The South Pacific forum (composed of Australia, the Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, and Western Samoa) drafted the Treaty of Rarotonga on August 6, 1985 and it entered into force in 1986.  The treaty establishes the South Pacific as a Nuclear Free Zone.  It is similar to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which establishes South America and the Caribbean as a Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone.  As in the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the Treaty of Rarotonga requires that states in the South Pacific do not possess, 
manufacture, or test "any nuclear explosive device."  Protocol 2 asks nuclear states not to "use or threaten to use" nuclear weapons against any state in the zone.   Protocol 3 of the treaty bans nuclear states from testing in the zone.  However, the Treaty of Rarotonga is stricter than the Treaty of Tlatelolco in certain respects.  First, it forbids all nuclear explosive devices, no matter what the purpose of the device, while the Treaty of Tlatelolco allows devices for nuclear testing.  Second, it does not allow the dumping of radioactive matter anywhere in the zone's waters, making it a Nuclear Free Zone instead of a Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone.

Verification Measures

As in the Treaty of Tlatelolco, "full-scope" IAEA safeguards are required for all nuclear activities of the Parties and for nuclear exports to non-nuclear states.  IAEA safeguards are also required for nuclear exports to nuclear states, although they do not need to be full-scope.¹

Articles 9 and 10, and Annexes 2 and 4: The Control System
9: The Director of South Pacific Bureau of Economic Co-operation (SPEC) will receive from any Party reports concerning the security of the Treaty.  The Director will circulate the information to all the Parties.  The Director will also annually present information regarding the security of the Treaty to the South Pacific Forum, including reports that Parties have sent to him/her.

10: If any Party so desires, the Director will call for a meeting of the Consultative Committee to discuss an issue.

Annex 2: Each Party will negotiate an agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) regarding "all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of the Party, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere."  The IAEA will then implement safeguards in the territory to ensure that the material used for peaceful purposes is not used for nuclear explosive devices.  Party X will send a copy of the IAEA's report on inspections within X to the Directory, and to Party Y if Party Y so requests.

Annex 3: The Consultative Committee will be composed of one representative from each Party who may be accompanied by advisers.  The chair of a Consultative Committee meeting will be the from the last country that last hosted the Heads of Government of Members of the South Pacific Forum meeting.  SPEC will pay for the costs of the Consultative Committee and of the special inspections in Annex 4.

Annex 4: If Party X has a complaint against Party Y, Party X will inform the Director and Party Y will have a chance to reply to the complaint.  If the Parties and the Director do not reach a conclusion, Party X may inform the Consultative Committee.
                  Special Inspection: If the Committee feels that there might be a problem, it will send a three-member special inspection team to the territory of Party Y.  Although neither Party X nor Party Y may be on the inspection team, they may accompany the inspection team.  Party Y will allow the inspectors full access to any area that relates to the complaint, and it will grant them immunity with relation to the inspection.  The inspectors will report their findings and conclusions to the Consultative Committee, which will in turn report to the South Pacific Forum.  If Consultative Committee feels that Party Y is violating the Treaty, Party X and Party Y will meet at the South Pacific Forum.²

Notes:

As in the Treaty of Tlatelolco, "full-scope" IAEA safeguards are required for all nuclear activities of the Parties and for nuclear exports to non-nuclear states.  Unlike the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the Treaty of Rarotonga requires IAEA safeguards are also required for nuclear exports to nuclear states, although they do not need to be full-scope.¹