Cooperative NMD and TMD Efforts: Compiled by the Arms Control Reporter

US-Russia. On 5 October 1991, Gorbachev proposed the creation of a joint US-Soviet system to avert nuclear missile strikes, with ground and space-based elements. The Bush administration greeted this Soviet volte-face eagerly, but the demise of the Soviet Union in December 1991 dissipated the US Congress' willingness to spend money on such a system. The space weapon talks failed to resume before the Soviet Union broke apart {575bBMD92 18.11}.
However, Russia, as the successor to the USSR's nuclear and space programs, remained interested in ballistic missile defense. Yeltsin reiterated Gorbachev's proposal, while confirming Russia's commitment to the ABM Treaty {575bBMD93 4.4}. On 17 June 1992, Yeltsin and Bush issued a joint statement calling for exploration of three steps: sharing early warning information, cooperation "with participating states" in ballistic missile defenses, and developing a legal basis for cooperation, including changes to existing treaties.
The Defense Consultative Group, composed of US and Russian officials, was considering joint early warning on ballistic missiles, ABM technology cooperation, and joint TMD exercises. It was formed in 1996 by merging two other working groups, the Strategic Stability Working Group (SSWG) and the Bilateral Working Group (BWG). The SSWG had handled arms control and TMD cooperation, while BWG had discussed military-to-military contacts, peacekeeping, and joint exercises {576bBMD96 4-7.6}.
In 1997, Yeltsin and Clinton agreed in a joint statement that there was "considerable scope for [US-Russian BMD] cooperation." BMDO chief Lester Lyles said that US-Russian BMD cooperation could include expanding existing programs and beginning new cooperative efforts in modeling and simulation {576bBMD97 5.6}. In September 1997, Yeltsin reportedly called for ASAT negotiations in a letter to President Clinton {576eBMD97 box 1.12}.
A joint cooperative program called Russian American Observational Satellites (RAMOS) began in 1992 to jointly observe the use of two satellites (one from each country) for stereo viewing of mainly geographic and meteorological objects. Stereo satellite viewing technology would have implications for tracking ballistic missiles and other objects in space. DOD proposed restructuring the program to cut costs and Russia was still considering the proposal {Reporter communication with BMDO official 28.6.99}.
In February 1998, the two countries started the Active Plasma Experiment, which aimed to detonate artificial plasma generators in the upper atmosphere. The explosions would be observed by "fly-long sensors." The experiment consists of four launches, the first of which was conducted successfully on 22 January 1999. The next launches were planned for 2001, 2002, and 2003 {Reporter communication with BMDO official 28.6.99}.
The two countries further discussed joint BMD cooperation in July 1999 {603b1ABM99 27.7}. In October 1999, the United States reportedly offered to cooperate on both BMD and missile early warning systems in return for Russian consideration of ABM Treaty revision. US proposals included the funding of an early warning radar installation and joint development of two missile observation satellites {603b1ABM99 17.10; 603b3ABM99 box 1.12}. However, US officials later denied that these cooperative efforts were in any way connected to the issue of Russian agreement to amend the ABM Treaty {603bABM99 9.11}.
At a press conference with President Clinton on 2 September 1998, Yeltsin announced plans for the establishment of a joint early warning center to be located in Russia {603e1ABM98 1-2.9}. In January 2000, the two countries signed a protocol on the early warning center {603e5ABM00 31.1}. The Bush administration considered offering Russia funding for its early warning system, sharing of early warning data, and purchase of Russia's S-300 missile systems in return for Russian concurrence in terminating the ABM Treaty {603e5ABM01 27.5}.

China/Russia. In 2000, Russia and China discussed possible cooperation on a possible Russian-Chinese ABM defense system {16-18.1.00; 26.4.00; 16-19.5.00}.

NATO/Western European Union-Russia. Russia proposed co-development of TMD systems with NATO in February 1997. A NATO ad hoc group met to consider the subject, but a US official said that Russia had nothing to offer. The WEU was pursuing similar low-key efforts {576bBMD97 23.2}. In 2000 and 2001, Russia again proposed cooperation with WEU and NATO on missile defense {5-6.6.00; 20.2.01}.

European missile shield. Germany, Italy, and the United States agreed to work together on a Medium Extended Area Defense System (MEADS)-an anti-aircraft and anti-TMD system {576bBMD97 10.12}. US funding for this effort was in jeopardy {603e1ABM98 29.9}, which upset its European allies {603b1ABM99 18.1}. In May 1999, Italy and Germany agreed to a US proposal to restructure the program to cut costs, with a new focus on the Patriot Advanced Capabilities-3 (PAC-3) to provide the foundation for MEADs {603b1ABM99 10.5}. However, disputes over US export of classified technology threatened to end German-US cooperation on the Patriot system {603b1ABM99 1.10}. These disputes were resolved in 2000 {603.e4ABM00 14-15.5}.
Britain agreed to cooperate with European states on TMD, but would not join MEADS {576.bBMD97 9.1}. In 1998, a US-German-Dutch planning group was established to develop an air defense system that could lead to a TMD system {603e1ABM98 15.4}. These states conducted joint TMD tests in 1998 and 1999 {603e1ABM98 1.7, 603b1ABM99 1.5}. The joint battlefield exercises were followed in November 1999 by a discussion on US-German-Dutch-Italian Naval TMD cooperation {603b1ABM99 29.11}.
In July 1998, Germany announced a US-German Joint Patrol Unit that would have air defense missiles {576bBMD97 15.7}.
NATO decided to conduct a feasibility study on fielding of a NATO-wide TMD system based on US technology sharing {603b1ABM99 27.9, 4.11}. NATO awarded a contract to two consortia for the feasibility studies in 2001 {603e4ABM01 3.6}.

Asian missile defense. Japan considered taking part in a joint TMD research and development (R&D) program with the United States in 1996 and 1997 {576bBMD96 23.2; 576bBMD97 9.8}. In late 1998, Japan decided it would join the project which would focus on the US Navy Theater Wide program {WT 26.12.98}. R&D would concentrate on a hybrid US-Japanese interceptor, although US and Japanese officials said their countries would also construct two Aegis destroyers for the Japanese Navy {603b1ABM99 7.1}. In March 1999, the Japanese parliament approved FY99 funding for cooperative TMD research with the United States, followed in August by a formal joint agreement on the terms of cooperation {603b1ABM99 22.3, 16.8, 6.9}. Late in 2001, Japan and the United States pledged to work together on a sea-based missile defense system {603e3ABM01 10.12}.
In 1997, the United States urged South Korea to purchase the US Patriot system while a Russian export company sought to sell it S-300s {576eBMD97 box 1.1}. In late 1998, the South Korean Defense Ministry announced plans to develop an anti-missile defense system based on the Russian S-300PMU {603eABM98 box 31.12}. In March 1999, South Korea, reacting to media speculation, said it would not join US-Japanese cooperative TMD efforts {603b1ABM99 22.3, 16.8, 6.9}. In 2000 and 2001, South Korea continued to harbor reservations about these efforts {603e3ABM00 29.6; 17.1.01}
Taiwan completed a successful test of its Tienkung II TMD, an improved version of the Sky-Bow II, and sought to purchase Aegis destroyers in order to bolster its BMD capabilities {603eABM98 box 31.12}. It also purchased and deployed its fourth PAC-3 battery in December 1998, and expressed an interest in future US Asian-Pacific TMD plans in August 1999 {603b1ABM99 18.8}. China was particularly concerned about Taiwan joining the US-Japanese TMD project. Taiwan said it was not "even capable of making an evaluation" of the program, much less being able to determine if it would take part in it {603b1ABM99 2.3}. In 2001, Taiwan successfully flight tested PAC-2 missiles and called for a joint US-Japanese-Taiwanese TMD program {603e4ABM01 20.6; 16.7}
In May 1999, the US Department of Defense issued a report to Congress on Asia-Pacific TMD architecture options for Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, based on each state's political and military threat environment {603b1ABM99 4.5}.

Middle Eastern missile defense. Currently, three major US-Israeli programs are being undertaken: the Arrow-2 interceptor system {603eABM98 boxes 1.1, 1.6, 31.12}, THEL, a high-energy laser with TMD capability {603b1ABM99 21.6, 5.8}, and a TMD-capable unmanned aerial vehicle {603b1ABM99 15.3, 603eABM98 box 31.12}. Additionally, in 1996, the United States agreed to provide Israel with early warning data {576bBMD96 28.4; 603e1ABM98 box 31.12}.
In 1998, US-Israeli officials held preliminary, informal consultations on extending TMD cooperation beyond current programs {603e1ABM98 18.1}. They would study the possibility of integrating the US Navy's Aegis system with Israeli ground-based systems {603e1ABM98 17.9}. In September 1999, Israel and the United States established a joint missile defense policy advisory group that would coordinate missile defense strategies of DOD and the Israeli Ministry of Defense {603b1ABM99 30.9}. The Arrow-II became fully operational in 2000 {603e2ABM00 16.10}. Testing of THEL continued {603e2ABM00 10.5; 28.8} amid plans to begin development of a mobile THEL {603e2ABM00 7.12}.
Other states that have indicated an interest in the Arrow boost-phase system include Turkey, the United Kingdom, Japan, and South Korea {603e1ABM98 29.4; 603e2ABM01 8.5}. Israel was interested in selling the system to the Palestinian Authority and Turkey as part of a Middle Eastern defense system {603b1ABM99 27.4}. Following a successful test of the system in November 1999, Israel hoped to deploy the first battery of Arrows by the end of 2001, with three deployments planned by 2003 {603b1ABM99 1.11}. Lately India has shown an interest in integrating the Arrow-II with India's Akash surface-to-air missile {603e4ABM01 5.9}.
In 1999, the United States was working with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to link their Patriot batteries to establish a network that would improve warning time and increase the chances of intercepting incoming missiles {603b1ABM99 22.3}.

India-Russia. Under a 10-year defense cooperation agreement signed in 1998, India and Russia would cooperate on TMD development by merging elements of India's Akash SAM missile and Rajendra radar with the Russian S-300V anti-tactical ballistic missile (ATBM) system {603e1ABM98 1.7}.
International clearinghouse. In 1998, President Clinton proposed the creation of an international clearinghouse that would coordinate information about international military and civilian above-the-horizon laser tests that could reach satellites, with the aim of protecting low-orbiting satellites {603e2ABM98 2.1}.
Other countries. A number of other countries have been asked to cooperate on joint BMD systems or have pursued their own, including Australia {576eBMD97 9.8}, Belarus (with Russia) {575bBMD92 19.5; 603b1ABM99 9.12}, Britain {576bBMD94 15.2; 576eBMD97 box 1.1}, Canada {575eBMD92 9.3}, Cyprus {603eABM98 box 1.6}, Denmark {576eBMD97 box 1.12}, France {576bBMD94 1.10}, Greece {603eABM98 31.12; 603b2ABM99 box 1.8}, India {603eABM98 box 31.12}, South Korea {603b2ABM99 box 1.8}, Sweden {575bBMD92 3.2; 603b2ABM99 1.8}, Turkey {603e1ABM98 19.1}, Taiwan {603b2ABM99 box 1.8, 23.8}, and United Arab Emirates {576eBMD97 box 1.1}.
Several states sought to buy complete systems for immediate deployment. Egypt and South Korea were upgrading or potentially attaining systems from both Russia and the United States; Cyprus, Greece, Libya, Kazakhstan, and Syria were purchasing (or considering purchasing) Russian systems; and Bulgaria was planning to replace old Soviet systems with NATO-compliant versions {603b3ABM99 box 1.8, box 1.12}.