Philosophy 210 - Logical Thought

HW #11 Possible Answers

(1) (Sufficiency): The general claim to which the author is committed is that whatever causes school children to lose out is wrong. Note that the author can reasonably claim that the statement is only about school children, since there is something special about them in virtue of which their interests should be protected. More specifically, if you have a c.e. in which somebody else loses out but in which that is not wrong, the author could easily block your c.e. by adding another premise that points specifically to the need to protect schoolchildren. Thus your c.e. would be relatively weak. So what you want here is a c.e. to the argument:

                Bussing causes the schoolchildren to lose out.

                \ Bussing is wrong.

Here the easiest way to attack the argument is by way of a direct c.e.

Setting it up: We would need a world in which bussing really does make the schoolchildren lose out (don't undermine the premise) but in which bussing is clearly OK.

Imagine, for example, that bussing somehow will make the children lose out; the disruption of their regular routines will mean that they don't learn as much about algebra, or literature, that the teachers will be overworked and be able to devote somewhat less attention to them, or whatever; but on the other hand, a policy of bussing will, in the long run, eliminate racism and racial discrimination in American society. Even though this one particular group of students (the first ones to undergo bussing) won't learn quite as much, in future years students will learn just as much or more, and in addition almost everybody (but not these particular schoolchildren --- remember not to undermine the premise) will be vastly better off because of healthier social attitudes. Thus even tho these children will be worse off, it is clearly a good thing to sacrifice a small amount of benefit to them for the great benefit of society at large.

     (Centrality):

Setting it up: Now you need to be willing to argue that bussing is wrong even if the schoolchildren are better off.

Here you might note that even if children were to benefit from the improved racial climate, and even if their education were to be somewhat improved, families are losing the right to determine for themselves where their children will be educated. In addition, a long tradition of neighborhood schools, and the sense of community that they create will be lost (even if the children themselves were better off -- remember, don't undermine the premise). It is possible to address adequacy here only if you are able seriously to entertain the conclusion that bussing is wrong.

(2) (Sufficiency): Again, the case of sufficiency can be seen simply as addressing an argument:

                Women would be happier with full equality.

                \ Women should be granted full equality.

        The general principle the author is committed to is either (a) if X would be happier with Y then X should be granted Y, or (b) if X would be happier with full equality then X should be granted full equality. Is the author committed only to a claim about granting equality  --(b)--, or is the author committed to the more general (a)? Given a c.e. that works against (a) but not (b), the author could try to block the c.e. by adding a premise that talks about the specific importance of equality. If it is possible to find a c.e. that works against the more specific claim, such a c.e. will be harder to block, and therefore stronger. [Lesson: if you can do so, make your c.e. stay as close as possible to the original argument/definition/because claim/conceptual claim. The closer it is, the stronger it is likely to be. This will not always be possible; there will be cases in which a c.e. to a more general structure actually works better because it gets more to the critical issues. But all other things being equal, a c.e. that sticks more closely to the original claim will be stronger.]

     Setting it up: So what we want is either a direct c.e. [a story that makes it compelling that women would be happier with full equality but should not be granted it], or an indirect c.e. [an argument of the same form, where X would be happier with full equality but where X should not be granted it].

Given the current political climate, it will be much easier to find a compelling indirect c.e. than it will to find a compelling direct c.e. That is because it will be hard to tell a story in which it will be clear to a wide audience that in that story, women should not be granted full equality.

        So, how about:

                Kids would be happier if they were granted full equality.

                \ Kids should be granted full equality.

        Since this is not as it stands completely compelling, I will fill it out (bolster it) with a direct c.e. to this indirect c.e., that is, a story according to which it is clear that kids would be happier with full equality, but should not be granted it. Kids would indeed be happier if they could determine their own hours and their own rules, if they could open charge accounts and drive cars. However, if we did that, things would be a terrible mess. We need to provide constraints for kids, restricting their freedom, even though they would be happier if we didn’t. [Although more detail would be useful, the indirect c.e., together with the story, is plenty to make clear that it doesn’t follow simply from the fact that full equality would make X happier, that X should be granted full equality.]

     (Centrality):

Setting it up: Here you need to be prepared to argue that women should be granted full equality even if they would not be happier.

This should not be hard. You could point to the history of slavery, arguing that even though many women would, because of their oppression, be happier if they remained oppressed --- didn’t have to worry about whom to vote for, or to suffer the indignity of employment, or to fear that they might get sent off to war --- even if that were the case, women should be granted full equality because a just society will not permit a slave class. This must be done even if those who are emancipated are less happy. It must be done not in order to create more happiness, but because it is the right thing to do.

        To the extent that this argument, or one similar to it, is compelling, you would have shown that the happiness of women is not the real reason why they should enjoy (or suffer) full equality. That is, you would have shown that the reason given, whether or not it is a sufficient reason for granting full equality, is nevertheless not the real or central reason why women should have full equality.

 

(3) This is a definition, so we need to examine both sufficiency and necessity.

(Sufficiency): x has true premises and a false conclusion => x is unsound.

Setting it up: We would need a case where an argument x has true premises and a false conclusion, but is sound.

Well, mirabile dictu, this doesn't look possible. Perhaps the condition is sufficient! If an argument actually does have true premises and a false conclusion, then it must be unsound. So the definition does give a sufficient condition.

(Necessity): x is unsound => (a) x has true premises, and

                                    (b) x has a false conclusion.

Setting it up: We would need a case in which an argument X is unsound, but in which (a) it has a false premise, or (b) it has a true conclusion.

Well, it is pretty easy to see we can do both of these, so that neither condition is necessary. We could give a separate c.e. for each of (a) and (b), but it is just as easy to give a c.e. that will cover both in one swell foop.

Everybody loves logic. Therefore somebody likes ice cream.

So that's an argument. It is obviously unsound. It's premise is clearly (and sadly) false; its conclusion is just as obviously true. So neither condition is necessary for an argument to be unsound.

(4)    Another definition.

Sufficiency: x is a soldier who understands his responsibilities and who always obeys orders => x is a good soldier. (Note that a c.e. that tries to have somebody who is not a soldier would be irrelevant. The 'one' in the original claim means that x is a good soldier iff x is a soldier who understands....

Setting it up: We need a case of a soldier who understands his responsibilities and always follows orders, but who is not a good soldier.

Well, this actually isn't too hard. We could, for example, imagine a spy who in order to avoid exposure always follows direct orders given him, but who betrays his fellow soldiers by passing information to the enemy. In order to maintain his secret life, he has a keen understanding of his responsibilities, and he hopes as much as possible to ignore or work against them.

Somewhat stronger (because it's harder to block) would be a sort of passive-aggressive soldier along the same lines. He does what he is told, he knows what he's supposed to do, but he doesn't do it unless he is ordered to.

Necessity: x is a good soldier =>

                            (a) x understands his responsibilities, and

                            (b) x always obeys orders

Setting it up: (a) a case of a good soldier who doesn't understand his responsibilities. (b) a good soldier who doesn't always obey orders.

(b) is easier. We can imagine a seasoned sergeant who is assigned to a psychotic and erratic lieutenant. On patrol one day the lieutenant gives an order to massacre a group of civilians for no good reason. Doing so would not only kill the civilians, but would also put his troops at risk of both retaliation and of legal action, so the sergeant refuses to obey.

The c.e. for (b) would be stronger, but perhaps less compelling, if the order that was disobeyed (unlike this one) were a legal order. The lieutenant orders the troops into a position that the sergeant knows is suicidal, knows that there is a far superior position available, but the lieutenant refuses to listen.

For (a) probably a Forrest Gump sort of figure would work best - a dedicated, devoted, brave, fierce, hard-working soldier who is just not the sharpest knife in the drawer, who is actually pretty dim. All of his buddies know his limitations, so nobody asks him what he can't produce, and so he performs with courage and distinction. But he really doesn't get his larger responsibilities as a soldier - he does what he is told within a simple framework. It looks in this case like he is a pretty good soldier - the army would probably like to have more like that.