As delivered
U.S. Diplomacy in South Asia: A Progress Report
Thank you, Mike [Armacost], for that introduction and for the work that
Brookings and the Council [on Foreign Relations] have done together to
improve national and international understanding of the issue we're
here to talk about today: the U.S. interest in peace and security and
prosperity on the Asian subcontinent. My colleagues here from the
State Department today, Assistant Secretary Rick Inderfurth and Lee
Feinstein of our Policy Planning Staff, and I are grateful to Richard
Haass, Mort Halperin, Stephen Cohen, and everyone who made the
Brookings-CFR task force so valuable to us in our own diplomatic
efforts.
Before I give you a progress report on those efforts, I want to
emphasize that our interests in South Asia are long-standing, enduring,
and broad-gauge. I'd like to think that even if it had not been for
the explosions 6 months ago in the Pokhran desert of Rajasthan and the
Chigai Hills of Baluchistan, we would still be meeting here today for a
wide-ranging discussion of a region that is the cradle of several of
the world's great religions and civilizations and home to well over a
billion people, almost one-fifth of all humanity. India and Pakistan
deserve more attention than they have traditionally received from the
U.S. Government and even from Brookings and the CFR. I'm sure my
friends, Ambassadors Chandra and Khokar, would agree.
Certainly President Clinton has felt that way for a long time. A year
and a half ago, he instructed his foreign-policy team to explore ways
to put our relations with India and Pakistan on a sounder, more mature
footing.
The premise, with respect to India, was that relations between our
countries were in a rut; we needed to get beyond the correct but rather
chilly exchanges of the past. Even the mantra about how the U.S. and
India were "the world's oldest and largest democracies," while a
factual statement and a source of pride, too often sounded like lip
service. The President looked to India to continue its emergence as a
global power. He also saw India and the United States to be natural
partners in making our shared expertise in high technology a source of
dynamism in the global economy.
As for Pakistan, there, too, the President felt we needed a fresh
start. The end of the Cold War had created the opportunity for a new,
more sophisticated basis for U.S.-Pakistani relations. He saw
Pakistan, as a deeply religious Islamic society and a democracy
situated on the crossroads of the Near East and south and central Asia,
to be facing choices that will resonate far beyond its own borders.
When the President gave us the task of intensifying and diversifying
our engagement with India and Pakistan in early 1997, the question of
their nuclear and ballistic-missile programs was, of course, also very
much on the agenda. We did not believe our commitment to non-
proliferation to be in any way at odds with our interest in better
relations with both countries. Quite the contrary: We saw these goals
to be mutually reinforcing.
We hope and believe they still are. But the task is more difficult
now. The tests in May have increased tensions, highlighted the
consequences of misunderstanding and miscalculation, and posed a
serious challenge to the viability of the global nonproliferation
regime. That means we have no choice but to adjust the focus of our
diplomacy accordingly, even while our long-term objectives and
interests remain intact.
A starting point for that diplomacy is that India and Pakistan need
security, deserve security, and have a right to determine what is
necessary to attain security. The essence of the case we are making to
them is that there are ways to enhance their security without testing
nuclear weapons or deploying missiles and that they will assuredly
undermine their security unless they move quickly and boldly to bring
under control the action-reaction cycle between them.
In making this case, we are drawing not only from our own experience
with nuclear weapons but from what we believe is a misreading of that
experience by many Indians and Pakistanis. Since May, we have heard
from many Indians and Pakistanis the notion that the tests will usher
in an extended period of nuclear stability in South Asia, comparable to
the one that preserved the peace between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. for
half a century. It's almost as if they see Cold War brinkmanship
between the superpowers as something to be emulated.
They should look at the record again, not from the vantage point of
having the seen the Cold War end peacefully but, rather, from the hard-
headed perspective of what it took to manage the rivalry. Mort
Halperin and any number of Brookings sages -- particularly Hal
Sonnenfeldt and John Steinbruner -- could provide them with a reading
list. (I might even have a suggestion or two myself.) The U.S. and
the Soviet Union had more than one narrow escape. India and Pakistan
have even less margin for error than the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. did over
Cuba and Berlin, if only for geographical reasons, since no ocean
separates them.
Moreover, during the half-century of the Cold War, we and the Soviets
never shed a drop of each other's blood on the battlefield -- at least
not in a direct conflict. India and Pakistan, by very germane
contrast, have over approximately the same span of time fought three
wars and there continue to be frequent and sometimes fatal exchanges of
artillery fire across the Line of Control in the disputed territory of
Kashmir.
And then there's the economic dimension of security. Before India and
Pakistan decide to replicate the U.S. and Soviet nuclear competition,
they should consider the price tag. A recent Brookings study estimated
that maintaining the American nuclear capability cost the United States
just under $5.5 trillion. On the other side of the Iron Curtain,
comparable expenses contributed to the disintegration of the Soviet
system and state.
The massive spending required to develop nuclear weapons is only a
fraction of what is required for safely managing even a modest
capability. The tense military situation generated by a nuclearized
subcontinent would further drive up overall military budgets -- a trend
already in evidence.
Perhaps the most serious economic threat to these two developing
nations is the near-certainty that foreign capital, which is critical
if either is to rehabilitate its infrastructure, will decline as risk-
averse investors back away from what will look like an unpredictable
environment.
The issue is, of course, complicated by the China factor. Indian
officials point to security concerns not just with Pakistan but with
their giant neighbor to the north as well. We respect India's right to
make that determination. We understand that this is a deeply felt
matter steeped in history. We ourselves have an on-going strategic
dialogue with China, including about critical regions, and our
determination to foster peace and security in South Asia will continue
to be very much part of our agenda with Beijing.
In discussing these concerns with us, Indian strategists often refer
not to any new or burgeoning military threat but to the possibility of
competing interests between India and China at some time in the future.
The best way to head off any such competition, it seems to us, is for
New Delhi and Beijing to resume an intensive bilateral effort to
enhance transparency and confidence and to overcome or at least narrow
existing differences. In particular, we hope India and China will
engage in a candid exchange on their strategic perspectives, goals, and
concerns.
India has said that it wants the world to consider its security in a
geographical scope that goes beyond the subcontinent itself. So the
world should -- and so we, the U.S., certainly do. But by precisely
that token, we hope the Indians will come to see their security in a
context that includes a worldwide trend in support of nonproliferation.
Especially since May, India and Pakistan have been bucking that trend,
thus putting it in jeopardy.
Now, I can understand how, from an Indian or Pakistani vantage point,
the monopoly of the five NPT nuclear-weapons states might look
discriminatory. But I would also hope that over time Indians and
Pakistanis would not try to redress what they might see as a historical
injustice by embracing "the Bomb" just as the rest of the world is
trying to wean itself off of the view that "the Bomb" bestows either
safety or stature on those who possess it.
We Americans take seriously our own obligations in this regard, and we
believe we are meeting them. The U.S. and Russia have already
dismantled or de-activated 18,000 nuclear weapons; we are prepared to
cut the U.S. and Russian strategic arsenals by 80% from their Cold War
levels. We've also cut our stockpiles of shorter-range tactical
nuclear weapons by 90%.
So when we urge the Indians and Pakistanis to call off their own
nuclear-arms and ballistic-missile race before it's too late, we are
practicing what we preach. And when we urge nuclear restraint and warn
about the nuclear danger, it is not from a position of smug
superiority. Rather, it's from a position of having been there and
done that; we're trying to share the cautionary lessons of our own
experience.
The second half of the 20th century has unfolded under the shadow of
the mushroom cloud. The U.S. played its own role in keeping that
sometimes frightening drama from becoming a tragedy, and now we're
doing everything we can to lift the cloud from the next century.
Let me turn now to the sanctions that the U.S. imposed on both
countries in the wake of the tests. They were necessary for several
reasons. First, it's the law. Second, sanctions create a disincentive
for other states to exercise the nuclear option if they are
contemplating it. And third, sanctions are part of our effort to keep
faith with the much larger number of nations that have renounced
nuclear weapons despite their capacity to develop them. Several of
those nations are living proof that having nuclear weapons is not a
prerequisite for survival or security.
Our sanctions mean the suspension of military and related technology
transfers; they mean stopping most U.S. financial assistance and
cutting off foreign assistance programs with the exception of food aid
and other humanitarian initiatives, since the purpose of the sanctions
is to influence the practices of governments, not to hurt those in
need.
The Brookings/CFR Joint Task Force has pointed out that congressionally
mandated sanctions are often a blunt instrument and unilateral
sanctions are worse than that, since they can have the perverse effect
of isolating the country that imposes them rather than the countries on
which they are imposed. I'm convinced that, in this case, we have
mitigated both dangers.
First, we have worked assiduously and I believe quite successfully with
Congress to develop a firm but flexible regime for implementation of
the sanctions. We have found there is a high degree of bipartisan
support for two propositions: that the U.S. must engage with India and
Pakistan as constructively as possible, and also that we must strike a
balance between our profound differences over the tests and our equally
profound desire to see them continue to develop as strong, safe,
prosperous democracies. We have already taken advantage of the targeted
waiver authority that the law now provides the President so that he can
facilitate progress on non-proliferation -- more about that in a moment
-- and also so that he can ensure that there are no unnecessary and
unintended consequences for our other interests that are at stake in
the region.
Specifically, we have decided to resume support for U.S. business and
investment through programs under the auspices of the Overseas Private
Investment Corporation, the Ex-Im Bank, and the Trade and Development
Agency. The U.S. also decided to waive restrictions on lending by
private U.S. banks and to bolster our military-to-military contacts by
restoring modest education and training programs. Finally, we have
signaled our support for the IMF's efforts to help Pakistan avert a
total economic collapse.
As for the concern and the criticism that the U.S. has reacted
unilaterally to the challenge posed by the tests, nothing could be
further from the truth. From the outset, we have been working in
concert with many other countries.
Let me be more specific. The UN Security Council, the Group of Eight
major industrialized nations, and the P-5 have each endorsed a set of
benchmarks that provide for the Indians and Pakistanis a map of the
path away from the nuclear brink and back into the mainstream of the
those countries that are part of the solution to the problem of
proliferation rather than being part of the problem itself. An
unprecedented ad-hoc task force of over a dozen nuclear and non-nuclear
weapons states, including several that abandoned nuclear-weapons
aspirations or status -- countries such as Brazil, Argentina and
Ukraine -- joined in forging a common response. So have regional
groupings such as the European Union, the Organization of American
States, the ASEAN Regional Forum, the Gulf Cooperation Council, the
Organization of the Islamic Conference, and several others.
It is very much in the framework of this international consensus that
we have conducted our own bilateral efforts. At the time of the tests
in May, President Clinton and Secretary Albright asked me to go to work
with the Indians and Pakistanis on three goals that we believe reflect
everyone's interests -- theirs, ours, and the world's: one, preventing
an escalation of nuclear and missile competition in the region; two,
strengthening the global non-proliferation regime; and three, promoting
a dialogue between India and Pakistan on the long-term improvement of
their relations, including on the subject of Kashmir.
So far, I've held six rounds of discussions with my Indian counterpart,
Jaswant Singh, the Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission, and I'll
be holding a seventh in Rome next week. On a parallel track, I've held
seven rounds with Shamshad Ahmad, the Foreign Secretary of Pakistan,
including one just last Wednesday here in Washington.
Two principles have guided the American side of this effort:
First, we remain committed to the common position of the P-5, G-8, and
South Asia Task Force, notably including on the long-range goal of
universal adherence to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. We do not
and will not concede, even by implication, that India and Pakistan have
established themselves as nuclear-weapons states under the NPT. Unless
and until they disavow nuclear weapons and accept safeguards on all
their nuclear activities, they will continue to forfeit the full
recognition and benefits that accrue to members in good standing of the
NPT.
This is a crucial and immutable guideline for our policy, not least
because otherwise, we would break faith with the states that foreswore
a capability they could have acquired -- and we would inadvertently
provide an incentive for any country to blast its way into the ranks of
the nuclear-weapons states.
Our second principle applies to the near and medium term, and to the
practice of diplomacy as the art of the possible. We recognize that
any progress toward a lasting solution must be based on India's and
Pakistan's conceptions of their own national interests. We're under no
illusions that either country will alter or constrain its defense
programs under duress or simply because we've asked it to. That's why
we've developed proposals for near-term steps that are, we believe,
fully consistent with the security requirements that my Indian and
Pakistani counterparts articulated at the outset of our discussions.
The Prime Ministers of both nations have said publicly that they seek
to define those requirements at the lowest possible levels.
In other words, while universal NPT adherence remains our long-term
goal, we are not simply going to give India and Pakistan the cold
shoulder until they take that step. We are working intently with both
countries to encourage them to take five practical steps that would
help avoid a destabilizing nuclear and missile competition and more
generally reduce tensions on the subcontinent and bolster our global
non-proliferation goals. Let me say a few words on each step.
First, we have urged India and Pakistan to sign and ratify the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, or CTBT. There has been some progress
in that direction. Both countries have declared voluntary moratoriums
on further testing, and at the United Nations in September the two
Prime Ministers pointed their governments toward CTBT adherence within
a year. We hope that India and Pakistan will take that step as soon as
possible, and we applaud the work that the Prime Ministers have done in
their respective countries to build public support for an agreement
that has long been demonized but that now, in the wake of the tests in
May, represents an opportunity to stabilize the region.
The second step we are urging India and Pakistan to take in the near
future is to halt all production of fissile material, which constitutes
the essential building block of nuclear weapons. On this point, too,
there have been some encouraging developments. The agreement earlier
this year of India and Pakistan to join talks at the Conference on
Disarmament in Geneva on a fissile material cutoff treaty allowed those
long-stalled discussions to go forward. This agreement could be an
important milestone in promoting international acceptance of a key
principle of nuclear arms control.
But even if, as we hope, those negotiations go well and move forward
quickly, completion and formal entry into force of a cutoff treaty is
still several years away. To prevent accumulation of fissile material
during that time, we urge India and Pakistan to join the other nations
that have conducted nuclear test explosions in announcing that they
will refrain from producing fissile material for nuclear weapons,
pending conclusion of a treaty.
The third key objective of our discussions with the Indians and the
Pakistanis involves limitations on the development and deployment of
missiles and aircraft capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction.
The point here is that the testing of explosive devices is not the only
threat to peace. Unless both India and Pakistan exercise genuine
restraint and great care, the delivery systems themselves could become
a source of tension and could by their nature and disposition increase
the incentive to attack first in a crisis. They could also increase
the risk that weapons would be used as a result of accident or
miscalculation. That's why, in keeping with their stated desire to
define their security requirements at the lowest possible levels, we
have urged our Indian and Pakistani counterparts to consider strategic
restraint measures -- a package of prudent constraints on the
development, flight testing, and storage of missiles, and also on the
basing of nuclear-capable aircraft.
The principles of prudence and restraint also apply to the fourth issue
we have raised with our Indian and Pakistani counterparts: tightened
export controls on sensitive materials and technologies that could be
used in the development of weapons of mass destruction. Both countries
have good track records on which to build in this regard, and both have
agreed that it makes sense to bring their existing policies and regimes
up to international standards. Hence, our discussions have moved
beyond the realm of principle into that of the practical, including the
exchange of information and expertise.
While the first four benchmarks deal with the overt manifestations of
the Indo-Pakistani nuclear competition, the fifth deals with the
underlying causes: the long-standing tensions and disputes between the
two. My Indian colleague Jaswant Singh often says that India and
Pakistan are "born of the same womb." Yet they have been prisoners of
their animosity and distrust. No amount of diplomatic exertion on our
part, on non-proliferation or any other subject, will have much effect
unless and until India and Pakistan can liberate themselves from their
own enmity. And while we and others can help through our good offices
with both, that liberation will occur only through direct, high-level,
frequent, and, above all, productive dialogue between the two of them.
In this crucial respect, we have seen some favorable developments,
especially the resumption of talks between the two foreign secretaries
in Islamabad last month. They are talking about Kashmir, they are
talking about confidence-building measures, about better communications
between civilian and military experts, about bus lines across the
border, about trading in energy.
Moreover, India and Pakistan are far more likely to move toward
stabilizing their military competition and -- we would hope --
ultimately meeting the non-proliferation benchmarks that we and the
international community are urging them to take -- if each knows,
through bilateral dialogue, what the other is doing and planning.
In that spirit, we hope that direct contacts between India and Pakistan
will not only complement but eventually supersede the efforts of the
United States. We hope that for two reasons. First, it would be as it
should be: two great countries dealing directly, normally, and
peacefully with each other to their mutual benefit and in pursuit of
their many mutual interests. Second, a breakthrough between India and
Pakistan would allow us, the United States, to get on with the task
that President Clinton set for us before the tests: developing the
kind of broad-gauge, forward-looking bilateral relationships with these
two countries, each in its own right, that they and we want and
deserve.
Meanwhile -- and I suspect it will be a fairly long meanwhile -- we
will continue to work the challenges and the dilemmas at hand. We will
also continue to be open to thinking outside the box, and that comes
from outside the Government. With that in mind, let me conclude this
progress report with a reiteration of my thanks for what Brookings and
the CFR have already done in this regard -- and with an invitation for
more help in the form of your comments and questions now.