March
7, 2003 Standoff
on the Korean Peninsula: Talking with Calvin Chen
| 
Photo:
Fred LeBlanc
Calvin
Chen, Luce Assistant Professor of Politics at Mount Holyoke,
is an expert on the political economy of East Asia, particularly
Chinese politics and the industrialization of the Chinese
countryside. |
With the revelation
that North Korea has missiles capable of reaching the West Coast
of the United States, last Sunday's interception by four North
Korean jet fighters of a U.S. spy plane in international airspace
over the Sea of Japan, and the recent dispatch by President Bush
of twenty-four B-52 and B-1 bombers to the United States Pacific
base on Guam, the situation on the Korean Peninsula seems to be
escalating each day. Is North Korea using nuclear blackmail? Is
leader Kim Jong Il a crazy man or a shrewd strategist—or
both? Is the North Korean regime an albatross? Janet Tobin, editor
of the College Street Journal, recently asked these and
other questions during a conversation with Calvin Chen, Luce Assistant
Professor of Politics at Mount Holyoke, about the situation in
North Korea. Chen is an expert on the political economy of East
Asia, particularly Chinese politics and the industrialization
of the Chinese countryside.
Do you think North Korea will launch a nuclear attack,
or are North Koreans using rhetoric to instill fear and wring
concessions?
While I can't say for sure, of course, I am cautiously optimistic
that the North Koreans won't use weapons of mass destruction.
The consequences would be absolutely horrific. However, from a
purely strategic perspective, it seems that North Korea has adopted
a very rational but ruthless strategy to achieve its policy objectives.
The North Koreans are playing on American, Chinese, Japanese,
and South Korean fears that they might use nuclear weapons and
cause unacceptable casualties. I'm not saying it's
right—that this is the most effective way to deal with potential
adversaries, by heightening fears to gain concessions—but
I think this is what North Korea is doing right now.
What makes you feel North Korea probably won't use nuclear
weapons?
If you look at this situation historically, there have not been
any major confrontations on the Korean Peninsula since the Korean
war. Any time there was a possibility of a major confrontation,
the North Koreans have eventually backed off. What they have done,
though, is test the limits on occasion. Test firing a missile
over Japan in 1998 is a recent example of this, as is the threat
of building nuclear weapons. Although the North Korean leadership
is playing a game of chicken, I don't think they would risk
total annihilation. Their main goal is regime survival.
When have
they used the nuclear threat to bargain for aid in the past?
It happened back in 1994, when weapons inspectors reported that
activities at the Yongbyon nuclear complex violated the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty, which North Korea signed in 1985. In
response, the Clinton administration negotiated the "Agreed
Framework," which provided oil and other goods to North
Korea in exchange for the shutdown of nuclear facilities. When
the North Koreans signed the agreement, they were facing a desperate
economic situation. Essentially, they used the agreement as a
way to secure critical supplies that their own economy couldn't
generate.
Our government seems to have ignored warning signs in recent years
that North Korea was violating the Nuclear Nonprolif-eration Treaty
and the Agreed Framework. Why do you think all this is coming
to a head now?
I think 9/11 led to a major rethinking in terms of American national
security. The administration is less satisfied now with containing
adversaries and is adopting a more aggressive approach that focuses
on eliminating them whenever possible, especially the "axis
of evil." It doesn't seem to me that it's just
mere coincidence that North Korea admitted to its secret nuclear
weapons program and began moving graphite rods at the Yongbyon
nuclear complex at the same time that the United States became
so focused on Iraq. I think the North Koreans are trying to use
the situation in Iraq to their advantage, and again, it's
a significant tactical move on their part. They know it would
be difficult, if not impossible, for the U.S. to fight two wars
at the same time, or even sequentially.
In Beijing last week, Secretary of State Colin Powell
met with Chinese President Jiang Zemin, and it was announced that
China is interested in helping resolve the crisis over North Korea's
nuclear weapons program. Do you think China can help?
While China has previously viewed North Korea as a player that
could potentially be used in some way to push the U.S. out of
its dominant position in East Asia, that has changed dramatically
in recent years. China now sees North Korea as a political and
economic burden, one that is interfering with the fulfillment
of China's most important goals. Having a conflict on the
Korean peninsula could threaten China's economic future
and destabilize the region. Right now, China's northeast
is one of its most economically depressed areas. It wouldn't
help the Chinese at all if Korean refugees poured in over the
border. China has some influence with North Korea, but not the
amount that the Bush administration thinks. However, it is in
China's interest to help resolve this conflict. This is
why China continues to serve as the largest supplier of vital
goods to North Korea. China believes that if North Korea's
economic and security concerns can be overcome, the North Koreans
would be less of a thorn in everyone's side.
Can China serve as a role model for North Korea?
The policies that are in place in North Korea, called juche, meaning
self-reliance, have overtones of what Mao tried to do when he
led China. The Chinese view is that if this approach didn't
work in a large country with a lot of resources, it's not
likely to work in a smaller country like North Korea. Right now
the North Korean economy barely has a pulse. Behind the scenes,
China is trying to convince North Korea to follow the same reform
route they pioneered. So far the Chinese have not succeeded in
persuading the North Koreans to fundamentally change course.
Is Kim Jung Il a crazy man who would have to be removed to resolve
this crisis?
Despite what we have heard about him being a wild playboy in years
past, Kim Jung Il has shown that he is more capable than we thought.
He visited China a number of times and has seen the transformation
of Beijing and the Chinese economy. He has demonstrated an ability
to learn and has matured since he has taken on a leadership role.
I think he is savvier than we give him credit for. He is very
pragmatic and strategic in his calculations, and knows he must
play on the fears of a wide audience to make his threats appear
menacing. He is trying to create divisions between the United
States, Japan, and South Korea. South Korea is extremely concerned
that it would sustain unspeakable devastation and increasingly
resents the Bush administration's tough approach. This was
not a development that the Bush administration expected, since
it assumed that South Korea would automatically support its position,
as it has so often done in the past. At the same time, Kim Jung
Il has to be careful about pushing his policies too far. Policymakers
may get to the point that they think he is so crazy and hell-bent
on using nuclear weapons that the U.S. would need to strike North
Korea's reactors and even pursue regime change. There are
already reports that the Defense Department has thought about
this as a possible response.
Is Kim Jung Il using the threat of using nuclear weapons as a
means to maintain his regime?
I don't doubt that he is using the threat of nuclear weapons
as a trump card to maintain his regime. It would be better if
he gave this up and realized that he could establish a stronger
sense of political legitimacy through economic development. I
think North Korean citizens would support any effort by the government
to improve their day-to-day lives. Unfortunately, North Korea
hasn't entertained this as a serious option. They are relying
on force to stay in power.
What will other rogue states think if we don't punish
North Korea for violations? Will others be encouraged to develop
nuclear weapons to wring concessions, as well?
North Korea is a bit unique. Its ability to play a game of nuclear
blackmail has a lot to do with its self-imposed isolation. I don't
think sanctions would work well with them since North Korea has
faced such difficulties before. The leadership still clings to
the ideal of self-reliance, and feels that their people will endure,
even if we cut them off. I think that the message for other rogue
states is that the United States is extremely concerned about
the development and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
and is highly committed to stopping this process. If you are determined
to develop these weapons, it will come at an enormous, even unacceptable
cost. It is far better to join with the international community
and secure economic benefits in a peaceful manner rather than
go it alone and try to wring concessions through military threats.
President Bush has been criticized for paying more attention to
Iraq when North Korea is a bigger threat to the United States.
Why do you think this is?
President Bush seems to be obsessed with Iraq, seeing it as unfinished
business, a carryover from his father's presidency. While
there is a fear that Saddam Hussein could use weapons of mass
destruction again, there are other complicating factors as well.
Oil, the perceived threat that Iraq poses to stability in the
Middle East, Iraq's possible connection to Al Qaeda—all
of these I think have fortified Bush's resolve to take Saddam
out. Unfortunately, the president's preoccupation with Iraq
has prevented him and others in the administration from seeing
North Korea as an urgent matter.
How well do you think the Bush administration is handling
the North Korean crisis?
I would say that many of this administration's policies
and its approach have not done much to ease tensions in North
Korea, even though the administration has been toning down its
cold war–era rhetoric a bit of late and seems somewhat more
willing to negotiate. The team Bush put together at the beginning
of all this was pretty noteworthy in that it didn't include
anyone who really understood North or South Korea. Tensions with
both countries are largely connected to this lack of expertise.
Certainly, Bush's designation of North Korea as part of
the "axis of evil" has not made the situation any
easier. The North Koreans found it quite offensive, and not in
the least bit constructive, to be called an evil rogue state and
a threat to the international community. This kind of rhetoric
fuels a vicious cycle of suspicion and confrontation. We may disagree
with North Korean policies and feel that their approach is bellicose
and extreme, but when we respond in kind, tensions only increase.
President Bush hasn't helped his own cause with this approach.
Do you think
that Washington policymakers' lack of understanding of Asian
culture and sensibilities is making a bad situation worse?
To a large degree, yes. If the Bush team had a better understanding
of Asian political and cultural norms, it probably would have
refrained from using such inflammatory rhetoric. This is not to
say by any means that we cannot articulate disagreements or policy
differences. However, I think a more effective approach would
be to meet with the North Koreans directly. The public nature
of our denunciations has not been constructive. Partly because
of this public war of words, the North Koreans believe that the
atmosphere has been poisoned before negotiations can even begin,
that the United States has already adopted a hard, uncompromising
stance, and consequently, that negotiations are not likely to
yield a positive outcome. One of the things that was especially
troubling to the North Koreans is that he went out of his way
to denounce Kim Jong Il. By declaring that "I loathe the
man," President Bush committed a very personal and serious
affront that violated a strong sense of public decorum and propriety.
If you were
president, how would you handle the North Korea crisis?
This situation is certainly a challenge, but I would start by
pursuing a diplomatic route more intensively before considering
military options. We have to sit down and be very clear about
what we want to achieve. If we want to see North Korea's
nuclear weapons program dismantled, we must think carefully about
how we can best do this without getting into a confrontation.
I think that if we can help stabilize the North Korean economy,
the likelihood of conflict would drop significantly. Enforcement
measures are absolutely critical, however. We need to be sure
that North Korea is fulfilling its end of the deal. Ultimately,
if North Korea understands that interaction with the international
community is beneficial, and their survival is not in jeopardy,
there is a greater chance they will end their nuclear weapons
program. South Korea may provide enormous assistance in this regard.
They are the only major actor in the area that looks at North
Korea as a possible economic asset. They have recently completed
rail links between themselves and the North. The South has also
encouraged companies like Hyundai to start economic projects with
North Korea. They are desperately hoping that their cultural bonds
can also serve as a springboard for overcoming this long-standing
political divide.
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