by Dr. Subhash Kapila

Introductory Background: The last three months have witnessed an ongoing debate in the Indian media and in particular spearheaded by a New Delhi weekly newsmagazine on the MacDonald Report officially titled “ Indo-US Relationship: Expectations and Perceptions” which was compiled by Julie MacDonald, Director in the Joint Net Assessment Office in the Pentagon, which sponsored the report.

This 141-page report is said to be a compilation of views of both American and Indian officials. In the case of the United States, the perceptions incorporated are of those American officials who have had some experience in interaction with the Indian defence set-up for over a decade or more.

It is the perceptions of the United States officials of India’s defence set-up which has drawn flak from the Indian media mouthing reactions from retired senior Indian Army officers and so called unnamed serving senior military officials”.

Lately, the added Indian media criticism focuses on the lack of official Indian reaction to the criticisms in the MacDonald Report from either the Ministry of Defence or in the Ministry of External Affairs.

Rightly too, that no official Indian reaction has taken place so far and nor should it come in the future, for the following reasons:

* The report does not incorporate the US Government views of India’s defence set-up.

* It incorporates the ‘perceptions’ of inter-acting officials.

* It is a report prepared for the US Defence Department. It is not a report of the US Defence Department.

In the opinion of this author, many of the American criticisms of India’s defence set-up are valid. It should be positively viewed as a wake-up call for the Indian Government, the Indian Ministry of Defence and the Indian military to initiate remedial actions on weaknesses which have been pointed out by many an Indian analyst too in the past.

The Indian side “going ballistic” on American criticisms, as termed by the said newsmagazine, is therefore a hypersensitive reaction and only reinforces the criticisms made.

Major Criticisms in the MacDonald Report: The major American criticisms that have emerged in the MacDonald Report can be grouped under the following major headings:

* India’s Lack of Strategic Vision,

* India’s Limitations in Being a Credible Military Partner of the United States.

* India’s Archaic Defence Decision-making.

* Attitudinal Approaches of the Indian military set-up.

Before a dispassionate analysis of the above are made the aim of the MacDonald Report needs to be put in the correct perspective, which was: -- “to reveal opportunities for and impediments in the way of military cooperation that might not be obvious to everyone, and also expose areas of disagreement and misunderstanding that will affect decision-making and enrich dialogue between the two sides.”

If that be the aim, then the hyper-sensitive Indian reactions are misplaced as the follow-up analysis would indicate.

India’s Lack of Strategic Vision: India’s most crucial national weakness that has persisted in the last 55 years, in its various political dispensations and despite five wars, has been the lack of a national strategic vision. It is not that the MacDonald Report only that has brought it out. This glaring national deficiency stands highlighted and discussed in fair detail in this author’s recently published book: “INDIA”S DEFENCE POLICIES AND STRATEGIC THOUGHT: A Comparative Analysis”.

It is a fact that India has yet to define its ‘National Interests’, its ‘National Objectives’ and from which logically would have emerged India’s ‘National Military Strategy’. While the book referred above discusses this aspect in detail, some of the major glaring factors that contribute to the obliviousness for articulating India’s strategic vision arise from

* India’s lack of strategic culture.

* India’s political culture which does not afford primacy to national security in the national agenda.

* Politicisation of national security issues by India’s politicians and thereby arresting the emergence of a bi-partisan ‘strategic vision

* India’s bureaucracy which by virtue of its background, service conditioning and inclination has no incentives towards matters strategic.

The American report therefore is accurate in highlighting this deficiency. While both USA and India hope for a strategic partnership, how can the United States fathom what India can contribute if India does not even formulate and articulate its strategic vision.

India’s Limitations in Being a Credible Military Partner of the United States: However much India dislikes being nailed down on strategic certainties, there is a distinct possibility that someday in the future, India may have to become a military partner of the USA to meet her own national security requirements of combating a common threat.

If that be so, and the prospect being not unlikely, then the United States is right in assessing India’s credibility in this regard.

India and Indians must face and find answers to the following vexatious strategic questions:

* India’s modernizations and upgradation plans for the Indian Armed Forces are always behind schedule in terms of implementation due to lack of firm political decisions and a lethargic and unimaginative Ministry of Defence bureaucracy.

* India’s immediate strategic priority is to be a regional power. India has yet to achieve an unmistakable and strategic superiority over Pakistan, her nearest rival.

* India’s weapon systems and military equipment suffer from inadequate maintenance due to limited funds, non-provision of spares of imported origin and over-use of military equipment in internal security and disaster relief operations.

* India’s Army lacks adequate time for training to improve its combat effectiveness due to over-involvement in internal security operations.

India’s conventional military potential even lacks credibility today in the regional context, leave aside the aspirations to be a predominant regional military power.

India’s Archaic Defence Decision Making: India’s lack of strategic vision and an external perception of its military credibility arise from India’s archaic defence decision making apparatus. Some of the visible shortcomings are:

* India’s military hierarchy not being in the higher defence decision-making loop.

* India’s lack of Chief of Defence Staff. The current government's excuse that political consensus is required amounts to shirking from crucial decisions.

* India’s lack of integration in its Ministry of Defence (MOD) of uniformed officials.

* India’s inept MOD bureaucracy not held accountable in any manner for delays in national security decisions, processes, and implementation of decisions.

The Americans are right in their criticisms of ‘protocol consciousness’, Hypersensitivity’ and ‘lack of timely responses on defence issues'. It should be made clear in the analysis that the above US criticisms are more aimed at the Indian MOD and its bureaucrats. The following trends of the Indian MOD need to be pointed out.

* Media reports of cancellations of joint meetings in USA by a previous Defence Secretary a couple of years ago on the grounds that protocol wise the US counter part was not of his level.

* It is said that Indian MOD gave directions some years back when military up gradations took place that level of interaction between MOD and military officials would remain the same i.e. while in the past MOD Joint Secretaries level of interaction was Major General or equivalent it would now be at Lieutenant General level.

* MOD passing the buck either to MEA or Services Headquarters on any issue sought to be raised by external counter-parts.

Attitudinal Approaches of the Indian Military Setup:

While not going into the question of intellectual and theoretical approaches or the superiority of the US system over the Indian system or vice versa, what needs to be observed here is that the criticisms here are to be viewed in two contexts (1) systemic imposition of restrictions in its military contacts and military to military interaction on the Indian military and (2) In-service impositions on military officers.

As regarding the first, due to lack of services integration in the Ministry of Defence, there is a virtual disconnect between the MOD and Services Headquarters interacting with the foreign delegations and more so when it comes to the military sales, joint training etc. The delays on part of the Services Headquarters which the US side perceives seems to arise from the necessity of the military to refer back every proposal that they receive for MOD approval even on the most mundane points.

In the second context, it is the successive generation of the senior Indian military officers who are to blame for this malaise. They have never encouraged Indian military officers to be thinking soldiers, be audacious in their military thinking, professional approaches and professional articulation. So what is being perceived by the US side as ‘being too intellectual’ and ‘theoretical in approach’ arise from, the double imposition of both of the above factors.

Concluding Observations:

Hypersensitive reaction to well meant criticism as far as the MacDonald Report is concerned, seems to be out of place. It is wrong to view this report in nationalistic terms.

The United States and India have officially set out to explore a strategic partnership arising from their ‘natural allies’ perception. During the Second World War, there were many strategic differences in the perception and conduct of military operations between the major allies i.e. United States and Britain. The misperceptions were always sorted out by discussions and remedial action taken by both sides.

If United States and India desire to expand their military to military contacts and move to some sort of strategic partnership, hypersensitive reactions have to be dispensed by both sides.

In this connection, writing on ‘Friendship Between Nations’, Kustner and Trifonovitch (1989) observed that “In developing friendship many values come into play: harmony, trust, honesty, informality and human concern, to name but a few. Values are very similar cross-culturally, but the order in which they are emphasized in any particular situation may differ and the means by which they are practised differ markedly”.

Both United Sates and more so the Indian defence set up have to appreciate the above, while attempting to forge more meaningful defence linkages.
(The author is an International Relations and Strategic Affairs analyst. He is the Consultant, Strategic Affairs with South Asia Analysis Group. Email <drsubhashkapila @yahoo.com>)