North Korea: Foreign Relations

Foreign Relations

(...and current events)

"Our foreign policy is the most righteous and principled one for the causes of socialism, which is also aimed at achieving independence for all humankind. We will further strengthen unity with the progressive people of the world desirous of socialism and with anti-imperialist, independent forces in the idea of independence, peace and friendship, and will smash the aggression and war moves of the imperialists and build a new world, peaceful and independent"(36).

North Korea, sometimes called the "Hermit Kingdom", has throughout its fifty year history kept its distance from other nations, showing little enthusiasm for diplomacy or people-to-people contact. Even during the Cold War, North Korea was a close ally of neither China nor the Soviet Union. After these two communist societies collapsed, North Korea became even more isolated. A strong military, including weapons of mass destruction, is the backbone of North Korean foreign policy. The most basic summary of its foreign policy is a 'mind your own business and leave us alone' policy. However, in more depth, North Korea's foreign policy must be broken up into four sections; relations with South Korea, relations with China, relations with Japan, and relations with the United States.

First, North Korean policies towards South Korea, before and after the Korean War in 1950, have been centered upon reunification of the Korean Peninsula. After the Korean War, the two Korea's signed an armistice (they technically remain in a state of war). While both the North and the South desire to be reunited, the two have fundamental differences in their approach to such an agreement. North Korea's position focuses on three major themes. First, it feels that both Koreas should simultaneously cut back on their military, second, that the two Koreas should become socialist states; and third, that a one-Korea policy should be pursued under all circumstances. Pyongyang seeks to settle military questions first, proposing cessation of the military buildup and the withdrawal of all foreign troops (American) from South Korea. South Korea's position is one of peaceful coexistence based on "peace first, unification later." Seoul first, seeks recognition of the political systems of the two Koreas, second, noninterference in each side's internal affairs, and third, the promotion of mutual economic cooperation. South Korea stresses the importance of preserving peace at all costs, specifying that each side refrain from invading the other or interfering in the other's affairs. In July of 2004, Minister of Unification and future presidential hopeful Chung Dong-young of South Korea eagerly prepared for his first trip to Kaesong in North Korea as minister (it had been reported last summer soon after he took office that he had been studiously preparing to meet with his North Korean counterparts), but was utterly humiliated at the ceremony marking the opening of the zone (The low-level North Korean representative at the ceremony criticized South Korea for its slowness in implementing the project and walked out on Chung's address). This incident in July 2004 only reinforced the North Korean judgment that the current unification minister is not the man with whom the DPRK is eager to speak and widened the gap between the neighboring countries. Despite the insult to Chung the two Koreas still aim to unify. Fueled by South Korean enthusiasm the two have agreed to build roads that connect the two countries and to allow a few South Korean firms into Kaesong. This project is fully subsidized by the South Korean government (the budget for inter-Korean economic cooperation is about $496 million). North and South relations seem to be beginning a slow but steady upward rise to reunification but official unification doesn't seem to be in the near future.

Second, China serves mostly as an intermediary between North Korea and the rest of the world. North Korea has always kept cordial relations with China due to its cultural affinity despite political and ideological differences. In addition the two countries have a history of being cordial. China saved North Korea in the Korean War, and during the Sino-Soviet deputes in the 1960's North Korea sided with China. However, as silly as it may sound, relations were strained when President Nixon was invited to Beijing in February of 1972. North Korea felt betrayed and China sought to assure the North Koreans of its continued friendship by boosting its aid donations. Even after China joined the United Nations the two countries met frequently. However, as China becomes more and more industrialized and a part of the global economy and affairs, North Korea is more and more of a burden. When North Korea suspended its unilateral participation in the Six-Party Talks, Beijing and China-North Korea relationships were put into the spotlight. No other party has enough leverage to convince the DPRK to return to dialogue. While Beijing’s position is enhanced by the fact that all the other parties are depending on Beijing’s diplomatic skills in dealing with the DPRK, it is by no means clear whether or how China might use the tools at its disposal to discipline and entice North Korea back to the negotiating table. In recent news, on April 9, 2005, two senior-level meetings between North Korean and Chinese leaders over the last two weeks to discuss the North's nuclear-weapons program, the Chinese have failed so far to persuade North Korea to rejoin nuclear disarmament talks.

Thirdly, North Korea and Japan have not established formal relations since North Korea was founded in 1948. In 2000 the two countries held several rounds of normalization talks that had been frozen since 1992. The talks however have been frozen since November of 2000 because one of North Korea's main demands on Japan is compensation for Japanese colonization in North Korea from 1910-1945. Japan has offered however large economic aid packages but North Korea will only accept compensation for Japan has long been considered an enemy by North Korea. In September of 1998, North Korea launched a test missile over Japan, claiming it was simply a scientific satellite used to broadcast the songs of General Kim Il Sung and General Kim Jong Il (you can listen to these songs at: http://www.kcckp.net/en/art/music/hymn.php?a+1). This launch alarmed Japan, and much of the rest of the world, and brought to the forefront North Korea's intentions regarding reentry into the nuclear arms race.

: Lastly, North Korea and the United States. In this section I will also discuss North Korea's nuclear weapons and its policies towards them. Ever since the Korean War, North Korea's relations with the United States have not been good. At the beginning of the war, the United States placed an economic embargo on North Korea (which still remains largely in place) and American passports became invalid for travel in North Korea and all American diplomats were told to ignore and avoid contact with North Korea. The low point of U.S.-North Korea relations came in 1968. In January, a thirty-one man Korean commando team staged an unsuccessful raid on the Korean presidential mansion in Seoul. Two days later, the North Koreans seized the U.S. reconnaissance vessel Pueblo, which they claimed was trespassing in their territorial waters, releasing the captain and crew eleven months after the United States released an apology. In April 1969, a U.S. Navy reconnaissance plane was shot down by the North Koreans, with the loss of forty-seven American lives. Such actions only served to strengthen American resolve to protect South Korea which is exactly opposite from what the North Koreans desire them to do. From here on out, North Korea persisted on American withdrawal of troops from the South, but the U.S. was in no mood to deal with the North Koreans. It was only after talks in Beijing beginning in December 1988 until September 1993 that U.S.-North Korean relations improved.

It was in 1993 that North Korea agreed to allow the IAEA to inspect their nuclear weapons programs and it signed a Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). When the IAEA felt that North Korea was hiding some of its nuclear programs and pressure from the United States to accept "special inspections" loomed North Korea announced its intentions to withdraw from the NPT. Not wanting North Korea to withdraw, the U.S. agreed to more high level talks thus, the North Korean's suspended their withdrawal. The talks resulted in an Agreed Framework which meant the United States was to provide North Korea with two modern, proliferation-resistant reactors in exchange for a freeze on North Korea's current nuclear program. This lighted U.S.-North Korean relations. However January 10, 2003 North Korea announced that it was officially withdrawing from the NPT. North Korea said: "We can no longer remain bound to the [non-proliferation] treaty, allowing the country's security and the dignity of our nation to be infringed upon" (33). Never before has any country withdrawn from the NPT. Pyongyang claimed that it was not going to produce nuclear weapons but use its nuclear power to produce electricity. No one quite believed this claim.

During talks with China and the U.S. in April 2003, North Korea announced that it had already produced nuclear weapons and threatened to test or export them. In July North Korean officials reported that the country had reprocessed enough plutonium to build six nuclear bombs. Kim has regularly used threats and hostile acts to try to wring aid from the international community, but it was difficult to decipher how he expected to accomplish his aims—economic aid and a safeguard against U.S. attack—through such reckless brinkmanship. Refusing to bow to North Korea's demands, the United States informed the nation's diplomats that it would not begin to negotiate until North Korea first dismantled its nuclear program. China took on the role of mediator between North Korea and the U.S., urging less inflexibility on both sides. A modest breakthrough occurred when officials from the U.S., North Korea, China, Russia, South Korea, and Japan met in August in Beijing, although nothing substantive resulted. Another round of six-nation negotiations in Feb. 2004 was also inconclusive. At a third round of negotiations on North Korea's nuclear weapons program in June 2004, the U.S. offered North Korea the delivery of heavy fuel oil and a “provisional security guarantee” if it agrees to disclose details of its weapons program, allows inspections, and begins to dismantle its nuclear program within three months. North Korea did not respond to the offer.

In Feb. 2005, North Korea admits for the first time that it possesses nuclear weapons and says it will not engage in further disarmament talks. In most recent news, April 18, 2005, North Korea refuses to freeze its nuclear weapons programs unless the United States does so too. It will only begin to discuss a disarmament program if the disarmament program is bilateral. This statement absolutely shocked the United States and the U.S. is still trying to figure out how it plans on dealing with this situation. Six-Party talks are in session but no breakthrough has occurred as of yet. In most recent news, May 2, 2005, it has been released that North Korea has the capability to fire missles. North Korea is several years away from being able to launch a missle that would reach the United States but even still, the world is on edge (27).

The United States has a few options of how it might deal with this. It could, increase diplomatic pressure against Pyongyang; create A UN Security Council resolution; impose economic sanctions; or increase counter-proliferation activities aimed at Pyongyang (such as stopping and boarding North Korean ships, as set forth in the U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative or PSI). It is most likely that the U.S. would increase its diplomatic pressures. Increasing its diplomatic pressures includes finding something for North Korea that is more appealing and important than bombs. Such a thing could be U.S. withdrawl from South Korea but the United States is not yet prepared for such a move. Creating a UN Security Council resolution is less likely because technically North Korea is not violating any international commitments since it has withdrawn from the NPT. Economic sanctions would be of little success because that would require full support from China and South Korea, and their support is improbable and counter-proliferation activities would take too much time, money and resources and really puts North Korea's neighboring countries in danger. The lack of trust between Washington and Pyongyang is the greatest obstacle blockading any possibility of diplomatic settlements. Until there is a clear line of communication and understanding between the two countries, disputes will not simmer.

Timeline of North Korea's nuclear weapons programs: http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/northkorea/timeline.html

To follow the news on this topic, go to: http://www.nytimes.com/pages/world/asia/index.html.

News from the DPKR's point of view: http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm

This web site was created by Anya Bogusky. Last updated May 2, 2005. Email the webmaster at: avbogusk@mtholyoke.edu.