

Algorithm Design

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Course Goals

- Learn how to formulate precise problem descriptions
- Learn specific algorithm design techniques and how to apply them
- Learn how to analyze algorithms for efficiency and for correctness
- Learn when no exact, efficient solution is possible

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Stable Matching Problem

Goal. Given n colleges and n students, find a suitable matching.

Colleges rank students in order of preference.

Students rank colleges.

- Each college gets exactly one student.
- Each student gets exactly one college.

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Stable Matching Problem

◦ Goal. Given a set of preferences among colleges and high school students, design an admissions process with these properties:

- Perfect matching: everyone is matched one-to-one.
- Each college gets exactly one student.
- Each student gets exactly one college.
- Stability: no incentive for some pair of participants to undermine assignment by joint action.
- In matching M , an unmatched pair c - s is unstable if college c and student s prefer each other to current partners.
- Unstable pair c - s could each improve by swapping with current assignments.
- Stable matching: perfect matching with no unstable pairs.

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Question 1

- Do all problems have a stable matching?

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Stable Roommate Problem

- Goal. Given $2n$ students, find a "suitable" matching.
- Students rank each other.

	Preferences		
Angel	Brat	Crook	Doofus
Brat	Crook	Angel	Doofus
Crook	Angel	Brat	Doofus
Doofus	Angel	Brat	Crook

Is there a stable matching?

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Stable Roommate Problem

- Goal. Given $2n$ students, find a "suitable" matching.
- Students rank each other.

	Preferences		
Angel	Brat	Crook	Doofus
Brat	Crook	Angel	Doofus
Crook	Angel	Brat	Doofus
Doofus	Angel	Brat	Crook

Is A-B, C-D a stable matching?

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Stable Roommate Problem

- Goal. Given $2n$ students, find a "suitable" matching.
- Students rank each other.

	Preferences		
Angel	Brat	Crook	Doofus
Brat	Crook	Angel	Doofus
Crook	Angel	Brat	Doofus
Doofus	Angel	Brat	Crook

Is A-B, C-D a stable matching?

No! B-C is an instability

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Stable Roommate Problem

- Goal. Given $2n$ students, find a "suitable" matching.
- Students rank each other.

	Preferences		
Angel	Brat	Crook	Doofus
Brat	Crook	Angel	Doofus
Crook	Angel	Brat	Doofus
Doofus	Angel	Brat	Crook

Is A-C, B-D a stable matching?

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Stable Roommate Problem

- Goal. Given $2n$ students, find a "suitable" matching.
- Students rank each other.

	Preferences		
Angel	Brat	Crook	Doofus
Brat	Crook	Angel	Doofus
Crook	Angel	Brat	Doofus
Doofus	Angel	Brat	Crook

Is A-C, B-D a stable matching?

No! A-B is an instability

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Stable Roommate Problem

- Goal. Given $2n$ students, find a "suitable" matching.
- Students rank each other.

	Preferences		
Angel	Brat	Crook	Doofus
Brat	Crook	Angel	Doofus
Crook	Angel	Brat	Doofus
Doofus	Angel	Brat	Crook

Is A-D, B-C a stable matching?

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Stable Roommate Problem

- Goal. Given $2n$ students, find a "suitable" matching.
- Students rank each other.

	Preferences		
Angel	Brat	Crook	Doofus
Brat	Crook	Angel	Doofus
Crook	Angel	Brat	Doofus
Doofus	Angel	Brat	Crook

Is A-D, B-C a stable matching?

No! A-C is an instability

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More Questions

- If the sets being matched are disjoint, is there always a stable matching?
- Is the stable matching always unique?
- Can we find a stable matching efficiently?

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Thoughts on Solving the Problem

- Initially, no colleges and students are matched.
- Pick an arbitrary college and have it admit its favorite student. Are we guaranteed that pair will be part of a stable matching?
 - Should a student accept her first offer?
 - If not, what should the student do?
- When are we done? Do we need to consider all combinations???

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Propose-and-Reject (Gale-Shapley) Algorithm

```
Initialize each college and student to be free.
while (some college is free and hasn't accepted
every student) {
  Choose such a college c
  s = 1st student on c's list that c has not
  yet accepted
  if (s is free)
    assign c and s to each other
  else if (s prefers c to her current college
  c')
    assign s and c to each other, and c' to
    be free
  else
    s rejects c
}
```

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Questions about the Gale-Shapley Algorithm

- Does the loop terminate?
- Is the matching perfect, that is, is it one-to-one?
- Is the matching stable?

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Proof by Contradiction (Review)

• How do we construct a “proof by contradiction”?

1. Assume the thing we want to prove is false.
2. Reason to a contradiction.
3. Conclude that it must therefore be true.