The decolonization of the Maghreb (Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia) confronted the United States and the Soviet Union with challenging and similar dilemmas. The process of decolonization took place at the peak of the Cold War, a time of high tension in many places around the globe. The two superpowers' difficulties stemmed from the challenge not only of calculating how best to preserve their vital interests in the region and maintain their good relationship with France, the colonial power, but also of reconciling this need with winning over the colonial peoples seeking independence from France, thus preventing them from joining the rival's bloc. Whereas decolonization of Morocco and Tunisia caused minimal tension between France and the two superpowers due to the less bloody features of the process, the moderation of the nationalist leaders, and the nature of the colonial status of these two protectorates, the war of liberation (1954-62) in Algeria - a country "legally" part of France - presented a much more complex predicament.
This study analyses the roles played by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in the decolonization of the Maghreb countries. Its working hypothesis is that both superpowers pursued similar policies aimed at reconciling contradictory objectives to safeguard their own strategic, political, and economic interests. Owing to the importance they accorded to their respective relationships with France, they sought to appease the colonial power while simultaneously trying to gain the friendship of the nationalist movements opposed to it. In this context, the primary consideration of the two superpowers was not to hasten the independence of the Maghrebi countries, but, in fact, at least until the late 1950s to delay it because of the uncertainty and power vacuum this would create, and in the case of the U.S. to guide it within a western context. The main goal for both superpowers was to pursue policies which would avoid alienating either of the protagonists, thus securing the objectives each had set for itself and to defeat the other in the zero-sum context of the East-West confrontation. Furthermore, in their rivalry to win over the "hearts and minds" of the Algerian nationalists and, by extension those of other emerging nations, the Soviets were more effective because of their opportunistic approach which consisted of providing considerable support to the Algerian nationalists once convinced that the independence of Algeria was inevitable. Although holding the same conviction regarding the inevitability of the outcome, the U.S., due mostly to the importance of France in the western alliance, coupled with hesitations within the American bureaucracy as to the attitude to be adopted towards anticolonialist movements, continued to support its NATO ally, thus failing to demonstrate authentic empathy for the aspirations of the nationalists. The most immediate consequential outcomes of such an ambivalent policy were continued misperceptions in U.S.-Algerian relations until the mid-1980s and America's failure to bring Algeria within the western camp, one of U.S. proclaimed objectives throughout the 1950s and early 1960s.
I
Paradoxically, perhaps, both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. saw the Maghreb as an integral part of France's undisputed colonial empire. The Soviets' attitude towards the evolution of the situation in the Maghreb was contingent upon France's standing in the international system. Further, their information regarding the region was furnished by the French Communist Party (P.C.F.), whose perspectives on the colonies were practically identical to those of the French government, that is, that the Maghreb countries must remain in the French union. The acceleration and increasing strength of Maghrebi nationalism and the turmoil which characterized the North African colonies after World War II made little impression on Joseph Stalin, who, unlike his successors in the 1950s, and despite the geopolitical aptitude attributed to him, failed to perceive the Maghreb as an extension of the Middle East, the Moslem world, or even the Mediterranean.(1) The anticolonial struggle waged in the Maghreb was virtually disregarded, except at the rhetorical level when it was acknowledged in such forums as the United Nations. Furthermore, the nationalist leaders did not appeal to Stalin, who viewed them as mere puppets or "lackeys" of imperialism, deserving no particular respect.(2) The Soviets mistrusted the political and ideological inclinations of the Maghrebi nationalist leaders due to the latter's contacts with American officials whose support they solicited in their anticolonial struggle. In general, despite some communist influence within their movement, Maghrebi nationalists were anticommunist and had hope that the Americans might exert some pressure on France in favour of their cause.(3)
Several reasons explain Moscow's indifference to the nationalist wave in the Maghreb. First, concern over the evolution of the situation in Europe was paramount. A constant in Soviet policy was that the interests of Soviet socialism and the preservation of the security and the boundaries of socialism must have priority over national liberation movements.(4) Second, France emerged as a potential "ally" owing to objective analogous interests regarding Germany and U.S. presence in Europe. A third reason was that the Soviets were more committed to thwarting what they perceived as American attempts to supplant France in the region than to contesting French colonial control in the Maghreb and elsewhere. This explains why Americans played a much more active role in the Maghreb than did the Soviets. But, it was this vigorous role assumed by the U.S. which compelled the Soviets and the French to be equally distrustful of American objectives in the Maghreb. Therefore, not surprisingly, Stalin's policy consisted in preserving the status quo in the French colonies and in preventing them from becoming part of the American sphere of influence. The Soviet government, through the media over which it always had fall monopoly, even accused "France's ruling circles" of consenting "to the inclusion of the French Union in America's sphere of influence."(5) Similarly, French officials and public opinion alike accused the Americans of undermining France's authority in the region by backing Maghrebi nationalists and were persuaded in the late 1940s and 1950s that the U.S. was determined to replace France as the colonial power in Morocco.(6)
America's globalism in the postwar era aroused both in France and in the U.S.S.R. strong suspicions regarding its intentions in the Maghreb, despite American determination to help rebuild the economies of the colonial powers and to restore their predominance in their colonies to prevent a power vacuum favourable to Soviet expansion. This perception was already manifest during the war when the U.S., through President Franklin Roosevelt, gave the impression that it might help Maghrebi nationalist leaders,(7) although there is little evidence that the U.S. had such intention. However, despite its lack of support for the nationalists and its recognition of France's colonial empire, as stipulated in the Anfa Accords of 1943,(8) the U.S. was much more cognizant than the U.S.S.R. of the overall value of the Maghreb. Policy planners in the Department of Defense (D.O.D.) were conscious of the significance of the region's strategic location both during the war and afterwards, which explains their insistence on implanting the maximum number of military bases in the region. But, although a few indicators show that the U.S. aspired to establish a commanding presence in the Maghreb, there is no significant proof to demonstrate any real desire to supplant France by extending any kind of support to the nationalists to achieve independence. Yet, undoubtedly, in the almost impossible task of trying to reconcile the demands on it from both the colonized and the colonizers, the U.S. ended up pursuing policies whose inevitable contradictions gave credence to the accusations levelled against it by the French on the one hand, and the Soviets on the other, and led the nationalists to question America's principled commitment to self-determination of colonial peoples, embodied in the Atlantic Charter.
In addition to the military bases acquired during the war in Morocco and Libya - which policy planners were determined to keep - Americans already possessed considerable financial holdings and pursued more aggressive economic policies in the area.(9) Unquestionably, there was in America an anticolonialist trend which, for moralistic, historical, and economic reasons, supported the anticolonial struggles waged in the Third World. In the Atlantic Charter both the U.S. and Great Britain pledged to respect the right of all peoples to choose their own form of government and to support the restoration of sovereign rights and self-rule for those who lost them through force. This was clearly the most attractive and promising aspect of the Charter for the Maghrebis. Still, despite the nationalists' endeavour to obtain their decolonization within a western context by reiterating their attachment to the West and, in the case of Morocco, even by applying for membership in NATO,(10) the U.S. could not fulfill its promise to help them recover their independence. The American dilemma was most apparent during the war.(11) Although the necessity to thwart Soviet penetration of the region had become paramount under Truman, the policy towards the nationalists, whose help in containing "Soviet expansionism" was deemed crucial, remained ambivalent due to the nature of U.S. objectives after 1945.
Unquestionably, America's primary objective under Truman was to consolidate the Atlantic alliance through economic and military assistance to the European powers to help them recover from the consequences of the war. This assistance contributed to strengthening the capacity of these powers to restructure their empires and perpetuate their exclusive domination. Such aid facilitated these powers' control in the colonies through economic programs aimed at curbing the rise of anti-colonialist movements. Whether intentional or not, the outcome of such a policy was a strengthening of European colonialism as a rampart against the spread of communism. Therefore, concerning the Maghreb, U.S. recognition of France's full and exclusive domination in North Africa was unavoidable. American policymakers were fearful that any American attempt to undermine French control there would backfire and only produce dissension within the alliance, an occurrence likely to be exploited by the U.S.S.R. and by the local communists. This is precisely why the U.S. government was distressed by the growing public and official suspicions in France towards America and was fearful that if such suspicions persisted, "the foundations of the North Atlantic Pact will be destroyed as far as French public opinion is concerned."(12)
America's worry was that the end of European hegemony in the Maghreb and elsewhere would leave a power vacuum, hence providing the opportunity for the Soviets to penetrate the region. Even if fully aware that "the people of the United States have maintained a traditional attitude of sympathetic understanding and encouragement towards dependent peoples striving for political freedom,"(13) American policymakers felt that "in most dependent areas of the world the security interests of the United States will best be served by a policy of support for the Western Colonial Powers, coupled as necessary with suggestions to them for the acceleration of political, economic, and social development,"(14) although the "fundamental psychological alignment of the American people must be taken into account in the formulation of United States policy." There was, however, a certain American willingness to distance itself from unpopular European policies and not to be lettered by its ties to European powers because, "in any given colonial issue, the United States must make a determination as to whether its security interests are best served by a support of the position of the colonial power or by the efforts to bring adjustments in the direction of the demands of nationalist groups."(15) Essentially, this realist attitude was motivated less by concern for the speedy decolonization of the region than by concern that the Soviets might be able to exploit western policies. American policymakers were conscious that Soviet Russia's attempts to depict itself as the ally of the oppressed peoples would eventually sway anticolonial movements; therefore their goal was "to prevent the Soviet Union from being regarded as the champion of colonial peoples."(16) The U.S. could achieve this mission in various ways: by accepting the reality of nationalism, by guiding the movement rather than opposing it, by supporting noncommunist nationalist movements in collaboration with the colonial powers, by integrating the dependent countries into the western world and ensuring that they would remain friendly to the West, and by helping in the economic development of these countries and establishing economic links that would also guarantee American access to the raw materials available in these countries. Nonetheless, the American dilemma remained that of securing the friendship of the colonial peoples without alienating the colonial powers with which it was allied.
This dilemma prevailed throughout the 1950s in the Maghreb; but, increasingly some officials held that if the policy discussed above, as it applied to the Maghreb, had any chance of succeeding it must necessarily move in one of two possible directions: either continued backing for the French, "qualified by insistence on certain limited reforms which do not threaten French control yet ease nationalist pressure in the area," or continued support for the French, "qualified by insistence that the French gradually reconcile themselves to nationalist pressure and ease the area's evolution towards responsible independence."(17)
Interestingly, the American position mirror-imaged that of the U.S.S.R., for each viewed the danger as stemming from the other in the zero-sum-game rivalry rather than from any ideologically-determined attempt to help the dependent peoples obtain their independence. The Maghrebis themselves were increasingly aware that the friendship of the "liberators" was not disinterested.(18)
By the 1950s, the U.S. had become a key player in Morocco and Tunisia. Indeed, the pro-Western and anticommunist inclination of the leaders of the nationalist movement compelled the Soviets to favour France's continued presence in the Maghreb to America's. But, the Americans, although still providing considerable support to the French position in North Africa, felt that France was becoming increasingly incapable of instituting meaningful reforms. American policymakers were progressively convinced that the lack of serious socio-economic reforms in the Maghreb strengthened the position of the nationalists. Further, some American officials expressed fear that the "Fr[ench] by themselves will not be able to maintain stability regardless of what course they take."(19) This explains why the U.S. government insisted on its continued interest in the Maghreb's political affairs and was thus less inclined than before to blindly endorse French policies.(20)
Meanwhile, Moscow's main preoccupation remained Europe. In order to achieve their objectives on the continent, Soviet policymakers had to maintain an especially friendly relationship with France. Clearly, keeping France as an interlocuteur valable was more realistic than backing the Maghrebi nationalist elites whose fidelity they could not rely on anyway. However, unlike the Americans, the Soviets were not only critical of French colonial policies, as they conveyed through their media,(21) but they also continually and effectively endorsed raising the Tunisian and Moroccan (and later Algerian) questions at the United Nations.(22) The U.S., on the other hand, albeit unenthusiastically and despite believing that the U.N. was indeed "competent to discuss such problems,"(23) supported France on every possible occasion(24) in order to demonstrate its attachment to its friendship and alliance with France and to allay French fears of an alleged American desire to supplant it in the region. But, the U.S. was also painstakingly seeking not to cut itself off from the nationalist movement for fear of alienating the Afro-Asian and Arab countries which were strongly supportive of Maghrebi self-determination. This explains such official statements as Secretary of State John Foster Dulles's that "there is no slightest wavering in our conviction that the orderly transition from colonial to self-governing status should be carried to a completion."(25) Nevertheless, the U.S. was still unwilling as yet to endorse the independence of the Maghrebi countries. While emphasizing the necessity of preserving U.S. security interests in the region, both D.O.D. and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (J.C.S.) were opposed to "the premature establishment of self-government" so as to "avoid undermining the position of responsibility to our NATO partner, France."(26)
In sum, in the context of the Cold War, the U.S. was unwilling to sacrifice its alliance with France on the altar of the nationalists' ideals and was reluctant to take into account "the fundamental psychological alignment of the American people in the formulation of United States policy." The major American objectives in the Maghreb remained the same: a) ". . . to insure that the area and its resources are available to the United States and its allies. . .; b) to prevent the extension of Soviet influence and communist ideology within the area; c) to increase stability within the area; d) to insure the association of the peoples of the area with the free world."(27) The various U.S. government agencies seemed to concur that the major danger in the Maghreb did not stem from the menace of a direct Soviet incursion, but rather from "the conflict between native nationalism and the French position."(28) Further, increasing self-government for Tunisia and Morocco looked to U.S. policymakers inevitable because of the little progress made by the French in the realm of socio-economic reforms. But, the U.S. was unwilling to openly endorse it, for, maintaining the existence of American military bases and building new ones in the Maghreb appeared more certain under French control in the area than with an independent Morocco and Tunisia, although the nationalists gave clear indications that they would continue cooperating both politically and militarily with the West. The U.S. planned on pursuing what it described as a "middle-of-the road" policy in North Africa; but, it did foresee the possibility of tilting towards the nationalists and openly favouring independence in case French control in the area broke down.(29) This, though, was only a contingency; in the meantime, whatever support the Maghrebi nationalists drew came from American public opinion, the media, the business community, and labour organizations,(30) and not from the U.S. government. From that government's perspective, official support, if any, must be discreet and cautious lest it infuriate the French.
II
After Stalin died in March 1953, Soviet policy in the Maghreb remained virtually unaltered despite some noticeable changes towards other emerging countries. The Kremlin's main focus remained its relationship with America and the evolution of the situation in Europe. Moscow's priority consisted in preventing German rearmament and Germany's integration into NATO. Aware of France's historical fear of a strong Germany, the Soviets sought to persuade the French to withstand American manoeuvres to incorporate Germany into NATO. Unquestionably, Soviet attitudes and policy towards French North Africa were contingent upon French-Soviet relations. Further, until 1955, Soviet policymakers were still immersed in issues relating to Stalin's succession and the consolidation of power of the collective leadership that replaced him.
Regarding the Maghreb, Soviet assessments of the developments in the: region still depended heavily on the P.C.F.'s distorted reports. The primary target of their verbal bellicosity opposing imperialism was the U.S. rather than France. Consequently, when the situation exploded in Algeria on 1 November 1954, the Soviets displayed no reaction. The P.C.F., on the other hand, described the uprising as an act of terrorism orchestrated by provocateurs. Undoubtedly, the P.C.F.'s position reflected Soviet policy, which relegated solidarity with Third World peoples to a secondary position, for Soviet Russia's foremost objective was to take advantage of every opportunity to disunite the Atlantic alliance.(31) Indeed, in the years 1954 and 1955 Russian policymakers were still striving to persuade the French that it was against their national interest to endorse the rearming of West Germany, albeit within the structures of the Western alliance, thereby submitting to American and British hegemony. They contended that if the U.S. were allowed to impose its will on France, the latter would lose its independence and regress to the position of an impotent power, thus creating instability in Europe. The Soviets made it plain that they preferred an independent and powerful France with its military remaining outside the framework of a supranational organization.(32)
The other, perhaps secondary reason why Moscow adopted a cautious and ambiguous attitude towards the Algerian uprising stemmed not only from mistrust of Arab neutralism - Iraq had joined the Baghdad Pact in February 1955(33) - but also from the membership of the Algerian Front de Liberation Nationale (F.L.N),(34) whose overwhelmingly peasant and anticommunist origin elicited scant enthusiasm from the state-controlled think-tanks and policymakers alike. Yet, in spring of 1955, when France was clearly not likely to pursue the policy wished for by the Soviets on European issues, the Kremlin published statements insinuating relative endorsement for national liberation movements in the Maghreb. Significantly, it was not until then, unofficially of course, that the Algerian war was even referred to in the Soviet media which almost always mirrored the basic point of view of the policymakers in the Kremlin.(35) Although the war was described as a "large-scale peasant uprising against the colonial yoke," at least some Soviet analysts perceived the existence of a growing "working class within the [national liberation] movement."(36) Such an appraisal, although there is little evidence to determine by whom it was inspired, reveals the rigidity of Soviet analyses, which always needed to follow the "correct" ideological line, and their dismal knowledge regarding the anticommunist nature of the nationalist movements in the region.
The internationalization of the Maghrebi struggle against French colonialism and the sponsorship it earned at the Bandung Conference, held in Indonesia in April 1955, found echoes in the Kremlin. The Soviets could not afford to sound less supportive of national liberation movements than China, still their ally, which at Bandung extended full support to the Maghrebi nationalists.(37) Whereas the Chinese restricted themselves to describing the struggle as national, anticolonial, and anti-imperialist, Soviet analysts, clinging to the Marxist-Leninist framework - which could never be challenged(38) - depicted the straggle in the Maghreb as one directed by the communists who, they said, were about to form a "single anti-imperialist front."(39)
Whatever the ideological rationale behind it, this was an unbelievable representation of the situation, for, in reality, the communists in the Maghreb were totally alienated from the nationalist movements.(40) American policy analysts were somewhat better informed of the situation and knew that only if France persisted in using repressive measures against the nationalists would there be any chance of an alliance between the nationalists and the communists.(41) In fact, not even in Algeria did the American fear of an enduring entente between communists and nationalists materialize because of communist misjudgments regarding the colonial question - which they made contingent upon the victory of the proletariat in the metropolis. The Algerian communists, who, like their counterparts in France, denounced the November insurrection, were estranged from the movement, at least as a party. This, however, did not inhibit the French from brandishing the spectre of communism in the Algerian war and presenting the fight against anticolonialist forces as an anticommunist campaign on behalf of the "free world."
Despite their uncertain disposition towards the insurrection, the Soviets adopted the same attitude on the Algerian question at the U.N. as they did in the case of Morocco and Tunisia, that is, support for including the Algerian question on the U.N. agenda. The Soviet representative, M. Kuznetsov suggested that the U.N. should examine the Algerian question and promote a peaceful settlement, taking into account the interests of the parties concerned. Of course, the Soviet representative took no position on the nature of the struggle in Algeria to avoid irritating the French. Evidently, the Kremlin's objective was simply to assert its leadership in the anticolonial straggle at low cost, for the Soviet vote at the U.N. was of little relevance and, being similar to previous votes, could not jeopardize French-Soviet relations. Still, such a position at the U.N. was appreciated by the nationalists.(42) At bottom, however, the Kremlin still showed no real interest for the Algerian revolutionaries. From the Soviet government's angle, Algeria was part of France, a position reiterated by Nikita Khrushchev just four days after the agenda vote at the U.N.(43) Like the U.S., the U.S.S.R. endeavoured to reconcile two conflicting objectives by assuaging the colonial power and pleasing the nationalist leaders attempting to destroy it.
If Soviet policymakers can be forgiven for not having anticipated the 1954 events in Algeria because of their dependence on the P.C.F. and their lack of direct interest in the region, no such leniency can be granted to American policymakers. Indeed, in a report to which most of the intelligence agencies contributed (D.O.D., C.I.A., J.C.S., army, navy, air force, and others), it was stated that "in Algeria nationalist sentiment is less intense" than in Tunisia or Morocco and that there was "no indication of impending violence."(44) Worse still, the report predicted that "the growth of organized nationalist activity in Algeria will probably lag behind that in adjacent areas. The objectives of many Algerian nationalists are likely to remain moderate in the next few years."(45) As late as October 1954, the National Security Council did not believe that Algerian nationalism represented "an immediate threat to French rule or to Franco-American interests there."(46)
The Algerian insurrection occurred during the first part of the Eisenhower presidency, at the height of the Cold War. In the fall 1953, the U.S.S.R. had exploded a hydrogen bomb, thus strengthening its strategic and political potential in the ideological struggle with the U.S. The Korean War had enticed both China and the U.S.S.R. to initiate a comprehensive global program (political, economic, cultural) to seduce the emerging states in the Third World. These factors, coupled with the surge of McCarthyism and the wave of anticommunism in America, compelled the Eisenhower administration to intensify the Cold War and to continue the policy of containment.(47) Significant too is the influential role played by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, whose strong anticommunist bias and disdain for African non-alignment made it plain that support for the emerging nations was much less important than containment of the communist menace. Therefore, despite public statements on self-determination, including Eisenhower's,(48) attitudes towards decolonization were fashioned by strategic and tactical motives.
U.S. reaction to the insurrection in Algeria was as cautious as the U.S.S.R.'s. Although initially uncertain, the Eisenhower administration decided to provide the essential military equipment, especially helicopters, to France to crush the Algerian insurgents.(49) French troops were removed from Germany in 1955 to be dispatched to Algeria, and the French government solicited Anglo-Saxon support in the name of NATO solidarity and the crusade against communism in North Africa.(50) American support for France was implicit rather than outright, presumably to avoid giving the impression of interference in France's domestic affairs. But, the U.S. was somewhat reluctant to provide such aid to France because "the North African nationalists tend to associate the United States with the painful repressions imposed upon them by these troops," and because both the defence and state departments "are seeking to prevent the use of this equipment for such purposes and to urge the return of MDAP [Mutual Defense Assistance Program! equipped forces to the European theater."(51) The requests made by D.O.D. for additional military bases in Algeria and Tunisia were opposed by France, thus compelling the U.S. military to study alternative locations. Despite its middle-of-the road policy, the U.S. did not succeed in allaying French apprehensions regarding objectives in the Maghreb. Because it depended on France for the extremely valuable bases in Morocco and because of the importance of France in Europe and in the NATO alliance, the U.S. could not make any "shift of our policy towards more support for the nationalists against France."(52) The U.S. thus resigned itself to hoping that the French would enunciate reforms which would make its presence less contested. Even Eisenhower seemed exasperated by the dilemma America was facing.(53)
French distrust of the U.S. increased after Moroccan and Tunisian independence on 2 March and 20 March 1956, respectively. In view of its particular objectives in the area, the U.S. instituted friendly relations with these two newly independent countries (hoping they would mediate between the French and the Algerian nationalists) and, although they viewed Algeria's status differently, Americans wished for a speedy denouement of the conflict. This U.S. attitude seemed to have been partly prompted by the Soviet decision, made at the 20th C.P.S.U. Congress, to undertake a "new course" in foreign policy. The U.S. was greatly concerned that the Algerian war would not only continue to deplete France's resources and enfeeble NATO, but would also have a harmful effect on the Arab/Afro/Asian world, which the U.S. wished to sway. Simultaneously, American policymakers resisted any action that might offend France, for a deterioration in French-American relations was already discernible in mid-1955.(54)
The war in Algeria was seen by American policymakers as a threat to their country's national interest. Therefore a quick resolution, brought about by France, "the only competent power," was considered the inevitable option. Following Moroccan and Tunisian independence, American policy towards the Maghreb included, inter alia, the following objectives:
1. Encourage Morocco and Tunisia to maintain friendly relations with France - an objective quite difficult to achieve in view of the popularity of and support for the Algerian cause in the region.
2. Use Moroccan and Tunisian nationalism as a bulwark against Egyptian and Soviet influence in the Maghreb. But, the continuation of the Algerian war would prevent the moderate elites from fulfilling such a task.
3. Maintain U.S. military bases in Morocco and renegotiate their use with its Sultan.
4. Integrate countries of the region into the western world through economic co-operation, technical assistance, and like means. France must continue to play the key role.
5. Help France in its "psychological and political adjustment to the rapid loss of its external territories."
6. Limit the damage on the Arab and Afro-Asian world caused by U.S. support to France in the Algerian war.
7. Seek Moroccan and Tunisian help in moderating demands of the Algerian nationalists.
8. Dispel any suspicions among the French that Americans are intent on replacing them in the region. Assure them of U.S. readiness to help them maintain their influence.
9. Prevent the Soviets from exploiting the Algerian situation to their own advantage.(55)
Despite the difficulty of reconciling such objectives, U.S. policymakers were convinced of their soundness and urged that they be realized. The apparent contradictions seemed in fact to reflect growing dissension within the different policy-making institutions as to how best preserve American interests.
III
America's middle-of-the road policy in North Africa was not gratifying, for despite the almost unconditional backing it offered France, the French continued to be highly suspicious of American objectives in the Maghreb, France's chasse gardee. In March 1956, Douglas Dillon, U.S. ambassador to France, and Henry Cabot Lodge, representative at the U.N., were distressed by the strong anti-American sentiment in France. In their judgement, the French were convinced that the U.S. was opposed to their position in Algeria.(56) A similar feeling was prevalent amid the colonial administration in Algeria, where French authorities were now openly charging the Americans with pursuing double tactics.(57) Relations between the two allies had reached such a low ebb that the U.S. government felt compelled to issue a public statement through its ambassador in Paris in which he reiterated American support for France, stressing that "Algeria is an internal French problem and therefore not appropriate for discussion by the U.N."(58)
When speaking about America's anticolonialist tradition, Dillon made a statement curiously similar to the one issued in 1939 by Maurice Thorez, secretary general of the P.C.F., regarding the freedom of dependent peoples: "It [such freedom] by no means requires a rupture between the peoples that have newly acquired their freedom and those that have led them along the path of this freedom"(59) Moreover, in a comment nearly identical to that of Khrushchev's made around the same period, Dillon assured the French that they have "our profound sympathy and support in [their] attempt to work out a liberal solution to this difficult problem of coexistence [. . .] The United States stays solidly behind France in her search for a liberal and equitable solution of the problems in Algeria." Dillon's reports which often displayed, albeit subtly, sympathy for the French position, added, despite the absence of any evidence,(60) that "there have been external [that is, Communist and Egyptian! influences at work trying to undermine the French position throughout North Africa."(61) America's solid commitment to France was, in fact, further evidenced shortly thereafter when the U.S. supported the diversion of two additional divisions from NATO and allowed priority delivery of helicopters to France.(62)
The administration was fully aware that although Dillon's speech generated favourable responses in France "there may be adverse reactions in the Moslem countries."(63) Indeed, both Moroccan and Tunisian leaderships expressed discontent with the speech. But, concurrently, the hijacking of the Moroccan airplane carrying five Algerian nationalist leaders (guests of Mohamed V, who was trying to mediate in the conflict) flying to Tunis from Rabat, had disastrous effects on France's relations with Tunisia and Morocco. This event added to the latter countries' willingness to establish solid relations with the U.S. to improve their position with France.(64) For the Algerian revolutionaries the situation was quite different because those leaders who were hopeful that the U.S. would perhaps distance itself from France in the Algerian affair, became disillusioned with the Americans and, eventually, began to look eastward for support.(65) The United States was fearful that unless something tangible were undertaken in the Maghreb, Soviet influence and arms would be coming in. One of the major American objectives - although recognizing its limits in influencing the two Maghrebi governments - was to prevent the establishment of diplomatic relations between Tunisia and Morocco with the Soviet Union.(66)
IV
By 1956, Soviet policy towards the colonial world displayed signs of a drastic shift. The attitude towards movements of national liberation and the role played by the "national bourgeoisies" in these movements showed indications of marked change.(67) In opposition to the Stalinist dogma which denied the notion that states not ruled by communist regimes could ever achieve true independence, Soviet policymakers began to qualify their objections. In the report presented at the famous Twentieth Party Congress, Khrushchev proclaimed that "the present disintegration of the imperialist colonial system is a postwar development of world-historic significance."(68) He ingeniously underlined the significance of political freedom in relationship to economic freedom. Khrushchev expressed his admiration for the new nations that conducted independent foreign policies and proposed economic aid to them on the condition they refused to commit themselves to military alliances with the western bloc. In a complete ideological turnabout, Soviet ideologists did not deem it essential that these countries adopt socialist economies modelled on the Soviet system. Indeed, a Soviet theorist and ideologue argued that the fight for political and economic independence was in itself an anti-imperialist struggle that undermined capitalist predominance and strengthened the Socialist camp.(69)
Although Soviet perspectives on the new nations were quite inconsistent, genuine attempts were undertaken to persuade the main think-tanks to work in earnest to determine the real conditions existing in the emerging nations,(70) and scholars began travelling to Africa and elsewhere to provide more accurate analyses.(71)
The change in Soviet policy coincided with the independence of Morocco and Tunisia, for which neither country - except for the support both obtained at the U.N. - owed anything to the U.S.S.R. The Kremlin's bellicosity towards Morocco's Istiqlal and Tunisia's Neo-Destour nationalist parties came to an end in that period. These parties had been the target of Soviet insults for soliciting American support in their dispute with France.(72) By 1956, especially after Khrushchev's declaration regarding different roads to socialism, the prerequisite of a social revolution contained in the old Stalinist doctrine was abandoned. This helps elucidate the Kremlin's turnabout towards Morocco and Tunisia shortly after recovering their independence. Moscow now had the opportunity to endcavour to develop good relations with these freshly independent nations.(73) The main objective was, of course, to use economic and technical aid, a short-term objective, as a way of achieving the long-term goal of accelerating the establishment of pro-Marxist-Leninist regimes. But, while its attitude towards Morocco and Tunisia was consistent with the new approach, the U.S.S.R. manifested no such consistency towards the ongoing battle in Algeria.
The Soviets warmly applauded the independence of Morocco and Tunisia. The Soviet press and officials alike hailed "the stubborn struggle of the Moroccan people against the colonial regime" which "forced the French rulers to make concessions."(74) The writer added that "independence for Morocco and Tunisia has aroused the indignation of French reactionaries" and that "according to the French press, certain sectors of the French public fear that the examples of Morocco and Tunisia may stimulate the national liberation struggle of the Algerian people."(75) Interestingly, though, the French socialist prime minister received the greatest credit because "it is difficult to say how long the decision on Morocco's future would have been postponed, had the Guy Mollet government not come to power."(76) Nikolai Bulganin, chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers and member of the presidium of the communist party, sent "his warmest greetings to Guy Mollet on the successful settlement of the Moroccan and Tunisian problems."(77) Conspicuously absent, however, was any allusion to Mollet's decision to send almost a half million troops to Algeria to repress the insurrection. Unmistakably, Moscow's attitude towards the French regime was dictated by the necessity to provide backing for the P.C.F. in its attempt to forge an alliance with the socialist government and to persevere in its campaign to split the Western alliance. The P.C.F. supported and voted for the "special powers" demanded by the government to quell the Algerian uprising by military means. There are grounds, therefore, for asserting that the Kremlin did not disapprove of the P.C.F.'s vote,(78) which coincided with the period of Dillon's address.
The Soviets were confident that the Mollet government would devise a peaceful settlement to the Algerian problem, perhaps one analogous to that negotiated with Tunisia and Morocco. But, in reality, the Algerian conflict was secondary to Moscow's main preoccupation, namely, the forging of an entente with France, particularly when French-American relations had deteriorated. Hence, in May 1956, two French delegations arrived in Moscow for negotiations. The last meeting (May 15-19), included Guy Mollet and Foreign Minister Christian Pineau.(79) Unavoidably, the Algerian question occupied a sizable place in the discussions. Khrushchev expressed his understanding for the dilemma faced by the Mollet government in resolving the problem. Although the Soviets declined to insert a declaration endorsing French policy in Algeria,(80) they consented to include a paragraph in the final communique in which they "expressed the hope that, in the liberal spirit that animates it, the French government will find it possible to solve this important problem in a manner appropriate to the spirit of our times and the interests of the peoples."(81) In many ways, the Soviets continued to subscribe to the French thesis that Algeria was a French domestic issue. Yet, from a Soviet perspective, this was a token concession, for the Kremlin was convinced that the Mollet government was attuning France's foreign policy to a course more congruent with Soviet objectives concerning questions much more salient than Algeria, notably disarmament, Germany, and peaceful coexistence.(82)
But, by the summer of 1956, the Soviets seemed disillusioned with the socialist government in France because, as perceived by some U.S. analysts in the N.S.C., they "no longer [. . .] consider that mollifying France is useful to the prosecution of Soviet policy towards Germany."(83) Soviet scepticism coincided with a shift in policy on the part of the French (and Algerian) communists towards the war in Algeria. The inability of Mollet to find a solution to the war made it easier for the Soviets to openly criticize the French regime and "the American imperialists in Algeria who seek to take over France's weakening positions there."(84) The Soviets now cautioned the French that time was playing against them because "the old colonial system is being destroyed [. . .] and those who try to oppose this inevitable historical process doom themselves to defeat."(85) But, such pronouncements, as well as Khrushchev's statement on Algerian independence, were credited with exaggerated significance in the American press (for example, an article in the New York Times, 8 July 1956, arguing that the "Soviet leaders finally came out openly for Algerian independence today and expressed sympathy for the fighting Algerian nationalists.") In reality, however, the Soviets were still hopeful that the French might still devise a peaceful solution. Indeed, when in the following year, French apprehensions regarding U.S. intentions in North Africa resurfaced, the Kremlin adroitly avoided making any move or issuing any statement which would favour a healing of the French-American relationship. Moscow's principal goal was to perpetuate French suspicions towards the United States.
Whatever American and Soviet true designs, the Cold War had reached the Maghreb. The independence of Morocco and Tunisia provided Moscow with a window of opportunity to establish a presence in the Maghreb. Following Morocco's independence, Soviet interest grew considerably. By 1957, a trade protocol was signed between the two countries and, despite American attempts to prevent such an occurrence, diplomatic relations were established in September 1958. King Mohamed V's militant neutralism in foreign policy was quite attractive to the Soviets, who provided him with military and economic assistance. In accordance with the agreement signed in November 1960,(86) deliveries of Soviet weapons were made to the kingdom in 1961-62, despite the more pro-western views of King Hassan II, who succeeded his father in 1961, and despite the repression of the pro-Moscow Moroccan Communist party in 1959-60. The main Soviet objective was to convince Morocco to close American military bases and to pursue a non-aligned foreign policy, which would diminish American influence in the country. The Soviets were no longer oblivious of the strategic importance of Morocco. Both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. carefully watched each other's manoeuvers in the Maghreb. The Suez affair strengthened Soviet status in Arab eyes (though also diminishing suspicions towards the U.S. for a certain period) whilst Soviet economic and technical assistance to the newly independent countries raised great concern in Washington.
The Eisenhower administration was anxious that unless the U.S. paid greater attention to the newly independent nations and extended considerable economic aid, Soviet involvement would weaken American interests and influence.(87) Due to Morocco's and Tunisia's pro-western policies, the U.S. succeeded in building friendly relations in the Maghreb. Eisenhower was especially impressed with Habib Bourguiba, whose pro-western sentiments were well-known.(88) Both he and King Mohamed V sought to persuade the Americans that unless the Algerian question was resolved, western interests in the region would be at risk, an assessment widely shared by American officials.(89) Indeed, Vice President Richard Nixon drew the same conclusion during his stay in Morocco and Tunisia in March 1957. Even though he concurred with Dulles's conviction that the European colonial powers should continue to play the major role in the former colonies and that the U.S. had no design for supplanting their presence in the colonies, Nixon cautioned that Africa would be lost to the Soviet bloc if the U.S. openly supported colonialism. He insisted that America should not choose sides in the Algerian conflict and that the best course for the U.S. remained the containment of communism and assistance to the new nations so that they could survive economically and not fall into the hands of the communists.(90) In practical terms, though, because of the need to preserve concord within the Western alliance, this meant that the United States should be "neutral" - but on France's side.
However, Soviet commentaries on the Nixon tour reveal indubitably that for the Kremlin exploiting French-American differences remained a crucial objective. In an interesting article published in the official Soviet organ, it was argued that the U.S. was using the French-Moroccan disputes to bolster its political and economic predominance in Morocco. Further, the U.S. was said to have extended the Eisenhower Doctrine (the special economic and military program for the Middle East) to cover Morocco, which is not part of the Middle East. Americans were providing economic assistance only to achieve their goal of bringing Morocco under their umbrella. The Soviet analyst, clearly reflecting an official opinion, concluded from Nixon's remarks on the need to aid Morocco that the U.S. was intent on integrating this newly-independent country into NATO.(91) In view of their assessment of U.S.-Moroccan and U.S.-Tunisian ties, it is doubtful whether the Soviets were too favourable to Algeria's independence in that period. In fact, Guy Mollet was told by the Soviet Ambassador to France, Sergei Vonogradov, that "as regards this business of yours in Algeria, it would be bad if Islam were to sweep all over Africa."(92)
In 1957, despite strong American support for France's position at the U.N. (the U.S. blocked a motion in favour of self-determination for the Algerian people),(93) French suspicions about their Anglo-Saxon allies worsened for several reasons. Following the discovery of oil in the Algerian Sahara, the French feared that secret deals might be made between the F.L.N. and the U.S. regarding oil in an independent Algeria.(94) Evidence for the French claims, however, is hard to establish. Further, the U.S. decision to supply small arms to the Tunisian government - after the Franco-Tunisian clashes at the Algerian border - aggravated French suspicions, although the American concession was made to ensure that Tunisia would not acquire arms from Egypt or the U.S.S.R.(95)
V
The absence of a solution in Algeria made American policy in the Maghreb increasingly and conspicuously more untenable. In American eyes, the French had done little to find a solution despite constant U.S. support. Yet, this support, in the absence of a solution, was detrimental to the American position and overall western interests. The continuance of the war discredited France's allies and threatened to open the door to Soviet and Egyptian influence. The contradictions in U.S. policy, due to the difficulty of reconciling the support for a major ally and the need to accommodate to the wave of nationalism, were apparent even to the little-educated Algerian warriors who, obviously, overlooked the realist aspects of American policy:
[T]he United States helps us through the U.N. with wheat and food, and . . . furnishes her ally, France, with the finest military hardware . . . to kill us off. Which way do the Americans want us, dead or alive?(96)
Even though the F.L.N. continued to appeal to America's traditional anti-colonialism,(97) its members became disillusioned with the U.S. government. The F.L.N. sought to convince the U.S. that its support for France was not only a violation of American values, but that it was against American long-term interests in Algeria and in the other Third World countries which supported the Algerian cause.(98) And, trying to play on American fears - as Bourguiba and Mohamed V admirably did(99) - the F.L.N. threatened that it would turn to the East bloc to get weaponry. This threat the Algerians eventually carried out, for, from their perspective, if the U.S. was not willing to see the introduction of Soviet weapons in the region, "is it with hunting rifles . . . that America would like to see the A.L.N. [National Liberation Army] defend itself against the B-26s the U.S. generously grants to those intent on exterminating the A.L.N. . . .?"(100)
However, it was not the F.L.N. threat which led to the minor, yet perceptible, shift in U.S. policy. The change, in fact, emerged from within the Eisenhower administration itself because American policymakers became increasingly concerned that communism was gaining the upper hand over nationalism, especially in Asia.(101) As far as Africa was concerned, these policymakers saw 1958 as a milestone year,(102) which marked the beginning of a re-evaluation of decolonization. Even if the change came more in the form of rhetoric than content, it did indicate a recognition, especially in Congress, of the limitations of the Eurocentric approach to the newly emerging nations. With respect to Algeria, a peaceful settlement of the war was sought because, in addition to bolstering the weight of the two neighbours, it was viewed as the only way to preserve western influence in the region, thus preventing the potential vacuum left by the western elimination from being filled by the U.S.S.R. and pro-Nasserite forces. Evidently, the underlying understanding was that whenever decolonization was given a nudge, the U.S. had to make sure that the newly independent state would be pro-western.
The change in rhetoric may well have been influenced by Senator John F. Kennedy, the most outspoken critic of the U.S. position on the Algerian question. Indeed, on 2 July 1957, Kennedy delivered a speech in the Senate in which he criticized the Eisenhower administration for pursuing what he described as an erroneous policy. Kennedy upset the prevailing opinion among American policymakers who readily confused nationalism with international communism. He questioned the Manichean approach to foreign policy and repudiated Dulles's neat partition of the world into two camps, American or Soviet.(103) Senator Kennedy was essentially a liberal "cold warrior" who suspected that absolute American sponsorship of the French in North Africa would damage the future of the West on the African continent.(104) His address embodied all the values that would be attractive to the emerging nations and would thus help improve America's image. Kennedy described Eisenhower's policy as an amalgam of"cautious neutrality on all the real issues, and a restatement of our obvious dependence upon our European friends, and our obvious dedication nevertheless to the principles of self-determination and our obvious desire not to become involved."(105) Consequently, said Kennedy, "we have deceived ourselves into believing that we have thus pleased both sides and displeased no one [. . .] when, in truth we have earned the suspicion of all."(106) He was persuaded - as were many policymakers in the various bureaucracies - that Algerian independence was unavoidable and that continuation of the war served no purpose. He understood what Nixon did before him and what the Eisenhower team had also learned: that the Algerian conflict was enfeebling not only France, but NATO and western interests as well. Furthermore, America's good standing in the newly independent nations suffered as a result of this policy, which supported an unjust war fought with American weaponry. Kennedy understood the potency of nationalism and argued that if the U.S. did not provide it with "hope and leadership" it could be exploited by the Soviets with dire consequences.(107)
In other words, decolonization should proceed, but in an orderly fashion and under western guidance to guarantee the emergence of pro-western regimes. This, in fact, did not differ much from Eisenhower's policy. Once in office in 1961, Kennedy failed to carry out his own vision: most of the African countries had already become independent. Again, it must be emphasized that the views of those in the U.S. government who favoured supporting the European allies rather than alienating them over issues of third world nationalism prevailed over those who wanted to accommodate the nationalists. And yet, the U.S.S.R. itself was entangled, for had it extended outright backing to the nationalists, this would without doubt have allowed the West to close ranks with adverse effects for the Soviets. Although the U.S. did not seek to undermine France's position, a change of attitude towards France's role in Algeria became noticeable. Contrary to past practices, the U.S. started abstaining at the U.N. rather than casting votes favourable to France, a move that infuriated the latter anyway. Moreover, despite its opposition to recognizing the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (G.P.R.A.),(108) proclaimed in September 1958, the U.S. did not display any hostility towards its representatives in New York, a leniency which the French denounced in vigorous terms.(109)
U.S. official policy formulated in 1959 reflected these changes towards the war in Algeria. American policymakers were fully conscious that the war blemished America's image, as was the case following the French bombing of the Algerian refugee camps in the western Tunisian town of Sakiet Sidi-Youssef, using American-made airplanes that killed scores of civilians, mostly school children. Americans were aware that even pro-western Arab regimes viewed them as the main outside support for French policy and that the U.S.S.R. was exploiting this situation by posing as the champion of the oppressed Algerian people, thus allowing the communists to gain influence within the nationalist movement.(110) Of course, the major concern for American policymakers remained the impact that the Algerian war continued to have on Franco-Tunisian and Franco-Moroccan relations and, more importantly, on America's relationship with France and on the Atlantic alliance generally. The Americans seemed exasperated by French suspicions regarding its role in North Africa.(111)
Because some American officials were worried that recalcitrant French policies in Algeria would undermine the moderate regimes in Morocco and Tunisia, it was felt that the U.S. had no alternative but to defend its interests in the region even at the risk of alienating the French, for "Moroccan and especially Tunisian nationalism can usefully serve U.S. interests as a counterweight to Arab extremism and Soviet ambitions both in Africa and the Middle East."(112) Tunisia was accorded special treatment by the White House because of the great impression that Bourguiba made on Eisenhower and the strong anticommunist and antiradical stances taken by the Tunisian leader,(113) who, unlike Mohamed V, did not espouse non-alignment so radically.
Contrary to the U.S., which, along with Britain, used its good offices to help France and Tunisia settle their important problems, the Soviets unequivocally condemned the French bombing of Sakiet Sidi-Youssef with the objective of creating more distance between Tunisia and western powers. Renouncing its critical attitude towards the U.S.S.R. of the past, the F.L.N. now praised the Soviet attitude, even though the leadership understood that the Soviets would encourage a solution within the framework of French-Algerian relations to bar the U.S. from supplanting France in Algeria.(114) Ironically, aside from their mutual suspicions, both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. preferred a solution to the Algerian conflict within a French framework. Regardless, the F.L.N. still sought to attract American support by cautioning the U.S. that "America's hesitations about the problems in North Africa raise suspicions about its traditional anti-colonialism . . . [and] discredit the West, whereas the arguments developed by Khrushchev carry more and more weight." In other words, the F.L.N. showed no compassion for Eisenhower's dilemma in choosing between a NATO ally and "North African friends;" basically, they reproached him with not taking a position in favour of Algerian self-determination similar to Khrushchev's.(115)
Soviet support for the Algerian cause did not mean alienating a powerful European power such as France. Indeed, the U.S.S.R. continued to court France, a move which the F.L.N. - not without suspicion - could understand nonetheless. In fact, the F.L.N. justified its discriminatory attitude towards the superpowers because of the urgency of acquiring military hardware in order to break the stalemate in the war. The appeal to the East for assistance fell within the Algerian nationalists' tactics of internationalizing the conflict to obtain maximum support and was not, as feared by the U.S., an alignment with the communist world.
VI
In May 1958, the crisis that shook and eventually brought down the Fourth Republic in France, due in great part to developments in Algeria, compelled some Frenchmen to call upon General Charles De Gaulle to come to power in June to save the country. His subsequent promise to create the conditions for a three-option referendum on self-determination within four years was enthusiastically endorsed by both superpowers. The Kremlin's support for De Gaulle's 16 September 1959 offer of a cease-fire leading to a referendum on self-determination, an overture the F.L.N. and the G.P.R.A. looked at suspiciously, added to the already visible strain in Sino-Soviet relations. Embracing a less flexible ideological line than the Soviets, the Chinese encouraged the Algerian nationalists to wage war until final victory.(116) On 31 October, Khrushchev announced that the Soviet government endorsed De Gaulle's approach - even though the P.C.F., which saw De Gaulle as a Fascist, and enjoyed support among the underprivileged pieds noirs in Algeria, had discarded it as a gimmick. Khrushchev asserted that if concrete measures were taken, De Gaulle's proposal "could play an important role in the settlement of the Algerian question."(117) Khrushchev was not only hopeful that negotiations between the French and the F.L.N. would soon begin, but he also announced that he would visit France in March 1960.(118) Not surprisingly, the Soviets immediately began moderating their acerbic rhetoric on the Algerian question. Khrushchev, unexpectedly, declared that:
[C]lose ties, shaped by history, exist between France and Algeria. If . . . these ties are from now on based on a new and mutually acceptable foundation with the real observance of the voluntary principle and of equality, this can promote the establishment of peace in this region . . . [A] peaceful settlement of the Algerian problem would contribute to the growth of France's international prestige and her role as a great power.(119)
Similarly to the U.S.S.R., the U.S. endorsed De Gaulle's project. Both the president and the secretary of state were satisfied with the inclusion of self-determination in De Gaulle's speech.(120) But, despite such support, the U.S. abstained at the U.N. on a resolution that recognized the right of the Algerian people to self-determination and enjoined the two parties to begin negotiations.
Of particular interest is the nationalists' reaction to the support given by the two superpowers to De Gaulle. The Algerian leadership seemed rather well aware of the objectives of both and had no doubt that "Algeria's liberation would be obtained only through self-reliance and within an Arab-Islamic context. All other assistance is merely supplementary."(121)
With respect to the United States, Algerians were of the opinion that "despite deceiving appearances, America has since September 16, 1959 [. . .] renounced her policy of putting pressure on the French government with regard to North African affairs."(122) The nationalist leaders were convinced that the U.S. and France made concerted efforts to put pressure on the Maghreb countries to "defeat the revolutionary movement and to perpetuate imperialist domination over our countries."(123) The F.L.N. decided to play East against West, showing the first how much it would gain by openly supporting the Algerian cause and the second how near it was to losing an important country to the communists.
Shortly after its inauguration, the Kennedy administration displayed a genuine interest in African affairs demonstrated by Kennedy's acceptance of nationalist movements and the reality of nonalignment. But, as with the preceding administration, security issues - which necessitated close ties with the European powers - were paramount. Because of its proximity to Europe and its abundant natural resources, Africa, whose ties with Europe needed to be strengthened, had to be denied to the Chinese and the Soviets. Relations with Europe being paramount, the U.S. had little room for manoeuvre with the colonial powers. Not surprisingly, in 1961, Kennedy, who adhered wholeheartedly to De Gaulle's position, was subjected to harsh criticism by the F.L.N.(124) The nationalists who had strongly applauded Kennedy's election were disappointed with his administration's opposition even to mentioning the G.P.R.A. - although it acknowledged its reality - in the preamble of the moderate UN. Resolution 1724 (XVI), using it as a pretext to abstain in the vote.(125) Although the U.S. commended the resolution for its moderate tone, its abstention underscored continued support for France. The vote could not have come at a worse time since only five months earlier, during the Franco-Tunisian conflict over the French military base in the Tunisian town of Bizerte, the U.S., by being too neutral, appeared to support the French. Further, the abstention votes cast by the majority of western countries, including the U.S., on a resolution introduced by the African-Asian bloc, underlined the identification of the West with French colonialism. In contrast, through the whole affair the U.S.S.R. sided with Tunisia in the Security Council.(126)
The U.S.S.R. began, albeit discreetly and in limited amounts, to provide material support to the F.L.N., thus improving its image among the Algerian nationalists. Although still distrustful of Soviet motives, the nationalists empathized with Soviet Russia in respect to the dilemma which it confronted on the Algerian issue. Clearly, the F.L.N. could not expect overt aid from the Soviets; it had to be channelled through intermediaries. Further, the Soviets were not ready to provide the Americans with a pretext for direct involvement in the Algerian war. The nationalist leaders were also aware that Soviet support was precarious, for, should France decide to take a course more congenial to the U.S.S.R.'s, the Algerian cause would be relegated to a much less important position.(127) But, in fact, all the U.S.S.R. needed was to adopt a careful wait-and-see policy to be able to shift gears when the outcome became inevitable. More importantly, it had to wait to determine in which direction the nationalists would lead Algeria because if independent Algeria were to fall within the U.S. camp, the Soviets would prefer a French solution.(128) What was missing in the nationalists' analysis was the Soviets' unwillingness to get so involved in the Algerian conflict as to produce the adverse effect, that is, the strengthening of the western alliance, especially when tension was growing over Berlin.
Communist China did not hesitate to recognize the G.P.R.A. shortly after its creation in September 1958; but the U.S.S.R. was reluctant to even grant it de facto recognition before October 1960. The Soviets were questioned why they declined to recognize the G.P.R.A. although several other countries had done so. Anastas Mikoyan argued that the Soviets had already provided considerable support to the Algerians. When asked whether the Soviets would send volunteers to fight in Algeria, which technically would have constituted a violation of NATO territory since the northern part of the country figured in the treaty, Mikoyan's response was swift: "Do you understand what this would mean? [S]ome people who heard your question will hasten to declare that the Bolsheviks want to occupy Algeria by volunteers and make it [their] colony . . ." Indeed, as absurd as such a scenario may have seemed, Gordon Gray, Director of the Office of Defence mobilization argued at the N.S.C. meeting that "we might possibly face in Algeria a problem of Soviet intervention involving movement of Soviet troops or arms into the country."(129) This issue was taken quite seriously even by the president.
The Soviets had clearly no intention of intervening in Algeria. In late 1959 already, Soviet chief ideologue, Mikhail Suslov explained to the G.P.R.A. delegation visiting Moscow why the Kremlin could not recognize it. Suslov admitted that military aid to the Algerians was limited because of the distance between the two countries and because the supply of modern equipment would be known to the West, thus working against the Algerians. He felt that for tactical reasons and in the interest of international detente (peaceful coexistence) it was preferable that only de facto relations be maintained. He argued that official recognition of the G.P.R.A. "would contribute to strengthen the western coalition against you, aggravate international tension and the cold war . . . This will not, however, prevent us from increasing our aid to you."(130)
Yet, despite their genuine interest in detente with France, the Soviets attacked the French government on the Algerian question whenever the risks were minor. Their harsh statements were usually made when relations with France were at a low ebb and generally expressed annoyance with France on a given issue. In November 1960, for example, Andrei Gromyko delared at the U.N. that, "as the atrocities of the Hitlerians could not make France either German or semi-German, neither could all the crimes and actions aimed at crushing the Algerian people's straggle for national liberation make Algeria French or semi-French."(131)
The Franco-German rapprochement in 1961-62 nullified Soviet goals of splintering the western alliance. Therefore, when the Evian Accords between the French government and the G.P.R.A. were signed in March 1962 to prepare the conditions for a referendum in Algeria, the Soviet government finally extended the G.P.R.A. de jure recognition. The recognition of the Algerian government by the U.S.S.R. just three months before independence led France to sever diplomatic relations with Moscow. These relations were, however, re-established shortly after Algeria's independence in July 1962. On 3 July, President Kennedy saluted Algeria's independence declaring that "in the coming days we wish to strengthen and multiply the American bonds of friendship with the Government and people of Algeria. We look forward to working together with you in the cause of freedom, peace and human welfare."(132) But the effects of American support for France during the war proved more consequential for U.S.-Algerian relations than imagined by Kennedy.
VII
During the cold war, both superpowers were confronted with difficult choices in the Maghreb. Their primary objective was to prevent the other from establishing its hegemony in the region. To achieve this goal, both favoured France's presence to that of their rival. The Americans feared that the end of French rule would lead to Soviet penetration, whereas the Soviets felt that the termination of French presence would guarantee U.S. hegemony, thus succeeding in spoiling Soviet interests. Both sought rather unsuccessfully to control the direction of Maghrebi nationalism even though Tunisia and, to a lesser degree Morocco until 1961, followed a more pro-western path.
The U.S. failed to win over the Algerian nationalists because of its constant support for France. Even though both superpowers knew that the outcome of the Algerian war would inevitably favour the nationalists, the U.S. never shifted its policy in any fundamental way. Having emerged from World War II as the greatest power on the globe, America continued holding idealistic and moralistic standards; but the reality of world power contradicted such considerations, thus creating a persistent paradox. America's dilemma throughout the 1950s was how to proceed carefully with decolonization within a western framework - in accord with the colonial powers, under U.S. leadership. The approach to decolonization was Eurocentric, hence leading to an inevitable clash between the aspirations of the emerging nations and the interests of the western powers. The issues facing the U.S. were colossal indeed: pressures from the emerging nations asking the U.S. to apply its tradition of support for nationalism and self-determination; demands from an important ally whose recovery as a strong European power and whose participation in the western alliance were pivotal; winning over the new states whose allegiance was essential to the containment of the communist advance - this is only a short list of the elements that constituted the American dilemma. The bias towards the colonial power proved costly to the United States because, by supporting French colonial policy, it lost much of its credibility as an anticolonialist nation. Yet, supporting France was deemed more important, for siding openly with the nationalists could have led to the fall of an important power upon whose help European and western security had to be built. Unquestionably, because of its indecisiveness, France under the Fourth Republic did not make matters easier for its ally. Further, perhaps the most difficult task for the U.S. was to bring stability to a world whose primary characteristic was precisely its instability. Wishing to create moderate nationalist movements by supporting their oppressors could only produce the opposite effect, as demonstrated by the Algerian case.
Objectively, the U.S.S.R.'s task was easier because there was little it could do to break the Alliance. Moreover, France's economic and political dependency on the U.S. was greater than the French would ever admit. Yet, as a result of the material and political support they provided, the Soviets succeeded in gaining the friendship of the Algerian nationalists despite the U.S.S.R.'s detente with the colonial power. Whether the U.S. could have done the same without risking the destruction of the alliance is hard to tell. But, it could be argued that the U.S. failed to take a stronger position in favour of the nationalists even when the outcome was already decided not because of the importance of its relationship with France, but also because its policy was bound within a more rigorous Cold War framework. Also, the weight of those in the administration holding strong Eurocentric views and endorsing continuous support to the colonial powers was heavier.
Thunderbird, The American Graduate School of International Management
1 Jack Perry, "Soviet Policy toward French North Africa," Unpublished Dissertation (New York, 1972), p. 377.
2 Francis Fukuyama, "Soviet Strategy in the Third World," Andrzej Korbonski and Francis Fukuyama, eds., The Soviet Union and the Third World: The Last Three Decades (Ithaca, 1987), p. 26.
3 For the Moroccan case, see Egya Sangmuah, "Sultan Mohammed ben Youssef's American Strategy and the Diplomacy of North African Liberation, 1943-61," Journal of Contemporary History, 27 (1992), pp. 129-48; also, Mohieddine Hadhri, L'URSS et le Maghreb: De la Revolution d'Octobre a l'Independance de l'Algerie, 1917-1962 (Paris, 1985), pp. 109 ff; L. Carl Brown, "The United States and the Maghrib," Middle East Journal, 30, 3 (Feb. 1976), pp. 287 ff.
4 See Karen Dawisha, "The Correlation of Forces and Soviet Policy in the Middle East," in Robbin Laird and Erik Hoffmann, eds., Soviet Policy in a Changing World (New York, 1986), p. 760.
5 G. Starko, "Crisis of the French Colonial Empire," New Times [Moscow], No. 9 (Mar. 1950), p. 11.
6 Luella Hall, The United States and Morocco, 1776-1956 (Metuchen, New Jersey, 1971), p. 1034.
7 Cf. Foreign Relations of the United States, Vol. V, The Near East and Africa (Washington, D.C., 1982), p. 1372 [Hereinafter as FRUS]. There is, according to official American sources, evidence that Roosevelt "spoke of American sympathy for Moroccan independence and the expectation of postwar economic cooperation." Ibid., n. 5. See also, Abdelkhaleq Berramdane, Le Maroc et l'Occident (Paris, 1987), p. 53; Elliot Roosevelt, As He Saw It (New York, 1946), pp. 110-12. Roosevelt cites his father as saying that "When we've won the war, I will work with all my might and main to see to it that the United States is not wheedled into the position of accepting any plea that will further France's imperialistic ambitions or that will aid and abet the British empire and its imperial ambitions," op. cit., pp. 115-16. According to Donald Cameron Watt, Succeeding John Bull. America in Britain's Place (Cambridge, 1984), p. 223, these statements should not be doubted, for they accurately represent Franklin Roosevelt's sentiments.
8 These accords contained U.S. pledge to restore France's authority over its colonies; see, Papers Relating to the Foreign Policy of the United States, 1943: Conferences at Washington and Casablanca (Washington, D.C., 1965), pp. 536-732; The Anfa Accords are summarized in Wiley, consul-general at Algiers, to secretary of state, telegram, 6 Feb. 1943, No. 740.0011/European War 1939, 27782, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
9 Egya Sangmuah, "Interest Groups and decolonization: American Businessmen and Organized Labor in French North Africa, 1948-1956," The Maghreb Review, 13, 3-4 (1988), pp. 161-74.
10 Christian Science Monitor, 15 Mar. 1949 and 31 Mar. 1949.
11 See, for instance, telegram No. 888 100/2576, from Robert Murphy to secretary of state, 20 June 1943, Foreign Relations of the United States. Diplomatic Papers, Vol. IV: The Near East and Africa (Washington, D.C., 1964), pp. 742-43.
12 Office Memorandum, United States Government, 2/2/1950, from Secretary Jack Neal, "American Intrigues in North Africa," 611.51T/1.350, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
13 The United States Attitude on the Colonial Question," Foreign Relations of the United States, Vol. III: United Nations Affairs (Washington, D.C., 1979), p. 1078.
14 Ibid., p. 1079.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid., p. 1099.
17 Manfred Halpern, "Analysis of U.S. Policy Alternatives for French North Africa," Division of Research for Near East, South Asia and Africa. Special paper, no. 611.51S/8-2652, 26 Aug. 1952, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
18 Christian Science Monitor, 30 Sept. 1952.
19 "The Ambassador in Egypt (Caffery) to the Department of State, Telegram 771.00/5-852, May 8, 1952," in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-54, Vol. XI, Africa and South Asia (Washington, D.C., 1983)p. 127.
21 See airgram 711.56371/5-953 sent on 27 May 1953 by the acting secretary of state to the embassy in France, in ibid, pp. 148-50.
21 See, for example, S. Datlin, "The Events in Tunisia," New Times [Moscow], No 16 (Apr. 1952).
22 George Day, Les Affaires de la Tunisie et du Maroc devant les Nations Unies (Paris, 1953); Muhammad El-Farra, Algeria and the United Nations (New York, 1956).
23 "Draft Policy Statement Prepared by the National Security Council Staff for the National Security Council Planning Board, 18 August 1953," in FRUS, 1952-54, op. cit. p. 150.
24 Pierre Queuille, Histoire de l'Afro-Asiatisme jusqu a Bandoung (Paris, 1965), pp. 177, 234-35; Berramdane, Le Maroc et l'Occident, p. 76; El-Farra, Algeria and the United Nations, p. 32.
25 New York Times, 19 Nov. 1953.
26 "Draft Policy Statement," op. cit., p. 152. Both D.O.D. and J.C.S., however, stressed the need for the U.S. to elicit the respect of the Maghrebis.
27 Ibid., p. 151.
28 "Statement of Policy by the National Security Council, NSC 5436/1, 18 October 1954," FRUS, 195254, op. cit., p. 171.
29 "National Security Council Staff Study" (enclosure to the document cited above), ibid., p. 174.
30 "Les Etats-Unis et le Maghreb," Maghreb, 7 (Jan.-Feb. 1965); J. Marcum, "The United States and Morocco," Middle Eastern Affairs (Jan. 1957); Berramdane, Le Maroc et l'Occident, pp. 74 ff.
31 Francois Fejto, The French Communist Party and the Crisis of International Communism (Cambridge, 1967), p. 40.
32 Pravda, 2 Aug. 1954, repr. in Current Digest of the Soviet Press (hereinafter CDSP), 6, 35; (1954), p. 11; see also Pravda, 28 Oct., 1954, repr. in CDSP, 6, 43 (1954), pp. 19-20, on Soviet-French relations in which the author insists that "the security of both states requires joint efforts against the possible revival of German militarism."
33 Faiz Abu-Jaber, "Soviet Attitudes toward Arab Revolutions: Yemen, Egypt, Algeria, Iraq, and Palestine," Middle East Forum, 56, 4 (1970), p. 55.
34 The best accounts of this membership remains Mohammed Harbi. F.L.N.: Mirage et Realites (Paris, 1980) and Aux Origines du F.L.N. (Paris, 1975).
35 On this point, see Jerry Hough, The Struggle for the Third World-Soviet Debates and American Options (Washington, D.C., 1986).
36 Krasnaya Zvesda, 29 Apr. 1955, repr. in CDSP, 7, 17 (1955), p. 18.
37 See the declaration of Chinese Foreign Minister, Chou En Lai, in Alaba Ogunsanwo, China's Policy in Africa, 1958-71 (New York, 1974), p. 21.
38 On this point, see Hough, op. cit., p. 17.
39 Krasnaya Zvesda, op. cit., p. 18 (emphasis added).
40 For a study of Maghrebi nationalist movements, see Jacques Berque. Le Maghreb entre deux guerres (Paris, 1970, 2nd edition).
41 See analysis on the probable developments in North Africa in the "National Intelligence Estimate, NIE-71 - 54," FRUS, 1952-54, op. cit., pp. 166-67. The intelligence services of most of the branches participated in the preparation of the report.
42 See Lakhdar Bentobbal's interview reprinted in Mohamed Harbi, Les Archives de la Revolution Algerienne (Paris, 1981), p. 296.
43 Pravda and Izvestia, 4 Oct. 1955, repr. in CDSP, 7, 4 (1955), p. 31.
44 NIE-71-54, op. cit., p. 157.
45 Ibid., p. 166
46 "'Statement of Policy by the National Security Council," NSC 5436/1, 18 Oct. 1954, FRUS 1952-54, op. cit., p. 170.
47 A good discussion on this continuity can be found in James Nathan and James Oliver. United States Foreign Policy and World Order (Glenview, 1989, Fourth edition), esp., pp. 143 ff.
48 Dwight D. Eisenhower, "The Chance for Peace," an address delivered before the American Society for Newspapers Editors, 16 Apr. 1953, in Public Papers of the Presidents, Dwight Eisenhower, 1953 (Washington, D.C., 1960), p. 180, cited in ibid., p. 155.
49 New York Times, 20 Nov. 1954 and, 18 June 1955.
50 Lorna Hahn, North Africa: Nationalism and Nationhood (Washington, D.C., 1960), p. 165. See also, "The Consul General at Tunis (Hughes) to the Department of State," 772.00/11-554: Telegram, 5 Nov. 1954, repr. in FRUS, 1952-54, op. cit., pp. 395-96.
51 Progress Report on NSC 5436/1, 1 June 1955, repr. in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, Vol. XVIII, Africa (Washington, D.C., 1989), p. 90.
52 Ibid., p. 93.
53 See his statement regarding the dilemma faced over Tunisia, in Richard Melanson and David Mayers, Reevaluating Eisenhower. American Foreign Policy in the 1950s (Urbana, 1987), p. 23.
54 Department of State, Foreign Service Despatch No. 611.51 S/7-855, 8 July 1955, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
55 These points have been summed up from National Security Council Policy Number 5614/1, 3 Oct. 1956, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
56 Department of State, Outgoing Telegram to Herbert Hoover, Jr., Acting Secretary, No. 611.51 S/3856, 8 Mar. 1956, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
57 Department of State, Incoming Telegram from Algiers to secretary of state, No. 611.51 S/3-2056, 20 Mar. 1956, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
58 Dillon to State, 20 Mar. 1956. Eisenhower Papers, White House Central Files, Confidential File, Subject Series, Box 71, "State, Department of, April 1956 (2)," Eisenhower Library.
59 Ibid.
60 Dillon raised this problem with Herbert Hoover, Under Secretary of State and Chairman of the Operating Coordinating Board until 1957; Dillon was asked to provide any documentation concerning communist penetration of the F.L.N. See, "Statement of Policy on Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria," in FRUS, 1955-57, op. cit., n. 10, p. 142.
61 Ibid.
62 Memorandum for the President, "Comments on Proposed Statement on the French North African Situation," by Herbert Hoover, Jr., Under Secretary, 27 Mar. 1956. Eisenhower Library, Whitman Files, International Series, Box 11, "France 1956-60 (6)."
63 Ibid.
64 A discussion of this question can be found in Richard Stebbins, ed., The United States in World Affairs 1956 (New York, 1957), pp. 281-83.
65 For the Algerian commentary on Dillon's speech, see El-Moudjahid, No. 18, 15 Apr. 1958. It should be noted that the F.L.N.'s representative in New York sent a letter to Eisenhower pleading for his help to put pressure on the French to release the five nationalists; see, telegram from M'hammed Yazid of the National Liberation Front of Algeria to President Eisenhower, Department of State, Central Files, 777.00/10-2456, FRUS, 1955-57, op. cit., p. 246.
66 See "Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco," 23 Sept. 1956, repr. in FRUS. 1955-57, op. cit., pp. 540-41.
67 Roger Kanet, "Soviet Attitudes Toward Developing Nations Since Stalin," Roger Kanet, ed. The Soviet Union and the Developing Nations (Baltimore, MD, 1974), p. 28.
68 Pravda, 15 Feb. 1956, repr. in CDSP, 8, 4 (1956), p. 7.
69 V. Semenov, "The Collapse of the Colonial System of Imperialism and Problems of International Relations," cited in R.A. Yellon, "The Winds of Change,"Mizan, 9, 2 (Jan.-Feb. 1967), p. 52.
70 See Pravda, 18 Feb. 1956, repr. in CDSP, 8, 8 (1956), pp. 9-10, regarding Anastas Mikoyan's now famous insulting remark to the members of the Institute of Oriental Studies: "The Academy of Sciences does have an institute that studies the problems of the East, but all that can be said of it is that although in our day the whole East has awakened, this institute is still sleeping."
71 See Hough, The Struggle for the Third World, op. cit., p. 46.
72 On this point, see Hadhri, L'URSS et leMaghreb, p. 113.
73 On this point, see Yahia Zoubir, "L'URSS et le Maghreb: une strategie equilibree et une approche pragmatique," Bassma Kodmany-Darwish, ed. Maghreb: Les Annees de Transition (Paris, 1990), p. 342; Yahia Zoubir, "Soviet Policy toward the Maghreb," Arab Studies Quarterly, 9, 4 (Fall 1987); Berramdane, LeMaroc et l'Occident, p. 173; Hadhri, pp. 15 ff.
74 "Morocco and Tunisia Win Independence," International Affairs [Moscow], 4 (Apr. 1956), p. 121.
75 Ibid., p. 122.
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid., p. 122.
78 See Fejto, The French Communist Party, p. 48 on the P.C.F.'s vote.
79 See Maxime Mourin, Les Relations Franco-Sovietiques, 1917-1967 (Paris, 1967), p. 319; Fejto, p. 63.
80 Perry, "Soviet Policy," p. 688.
81 Cited in Fejto, The French Communist Party, p. 63.
82 See N. Molchanov, "The Soviet Union and France," International Affairs [Moscow], No 5 (May 1956).
83 National Security Council, "Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria," NSC 5614/1 (Staff Study, p. 25), 3 Oct. 1956, Dwight Eisenhower Library.
84 "Peaceful Settlement is in the Interests of French and Algerian peoples," Pravda, 7 July 1956, repr. in CDSP, 8, 27 (1956), p. 19.
85 Ibid.; see also S. Datlin, "Africa through Colonialist Eyes," International Affairs [Moscow], No. 12 (Dec. 1956)
86 See Jean-Paul Constant, Les Relations Maroco-Sovietiques, 1956-1971 (Paris, 1973), pp. 9-10.
87 U.S. alarmist reaction was best expressed by Under Secretary of State Douglas C. Dillon, saying that "the Soviet economic offensive is a means of carrying the struggle against us in its economic aspects to the most vulnerable sector of the free world. The ultimate objective of Soviet leaders continues to be the downfall of the West." U.S. Department of State, Communist Economic Policy in the Less Developed Area (Washington, DC, 1960), Foreword.
88 Dwight Eisenhower, Waging Peace: The White House Years, 1956-1961 (New York, 1965), p. 104.
89 See "Statement of Policy on Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria," in FRUS, 1955-57, op. cit., p. 141-42.
90 Nixon Report, "The Emergence of Africa,"Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 36, No. 930 (1957), p. 638.
91 Pravda, 5 Mar. 1957, repr. in CDSP, 9, 9 (1957), p. 29
92 Telegram from the Embassy in France to the Department of State, Department of State, Central Files, 611.51/3-1356, FRUS. 1955-57, op. cit., p. 119.
93 Paul Zinner, ed., Documents on American Foreign Relations 1957 (New York, 1958), pp. 301-3.
94 Alistair Horne, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria, 1954-1962 (New York, 1987. 2nd edition), p. 242. The author reports that French soldiers were taught a course on U.S. imperialism.
95 NSC 5614/1, FRUS, 1955-57, op. cit., p. 145.
96 Quoted in Richard and Joan Brace, Ordeal in Algeria, cited in Home, op. cit., p. 244.
97 "La politique internationale des blocs et la guerre d'Algerie,"El Moudjahid, No. 18, 15 Feb. 1958.
98 "Les USA devant le probleme algerien,"El-Moudjahid, No. 18, 15 Apr. 1958. The F.L.N. delegation in New York had assured the Americans that the communists were enemies of the F.L.N. and that the F.L.N. was not seeking weapons from the U.S.S.R. or other East European countries, but would prefer to obtain them from NATO countries. See, Telegram from the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State, Department of State, Central Files, 751S.00/9-3057, 30 Sept. 1957, FRUS, 1955-57, op. cit., pp. 284-85.
99 See Egya Sangmuah, "Eisenhower and Containment in North Africa, 1956-1960," The Middle East Journal, 44, 1 (Winter 1990).
100 "Les USA devant le probleme algerien," op. cit.
101 See, Paul Kattenburg, The Vietnam Trauma in American Foreign Policy, 1945-75 (New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1980), p. 10.
102 See, Joseph Satterthwaite, first Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, "The United States and the New Africa," State Department Press Release 38, 17 Jan. 1959. In the state department, a special bureau of African affairs, headed by an assistant secretary of state was created. This, of course, demonstrated that both congress and the executive branch had understood that African issues should no longer be dealt with as an extension of European Middle Eastern policy.
100 Richard Mahoney, JFK: Ordeal in Africa (New York, 1983), p. 19.
104 Ronald J. Nurse, "Critic of Colonialism: JFK and Algerian Independence," The Historian, 39, 2 (Feb. 1977), p. 311.
105 New York Times, 3 July 1957.
106 Ibid.
107 Cited in Mahoney, JFK, p. 22.
108 The U.S. was against the formation of the G.P.R.A. because of the negative repercussions in France. Both the state department and the Operations Coordinating Board also felt that the F.L.N.'s move would prolong the war and make it difficult for the U.S. to push the French to seek a peaceful settlement. See, Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia, Department of State, Central Files, 770A.00/5-358, 3 May 1958, in Foreign Relations of the United States, Vol XIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute; United Arab Republic; North Africa (Washington, D.C., 1992), pp. 635-36.
109 See, Letter from Prime Minister Debre to the Ambassador in France (Houghton), Department of State, Central Files, 751.13/4-2959, 28 Apr. 1959, FRUS, 1958-60, op. cit., p. 653.
110 NSC Policy No. 5911/1, 4 Nov. 1959. National Archives, Washington, D.C.
111 Ibid.
112 Ibid.
113 See Bourguiba's article "Nationalism: Antidote to Communism" in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 35 (July 1957); and his speech to the constituent assembly on 20 Mar. 1958, repr. in Press Department, Embassy of Tunisia, Washington, D.C., No. 12, 21 Mar. 1958. Washington must have also been delighted by Tunisia's breaking off diplomatic relations with Egypt in 1958.
114 Editorial, "Les Prises de position de l'URSS," El-Moudjahid, No. 20, 15 Mar. 1958.
115 Ibid.
116 Daniel Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-1961 (New York, 1969), p. 273.
117 Cited in ibid., p. 272.
118 Mourin, Les Relations Franco-Sovietiques, p. 333.
119 Cited in Perry, "Soviet Policy," p. 606.
120 De Gaulle's speech and Eisenhower's and Christian Herter's statements can be found in Paul Zinner, ed. Documents on American Foreign Policy 1959 (New York, 1960), pp. 420-25.
121 Dr. Lamine Debaghine's expose, repr. in Harbi, Les Archives de la revolution, p. 489.
122 El-Moudjahid, No. 64, 12 May 1960.
123 Ibid.
124 El-Moudjahid, No. 83, 19 July 1961. See also the Algerian nationalists' points of view exposed to Marshall Joseph Tito of Yugoslavia, 12 Apr. 1961, repr. in Harbi, pp. 513-14.
125 See, "Statement of United States Delegate Charles Yost to the Political and Security Committee, December 19, 1961," and "Resolution 1724 (XVI), December 20, 1961," in Documents on American Foreign Relations 1961, Richard Stebbins, ed. (New York, 1962), pp. 361-63.
126 The United States in World Affairs 1961, Richard Stebbins, ed. (New York, 1962), p. 267.
127 Dr. Debaghine, in Harbi, p. 488.
128 Analysis of Abdelmalek Benhabyles, in Harbi, op. cit., 492.
129 See, "U.S. Policy Toward Algeria," NSC 5910/1, in FRUS, 1958-60, pp. 706-7.
130 Document in Harbi, Les Archives de la Revolution Algerienne, pp. 518-19.
131 Quoted in Mourin, Les Relations Franco-Sovietiques, p. 338.
132 "Achievement of Algeria's Independence: Statement by the President, July 3, 1962," Documents on American Foreign Relations 1962, R. Stebbins, ed. (New York, 1963), pp. 308-9.
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