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And thus our finding, that the dissolution of matter, in which living beings were most nearly interested, is not their dissolution ; and that the destruction of several of the organs and instruments of perception and of motion belonging to them, is not their destruction ; shows demonstratively, that there is no ground to think that the dissolution of any other matter, or destruction of any other organs and instruments, will be the dissolution or destruction of living agents, from the like kind of relation. And we have no reason to think we stand any other kind of relation to any thing which we find dissolved by death. But it is said these observations are equally applicable to brutes : and. it is thought an insuperable difficulty that they should be immortal, and by consequence capable of everlasting happiness. Now this manner of expression is both invidious and weak: but the thing intended by it, is really no difficulty at all, either in the way of natural or moral consideration. For 1st, Suppose the invidious thing. designed in such a manner of expression, were really implied, as it is not in the least in the natural immortality of brutes: namely, that they must arrive at great attainments, and become rational and moral agents; even this would be no difficulty: since we know not what latent powers and capacities they may be endued with. There was once, prior to experience, as great presumption against human creatures as there is against brute creatures, arriving at that degree of understanding, which we have in mature age. For we can trace up our own existence to the same origin of theirs, And we find it to be a general law of nature, that creatures endued with capacities of virtue and religion should be placed in a condition of being in which they are altogether without the use of them, for a considerable length of their duration; as in infancy and childhood. And great part of the human species go out of the present world, before they come to the exercise of these capacities in any degree at all. But then, 2dly, the natural immortality of brutes does not in the least imply that they are endued with any latent capacities of a rational or moral nature. And the economy of the universe might require, that there should be living creatures without any capacities of this kind. And all difficulties as to the manner how they are to be disposed of are so apparently and wholly founded in our ignorance, that it is wonderful they should be insisted upon by any, but such as are weak enough to think they, are acquainted with the whole system of things. There is then absolutely nothing at all in this objection, which is so rhetorically urged, against the greatest part of the natural proofs or presumptions of the immortality of human minds; I say the greatest part; for it is less applicable to the following observations, which is more peculiar to mankind: III. that as it is evident that our present powers and capacities to reason, memory, and affection, do not depend on our gross body in the manner in which perception by our organs of sense does; so they do not appear to depend on our gross body in the manner in which perception by our organs of sense does; so they do not appear to depend upon it at all in any such manner, as to give ground to think, that the dissolution of this body will be the destruction of these our present powers of reflection, as it will of our powers of sensation; or to give ground to conclude, even that it will be so much as a suspension of the former. Human creatures exist at present in two states of life and perception, greatly different from each other; each of which has its own peculiar laws and its own peculiar enjoyments and sufferings. When any of our senses are affected or appetites gratified with the objects of them, we may be said to exist or live in a state of sensation. when none of our senses are affected or appetites gratified, and yet we perceive, and reason, and act; we may be said to exist or live in a state of re-flection. Now it is by no means certain, that any thing, which is dissolved by death, is any way necessary to the living being in this its state of reflection, after ideas are gained. For, though, from our present constitution and condition of being, our external organs of sense are ne-cessary for conveying in ideas to our reflecting powers, as carriages, and levers, and scaffolds are in architec-ture: yet when these ideas are brought in, we are capa-ble. of reflecting in the most intense degree, and of enjoying the greatest pleasure, and feeling the greatest pain, by means of that reflection, without any assistance from our senses ; and without any at all, ,which we know of, from that body which will be dissolved by death. It does not appear then, that the relation of this gross body to the reflecting being is, in any degree, necessary to thinking ; to our intellectual enjoyments or sufferings: nor, consequently, that the dissolution or alienation of the former by death, will be the destruction of those pre- sent powers, which render us capable of this state of re-flection. Further, there are instances of mortal diseases, which do not at all affect our present intellectual powers; and this affords a presumption, that those diseases will not destroy these present powers. Indeed, from the observations made above, (Pp. 64, 65) it appears, that there is no presumption, from their mutually affecting each other, that the dissolution of the body is the destruction of the living agent. And by the same reasoning, it must appear too, that there is no presumption, from their mutually affecting each other, that the dissolution of the body is the destruction of our present reflecting powers: but in-stances of their not affecting each other, afford a pre-sumption of the contrary. Instances of mortal diseases not impairing our present reflecting powers, evidently turn our thoughts even from imagining such diseases to be the destruction of them. Several things indeed greatly affect all our living powers, and at length sus-pend the exercise of them; as for instance drowsiness, increasing till it ends in sound sleep : and from hence we might have imagined it would destroy them, till we found by experience the weakness of this way of judg-ing. But in the diseases now mentioned, there is not so much as this shadow of probability, to lead us to any such conclusion, as to the reflecting powers which we have at present. For in those diseases, persons the moment before death appear to be in the highest vigour of life. They discover apprehension, memory reason, all entire; with the utmost force of affection ; sense of a character, of shame and honour; and the highest mental enjoyments and sufferings, even to the last gasp : and these surely prove even greater vigour of life than bodily strength does. Now what pretense is there for think-ing that a progressive disease when arrived to such a degree, mean that degree which is mortal, will destroy those powers, which were not impaired, which were not affected by it, during its whole progress quite up to that degree? And if death by diseases of this kind is not the destruction of our present reflecting powers, it will scarce be thought that death by any other is. |
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