Senate - October 14, 1993 Mr. SASSER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the pending committee amendments be set aside. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.
(PURPOSE: TO ACHIEVE GREATER COOPERATION FROM ALLIES OF THE UNITED STATES
AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS FOR THE SUPPORT OF THE COSTS INVOLVED
IN DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION OF THEATER MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS) The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the amendment. The legislative clerk read as follows: The Senator from Tennessee [Mr. Sasser], for himself, Mr. Leahy, Mr. Simon, Mr. Wofford, Mr. Conrad, Mr. Feingold, and Mrs. Boxer, proposes an amendment numbered 1036. Mr. SASSER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that reading of the amendment be dispensed with. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The amendment is as follows:
Sec. . Not later than January 1, 1994, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress a report on steps that can be taken by the United States to achieve greater cooperation from allies of the United States and international organizations for the support of the costs involved in development and production of Theater Missile Defense systems. (b) The Congress shall establish by law for each fiscal year (beginning with fiscal year 1995) the level of new obligational authority (stated as a single dollar amount) for research, development, test, and evaluation and for procurement for Theater Missile Defense programs of the Department of Defense for that fiscal year. (c)(1) Not more than 80 percent of the amount established pursuant to subsection (b) for any fiscal year may be provided from amounts appropriated to the Department of Defense from the general fund of the Treasury, and no appropriation may be made to the Department of Defense for any fiscal year which would cause the total amount appropriated for that fiscal year for research, development, test, and evaluation and for procurement for Theater Missile Defense programs of the Department of Defense to exceed 80 percent of such amount. (2) Any additional funds for research, development, test, and evaluation and for procurement for Theater Missile Defense programs for any fiscal year for which an amount has been established pursuant to subsection (b) shall be derived from the Theater Missile Defense Cooperation Account under section 2609 of title 10, United States Code, as added by subsection (e). (3) The President may waive the limitation in paragraph (1) and the requirement in paragraph (2) to the extent that the President determines appropriate in the national security interest of the United States. (d) It is the intent of Congress that, except as provided in subsection (e), the percentage of the cost of development and production of Theater Missile Defense systems that is borne by the United States, and the percentage that is borne by allied nations and international organizations, should incrementally shift over the fiscal years after fiscal year 1995 so that the percentage actually borne by the United States in later fiscal years is significantly less than the maximum of 80 percent provided for under subsection (c). (e) The financial contribution requirements established for allied nations in the administration of this section shall not apply to any foreign nation that, as of the date of the enactment of this Act, is paying at least 20 percent of the total cost of the contracts in existence under a theater missile defense interceptor system program being carried out on such date in cooperation between that foreign nation and the United States. (f)(1) Chapter 155 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new section: `2609. Theater Missile Defense : acceptance of contributions from allies; Theater Missile Defense Cooperation Account `(a) Acceptance Authority: The Secretary of Defense may accept from any allied foreign government or any international organization any contribution of money made by such foreign government or international organization for use by the Department of Defense for Theater Missile Defense programs. `(b) Establishment of Theater Missile Defense Cooperation Account: (1) There is established in the Treasury a special account to be known as the Theater Missile Defense Cooperation Account'. `(2) Contributions accepted by the Secretary of Defense under subsection (a) shall be credited to the Account. `(c) Use of the Account: (1) Funds in the Account are hereby made available for obligation for research, development, test, and evaluation, and for procurement, for Theater Missile Defense programs of the Department of Defense , subject to annual limitations provided by law in total obligations for such purpose. `(d) Investment of Money: (1) Upon request by the Secretary of Defense , the Secretary of the Treasury may invest money in the Account in securities of the United States or in securities guaranteed as to principal and interest by the United States. `(2) Any interest or other income that accrues from investment insecurities referred to in paragraph (1) shall be deposited to the credit of the Account. `(e) Notification of Conditions: The Secretary of Defense shall notify Congress of any condition imposed by the donor on the use of any contribution accepted by the Secretary under the authority of this section. `(f) Reporting Requirement: Not later than 30 days after the end of each quarter of each fiscal year, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress a report on the contributions accepted by the Secretary under this section during the preceding quarter. `(g) Annual Audit by GAO: The Comptroller General of the United States shall conduct an annual audit of money accepted by the Secretary of Defense under this section and shall submit a copy of the results of each such audit to Congress. `(h) Regulations: The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe regulations to carry out this section.'. (2) The table of sections at the beginning of such chapter is amended by adding at the end the following new item: `2609. Theater Missile Defense : acceptance of contributions from allies; Theater Missile Defense Cooperation Account.'.
Mr. SASSER. Mr. President, I might say that this amendment is cosponsored by Senators Leahy, Simon, Wofford, Conrad, Feingold, and Boxer. Mr. President, as illustrated by the Senate's debate a few weeks ago on the fiscal year 1994 national defense authorization bill, the United States is now in the process of rethinking its whole missile strategy. Since the 1950's, I think there is general consensus that the greatest military threat to the United States has been the long-range Russian ballistic missile force, and the very existence of this long-range intercontinental ballistic missile force was really the driving thrust behind what gave birth to something we called the strategic defense initiative, star wars, or SDI. The United States of America has already spent $32 billion on SDI. Let me repeat that figure--$32 billion has already been spent on SDI. At the rate we are going, over the next 5 years we will spend an additional $18 to $20 billion on these missile defense systems. Of that $18 to $20 billion, $12 billion will be spent on so-called theater missile defense systems. Since the breakup of the Soviet Union and the end of the cold war, the threat of an intercontinental ballistic missile attack on the United States has shrunk to almost nothing. That is not to say we as a nation ought to let down our guard. We are continuing robust spending for national defense in general, and we are continuing very robust funding for ballistic missile defense in particular. That underscores I think this Nation's commitment to vigilance. We always must cast a wary eye toward development of long-range ballistic missiles and also of new warheads by countries such as China or North Korea. We are essentially worried about intercontinental ballistic missiles. Because the United States has two great oceans protecting it, we are literally thousands upon thousands upon thousands of miles away from any nation which could threaten us with missiles. Our allies in Europe and in other areas do not have the same luxury. They do not have great oceans protecting their borders for thousands of miles as we have in the United States. They are not frightened there so much of intercontinental ballistic missiles, but many of our allies do live under the constant threat of attack by short-range or theater ballistic missiles. Now, those are the kinds of missiles which we saw operating in a very primitive way in Operation Desert Storm, those very primitive missiles the Iraqis had. But many of these nations operate within range of those types of primitive theater ballistic missiles. And many more of our allies are likely to come within range of these missiles at some time in the near future. When you compare these so-called theater ballistic missiles to an intercontinental ballistic missile , they are relatively cheap to manufacture and relatively easy to deploy, and perhaps the most alarming thing about theater ballistic missiles is that the trigger is not held by Boris Yeltsin. It is more likely to be held by a Mu'ammar Qadhafi or a Saddam Hussein. Now, Mr. President, I have brought with me today a chart which has been prepared by the Department of Defense , and this chart shows the threat posed by existing theater ballistic missiles held by so-called third countries that are not our allies. This map shows the west coast of the United States. This is the east coast of the United States, and South America. And you note that the United States is not threatened at all by these so-called theater ballistic missiles. They are concentrated mostly in the Middle East and around, and you see they have an operational range that takes them up into parts of China, parts of Russia, parts of Southern and Eastern Europe. Western Europe at this juncture is not seriously threatened. But clearly the United States itself is not threatened at all. The real threat from theater ballistic missiles today is to some of our allies in the Middle East and in Southern or Eastern Europe, and in the not too distant future some of our allies probably in Western Europe. We found in the war in the Persian Gulf that probably any despot who has enough financial wherewithal can field an arsenal of theater ballistic missiles even though some might be of crude arrangement. But for now and the foreseeable future, the sole direct threat to U.S. interests from theater missiles and tactical missiles comes only when United States military forces are deployed in overseas theaters. The continental United States is not affected, nor is Hawaii, nor is the State of Alaska. Clearly, our attempt to defend against theater missiles ought to be driven by what is in our vital interests. It ought to be driven by our geographic position in the world. It ought to be driven by strategic reality. A recent Department of Defense SDI briefing states that the mission of the U.S. Theater Missile Defense Program is to `protect U.S. forces, U.S. allies, and other important countries.' Let me read that so my colleagues will understand.
Well, a very generous objective indeed, very generous. But like it or not, let me say to my colleagues, this country of ours has been the policeman of the world for at least the last half century. We have paid an enormous price for that, and the American people are telling us they have had enough of it. They want other nations to pick up part of the price tag, at least for their own defense . We have expended and continue to expend vast amounts of our resources to protect our allies. Whether it is troops of the United States stationed in Europe--and bear in mind we still have over 150,000 U.S. troops stationed in Western Europe, almost a half century after World War II--or whether it is the mighty nuclear carrier battle groups steaming through the Red Sea, we are there to keep the peace. And our U.S. taxpayers are paying for it. And honoring these many commitments to our allies and keeping the peace comes at an enormous price. Nobody argues with what occurred after World War II. The largess of the United States made sense. We are the only superpower dedicated to democracy and freedom, and our allies were devastated by the war and had little money to spend to defend themselves. Europe lay in rubble and struggled to feed its citizens, and the armies of the Soviet Union were on the move gobbling up vast amounts of territory. The doomsday clock was ticking toward midnight. But things have changed dramatically since 1946 or 1947 and 1949, indeed, since even 1960. Fifty years after the Second World War ended, the situation has changed very, very dramatically. The allies that were devastated in 1945 now have robust economies, and they built those robust economies to some extent freed by the high cost of national defense because the United States has been footing the bill. Uncle Sugar has plowed vast amounts of money into rebuilding and developing their industrial base. And many of these countries in Europe have created a standard of living which rivals and even exceeds that of the United States. And half a century after World War II, the United States is no longer the unchallenged industrial giant of the world. We are struggling right here at home to overcome a very anemic economy, indeed. We are struggling to find the funding to educate our children, to provide health care for our citizens, to battle and defeat the criminality that stalks our streets day after day. We are running an enormous trade deficit. We are trillions of dollars in debt and have a $300 billion budget deficit staring us in the face for the coming fiscal year. So is it not a testament to the wisdom of the American people that they are now looking to Europe, to Japan, and to Korea, our three biggest economic competitors and saying, enough is enough. We have done our share. My constituents in the State of Tennessee are telling me that they think it is time our allies should start assuming more of the burden of their own defense . And I believe, Mr. President, they are right. I might say that from Europe to Asia our allies now are slowly starting to pick up more of the bill. So there is some light there, I would suggest, at the end of the tunnel. We talk a lot about burdensharing, sharing the burden of defending the democracies of the world and those who are striving to become democracies and those who believe in freedom, believe in civil liberties, believe in human rights. I would submit that nowhere is burdensharing more appropriate than in the theater missile defense area. As I spelled out earlier, theater missile defense is primarily a problem of our allies. Yet, a recent Defense Week article entitled `European Ballistic Missile Defense --Big Plans, Lots of Talk, But Not Much Cash' stated `No European state has an antimissile program.' None of these nations that are threatened in Southern and Eastern Europe and soon to be threatened in Western Europe, according to Defense Week, have an antimissile program. If they are so threatened, why do they not have programs going? And if we in the United States are not threatened, why are we calculating to spend $12 billion over the next 5 years for theater missile defense , and we are not even threatened by theater ballistic missiles? Well, the only time we are threatened by theater ballistic missiles is when we are there with our troops protecting our lives. Who shouldered the cost of the R&D for theater ballistic missile defense ? You guessed it: Uncle Sugar, the United States. Let me just share with my colleagues another chart, which I think those in the Chamber and those watching on television will find interesting: Missile defense research. Expenditures between 1985 and 1993. Total expenditures for missile defense research in the 8-year period from 1985 to 1993 was $33 billion. The United States spent $32.5 billion of that $33 billion. How much did our allies spend? Look at the little blue line for our allies--$500 million over the same 8-year period. So let me just calculate this out for you. For missile defense research, trying to find a way to knock down in-coming missiles, the United States footed a 98.5-percent share, total. Where is the fairness to that? Where is the equity? Why are we doing it? Well, let me tell you what is fair about the amendment that I offer today. As you can see from a third chart here, which I use to graphically illustrate to my colleagues what I am trying to do, the Sasser amendment that we offer today on behalf of myself and others, No. 1, recognizes the importance of theater missile defenses. We are not going to argue about that. They are important. Even though the continental United States or Alaska or Hawaii are not threatened by theater ballistic missiles, we can see that theater missile defenses are important because we do have forces deployed around the world. We recognize that theater -range missiles pose a threat to our allies that equals or exceeds the threat posed to U.S. interests. We say `equals or exceeds.' The truth is that the threat to our allies from theater -range missiles greatly exceeds the threat to the United States. But in the interest of being fair, we say `equals or exceeds' the threat posed to U.S. interests. Our amendment recognizes that U.S. taxpayers have borne a disproportionate share of the burden for developing theater missile defense systems. As we indicated earlier, $33 billion has been spent on missile defense , and 98.5 percent of it has been paid for by the United States. Our amendment supports the recent administration and congressional statements expressing the desire and need to receive greater allied support in protecting Western security interests. Last, in the event there is no cooperation , or if we cannot implement it, then our amendment provides a Presidential waiver if deemed essential to U.S. national interests. So what we are saying is that if we pass this amendment and we say that our allies have to contribute to developing a theater missile defense system, but the President and Secretary of Defense , try as they might, cannot get any help on it and they still believe it is essential to the U.S. national interests to go forward, then the President can simply waive this amendment by a letter to the Congress stating that he cannot put it into effect. What we are saying here in a nutshell is that the Sasser amendment says that the United States is no longer going to pick up the entire tab for theater missile defense . Under this amendment before us today, Congress would establish overall theater missile defense funding levels. In doing so, we would prevent the type of carte blanche research and development and procurement spending that has become all too familiar. Here is how it would work. This gives the President and the Secretary of Defense over a year to implement this program. Beginning in fiscal year 1995, the United States would pay 80 percent of the overall amount for theater missile defense R&D, and the allies would pay the remaining 20 percent. This figure would perhaps rise in subsequent years. That is, the allied contribution would be more, and the U.S. contribution would be less. How would the amendment effectuate itself? The allied contribution would be deposited into a theater missile defense cooperation account established by the Department of the Treasury. You remember the account that was set up in Operation Desert Storm for the various nations involved, to put money into that account to defray a portion of the cost of that military operation. This would be very similar to that. A precedent has already been set for this type of account being established in the Department of the Treasury here in the United States. As I previously mentioned, the President of the United States could waive an ally's obligation any time it shall be deemed in the national interest of the United States. Finally, as I said earlier, the amendment will not take effect until fiscal year 1995. This gives the administration and our allies ample time to adjust and develop a program for contribution and programs for beginning to share the cost. Some of my colleagues may say this amendment is too harsh. I hope they do not. Or they might say it is too critical of our allies. I do not think so. We are saying, look, allies, even though the United States is not threatened by theater ballistic missiles, even though we are not threatened, we are going to pay 80 percent of the cost. We are just asking you to come along and pay 20 percent of the cost. Now that, I think, ought to be a deal they could not pass up. But this amendment does resort to a stick when a carrot would be more successful. Let me say that I recommend an excellent study recently conducted under the auspices of the National Institute for Public Policy. The National Institute for Public Policy is a conservative-leaning think tank. This conservative-leaning think tank, in a study entitled `Proliferation and Missile Defense , European Allied and Israeli Perspectives,' indicates that there is already a movement on the part of some of our allies to get into the business of theater missile defense R&D. This 1993 study printed in June says this, and this is a direct quote:
Still quoting: These developments should help alleviate U.S. concern regarding equitable burdensharing with its European allies in the area of ballistic missile defense . So what they are saying is with just a little push, with just a gentle nudge, the Europeans are ready to come forward, act in their own self-interest, and start contributing to this whole concept of theater ballistic missile research and development and the development of the systems themselves. I must say, Mr. President, that this study should be required reading for all of my colleagues who are concerned that we are being too harsh on our allies with this amendment. What we are saying and what this article is saying is that our allies, on their own, realizing that their own self-interest is at stake, have indicated a growing willingness to participate in U.S. theater missile defense efforts, and this amendment would provide them the opportunity and the nudge forward to do it. This is a fair amendment. I think it deserves the Senate's support. As a matter of fact, I was hopeful and still hope that maybe the distinguished chairman will accept this amendment. We are not placing an onerous financial burden on our allies. We are not leaving them to the prey of wolves like Saddam Hussein and his kind. The amendment simply and basically reflects the change in world politics; it reflects the change in world economics; and it reflects the changing burdens in the defense of the so-called developing world. Our defense budgets must reflect these changes. The United States can no longer afford to shoulder the entire burden, or virtually the entire burden, alone. Our people see this. Our constituents see it. They tell us that now every day. And we have to start expressing their wishes and their will in some of this legislation that is moving through here funding the Department of Defense operations. The truth is that our allies, or most of them, can afford to pay more to defend themselves and some of them are willing to do so. I say, Mr. President, it is time that Uncle Sam made a prudent and fair cut in the allowances of some of those allies of ours that see themselves as the ward of the U.S. taxpayer. Mr. President, I urge adoption of this amendment and yield the floor. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Hawaii [Mr. Inouye]. Mr. INOUYE. Mr. President, it pains me to speak in opposition to this amendment because, as many of my colleagues are aware, I am one of the early advocates of burdensharing. I have long insisted upon burdensharing throughout this globe. But yet, as we all know, there is no uniformity among our allies. For example, at this moment, our NATO allies provide 24 percent of the cost of our presence there, the cost of real estate, the cost of housing, the cost of hiring of nationals, the cost of utilities--24 percent. In Korea, the Koreans provide 70 percent, and it is rising. In Japan at this time, it is in excess of 76 percent, and in 2 years it will be just about 100 percent. For example, at this moment, when we build a barracks, the cost of construction is borne completely by the Japanese Government. This is burdensharing. I wish I could say that we have been successful, that all nations have been contributing heavily. But such is not the case. However, my opposition to this amendment goes a bit further. Mr. President, we should keep in mind that the theater missile defense system is established to protect our troops overseas--our troops. I hope that all of us can recall the Scuds. I remember watching CNN one evening and witnessing the conflagration in Saudi Arabia when one of the Scuds landed on a barracks. I believe about 50 men and women perished as a result of that. This is the system to counter these Scuds. Yes, the Scud was a very primitive system. But I am certain all of us are aware that since that time the Chinese have been working at it and the Iranians have been working at it. If this amendment becomes the law of the land, our allies, whoever they are, will be determining the pace of our production, the amount spent for the production of these protective devices and the placement of these protective devices. We have been critical of our leadership because some have suggested that we were slow in providing equipment to our men in Somalia. What would we say to those men and women who are serving overseas if we explain to them, well, we cannot put up the full system because our allies here have failed to put in their share? This is not real estate, Mr. President. This is not housing. These are devices, weapon systems, to protect our personnel. Then the question comes up, what do we mean by allies? I think that is a very fundamental question. Who are the allies that we are speaking of? Let us take a small place called the Middle East. In Desert Storm, we considered Syria our ally. Is Syria part of this program? Is Egypt part of this program? Is Bahrain part of this program? Are the Arab Emirates part of this program? Is Turkey? Is Korea an ally? Is Pakistan an ally? I have no idea what we mean by allies. Although the measure says the Department of Defense may accept contributions from allies, there is another provision that says we will negotiate with these allies to give us money. Mr. President, it is true that some of our allies, who were devastated in World War II, have, as a result of our assistance, made miraculous recoveries. They have done very well, and they should be participating in burdensharing. But, Mr. President, I do not believe that a theater missile defense system should be an item for burdensharing. We should be responsible for what we provide for our personnel. What do we do if our allies say, yes, we agree that we should have theater missile defense in this country, but we insist that you use our system because it is cheaper? And yet we know it is inferior to ours. Do we, as a result of negotiations, tell our men and women we are going to provide you with a system which is less efficient because it is cheaper and this is what our allies can afford? No, Mr. President. I can speak at greater length, but I do hope that we will reject this. But in so saying, because I believe that this program does have merit in the sense that it should be taken into serious consideration by our administration, I would like to have the administration, the Department of Defense , respond to this measure and tell us how they can carry out the intent of the Sasser amendment in a way that would not jeopardize the security of our military personnel overseas. I would hate to just reject this outright. I hope we can somehow come up with some amendment or some modification that would bring this about, because the concept itself may have some merit. But to do what my good friend is trying to provide in this measure I think would be placing our manpower, our personnel, our young men and women who have decided to place themselves in harm's way, in great jeopardy. So, with some pain, I must oppose this amendment.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Tennessee. Mr. SASSER. Let me just briefly respond to the distinguished chairman, because I do not wish to prolong this debate this afternoon. But I think it should be pointed out that the amendment before us today specifically exempts any nation from contribution which is paying at least 20 percent of the total cost of the contracts in existence under a theater missile defense interceptor program. Now, this would exempt one country and that one country alone, and that is the State of Israel, because they are the only country that is presently involved in developing a theater missile defense program. And that is the Arrow system which is being developed now by the State of Israel. Israel is exempt under this amendment because the Israelis are making an effort to come up with their own system. But they are the only nation, other than the United States and the Russians, who have any kind of theater missile defense system. I heard the distinguished chairman state during the course of his argument here that we would run the risk of perhaps depriving U.S. forces of an adequate theater missile defense if this amendment were adopted. I do not think that is the case at all. In other words, the United States would still be sovereign over its own theater missile defense program, if it wished to be. The United States would certainly deploy the missile defense systems and could deploy them as an umbrella over United States troops. My question is this: Why should the taxpayers of the United States, who are not threatened by theater missile defense or theater ballistic missiles, have to pay for the development of a defense system that not only defends United States troops in Germany, but also defends German troops in Germany, if they are subject to a theater ballistic missile attack, or defend French troops or British troops or Belgium troops, for that matter? Why cannot the taxpayers of those nations come forward and help defray a portion of the defense system for their troops? Now, bear in mind, under this amendment the United States still pays 80 percent of the cost. We are simply saying, for those who are able, working in conjunction with us, working with the Secretary of Defense and the Government of the United States, let us work out a system where you share in some of the research and development and procurement costs of theater missile defenses. Interestingly enough, Mr. President, in a publication of the Congressional Research Service entitled `Theater Missile Defense ,' it says: According to the Ballistic Missile Defense Office, foreign participation has helped the U.S. missile defense effort. Basically, Ballistic Missile Defense Office has received widespread access to foreign technical expertise and innovative technology contributions. So to say that collaboration with our allies in the production or in the development of this theater missile defense system would be counterproductive flies in the face of the CRS report that says it would be productive. Now, when you blow all the foam off of this amendment here and you get down to the basics, here is what you have: We presently are going to spend, over the next 5 years, about $12 billion for theater missile defense . If the Sasser amendment becomes law, we are going to save about $3 billion of that $12 billion spent. That is $3 billion that is going to be paid by the taxpayers of France, Germany, Belgium, Italy, Japan, Korea, and others who are directly threatened by theater ballistic missiles, to work in conjunction with us to develop a system that they can have access to, that they can participate in financially to protect their own troops and their own people. That is all we are saying, `Let us do it together. Sure we will continue to pay 80 percent of the cost, but you kick in $3 billion, save us that $3 billion, and we will move forward together and develop a theater missile defense system with you, even though we are not directly threatened here in the United States by theater ballistic missiles.' So, that is what we are all about here, Mr. President, simply trying to get our allies to contribute a modest amount towards the collective effort to put up a theater missile defense . And if, at the end of fiscal year 1995, the President says, `I just can't do it. We simply can't cooperate with them. We can't get them to contribute. They will not bring in the financial resources that we think they ought to have, but we still need to go forward and develop a theater missile defense because we think it is in the national interest of the United States,' the President can do that. We are not tying his hands here. We are just simply giving the President and the Secretary of Defense the wherewithal to nudge our allies into doing what some of them are inclined to do anyway. So, there we have it, Mr. President. The vote is not: Do we want an adequate theater missile defense ? The vote here is: Do we want to spread the costs among our allies, spread its costs among all of those who are defended, and do we want to save the American taxpayer $3 billion over the next 5 years? I yield the floor. Mr. STEVENS addressed the Chair. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair recognizes the Senator from Alaska [Mr. Stevens]. Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, as I understand Senator Sasser's amendment, he would restrict funding for this program to 80 percent of the required amount. In my judgment, that would mean the future of this program would depend upon foreign contributions for U.S. defensive systems. This could really jeopardize the U.S. technologies that we lead the world in developing, technologies we share with our allies in a common defense . But I do not know why we should share the money we use to develop those defensive systems with them. To me, it would make the development of this program dependent upon the rate of allied financial support. That poses a great risk to U.S. command and control of the systems and it is a force sharing prior to their development. I just have to say to the Senator, while I have supported other efforts in the past to share defense spending for the development of new systems with our allies, that was done in the days when we had a lot more money available. We have already cut this down. It is down literally to its lowest possible level, as far as I am concerned, as far as the total development of the system. For theater missile defense to proceed I think the Sasser amendment has to be defeated.
This amendment would allow us to continue the TMD Program as planned. It would simply realize, and address, the reality of this program: That our allies face a greater risk from tactical missiles, and that therefore they should bear a greater cost burden than they now bear. The contributions that would result from this amendment would free up about $3 billion over the next 5 years. In this day and age of trillion-dollar budgets, that is not a lot of savings, Mr. President. But then it is also not an unfair burden for our Allies. As my colleague from Tennessee points out--who incidently is the chairman of the Senate Budget Committee and should know such things--without the Sasser amendment, the TMD Program will be one of the fastest growing programs in the entire Federal budget. With the Sasser amendment, the planned program growth would continue, but the American taxpayers would not have to foot the entire bill. Yet the United States would still be picking up 80 percent of the tab. The Sasser amendment contains the requisite flexibility by allowing the President to waive the requirement for burden sharing by our allies if he deems it in the interest of the United States. Under this amendment, he has that discretion. Mr. President, the American taxpayer has become weary from his and her long bout resisting communism. He and she were willing to play the lead role in preserving freedom on behalf of the world. Now, the Communist dragon has been slain. Yet we are still footing the bill. When is enough enough? It seems to me, Mr. President, that the Sasser amendment successfully answers that question. That is why I join him on his amendment, and I congratulate him for raising it here before this body. Thank you, Mr. President, and I yield the floor. Mr. STEVENS. I suggest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER (Ms. Moseley-Braun). The clerk will call the roll. The assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll. Mr. SASSER. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. SASSER. Madam President, I am prepared to yield back all time if the distinguished chairman is. Mr. INOUYE. Madam President, there is no time agreement, but as of this moment we have had no requests for time to speak, so I assume all the debate has been concluded. We are prepared to resolve this matter now by voice vote or-- Mr. SASSER. Madam President, I ask for the yeas and nays. SASSER (AND OTHERS) AMENDMENT NO. 1036 (Senate - October 14, 1993) [Page: S13515] (2) The table of sections at the beginning of such chapter is amended by adding at the end the following new item:
House - September 29, 1993 MODIFICATION TO THE AMENDMENT OFFERED
BY MR. MEEHAN At the end of subtitle C of title II (page 70, after line 19), insert the following new section: SEC. . TACTICAL AND THEATER MISSILE DEFENSES. (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings: (1) Systems to provide effective defense against theater and tactical ballistic missiles that may be developed and deployed by the United States have the potential to make equal or greater contributions to the national security interests of nations that are allies of the United States as they do to the national security interests of the United States. (2) The cost of developing and deploying a broad spectrum of such systems will be several tens of billions of dollars. (3) A truly cooperative approach to the development and deployment of such systems could substantially reduce the financial burden of such an undertaking to any one country and would tap additional sources of technological expertise. (4) While recent statements of nations that are allies of the United States have expressed a desire for greater involvement in United States tactical missile defense efforts, those nations are unlikely to support programs for theater missile defense development and deployment unless, at a minimum, they can play a meaningful role in the planning and execution of such programs, including active participation in research and development and production of the systems involved. (5) Given the high cost of developing theater ballistic missile defense systems, allied participation in tactical missile defense efforts would result in substantial savings to the United States. (b) Plan and Reports.--(1) The Secretary of Defense shall develop a plan to coordinate development and implementation of Theater Missile Defense programs of the United States with that of its allies, in order to avoid duplication of effort, to increase interoperability, and to reduce costs. The plan shall set forth in detail any financial, in-kind, or other form of participation in cooperative efforts to plan, develop, produce, and deploy theater ballistic missile defenses for the mutual benefit of the countries involved. (2) The Secretary shall submit to Congress a report on the plan developed under paragraph (1). The report shall be submitted in both classified and unclassified version, as appropriate, and may be submitted as a component of the next annual Ballistic Missile Defense organization report to Congress. (3) The Secretary shall include in each annual Ballistic Missile Defense Organization report to Congress a report on steps taken to implement the plan developed under paragraph (1). Each such report shall set forth the status of discussions with United States allies for the purposes stated in that paragraph and the status of contributions by those allies to the Theater Missile Defense Cooperation Account, shown separately for each allied country covered by the plan. (c) Restriction of Funds.--Of the total amount appropriated pursuant to authorizations in this Act for theater ballistic missile defenses programs, not more than 80 percent may be obligated until-- (1) the report under subsection (b)(2) is submitted to Congress; and (2) the President certifies in writing to Congress that each of the NATO allies, Japan, Israel, South Korea, and any other country that the President considers appropriate have been formally contacted concerning the matters described in the report. (d) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that, whenever the United States deploys theater ballistic missile defenses to protect another country, or the military forces of another country, that has not provided financial or in-kind support for development of theater ballistic missile defenses, the United States should consider whether it is appropriate to seek reimbursement from that country to cover at least the incremental cost of such deployment. (e) Requirement To Establish Annual TMD Level.--The Congress shall establish by law for each fiscal year (beginning with fiscal year 1995) the level of new obligational authority (stated as a single dollar amount) for research, development, test, and evaluation and for procurement for theater missile defense programs of the Department of Defense for that fiscal year. (f) Allied Participation in TMD.--Congress encourages greater participation by United States allies, and particularly by those nations that would benefit most from Theater Missile Defense systems, in cooperative Theater Missile Defense efforts with the United States. (g) Fund for Allied Contributions: (1) Chapter 155 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new section:
`(a) Acceptance Authority: The Secretary of Defense may accept from any allied foreign government or any international organization any contribution of money made by such foreign government or international organization for use by the Department of Defense for Theater Missile Defense programs. `(b) Establishment of Theater Missile Defense Cooperation Account: (1) There is established in the Treasury a special account to be known as the `Theater Missile Defense Cooperation Account'. `(2) Contributions accepted by the Secretary of Defense under subsection (a) shall be credited to the Account. `(c) Use of the Account: (1) Funds in the Account are hereby made available for obligation for research, development, test, and evaluation, and for procurement, for Theater Missile Defense programs of the Department of Defense . `(d) Investment of Money: (1) Upon request by the Secretary of Defense , the Secretary of the Treasury may invest money in the Account in securities of the United States or in securities guaranteed as to principal and interest by the United States. `(2) Any interest or other income that accrues from investment in securities referred to in paragraph (1) shall be deposited to the credit of the Account. `(e) Notification of Conditions: The Secretary of Defense shall notify Congress of any condition imposed by the donor on the use of any contribution accepted by the Secretary under the authority of this section. `(f) Annual Audit by GAO: The Comptroller General of the United States shall conduct an annual audit of money accepted by the Secretary of Defense under this section and shall submit a copy of the results of each such audit to Congress. `(g) Regulations: The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe regulations to carry out this section.'. (2) The table of sections at the beginning of such chapter is amended by adding at the end the following new item: `2609. Theater Missile Defense : acceptance of contributions from allies; Theater Missile Defense Cooperation Account.'.
The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California? There was no objection. The CHAIRMAN pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the amendments en bloc are not subject to a demand for division of the question. The gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums] will be recognized for 10 minutes, and the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. Spence] will be recognized for 10 minutes. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California [Mr. Dellums]. Mr. DELLUMS. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to yield 3 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Meehan]. Mr. MEEHAN. Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong support of the en bloc amendment's language on theater missile defense burdensharing. The rationale for this amendment is clear--our allies are the principal beneficiaries of these defensive systems, and we want to ensure that they have the opportunity to contribute to the cost of research and development of the program. Theater defenses do not offer protection against missiles capable of intercontinental flight. Even at the height of the cold war, they would not have protected the United States against attacks from the Soviet Union, because they're designed to intercept objects fired at low-altitude trajectories. The Clinton administration's bottom-up review proposes spending $12 billion on theater missile defense systems from 1995 to 1999. Despite the end of the cold war and our crushing budget problems, the United States continues to fund virtually all of the theater missile defense programs. Clearly, we cannot continue to shoulder the entire burden of paying for this program. This amendment requires the Secretary of Defense to develop a detailed plan to coordinate development and implementation of TMD programs with our allies to avoid duplication and reduce costs. In an effort to encourage greater participation by our allies in cooperative theater missile defense efforts, the amendment directs the Secretary of Defense to submit to Congress classified and unclassified reports that detail financial, in-kind, and any other contributions made by our allies toward the theater missile defense program. I want to emphasize that point again, because it goes to the heart of the issue. This amendment specifies, for the first time, that the Secretary of Defense must take concrete steps to implement the plan. The Secretary must keep Congress informed on the status of discussions with our allies and the amount of allied contributions, broken down by country, to the theater missile defense cooperation account. Theater missile defense continues to have utility in the post-cold-war world. Make no mistake--this amendment is not about eliminating the TMD program. Rather, this amendment puts the Department of Defense and our allies on notice that it is in their interests to share the costs of building TMD systems that are designed primarily to benefit them. Let us share the burden.
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