INDIA AND MISSILE DEFENSE
The Center for Security Policy

Washington's developing strategic relationship with India would dearly benefit from a Bush Administration approval of Israel's intention to sell its Arrow missile defense system to India. Some in the Bush Administration, however, oppose this sale fearing an Indian strategic advantage would destabilize that tense region. But they might also be wrong, as helping India obtain missile defenses could help defend democracy in India, the United States, Israel, and even promote it in Pakistan.

The State Department, which reportedly believes this sale would be destabilizing, has a full plate of war and peace issues to consider in South Asia. Since a December attack on India's Parliament by Pakistani-based terrorist group seeking to wrest control of the disputed region of Kashmir, both countries have been on a near-war footing. For its part, Pakistan has on several occasions threatened nuclear retaliation if India attacks Kashmiri terrorist groups that Islamabad has long supported. A new conflict, were it to include a nuclear exchange, would deeply set back Washington's current war on terrorism, which has had the beneficial side effect of facilitating the best level of cooperation in decades with both India and Pakistan.

It is possible, however, that the sale of non-nuclear missile defenses to India would actually have a positive effect on even these short-term concerns. Presumably, those in the Administration who oppose the Arrow sale fear that an effective Indian defense against Pakistan's nuclear missiles would embolden India to undertake "destabilizing" strikes against Pakistani-based terrorists. But the terrorists who are attacking democratic India have also volunteered to fight for the Taliban and Osama Bin Laden's Al Qaeda network in Afghanistan. They are as much America's enemy. And India's goal this year has not been to attack the terrorists, but to use its military to force Islamabad, and to pressure Washington to force Islamabad, to dismantle the terrorists by itself. This pressure has succeeded in obtaining Pakistani President Musharraf's rhetorical commitment to crack down on the terrorists, though progress in that direction is painfully slow.

So it is conceivable that as Pakistan views its nuclear forces and nuclear armed missiles as deterring an Indian attack, then some diminution of Pakistan's deterrent would allow India to place greater pressure on Islamabad to be rid of the terrorist networks. Musharraf and the military forces that keep him in power need that encouragement. This is a goal that Delhi, Washington, and even Islamabad can share.

Moving on to the longer term, the last year has witnessed a near revolution in U.S.-Indian defense relations, which were a perpetual victim of Cold War rivalries and then a series of Kashmir and proliferation-related disputes. President George Bush entered office determined to positively recast relations with Delhi. And since the September 11 attacks against the U.S. by Osama Bin Laden, U.S.-Indian cooperation has accelerated in the countering of terrorism, and in building cooperation between their respective military services. This has so far included joint naval patrols and army exercises. For the first time since Indian independence from Britain in 1947, there is a sense that the world's two largest democracies can cooperate for their greater security.

One of the most exciting areas for future U.S.-Indian cooperation could be missile defense. Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee responded to Bush's early warming of ties by offering an indirect endorsement of Bush's May 2001 proposal to couple deep nuclear missile reductions with missile defenses. Earlier this year Indian defense experts visited the U.S. to discuss a range of issues concerning missile defense.

There are good reasons to proceed with missile defense cooperation. First, enlisting other states to replace offensive missiles with defensive missiles serves larger U.S. arms control goals while providing for stability. Second, Pakistan's nuclear and missile capabilities are dependent on China for nuclear weapon and solid fuel missile technology, and from North Korea for liquid fuel missile technology. Helping democratic India to defend itself against these missiles is a way to stand up to Communist China's nuclear and missile proliferation, and to help India defend itself from China's growing nuclear missile arsenal. Should an Indian missile defense capability emerge at about the same times as similar capabilities emerge in Japan and Taiwan, then Beijing may seriously reconsider it current strategy which rests on terrorizing its neighbors with nuclear missiles, for real regional missile controls.

Allowing the sale of Israel's Arrow missile defense system will also benefit developing Indian-Israeli defense relations, which can rebound the benefit of the U.S. India and Israel already share deep concerns over their mutual Islamic terrorism, a concern now shared with the U.S., so why not extend trilateral efforts to missile defense? Of course, there are U.S. missile defense makers like Raytheon who might like to win this business by selling systems like the Patriot PAC-3. But the Israeli Arrow is further developed, and India could also opt for a Russian missile defense system like the S-300V.

It is far better that India be encouraged to build missile defenses with a democratic partner. India will obtain a missile defense, so Washington should not oppose the Israeli sale if India determines the Arrow meets its needs. It would not necessarily preclude future missile defense cooperation with the U.S. or even technology sales. Indians deserve to be defended from nuclear missiles as much as do Americans and Israelis. Washington's helping India obtain missile defenses can promote the notion that democracy and non-nuclear missile defenses are intertwined, as they are in America, so they should also be in India, Israel, and Taiwan.