December
5, 2003
Georgia's
Future: A Q&A with Professor Stephen Jones
|
Photo: Fred LeBlanc
Stephen Jones has traveled
extensively in Georgia, site of the recent peaceful coup
that removed President Eduard Shevardnadze.
|
Stephen F. Jones,
professor and chair of Russian and Eurasian studies, is an expert
on Caucasia and has traveled extensively in Georgia. He spoke
with the College Street Journal about the recent coup in Georgia
that ousted Eduard Shevardnadze, the longtime democratic, pro-Western
reformer who became Georgia's president in March 1992 after a
violent overthrow of his predecessor.
Q: What was the
situation in Georgia that led to Shevardnadze's becoming president
back in 1992?
A: After the Soviet
Union disappeared in December 1991, Georgians elected a human
rights activist, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, as president. In one of those
ironies of history, Gamsakhurdia turned out to be a president
with dictatorial tendencies. He was overthrown in a popularly
supported coup but the country collapsed into chaos. Shevardnadze
was called back from Moscow to Georgia in March 1992 to reunite
the country, establish a constitution, introduce democracy, and
attract foreign investment. It was hoped he would bring the political
and financial support of the West.
Q: The United
States and other Western countries had high hopes for Shevardnadze.
What went wrong?
A: Well, not everything
that went wrong can be attributed to Shevardnadze. Georgia is
in a very difficult neighborhood--Russia and Chechnya to the north,
Armenia and Turkey to the south, Azerbaijan to the East. He had
to contend with a civil war and two secessionist wars. Georgia
survived these in part because of Shevardnadze's diplomatic skills.
But Shevardnadze was trained in Soviet customs and habits, and
despite some initial hopes that he would create a democratic state,
he proved to be a lukewarm reformer who lost touch with the needs
of the population. Shevardnadze's government became one of the
most corrupt among the former Soviet states, and 60 percent of
the population officially ended up on the poverty line. However,
Western governments supported him--most strongly the United States--despite
a series of falsified elections, because he promised to protect
precious oil pipelines that crossed Georgian territory from Central
Asia. He was pro-Western and helped prevent Russia from asserting
control over the oil pipelines.
Q: Who is Shevardnadze's
successor and what can we expect of him?
A: He [doesn't have]
a democratically elected successor yet; the speaker of the parliament
has temporarily taken over. Elections will be in January. The
most promising candidate, who led the storming of the parliament
on November 23, is Misha Saakashvili. He is young, ambitious,
charismatic, and, as far as the United States is concerned, a
good bet. He received a law degree from Columbia University and
represents a new post-Soviet generation of young reformers with
strong ties to the West. If he becomes president, we can expect
some tough times ahead as he is determined to crack down on corruption
and take the political system in a more democratic direction.
That is going to inspire a strong reaction from the old Georgian
elite just ousted from power who are still very powerful and very
rich.
Q: How will this
change in leadership affect Georgia's relationship with Russia?
A: Russia actually
played a positive role in the transfer of power, urging Shevardnadze
to resign to avoid bloodshed. Yet Russia has lost out to the United
States in the battle for influence in Caucasia and Georgia. But
Russia is still a powerful presence with many levers under its
control. It monopolizes Georgia's gas and electricity supplies,
and it supports two secessionist regimes that have broken away
from Georgia--Abkhazia and South Osetia. Russia has used these
two breakaway regions in the past to put pressure on Shevardnadze
and to destabilize the country. It still has that power. Much
depends on how the new Georgian leadership deals with Russia and
how much support it gets from the West. Russia will not abandon
its interests in Caucasia.
Q: Are the Georgians
prematurely optimistic in calling this a "velvet revolution"?
A: The "revolution,"
if we can call it that, was remarkably peaceful. Not a single
person was killed. The opposition stormed the parliament with
roses in their hands and gave gifts of food to the policemen guarding
the parliamentary building. But along with the opportunities for
change, there are many dangers. We have mentioned Russia
and the former Georgian elite--Georgia has still not integrated
its national minorities successfully into the political system.
Reviving the economy will take decades. Georgians are tremendously
optimistic now, but their expectations are bound to be disappointed.
Q: What opportunities
does the change in leadership open up for Georgia?
A: The opportunities
are there. Political reform is on the agenda. If the new leadership
acts intelligently--by no means guaranteed--it has an opportunity
to resolve Georgia's ethnic conflicts. If it could do that peacefully,
it would be an example for other ethnic conflicts in Caucasia.
On the other hand, the new leaders may decide to quickly end the
stalemate with secessionist Abkhazia and Osetia by more forceful
means, as negotiations haven't gone anywhere in the last ten years
and the public will be expecting progress. That will lead to disaster.
Q: What can the
U.S. and other countries do now to support the new leader of Georgia?
A: The United States
has already invested billions of dollars in Georgia. Over the
last five years Georgia has been the highest recipient of U.S.
aid per capita after Israel and Egypt. But the money has achieved
very little. The West, including the U.S., should reassess its
aid strategies, and this would be an opportunity to do so. The
"revolution" in Georgia is a genuine opportunity for democracy,
so the U.S. should do all it can to help establish workable democratic
institutions without insisting that what works for the U.S. will
work for Georgia. The U.S. has not been the best example of democracy
in recent years. But having said that, Western support for Georgia
is crucial at this stage-- otherwise Russia will assert its traditional
security interests in the region and Georgians will lose their
chance again.
Q: Shevardnadze
was a major figure in bringing about a peaceful end to the cold
war and creating positive relationships with the West. Given the
chaos he leaves behind in Georgia, what is his legacy?
A: Mixed, of course.
Without him in the early years of Georgia's independence, Georgia
may not have survived. He was a great conciliator and successfully
balanced opposing political forces that were ready to tear one
another apart when he first arrived in Georgia. But those policies
were not successful at building a democratic state. Conciliation
became a form of favoritism, divvying up economic spoils and political
power, and balancing opposing forces led to political stagnation.
You cannot create democracy by sitting still. Shevardnadze lost
his political direction and let the country fall into the hands
of powerful political groups. However, the fact that the "revolution"
in Georgia was peaceful was largely due to Shevardnadze. He refused
to use force against the opposition. That's a very positive legacy.
More generally, of course, he will be remembered for his role
in ending the cold war peacefully.
Q: What lessons
can other former Soviet republics take from Georgia's experience?
A: There are some
lessons here that other states might not want to learn. I am sure
that the authoritarian leaders in Belarus and Azerbaijan, for
example, are looking at Georgian events with great concern. At
best, the Georgian "revolution" could lead to similar popular
"revolutions" in other authoritarian post-Soviet states. However,
I am skeptical because most other leaders in former Soviet states
do not have Shevardnadze's tolerance. If I was to be a bit more
sentimental--and somewhere at the back of my mind I believe this--the
lesson is that democracy still has a chance in some of the Soviet
Union's more repressive states. No authoritarian leader, as events
over the last decades have shown us, should feel that his or her
power is invulnerable to popular protest.
he
un
he
counter is
1,068
|
