In Cairo, Egypt on April 11, 1996, forty-eight African nations signed The Treaty of Pelindaba, establishing Africa as a nuclear weapon-free zone (NWFZ).  It requires each party "not to conduct research on, develop, manufacture, stockpile or otherwise acquire, possess or have control over any nuclear explosive device by any means anywhere."  Article 5 of the treaty bans testing of nuclear explosive devices and Article 6 asks the parties to dismantle any devices that were manufactured prior to the treaty and to convert or destroy facilities that create nuclear explosive devices.  Like the Treaty of Rarotonga, the Treaty of Pelindaba forbids the dumping of radioactive material in the zone covered by the treaty.  The treaty also promotes efforts by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the African Regional Cooperation Agreement for Research, Training and Development Related to Nuclear Science and Technology (AFRA) promote programs that advocate the peaceful use of nuclear energy for the betterment of society.  As the other NWFZ treaties require, the Treaty of Pelindaba requires nuclear states not to "use or threaten to use" nuclear weapons against any state in the zone and not to contribute to the violation of the treaty in any way. 

Verification System

    The treaty creates the twelve member African Commission on Nuclear Energy (AFCONE) to overlook compliance with the treaty.  The parties elect the members of AFCONE to three-year terms.
    Like the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the Treaty of Rarotonga, the Treaty of Pelindaba requires the parties to undertake IAEA safeguards.

Articles 9, 12-13, Annexes II: Compliance
9: The party may use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes as long as it negotiates an agreement with the IAEA for that agency to verify compliance.  The party may give fissionable material to a non-nuclear state only if that state has IAEA safeguards as well.

12: AFCONE will be established to exchange reports and other information, listen to complaints from the parties, call together the parties, if necessary, for any matter relating to the treaty, examine IAEA safeguards, promote programs that advocate the peaceful use of nuclear energy for the betterment of society, and improve cooperation with extra-zonal states for the peaceful use of nuclear energy.  AFCONE meetings will take place annually.

13: AFCONE will receive annual reports from each party on its activities regarding the treaty and from the IAEA regarding the activities of AFRA.

Annex II: Each Party will negotiate an agreement with the IAEA to ensure that nuclear material intended for peaceful purposes is not put to any other use.  Unless the Party allows the Commission to do so, the Commission will not transmit any information from the Party's report about its nuclear activities to a third party.

Annex III: This annex explains AFCONE (previously described).

Annex IV: If a Party X has a complaint against another Party Y, the two Parties will first try to resolve the dispute themselves.  If there is no resolution, Party X will bring the complaint in front of the Commission.  If, after Party Y replies to the complaint, the Commission deems that there is a need for an inspection, the IAEA will conduct an inspection of Party Y.  Although neither Party X nor Party Y may be on the inspection team, Party Y may accompany the inspection team.  Party Y will allow the inspectors full access to any area that relates to the complaint, and it will grant them immunity with relation to the inspection.  The inspectors will report their findings and conclusions to the Commission, which will in turn report to all the Parties.  If Commission feels that Party Y is violating the Treaty, all Parties will meet to discuss the situation.  They will advise Party Y on a course of action, and, if they so desire, refer the matter to the Organization for African Unity (OAU), who might, in turn, refer to the UN Security Council.¹

Notes

    While the Protocols ask nuclear states not to contribute to the violation of the treaty, there is no verification system in place to monitor the naval and air deployments of the nuclear powers in the zone and areas neighboring the zone.²
    The verification measures in the Treaty of Pelindaba are quite similar to that in the Treaty of Rarotonga.  Both treaties require IAEA safeguards before transferring nuclear material to non-nuclear states and ask the IAEA to submit reports ensuring that nuclear material is used only for peaceful purposes.  Unlike the Treaty of Rarotonga, the Treaty of Pelindaba explicitly states that no third parties may view reports on a party's nuclear activity. (See Disseminating Data under Process of Verification)   Some specifics of the complaint system also vary between the two treaties.  For example, in the Treaty of Rarotonga representatives of both Party X and Party Y may accompany the special inspection team in the territory of Party Y, but in the Treaty of Pelidaba representatives of only Party Y may accompany the inspection team.