NEARLY three days of the Fifteen Weeks had already elapsed when the British
ambassador met with Secretary Marshall at 10 a.m. on Monday. February 24. His
call was something of an anticlimax, for, as we have seen, the First Secretary
of the Embassy, Mr. Sichel, had brought copies of the British notes over to
Henderson the previous Friday afternoon. When the Ambassador arrived, Secretary
Marshall had already read the notes, as well as the memorandum that Henderson
and his staff had prepared over the weekend. Moreover he had already had a long
session with Acheson, who had brought him up to date on what had happened since
he left his office early Friday afternoon.
Lord Inverchapel delivered his messages orally, referring to the texts of the
notes, and added a few comments of his own. There was little discussion. Secretary
Marshall assured the Ambassador that the Greece-Turkey matter seemed to be of
the utmost importance and that he would give it his immediate attention. He
promised to discuss it at once with the President and the Chief of Staff and
give answer promptly.
Two hours later, while the Cabinet was assembling for luncheon with the President,
Secretary Marshall told Forrestal of the Ambassador's call, the serious problem
it dumped in our lap, and remarked that it was tantamount to British abdication
from the Middle East with obvious implications as to their successor. At that
moment Lord Inverchapel was leaving Washington for New Haven, Connecticut, where
he spent a convivial evening as guest of the Yale Whiffenpoofs.
Marshall's reaction was similar to that of all the others in the Department
who had heard the news. Without any exception known to the writer, everyone
in the executive branch recognized what this meant, and saw that if Russian
expansion was to be checked, the United States must move into the defaulted
position in the Middle East.
The instant recognition of this, the virtual unanimity of view, made it possible,
within a single week beginning February 21, for the staff of the State Department
to prepare a documented statement of position and recommendations, for this
to be approved by Acheson, Marshall, the Secretaries of War and of the Navy,
and the President, for it to be cleared by the President with congressional
leaders, and for a State Department working party to start preparing a detailed
program of action. The singleness of reaction grew from accumulating facts that
had been shouting for recognition for a long time. One more fact was added,
and the situation no longer shouted, but commanded, and was obeyed. History
took a new course.
For reasons of high policy and good manners the United States did not during
the Fifteen Weeks, or thereafter, dramatize the takeover of leadership of the
free world from Great Britain. It was not to our national interest at that critical
moment to emphasize Britain's weakness in the Mediterranean and the Middle East,
and good sportsmanship forbade noticing more than was necessary the exhaustion
of a teammate. But during the Fifteen Weeks the consciousness that a chapter
in world history had come to an end was so real and ever-present as to seem
almost tangible. During those weeks of tough decision and hard-headed thinking,
emotion-proceeding from a realization that world power was at that moment changing
hands-was not far from the surface. And even while the eyes observed the new
spectacle with pride, the memory persistently called up the gallant role Great
Britain had for so long played as world leader.
There were no officers in the Department of State who appreciated that role
more than Loy Henderson and Jack Hickerson, the two who first received the news
of Britain's decision. Henderson, born in Arkansas, had been in the Foreign
Service for twenty-five years, nine of them spent in the Soviet Union or countries
on its periphery, and had served many years as assistant chief of the State
Department's Division of European Affairs. He was regarded as one of the Department's
experts on the Soviet Union. Hickerson born in Texas, had entered the Foreign
Service in 1920 and had served some years abroad; then for nearly twenty years
he had held top posts in the Department's offices dealing with European Affairs
and had a wide knowledge of the affairs of the British Commonwealth. Both were
vigorous, hard-hitting, responsible men, aware that order in international relations
is not a natural condition but one that can at times be created by the full
and wise and systematic organization of power. Perhaps more important, their
initiative had not been eroded by sycophancy or intimidated by public attack.
Dean Acheson was thoroughly familiar with the situation in Greece. Only the
day before, Ambassador MacVeagh, Mark Ethridge, and Paul Porter had climaxed
a series of alarming cables from Athens with a message, concurred in by all
three, that could only be characterized as frantic: Greece was on the point
of panic, in danger of complete collapse, economically, psychologically, and
militarily, within a matter of weeks, and if it collapsed the aimed Communist
bands would take over. That very morning, February 21, before leaving for Princeton,
Secretary Marshall had sent Acheson a memorandum recommending that a bill be
drawn up for congressional approval providing for a direct loan to Greece, and
that a decision be cleared through the executive branch to transfer military
equipment to Greece. But reports from Athens and the Secretary's decision had
not taken into account the towering new fact of which Acheson was now apprised:
the imminent cessation of British support. The probability of Greece's early
fall was now transformed into a certainty unless the United States should act
to prevent it. Not just part of the responsibility for saving the situation,
but most of it, was now ours. Moreover urgency would have to be measured on
an entirely new scale: likewise the kinds and amounts of aid that would have
to be provided. Stopgap measures would no longer suffice. The problem had to
be faced fully and frontally. For not just the fate of Greece was at stake.
Greece was the key to a much wider situation: the freedom and security of a
large part of the world.
Acheson, Henderson, and Hickerson knew the problem well, and they were in general
agreement: the discussion among them was therefore brief that Friday afternoon.
The most important thing was to work out an orderly procedure and get things
moving fast. Acheson suggested that Henderson call a staff meeting for that
evening to consider the problem and prepare a paper summarizing the most pertinent
facts and estimates of the situation in Greece and Turkey as reported by United
States representatives. It was also necessary to list the funds and authority
available to the executive branch (they were known to be wholly inadequate)
for extending military, technical, and economic assistance, and to analyze the
significance of Greece and Turkey to the defense of the free world. This memorandum
would be handed to Secretary Marshall before he received Lord Inverchapel on
Monday morning. Acheson also asked Henderson and Hickerson to confer the next
day with Vice-Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations,
and Major General Lauris Norstad, Director of Plans and Operations of the War
Department General Staff, giving them hill information on the situation and
the new problem that had arisen, so that they might brief the Secretary of the
Navy and the Secretary of War for a meeting with Marshall and Acheson on Monday.
Then, as Hickerson and Henderson hastened bad to their offices to begin a weekend
of heavy labor, Acheson telephoned President Truman at the White House and Secretary
Marshall in Princeton to tell them of what had happened and the arrangements
he had made.
George F. Kennan chaired the staff meeting in the Department that evening. Henderson,
Hickerson, the senior members of their offices, and a few others were there.
Kennan, then lecturing at the War College in Washington, had acquired great
prestige in the Department and in the upper echelons of the government generally
as a consequence of the realism and incisiveness of his reports from Moscow.
In one notable cable (it ran to eight thousand words) submitted a year earlier
when he was chargé in the Moscow Embassy, he had so impressively analyzed Soviet
motivations and designs as to contribute markedly to the stiffening of United
Stales policy toward Soviet expansionism. Kennan had recommended that the American
public be told the full truth about the realities of the Russian situation,
that the Western world develop cohesion, firmness, and vigor in its dealing
with the Soviet Union, that we proceed with courage and self-confidence and
put before the free peoples of the world a "much more positive and constructive
picture of the sort of world we would like to see than we have put forward in
the past."' Henderson and Hickerson, realizing that large-scale United States
aid to Greece and Turkey involved at its core our relations with the Soviet
Union, and aware also that Secretary Marshall had asked Kennan to create and
head a Policy Planning Staff in the Department when his assignment at the War
College ended in May. thought it fitting to invite him to the first staff meeting
on the Greek crisis and offered him the chair.
There is apparently nothing that is recorded and little that is remembered about
that meeting except that all present agreed that the United States would have
to give extraordinary economic and military aid to Greece. The problem of aid
to Turkey, being of secondary urgency, was hardly discussed. Everyone was aware
that what was involved was the commitment of American power in Greece and the
Middle East. The members of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs were
quite openly elated over the possibility that the United States might now take
action on a broad enough scale to prevent the Soviet Union from breaking through
the Greece-Turkey-Iran barrier into the Middle East, South Asia, and North Africa.
They had long felt themselves virtually unarmed in trying to deal with this
problem, which was to them as real as the walls about them and held frightful
potentialities for the security of the United States and the future of the world.
After the discussion ended Henderson made assignments, and by midnight the first
draft of a factual paper on the situation in Greece was completed. Thus, eight
hours after the transmission of the first spark from the British Embassy, ended
the first day of the Fifteen Weeks. Kennan recalls driving borne with a sense
of great developments impending. Nevertheless, occupied with another job, he
had nothing further to do with the Greece-Turkey matter except for an intervention
that will be described later.
Saturday, February 22, was a busy day in the State Department Hickerson and
Henderson had a long session with Admiral Sherman and General Norstad in Hickerson's
office, in which all aspects of the Greece-Turkey problem were considered. Acheson
conferred throughout the day with his staff, initiating studies and giving guidance.
The Near Eastern Affairs staff worked furiously; by late Sunday afternoon they
had revised, expanded, and refined the paper that had been hastily drafted on
Friday evening, had buttressed it with supporting studies, and Henderson had
delivered the end-product to Acheson at his Georgetown home.
Secretary Marshall's induction Monday morning into the Greece-Turkey crisis
has already been related. Shortly before noon he crossed Executive Avenue to
confer with the President, as was customary, before the regular weekly luncheon
of the Cabinet. Marshall told the President of the British Ambassador's call
and the problem it posed for the United States. He also told him of the steps
that were being taken to bring about a coordinated recommendation by State,
War, and Navy for the President's early decision.
Secretary Marshall, busy preparing for the Moscow Conference only a few days
away, deliberately left the Greece-Turkey ball with Acheson, who had first caught
it and who would have to run with it when Marshall left. Marshall therefore
attended only the meetings where his presence was absolutely required. Acheson
of course kept hiim fully informed and sought his approval on important decisions.
Monday afternoon, February 24, Acheson, assisted by Henderson and Hickerson,
presided over a conference with Forrestal, who was accompanied by Admiral Sherman,
and Patterson, who was accompanied by General Norstad. This was an important
meeting, for the problem of aid to Greece and Turkey was considered on a high
level in its wider world setting, and a broad government position began to grow.
Forrestal and Patterson showed themselves to be well informed on the details
of the Greece-Turkey problem. The discussion was long, and many questions were
asked and answered all around. At the end Acheson summed up the conclusions,
and all found themselves in agreement that it was vital to the security of the
United States that Greece and Turkey be strengthened; that only the United States
was in a position to do this; and that the President should therefore ask Congress
for the necessary funds and authority. Acheson told Forrestal and Patterson
that a formal statement of position and recommendation would be drawn up and
submitted to them for approval on Wednesday. Later Acheson told Marshall of
the conclusions reached, and Marshall concurred.
Were it not that the subordinate staff of the State Department contributed so
markedly to the policy development of this period it would not be important
to record here a meeting of key political, economic, legal, and information
officers that Acheson held Tuesday afternoon, February. 25. In a judicial manner
Acheson laid out the problem posed by the withdrawal of the British from Greece
and Turkey and outlined alternate courses of action the United States might
follow. He refrained until near the end of the meeting from expressing any conclusions:
instead, in the characteristic manner described before, he stimulated all present
to express their views, to raise questions, to voice doubts. Some were concerned
over the responsibility involved in challenging the Soviet Union at a time when
our military strength was at a low ebb and no one knew what the Soviet reaction
would be. Some were elated over the possibility that the United States might
at last stand out boldly against Soviet expansion. Others offered ideas as to
how the matter ought to be presented to the public or pointed out obstacles
that would have to be overcome. All were to some degree filled with awe at the
turning point that the United States had reached in its history.
When all had spoken, Acheson made his summation, in the process allaying doubts,
resolving conflicts, incorporating ideas presented to him, pointing up the logic
of the discussion. Thus Acheson broadened his own conception of the problem
and fortified his staff for creative work on the project ahead. Chief and staff
were as one. There was only one point of view, and that was growing, evolving,
from a free flow of ideas. After this meeting Acheson, Henderson, and the staff
of NEA worked late, writing the final version of the "Position and Recommendations
of the Department of State Regar ding Immediate Aid to Greece and Turkey."
The general position taken in that document was that the political and territorial
integrity of Greece and Turkey should be maintained
and that every effort should be made to extend the aid necessary to assure the
development of those countries as democratic states with sound economies. It
was recommended that the British be so informed, and be asked to give assurances
that they would continue to do all possible to achieve the same ends. There
were a number of specific recommendations for action:
That the administration propose to Congress, first, immediate legislation authorizing
the Export-Import Bank to extend credits free from the restrictions that normally
hamper the Bank's lending activities, and, second, legislation authorizing longer-range
financial aid;
That all available military supplies that could be transferred tinder existing
legislation be sent to Greece and Turkey, and that legislation be prepared and
proposed to Congress authorizing the furnishing of supplies and equipment needed
to restore order and maintain independence;
That legislation be prepared and proposed to Congress which would authorize
the sending of United States government personnel for administrative, economic,
and financial work with the Greek government;
That plans be worked out for an American administrative organization in Greece
that would control the Greek economic program in order to assure proper use
of the funds and supplies furnished by the United States (it was recognized
that a program of several years would probably be required);
That Greece be given precedence in the matter of military requirements and that
discussions be inaugurated at once with British representatives in Washington
on Greece's military needs and how the furnishing of military supplies might
be expedited;
And, finally, that measures be taken to inform the public of the urgent need
of aid to Greece.
Forrestal and Patterson met with Marshall and Acheson on Wednesday morning,
February 26, to consider the State Department's "Position and Recommendations."
The question was discussed at this meeting, as it bad been two days earlier
at the meeting of Acheson with Forrestal and Patterson, of the probable needs
of other countries for aid similar to that proposed for Greece and Turkey. The
necessity for large-scale aid to South Korea was looming at that moment. It
had become clear that the Soviet Union was not going to agree to a unification
of the northern and southern zones, and the American-held southern portion required
vast economic reconstruction and development if it was to exist as an independent
country. China also might require further aid. When, therefore, the Greece-Turkey
crisis arose, General Eisenhower, Chief of Staff of the Army, addressed a memorandum
to the Secretary of War in which he called attention to the various problems
of foreign aid that were arising and suggested that a study be made of the prospective
needs of all foreign countries for United States aid, with a view to asking
for an appropriation to cover the whole.
This point of view was considered at the meeting on February 26, but it was
recognized that the suggested study would take a long time to prepare, that
getting a general aid bill approved by Congress would be extremely difficult
and in any event would take a very long time, and that the Greek crisis required
the fastest possible action. The Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy
therefore endorsed the State Department's "Position and Recommendations" regarding
immediate aid to Greece and Turkey, but it was understood that a comprehensive
study should be made of other situations that might require our aid.
That afternoon Marshall and Acheson met with President Truman and fully explained
the recommendations of the three Departments. Truman required no convincing.
He had already discussed the matter in a preliminary way with Marshall, and
several times with Acheson over the telephone, and, as we have seen, he knew
the problems of the Middle East intimately. He accepted and approved the joint
State-War-Navy recommendations. The problem was not what should be done, but
how to get authorizing legislation through Congress. There was no time to be
lost, and Marshall would be leaving soon for Moscow. The President decided to
invite congressional leaders to the White House the next day to hear Marshall
and Acheson put the case and to get their reaction to the proposed program.
The White House telephoned the invitations.
That February 27 meeting at the White House is of great importance in this chronicle.
Present from Capitol Hill were Senator Vandenberg; Speaker Martin; Representative
Sam Rayburn, Democrat, House Minority Leader; Representative Charles A. Eaton,
Republican, chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs; Senator Styles
Bridges, Republican, chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee; Senator
Tom Connally, ranking Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; and
Representative Sol Bloom, ranking Democrat on the House Foreign Affairs Committee.
Representative John Taber, Republican, chairman of the House Appropriations
Committee, was invited but could not attend; nevertheless he hastened to the
White House in the afternoon and was informed in detail on what had happened.
At the request of the President, Secretary Marshall led off in the presentation
of the problem. In dry and economical terms he gave the congressional leaden
the facts about the imminent withdrawal of British support from Greece and Turkey,
the situation those countries were left in, vulnerable to Soviet domination,
and the recommendations for aid that had been agreed upon the executive branch.
There is no question that the Secretary understood thoroughly the strategic
importance of Greece and Turkey, but somehow his summary and cryptic presentation
failed to put it across to his listeners. In fact he conveyed the over-all impression
that aid should be extended to Greece on grounds of loyalty and humanitarianism,
and to Turkey to strengthen Britain's position in the Middle East. This did
not go down well with some of the congressional leaders, whose major preoccupation
at that moment was reducing aid abroad and taxes at home. Their initial reaction
was later described as "rather trivial" and 'adverse." The immediate questions
asked were:
"Isn't this pulling British chestnuts out of the fire?" "What are we letting
ourselves in for?" "How much is this going to cost?" Answers only took the discussion
farther off the main track.
Things were going very badly indeed, and Acheson was greatly disturbed. Leaning
over to Secretary Marshall, who sat beside him, Acheson asked in a low voice,
"Is this a private fight or can anyone get into it?" Whereupon Marshall addressed
the President and suggested that Acheson had something to say. Acheson was given
the floor. Many of the things be said are already known to us but in view of
the impact upon his listeners it is worth following his argument.
In the past eighteen months, Acheson began, the position of the democracies
in the world had seriously deteriorated. While Secretary Byrnes and Senator
Vandenberg and Senator Connally had gone from conference to conference trying
to negotiate peace settlements that would save certain countries of Central
Europe from Soviet control, the Soviet Union had been busy elsewhere, and with
greater success than was generally realized. It was dear they were making the
most persistent and ambitious efforts to encircle Turkey and Germany and thus
lay three continents open to Soviet domination.
Acheson described the direct pressures of the Soviet Union on Turkey during
the preceding year and a half for territorial cessions and for military and
naval bases in the Turkish Straits that would mean the end of Turkish independence.
These had been accompanied, he said, by a vicious and prolonged propaganda campaign
and, more important, by encircling movements aimed at Iran and Greece. The Turks,
with British and American diplomatic support, had stood firm against Soviet
pressures, and the move against Iran had for the time being failed. Now Communist
pressure was concentrated on Greece, and there was every likelihood that unless
Greece received prompt and large-scale aid from the outside the Communists would
succeed in seizing control. Reports from Greece indicated that complete collapse
might occur within a matter of weeks.
The Russians had any number of bets, Acheson went on. If they won any one of
them, they won all. If they could seize control of Turkey, they would almost
inevitably extend their control over Greece and Iran. If they controlled Greece,
Turkey would sooner or later succumb, with or without a war, and then Iran.
If they dominated Italy, where Communist pressures were increasing, They could
probably take Greece, Turkey, and the Middle East. Their aim, Acheson emphasized,
was control of the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East From there the
possibilities for penetration of South Asia and Africa were limitless.
As for Europe, Acheson continued, it was clear that the Soviet Union, employing
the instruments of Communist infiltration and subversion, was trying to complete
the encirclement of Germany. In France, with four Communists in the Cabinet,
one of them Minister of Defense, with Communists controlling the largest trade
union and infiltrating government offices, factories, and the armed services,
with nearly a third of the electorate voting Communist, and with economic conditions
worsening, the Russians could pull the plug any time they chose. In Italy, similar
if less immediately dangerous situation existed, but it was growing worse. In
Hungary and Austria the Communists were tightening the noose on democratic governments.
If Greece and the eastern Mediterranean should fall to Soviet control, the material
and psychological effects in the countries that were so precariously maintaining
their freedoms and democratic institutions would be devastating, and probably
conclusive.
It had been remarked, Acheson observed, that in aiding Greece and Turkey we
would only be "pulling British chestnuts out of the fire." Britain's world power
was shattered, he said, just as was that of every other democratic country except
the United States. Great Britain was in grave financial trouble. He mentioned
the two recent White Papers and their dark outlook for national survival, and
explained that for financial reasons Britain was now obliged to withdraw troops
and economic support from still other positions upon which her world power was
based.
Only two great powers remained in the world, Acheson continued, the United States
and the Soviet Union. We had arrived at a situation unparalleled since ancient
times. Not since Rome and Carthage had there been such a polarization of power
on this earth. Moreover the two great powers were divided by an unbridgeable
ideological chasm. For us, democracy and individual liberty were basic; for
them, dictatorship and absolute conformity. And it was dear that the Soviet
Union was aggressive and expanding. For the United States to take steps to strengthen
countries threatened with Soviet aggression or Communist subversion was not
to pull British chestnuts out of the fire; it was to protect the security of
the United States-it was to protect freedom itself. For if the Soviet Union
succeeded in extending its control over two-thirds of the world's surface and
three-fourths of its population, there could be no security for the United States,
and freedom anywhere in the world would have only a poor chance of survival.
The proposed aid to Greece and Turkey was not therefore a matter of bailing
out the British, or even of responding on humanitarian grounds to the need of
a loyal ally It was a matter of building our own security and safeguarding freedom
by strengthening free peoples against Communist aggression and subversion. We
had the choice, he concluded, of acting with energy to meet this situation or
of losing by default.
Acheson had abandoned the manner of a judge and for ten or fifteen minutes had
spoken as a fervent advocate. When he finished a profound silence ensued that
lasted perhaps ten seconds. It was broken by the voice of Senator Vandenberg.
Slowly and with gravity, Vandenberg said that be had been greatly impressed,
even shaken, by what he had heard. It was clear that the country was faced by
an extremely serious situation, of which aid to Greece and Turkey, although
of great importance, was only a part. He felt that it was absolutely necessary
that any request of Congress for funds and authority to aid Greece and Turkey
should be accompanied by a message to Congress, and an explanation to the American
people, in which the grim facts of the larger situation should be laid publicly
on the line as they had been at their meeting there that day.
The President went around the circle, inviting the comments of everyone present.
Not one registered opposition. Not one asked trivial questions or raised side
issues. All had apparently been deeply impressed. Vandenberg wrote some time
later that no commitments were made at this meeting. That is true. None had
been asked. Rut the very definite impression was gained, and was conveyed to
the State Department staff the next day as a working hypothesis, that the congressional
leaders would support whatever measures were necessary to save Greece and Turkey,
on the condition, made by Senator Vandenberg and supported by others present,
that the President should, in a message to Congress and lit a radio address
to the American people, explain the issue in the same frank terms and broad
context in which it had been laid before them. What Vandenberg meant by the
broad context may be indicated by something he wrote six days later to a congressional
colleague:
I am frank in saying that I do not know the answer to the latest Greek challenge
because I do not know all the facts. I am waiting for all the facts before I
say anything. . . But I sense enough of the facts to realize that the problem
in Greece cannot be isolated by itself. On the contrary, it is probably symbolic
of the world-wide ideological clash between Eastern communism and Western democracy;
and it may easily be the thing which requires us to make some very fateful and
far-reaching decisions.
The question has often been raised as to why the matter of aid to Greece and
Turkey was presented to Congress and the American people enveloped in a statement
of global policy that picked up the ideological challenge of communism. The
February 27 meeting at the White House holds part of the answer. The explicit
reaction of all in the government, from the President down, who were concerned
with the decision to aid Greece and Turkey was that a historical turning point
had been reached, that the United States must now stand forth as leader of the
free world in place of the flagging British and use its power directly and vigorously
to strengthen free nations. But there is a great difference between thinking
or determining this and announcing it as the policy of the United States to
a questionable Congress and an apathetic electorate. Because of the searing
political lessons of the previous twenty-eight years, beginning with rejection
of membership in the League of Nations and continuing through the isolationism
of the twenties, the neutrality of the thirties, and the reaction against President
Roosevelt's "quarantine" speech in Chicago in October 1937, the cautious, limited,
backdoor approach to involvement in world affairs had become almost a reflex
in successive administrations, notwithstanding support of the United Nations
and vigorous participation in the negotiation of peace treaties. At the meeting
with congressional leaders Acheson discovered that he had to pull out all the
stops arid speak in the frankest, boldest, widest terms to attract their support
for a matter which in parliamentary democracies without a tradition of isolationism
would have been undertaken quietly and without fanfare. This time the frank
and bold approach, far from shocking congressional leaders into timorousness,
paid off. They were deeply impressed and felt that on that basis they could
go before their constituents. It was Vandenberg's "condition" that made it possible,
even necessary, to launch the global policy that broke through the remaining
barriers of American isolationism.
President Truman promised the congressional leaders to have a detailed program
prepared for a second meeting with them, which he would call for Friday, March
7 (actually it was not held until Monday, March 10). He agreed that the matter
of aid to Greece and Turkey should be presented by him to Congress in its broadest
context and in the frankest terms, and promised that a message would be prepared
along these lines. The question was raised as to whether the British could be
persuaded to keep their remaining troops in Greece, and Marshall replied that
the matter was under discussion with the British. Neither the President nor
Secretary Marshall could give any assurances that the situation in Greece and
Turkey could be saved by American assistance, but only that it was clear it
could not be saved without American assistance. The meeting came to an end.
The evening of February 27 Acheson held an off-the-record background conference
with about twenty newspaper correspondents who regularly covered the State Department.
The press had got wind of momentous happenings, had begun to speculate on them,
and knew of the morning's meeting at the White House. Acheson thought it important
to give the correspondents the correct pitch at the beginning, even though at
this early stage it was not possible to issue a release, talk particulars, or
authorize quotation. He told them of the British notes regarding Greece (Turkey
was not mentioned at this stage) of the situation in Greece and its relation
to the security of the eastern Mediterranean, of the decision to ask Congress
to authorize aid for Greece, and of the morning's meeting with congressional
leaders at the White House. More important, he pitched the problem of aid to
Greece in its broad context. During the succeeding days Acheson met with other
small groups of radio commentators, columnists, and newsmen in similar off-the-record
conferences.
Following the first of these conferences, James Reston, in the New York Times
of March 1, posed the problem of aid to Greece in terms of three questions:
Is the United States prepared to take specific action in Greece in opposition
to the expansion of Soviet influence in the eastern Mediterranean?
Is the United States prepared to assume the risks and expense of bolstering
world stability as Britain did in the nineteenth century?
Can the two major political parties, one in control of the Executive and the
other in control of Congress, agree on a policy of aid to a government supported
by the British and violently opposed by the Soviet Union?
A great deal of the radio, editorial, and columnist comment during the early
days of March was in this same vein. It encouraged those engaged in articulating
and implementing policy and performed an invaluable service as advance agent
to Congress and the public for the President's message of March 12.
The morning of February 28 was a memorable one in the Department of State. At
10:30 in the Secretary's conference room Acheson met with those departmental
officers who would have the chief responsibility for working out all aspects
of the program. The meetings of the preceding seven days had been devoted to
probing, discussing, sizing up the problem. This one was different. The scope
of the problem had been determined, decisions made and approved. At this meeting
no suggestions were invited, no questions asked. The problem, the solution,
the pitch, were set forth fully and concisely. The show was put on the road.
Acheson, revealing his awareness of the epochal importance of what he was saying
only by an unusual gravity of manner, reviewed briefly the events of the preceding
week, told of the decisions that had been made by the Secretary and the President,
and then proceeded to a detailed description of the previous day's meeting with
the congressional leaden. Tenseness and controlled excitement grew by the moment
in the large room as Acheson launched into a full statement of the larger issues,
repeating the exposition that had so impressed the legislators. And when he
described their generally favorable reaction and the indications they had given
of support, and told of Vandenberg's "condition," which the President had welcomed,
it seemed to those present that a new chapter in world history had opened and
that they were the most privileged of men, participants in a drama such as rarely
occurs even in the long life of a great nation.
There was a great job to be done, Acheson said, and it would have to be done
with great speed. Within a few days it was necessary to draw up in detail a
program of economic, military, and technical aid to Greece and Turkey, to draft
the necessary enabling legislation, the President's message to Congress, and
a radio "fireside chat" to be delivered the day the message went to Congress,
and to develop and get under way a program of public information. Acheson reported
Secretary Marshall's injunction that the matter be presented to Congress and
the public in the tallest and frankest terms. He also reported Marshall's instruction
that the staff should go about their work vigorously without any regard to the
effect that the Greece-Turkey program, or any public statement of it, might
have on the Moscow Conference or upon his personal position there. The mind
went back at this point to other Secretaries of State and the priorities they
almost certainly would have established even under these circumstances. Had
Secretary Marshall not seen what was important, and what was relatively less
so, the history of recent years misfit have been far different. All barriers
to bold action were indeed down.
Acheson advanced only one caution. Although we should be vigorous and forthright,
we must not be belligerent or provocative. Our policy was not directed against
any country or even any movement, but was a positive policy directed toward
helping free nations strengthen their democracy and their independence and thereby
protecting the liberties of the individual citizen.
The group there assembled, Acheson concluded, would have the responsibility
for the program. Henderson would head up and coordinate the work, Hickerson
would be his second, and Jack Jernegan would be the executive secretary of the
coordinating committee. (Actually the group never functioned as a committee.
There was so much to be done in so little time that there was no time for formal
committee sessions. Henderson did direct and coordinate the staff work, however.)
At this point Acheson withdrew from the meeting and turned it over to Henderson,
who began to make assignments, When, a few minutes thereafter, he was called
away, Hickerson took the chair. John Gange of the Central Secretariat, in consultation
with Acheson and his chief lieutenants, had prepared a document outlining the
various parts of the work program and indicating those responsible for each
part: economic and technical aid; military aid (this was left for Henderson
and Hickerson to work out with the War and Navy Departments); public information;
and the determination and drafting of needed legislation. The drafting of the
President's message and his radio address were not assigned at this meeting;
however, Joseph Jones assumed the assignment would fall to him and proceeded
upon that assumption, which proved to be correct. These other specific tasks
were assigned: the drafting of replies to the British notes, the drafting of
the specific terms of a request for United States aid which would be suggested
to the Greek government, the drawing up of an agenda of matters to be discussed
with the British, and the preparation of more detailed background studies on
Greece and Turkey that would be needed in everybody's work. In concluding, Hickerson
said that we were dealing with the most important thing that had happened since
Pearl Harbor, and counseled that each approach his job with humility. The meeting
broke up; the members returned to their offices to undertake tasks in which
they found release from the professional frustration of years.