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CONCLUSION
The observations of the last Chapter lead
us to consider this little scene of human life, in which we are
so busily engaged, as having a reference, of some sort or other,
to a much larger plan of things. Whether we are, any way, related
to the more distant parts of the boundless universe, into which
we are brought, is altogether uncertain. But it is evident, that
the course of things, which comes within our view, is connected
with somewhat, past, present, and future, beyond it. So that
we are placed, as one may speak, in the middle of a scheme, not
a fixed but a progressive one, every way, incompre-hensible:
incomprehensible, in a manner equally, with respect to what has
been, what now is, and what shall be hereafter. And this scheme
cannot but contain in it somewhat as wonderful, and as much beyond
our thought and conception, as any thing in that of Religion.
For, will any man in his senses say, that it is less difficult
to conceive, how the world came to be and to continue as it is,
without, than with, an intelligent Author and Go-vernor of it?
or, admitting an intelligent Governor of it, that there is some
other rule of government more natu-ral, and of easier conception,
than that which we call moral? Indeed, without an intelligent
Author find Governor of Nature, no account at all can be given,
now this universe, or the part of it particularly in which we
are concerned, came to be, and the course of it to be carried
on, as it is: nor any, of its general end and design, without
a moral Governor of it. That there is an intelligent Author of
Nature, and natural Governor of the world, is a principle gone
upon in the foregoing treatise; as proved, and generally known
and confessed to be proved. And the very notion of an intelligent
Author of Nature, proved by particular final causes, implies
a will and a character. Now, as our whole nature, the nature
which he has given us, leads us to conclude his will and character
to be moral, just, and good: so we can scarce in imagination
conceive, what it can be otherwise. However, in consequence of
this his will and character, whatever it be, he formed the universe
as it is, and carries on the course of it as lie does, rather
than in any other manner; and has assigned to us, and 'to all
living- creatures, a part and a lot in it. Irrational creatures
act this their part, and enjoy and undergo the pleasures and
the pains allotted them, without any reflection. But one would
think it impossible, that creatures endued with reason could
avoid reflecting sometimes upon all this; reflecting, if not
from whence we came, yet, at least, whither we are going; and
what the mysterious scheme, in the midst of which we find ourselves,
will, at length, come out and produce: a scheme in which it is
certain we are highly interested, and in which we may be interested
even beyond conception. For many things prove it palpably absurd
to conclude, that we shall cease to be, at death. Particular
analogies do most sensibly show us, that there is nothing to
be thought strange, in our being to exist in another state of
life. And that we are now living beings, affords a strong probability
that we shall continue so; unless there be some positive
ground, and there is none from reason or analogy, to think death
will destroy as. Were a persuasion of this kind ever so well
grounded, there would, surely, be little reason to take pleasure
in it. But indeed it can have no other ground, than some such
imagination, as that of our gross bodies being ourselves; which
is contrary to experience. Experience too most clearly shows
us the folly of concluding, from the body and the living agent
affecting each other mutually, that the dissolution of the former
is the destruction of the latter. And there are remarkable instances
of their not affecting each other, which lead us to a contrary
conclusion. The supposition, then, which in all reason we are
to go upon, is that our living nature will continue after death.
And it is infinitely unreasonable to form an institution of life,
or to act upon any other supposition. Now all expectation of
immortality, whether more or less certain, opens an unbounded
prospect of our hopes and our fears: since we see the constitution
of nature is such, as to admit of misery, as well as to be productive
of happiness, and experience ourselves to partake of both in
some degree; and since we cannot but know, what higher degrees
of both we are capable of. And there is no presumption against
believing further, that our future interest depends upon our
present behaviour: for we see our present interest doth; and
that the happiness and misery, which are naturally annexed to
our actions are done, to which they are respectively annexed.
So that were speculation to leave us uncertain, whether it were
likely, that the Author of Nature, in giving happiness and misery
to his creatures, hath regard to their actions or not: yet, since
we find by experience that he has given us, plainly leads us,
at once and without any elaborate inquiries, to think, that it
may, indeed must, be to good actions chiefly that he hath annexed
happiness, and to bad actions misery: or that he will, upon the
whole, reward those who do well, and punish those who do evil.
To confirm this from the constitution of the world, it has been
observed, that some sort of moral government of God, which we
experience ourselves under; that good and bad actions, at present,
are naturally rewarded and punished, not only as beneficial and
mischievous to society, but also as virtuous and vicious: and
that there is, in the very nature of the thing, a tendency to
their being rewarded and punished in a much higher degree than
they are at present. And though this higher degree of distributive
justice, which nature thus points out and leads towards, is prevented
for a time from taking place; it is by obstacles, which the state
of this world unhappily throws in its way, and which therefore
are in their nature temporary. Now, as these things in the natural
conduct of Providence are observable on the side of virtue; so
there is nothing to be set against them on the side of vice.
A moral scheme of government then is visibly established, and,
in some degree, carried into execution: and this, together with
the essential tendencies of virtue and vice duly considered,
naturally raise in us an apprehension, that it will be carried
on further towards perfection in a future state, and that every
one shall there receive according to his deserts. And if this
be so, then our future and general interest, under file moral
government of God, is appointed to depend upon our behaviour;
notwithstanding the difficulty, which this may occasion, of securing
it, and the danger of losing it: just in the same manner as our
temporal interest, under his natural government, is appointed
to depend upon our behaviour; notwithstanding the like difficulty
and danger. For, from our original constitution, and that of
the world which we inhabit, we are naturally trusted with ourselves;
with our own conduct and our own interest. And from the same
constitution of nature, especially joined with that course of
things which is owing to men, we have temptations to be unfaithful
in this trust; to forfeit this interest, to neglect it, and run
ourselves into misery and ruin. From these temptations the difficulties
of behaving so as to secure our temporal interest, and the hazard
of behaving so as to miscarry in it. There is therefore nothing
incredible in supposing there may be the like difficulty and
hazard with regard to that chief and final good, which Religion
lays before us. indeed the whole account, how it came to pass
that we were placed in such a condition as this, must be beyond
our comprehension. But it is in part accounted for by what Religion
teaches us, that the character of virtue and piety must be a
necessary qualification for a future state of security and happiness,
under the moral government of God; in like manner, as some certain
qualifications or other are necessary for every particular condition
of life, under his natural government: and that the present state
was intended to be a school of discipline 'for improving in ourselves
that character. Now this intention of nature is rendered highly
credible by observing; that we are plainly made for improvement
of all kinds: that it is a general appointment of Providence,
that we cultivate practical principles, and form within ourselves
habits of action, in order to become fit for what we were wholly
unfit for before: that in particular, childhood and youth is
naturally appointed to be a state of discipline for mature age:
and that the present world is peculiarly fitted for a state of
moral discipline. And, whereas objections are urged against the
whole notion of moral government and a probationary state, from
the opinion of Necessity; it has been shown, that God has given
us the evidence, as it were, of experience, that all objections
against Religion, on this head, are vain and delusive. He has
also in his natural , government, suggested an answer to all
our short-sighted objections, against the equity and goodness
of his moral government; and in general he has exemplified to
us the latter by the former.
These things, which it is to be remembered,
are mat-ters of fact, ought, in all common sense, to awaken man-kind;
to induce them to consider in earnest their con-dition, and what
they have to do. It is absurd, absurd to the degree of being
ridiculous, if the subject were not of so serious a kind, for
men to think themselves secure in a vicious lire; or even in
that immoral thoughtlessness, which far the greatest part of
them are fallen into. And the credibility of Religion, arising
from experience and facts here considered, is fully sufficient,
in reason, to engage them to live in the general practice of
all virtue and piety; under the serious apprehension, though
it should be mixed with some doubt, of a righteous administration
established in nature, and a future judgment in consequence of
it: especially when we consider, how very questionable it is,
whether any thing at all can be gained by vice, how unquestionably
little as well as precarious, the pleasures and profits of it
are at the best; and how soon they must be parted with at the
longest. For, in the deliberations of reason, concerning what
we are to pursue and what to avoid, as temptations to any thing
from mere passion are supposed out of the case: so inducements
to vice, from cool expectations of pleasure and interest so small
and uncertain and short, are really so insignificant, as, in
the view of reason to be almost nothing in themselves; and in
comparison with the importance of Religion they quite disappear
and are lost, Mere passion indeed may be allied, though not as
a reason, yet as an excuse, for a vicious course of life, And
how sorry an excuse it is, will be manifest by observing, that
we are placed in a condition in which we are unavoidably inured
to govern our passions, by being necessitated to govern them:
and to lay ourselves under the same kind of restraints, and as
great ones too, from temporal regards, as virtue and piety, in
the ordinary course of things require. The plea of ungovernable
passion then, on the side of vice, is the poorest of all things;
for it is no reason, and but a poor excuse. But the proper motives
to religion are the proper proofs of it, from our moral nature,
from the presages of conscience, and our natural apprehension
of God under the character of a righteous Governor and Judge:
a nature, and conscience, and apprehension, given us by him;
and from the confirmation of the dictates of reason, by life
and immortality brought to light by the gospel; and the wrath
of God revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness
of men.
END OF THE FIRST PART
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