This opinion piece ran in the San Diego Union-Tribune
on Sunday, September 14, 2003.
AS VIOLENCE ESCALATES, MIDDLE EAST
SINKS FURTHER INTO DESPAIR
By Scott B. Lasensky
With the resurgence of Israeli-Palestinian violence, the resignation
of Palestinian Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas and the complete collapse
of the road map peace initiative, it is an auspicious time for
stocktaking on the Israeli-Palestinian front. Sept. 13 marks a
decade since the PLO signed the Oslo accord, the historic agreement
with Israel to renounce violence and begin negotiations toward
a permanent settlement. Where is the Palestinian national movement
today?
By almost every measure, Palestinians are experiencing a crushing
setback. Despite obtaining measurable achievements through peacemaking
in the 1990s, Palestinians are now mired in an uprising that has
pushed the prospect of statehood further out of reach. To be sure,
Israel faces painful choices whether to continue building
the "separation fence" (which President Bush has criticized)
or whether to expand Jewish settlements in Palestinian lands (which
most Israelis consider a big mistake) to name just two. But Palestinians
face an even greater test to cast aside their insurgent
mentality, reject terrorism and focus squarely on state-building.
It is not an insurmountable challenge. But without a clear political
decision to abandon violence and confront the armed rejectionist
groups, the Palestinian national movement will remain frustrated
leaving Palestinians trapped somewhere between insurgency
and statehood.
Meaning of Oslo
Palestinian achievements at Oslo were myriad and far-reaching.
The PLO, long a bitter foe of Israel, and a pariah in Washington,
was recognized by the late Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin
and former U.S. President Bill Clinton as the legitimate representative
of the Palestinian people. A massive international donor effort
quickly turned Palestinians into the highest per capita recipients
of development aid in the world, and helped establish a full menu
of state-like institutions.
For the first time, Palestinians had a real opportunity to manage
their own affairs. Public institutions were established, ranging
from education and public health to finance and welfare.
The exiled Palestinian leadership, led by Yasser Arafat, returned
to the territories to lead this state-building enterprise. Although
specific outlines of a future Palestinian state were not achieved
at Oslo, Palestinians did obtain an Israeli commitment that even
the most sensitive issues, like the status of Jerusalem, would
be negotiated.
As with most peace settlements, there were trade-offs and setbacks.
From the outset, Palestinians have had a hard time coming to terms
with the fact that Oslo did not require Israel to freeze settlements.
The setbacks came early. The emergence of rejectionist terror
led to tough Israeli security measures and a consequent decline
in the Palestinian standard of living. Then, just two years after
that famous handshake, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin was
assassinated.
Missed opportunities
Oslo was never meant to produce a complete settlement; it was
a framework agreement designed to launch a step-by-step process
of peacemaking. Israeli leaders avoided discussing final status
issues until seven years after Oslo, when President Clinton made
a hurried push for peace beginning at Camp David in summer 2000.
These talks were a watershed in Israeli-Palestinian relations.
The Israeli positions are by now well known. Palestinians received
a commitment that most settlements would be evacuated. Jerusalem
would be a shared capital. A Palestinian state, though demilitarized,
would benefit from a U.S.-led peacekeeping force. Tens of billions
of dollars would be made available for refugee resettlement, rehabilitation
and compensation. The 1967 borders, with agreed land swaps, would
settle the territorial dispute.
Measured against the Palestinian position a decade earlier,
with the PLO marginalized and bankrupt, and a complete Israeli
occupation of the territories, these were stunning achievements.
But whether by abandonment or outright rejection, Palestinians
failed to seize this opportunity for peace.
Camp David and the negotiations that followed were not perfect.
Missteps by Barak and Clinton were numerous, and have been documented
in testimonials from Israeli, American and Palestinian participants.
But Arafat's decision to walk away from the negotiations and not
to confront the violence that ensued was a catastrophic miscalculation,
and remains the single most consequential factor in the defeat
of Ehud Barak, the decline of Israel's Labor Party and the destruction
of the Israeli "peace camp."
Intifada as catastrophe
Palestinian violence during the past three years, which Yasser
Arafat and the Palestinian leadership have failed to challenge,
has given Israel greater legitimacy to respond with an iron fist.
The current intifada has revealed how Arafat maintained a dual
existence throughout the Oslo years as both a leader of a national
liberation movement and a nascent nation-state. Arafat sought
to epitomize the role of insurgent and statesman.
But Arafat has been forced to forfeit the role of statesman.
He decided to ride the wave of violent confrontation with Israel,
a misjudgment that has borne terrible consequences for Palestinians.
Because Palestinians chose to pursue the violent path to state
formation, they unwittingly (though not uncharacteristically)
played to Israel's strength.
As a result of the violence that erupted after Camp David, a
good deal of the moral high ground that Palestinians occupied
since the first intifada was lost. Unlike that earlier struggle,
where the Israeli military primarily faced stone-throwing children,
over the past three years Israel has frequently confronted paramilitary
forces of under-equipped yet legitimate targets.
The Palestinian death toll stands well over 2,000, with more
than 25,000 injured. Civil society is disintegrating, and the
Palestinian economy lies in ruins. Poverty is rampant and unemployment
is pushing 60 percent. According to the World Bank, 2 million
Palestinians subsist on two dollars a day or less. The Palestinian
GNP has shrunk by 40 percent since 2000. Malnutrition is on the
rise.
But a Palestinian defeat does not make life any simpler for
President Bush. A reduction of Israeli-Palestinian violence, and
an eventual settlement, is still important if the United States
hopes to win the war on terror and continue to manage its diverse
interests across the Arab world, especially in Iraq. The White
House has declared repeatedly since 9/11 that the end of the occupation
and the establishment of a viable, democratic Palestinian state
is a critical American national security objective.
No victory for Israel
Neither does a Palestinian defeat mean victory for Israel. Even
Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, an opponent of the Oslo process,
has acknowledged that a political settlement is necessary for
Israel's own survival. For the first time in a century, time may
not be on the side of the Zionist enterprise. For 100 years, Zionists
believed the clock was working for them. At its operational core,
the Zionist movement was about creating facts on the ground.
State-building and land settlement went hand in hand in an effort
premised upon the belief that Arabs would eventually come to terms
with a Jewish state that was more than just a military juggernaut
but a physical, economic and social force as well. But
times have changed. In the area between the Jordan River and the
Mediterranean, Arabs will soon outnumber Jews (if they don't already).
Demography is quickly outstripping geography as Israel's principal
strategic concern.
The road ahead
Ten years after first sitting down with Israel to negotiate
a political settlement, the Palestinian national movement stands
at a crossroad. If Arafat and the Palestinian leadership decide
to let the intifada continue, the current catastrophe will only
worsen and Palestinian society will suffer even more. In the aftermath
of America's military defeat of Saddam Hussein, there will be
little tolerance in Washington for a continued Palestinian insurgency.
Moreover, with Saddam removed, Palestinians have few, if any,
regional patrons that are as vocal and generous as Ba'athist Iraq.
Palestinians can choose a different path, but it will take courageous
leadership. The new Palestinian prime minister will need to prove
that even though he is partially constrained by Arafat's grip,
resolute action can be taken to reign in the Intifada and challenge
extremist violence. Prime Minister Ahmed Qureia, like his predecessor,
will complain that he lacks the capacity to do so. But in reality
the problem goes much deeper. To borrow one of Arafat's favorite
phrases, "where there's a will, there's a way." Palestinians
must demonstrate the will to confront violent renegades in their
midst. Until that happens, Palestinians are likely to remain where
they are today defeated and worse off than a decade earlier
when prospects for peace were real and a better future was within
reach.
Scot B. Lasensky formerly a fellow at the Brookings
Institution and the Council on Foreign Relations is a professor
at Mount Holyoke College in Massachusetts.