders for the missile the army has ensured that it, too, has acquired a nuclear weapon delivery capability and could eventually build up a case for having all land-based nuclear missiles placed under its fold. Serial production of the SS-150s has begun and these missiles have been inducted into the 333rd Missile Group based in the southern Indian city of Secundrabad, well away from the Indo-Pakistani border. The current size of the Prithvi force is considered to be in the range of 20 to 50 missiles.
The Agni, however, is still in the development stage and years away from serial production. According to Dr Kalam, the government has approved the second phase of the Agni development programme. This approval appears to have been given shortly before the nuclear tests were conducted. The improved Agni, designed to have a greater range, is "in an advanced stage of development and will be modular in construction", Dr Kalam disclosed. This design would give the flexibility to allow the fuel configuration to be changed using different combinations for different mission requirements. The original two-stage Agni, a `technology demonstrator' under development since 1983, uses both solid and liquid fuel and is designed to carry a one-ton payload to targets up to 2,500km away, although it has not flown beyond 1,400km in any of the three tests conducted so far. Nonetheless, Indian scientists are confident that the Agni can carry a one-ton payload up to a range of 2,500km as planned. However, the present configuration of the two-staged missile is much too cumbersome to make it either road-mobile or effectively deployable. Thus the improved Agni is expected to be road or rail-mobile and have two solid-fuel stages that will provide greater range and eventually lead to the development of a 4,000km-range missile. At the moment none of the three services have been designated to receive the Agni, but it is likely that different versions may be given to both the army and the air force, as was the case with the Prithvi missile.
In contrast, there is no doubt that the sea-based version of the nuclear missiles - the Sagarika - will be given only to the Indian Navy. There are reports of two different kinds of sea-based missiles being developed: one is a surface ship-launched version of the Prithvi ballistic missile, which could be operational as early as 2001; the other is a submarine-launched cruise missile, with a reported range of about 330km, which could become operational by 2010 (see box).
Even more significant is the assessment that the design for the long-awaited Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV), India's nuclear submarine programme, is complete; construction could begin as soon as the government approves. The ATV is expected to have a displacement of 9,400-tonnes and a maximum submerged speed of 24kts. This platform, along with the onboard nuclear cruise missile, would complete India's nuclear triad by the end of the next decade.
Doctrine of use
Soon after the tests India declared its intention to discuss a `no first use' agreement with other countries, either bilaterally or collectively. This includes not only Pakistan and China but also the other nuclear weapon states. Thus, unlike China, India has not given a unilateral and universal `no-first use' guarantee. This is probably on account of two factors: firstly, India does not appear to accept the veracity of such verbal commitments - particularly from China, with which it has fought a bitter and contentious war; secondly, implicit in an oral `no first use' declaration is an assured second-strike capability which, clearly, India does not possess even now, particularly with respect to China. Indeed, even before the recent tests, while India consistently proposed a `no first use' agreement (of the nuclear weapon capability) to Pakistan, it made no such offer to China. One explanation could be that, given India's non-nuclear weapon status and China's nuclear weapon status, such an offer would be incompatible. However, India's de facto nuclear weapon status after the tests has made New Delhi confident enough to make this offer.
Moreover, if the `no first use' offer is not taken up and no agreement is reached, then clearly India reserves the right of nuclear first use, particularly against those countries that have not even entered into discussion on the subject.
In the case of Pakistan, India clearly has conventional superiority and also a second-strike nuclear capability. Therefore, it is likely to follow a `no first use' doctrine even if there is no formal agreement with Pakistan. However, by binding Pakistan in a formal agreement, India may be tempted to use its conventional advantage against Pakistan. This is the primary reason why Pakistan would be unwilling to commit itself to a `no first use' deal, although Pakistan may be willing to enter into such an agreement once it is convinced that it, too, has a second strike capability against India.
A nuclear path to disarmament?
There is another rational behind India's decision to make its `no first use' offer universal. India sees the role of its nuclear arsenal not only to protect its national security interests but also to further the cause of complete global nuclear disarmament. Hence, were all the nuclear weapon states to take up India's offer and to sign up to a `no first use' agreement collectively, it would be tantamount to a `no use of nuclear weapons' agreement.
Dr W P S Sidhu is a specialist on South Asian security issues. He was awarded his PhD from the University of Cambridge, UK, the title of his thesis being The Development of an Indian Nuclear Doctrine since 1980.
(Copyright 1998)
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