Europeans as well as many Muslims greeted de Gaulle's return to power as the breakthrough needed to end the
hostilities. On his June 4 trip to Algeria, de Gaulle calculatedly made an ambiguous and broad emotional appeal to all
the inhabitants, declaring "Je vous ai compris" (I have understood you). De Gaulle raised the hopes of colons and the
professional military, disaffected by the indecisiveness of previous governments, with his exclamation of "Vive Algérie
française" (long live French Algeria) to cheering crowds in Mostaganem. At the same time, he proposed economic,
social, and political reforms to ameliorate the situation of the Muslims. Nonetheless, de Gaulle later admitted to having
harbored deep pessimism about the outcome of the Algerian situation even then. Meanwhile, he looked for a "third
force" among Muslims and Europeans, uncontaminated by the FLN or the "ultras"--colon extremists--through whom a
solution might be found.

De Gaulle immediately appointed a committee to draft a new constitution for France's Fifth Republic, which would be
declared early the next year, with which Algeria would be associated but of which it would not form an integral part.
Muslims, including women, were registered for the first time with Europeans on a common electoral roll to participate in
a referendum to be held on the new constitution in September 1958.

De Gaulle's initiative threatened the FLN with the prospect of losing the support of the growing numbers of Muslims
who were tired of the war and had never been more than lukewarm in their commitment to a totally independent
Algeria. In reaction, the FLN set up the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (Gouvernement Provisionel
de la République Algérienne--GPRA), a government-in-exile headed by Abbas and based in Tunis. Before the
referendum, Abbas lobbied for international support for the GPRA, which was quickly recognized by Morocco,
Tunisia, and several other Arab countries, by a number of Asian and African states, and by the Soviet Union and other
East European states.

ALN commandos committed numerous acts of sabotage in France in August, and the FLN mounted a desperate
campaign of terror in Algeria to intimidate Muslims into boycotting the referendum. Despite threats of reprisal, however,
80 percent of the Muslim electorate turned out to vote in September, and of these 96 percent approved the
constitution. In February 1959, de Gaulle was elected president of the new Fifth Republic. He visited Constantine in
October to announce a program to end the war and create an Algeria closely linked to France in which Europeans and
Muslims would join as partners. De Gaulle's call on the rebel leaders to end hostilities and to participate in elections was
met with adamant refusal. "The problem of a cease-fire in Algeria is not simply a military problem," said the GPRA's
Abbas. "It is essentially political, and negotiation must cover the whole question of Algeria." Secret discussions that had
been underway were broken off.

In 1958-59 the French army had won military control in Algeria and was the closest it would be to victory. During that
period in France, however, opposition to the conflict was growing among many segments of the population. Thousands
of relatives of conscripts and reserve soldiers suffered loss and pain; revelations of torture and the indiscriminate
brutality the army visited on the Muslim population prompted widespread revulsion; and a significant constituency
supported the principle of national liberation. International pressure was also building on France to grant Algeria
independence. Annually since 1955 the UN General Assembly had considered the Algerian question, and the FLN
position was gaining support. France's seeming intransigence in settling a colonial war that tied down half the manpower
of its armed forces was also a source of concern to its North American Treaty Organization (NATO) allies. In a
September 1959 statement, de Gaulle dramatically reversed his stand and uttered the words "self-determination," which
he envisioned as leading to majority rule in an Algeria formally associated with France. In Tunis, Abbas acknowledged
that de Gaulle's statement might be accepted as a basis for settlement, but the French government refused to recognize
the GPRA as the representative of Algeria's Muslim community.

Claiming that de Gaulle had betrayed them, the colons, backed by units of the army, staged an insurrection in Algiers in
January 1960 that won mass support in Europe. As the police and army stood by, rioting colons threw up barricades in
the streets and seized government buildings. In Paris, de Gaulle called on the army to remain loyal and rallied popular
support for his Algeria policy in a televised address. Most of the army heeded his call, and in Algiers General Challe
quickly defused the insurrection. The failure of the colon uprising and the loss of many ultra leaders who were
imprisoned or transferred to other areas did not deter the militant colons. Highly organized and well-armed vigilante
groups stepped up their terrorist activities, which were directed against both Muslims and progovernment Europeans,
as the move toward negotiated settlement of the war and self-determination gained momentum. To the FLN rebellion
against France were added civil wars between extremists in the two communities and between the ultras and the French
government in Algeria.

Data as of December 1993

From Library of Congress:

De Gaulle

Europeans as well as many Muslims greeted de Gaulle's return to power as the breakthrough needed to end the
hostilities. On his June 4 trip to Algeria, de Gaulle calculatedly made an ambiguous and broad emotional appeal to all
the inhabitants, declaring "Je vous ai compris" (I have understood you). De Gaulle raised the hopes of colons and the
professional military, disaffected by the indecisiveness of previous governments, with his exclamation of "Vive Algérie
française" (long live French Algeria) to cheering crowds in Mostaganem. At the same time, he proposed economic,
social, and political reforms to ameliorate the situation of the Muslims. Nonetheless, de Gaulle later admitted to having
harbored deep pessimism about the outcome of the Algerian situation even then. Meanwhile, he looked for a "third
force" among Muslims and Europeans, uncontaminated by the FLN or the "ultras"--colon extremists--through whom a
solution might be found.

De Gaulle immediately appointed a committee to draft a new constitution for France's Fifth Republic, which would be
declared early the next year, with which Algeria would be associated but of which it would not form an integral part.
Muslims, including women, were registered for the first time with Europeans on a common electoral roll to participate in
a referendum to be held on the new constitution in September 1958.

De Gaulle's initiative threatened the FLN with the prospect of losing the support of the growing numbers of Muslims
who were tired of the war and had never been more than lukewarm in their commitment to a totally independent
Algeria. In reaction, the FLN set up the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (Gouvernement Provisionel
de la République Algérienne--GPRA), a government-in-exile headed by Abbas and based in Tunis. Before the
referendum, Abbas lobbied for international support for the GPRA, which was quickly recognized by Morocco,
Tunisia, and several other Arab countries, by a number of Asian and African states, and by the Soviet Union and other
East European states.

ALN commandos committed numerous acts of sabotage in France in August, and the FLN mounted a desperate
campaign of terror in Algeria to intimidate Muslims into boycotting the referendum. Despite threats of reprisal, however,
80 percent of the Muslim electorate turned out to vote in September, and of these 96 percent approved the
constitution. In February 1959, de Gaulle was elected president of the new Fifth Republic. He visited Constantine in
October to announce a program to end the war and create an Algeria closely linked to France in which Europeans and
Muslims would join as partners. De Gaulle's call on the rebel leaders to end hostilities and to participate in elections was
met with adamant refusal. "The problem of a cease-fire in Algeria is not simply a military problem," said the GPRA's
Abbas. "It is essentially political, and negotiation must cover the whole question of Algeria." Secret discussions that had
been underway were broken off.

In 1958-59 the French army had won military control in Algeria and was the closest it would be to victory. During that
period in France, however, opposition to the conflict was growing among many segments of the population. Thousands
of relatives of conscripts and reserve soldiers suffered loss and pain; revelations of torture and the indiscriminate
brutality the army visited on the Muslim population prompted widespread revulsion; and a significant constituency
supported the principle of national liberation. International pressure was also building on France to grant Algeria
independence. Annually since 1955 the UN General Assembly had considered the Algerian question, and the FLN
position was gaining support. France's seeming intransigence in settling a colonial war that tied down half the manpower
of its armed forces was also a source of concern to its North American Treaty Organization (NATO) allies. In a
September 1959 statement, de Gaulle dramatically reversed his stand and uttered the words "self-determination," which
he envisioned as leading to majority rule in an Algeria formally associated with France. In Tunis, Abbas acknowledged
that de Gaulle's statement might be accepted as a basis for settlement, but the French government refused to recognize
the GPRA as the representative of Algeria's Muslim community.

Claiming that de Gaulle had betrayed them, the colons, backed by units of the army, staged an insurrection in Algiers in
January 1960 that won mass support in Europe. As the police and army stood by, rioting colons threw up barricades in
the streets and seized government buildings. In Paris, de Gaulle called on the army to remain loyal and rallied popular
support for his Algeria policy in a televised address. Most of the army heeded his call, and in Algiers General Challe
quickly defused the insurrection. The failure of the colon uprising and the loss of many ultra leaders who were
imprisoned or transferred to other areas did not deter the militant colons. Highly organized and well-armed vigilante
groups stepped up their terrorist activities, which were directed against both Muslims and progovernment Europeans,
as the move toward negotiated settlement of the war and self-determination gained momentum. To the FLN rebellion
against France were added civil wars between extremists in the two communities and between the ultras and the French
government in Algeria.

Data as of December 1993

From the Library of Congress Archives:

De Gaulle

Europeans as well as many Muslims greeted de Gaulle's return to power as the breakthrough needed to end the
hostilities. On his June 4 trip to Algeria, de Gaulle calculatedly made an ambiguous and broad emotional appeal to all
the inhabitants, declaring "Je vous ai compris" (I have understood you). De Gaulle raised the hopes of colons and the
professional military, disaffected by the indecisiveness of previous governments, with his exclamation of "Vive Algérie
française" (long live French Algeria) to cheering crowds in Mostaganem. At the same time, he proposed economic,
social, and political reforms to ameliorate the situation of the Muslims. Nonetheless, de Gaulle later admitted to having
harbored deep pessimism about the outcome of the Algerian situation even then. Meanwhile, he looked for a "third
force" among Muslims and Europeans, uncontaminated by the FLN or the "ultras"--colon extremists--through whom a
solution might be found.

De Gaulle immediately appointed a committee to draft a new constitution for France's Fifth Republic, which would be
declared early the next year, with which Algeria would be associated but of which it would not form an integral part.
Muslims, including women, were registered for the first time with Europeans on a common electoral roll to participate in
a referendum to be held on the new constitution in September 1958.

De Gaulle's initiative threatened the FLN with the prospect of losing the support of the growing numbers of Muslims
who were tired of the war and had never been more than lukewarm in their commitment to a totally independent
Algeria. In reaction, the FLN set up the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (Gouvernement Provisionel
de la République Algérienne--GPRA), a government-in-exile headed by Abbas and based in Tunis. Before the
referendum, Abbas lobbied for international support for the GPRA, which was quickly recognized by Morocco,
Tunisia, and several other Arab countries, by a number of Asian and African states, and by the Soviet Union and other
East European states.

ALN commandos committed numerous acts of sabotage in France in August, and the FLN mounted a desperate
campaign of terror in Algeria to intimidate Muslims into boycotting the referendum. Despite threats of reprisal, however,
80 percent of the Muslim electorate turned out to vote in September, and of these 96 percent approved the
constitution. In February 1959, de Gaulle was elected president of the new Fifth Republic. He visited Constantine in
October to announce a program to end the war and create an Algeria closely linked to France in which Europeans and
Muslims would join as partners. De Gaulle's call on the rebel leaders to end hostilities and to participate in elections was
met with adamant refusal. "The problem of a cease-fire in Algeria is not simply a military problem," said the GPRA's
Abbas. "It is essentially political, and negotiation must cover the whole question of Algeria." Secret discussions that had
been underway were broken off.

In 1958-59 the French army had won military control in Algeria and was the closest it would be to victory. During that
period in France, however, opposition to the conflict was growing among many segments of the population. Thousands
of relatives of conscripts and reserve soldiers suffered loss and pain; revelations of torture and the indiscriminate
brutality the army visited on the Muslim population prompted widespread revulsion; and a significant constituency
supported the principle of national liberation. International pressure was also building on France to grant Algeria
independence. Annually since 1955 the UN General Assembly had considered the Algerian question, and the FLN
position was gaining support. France's seeming intransigence in settling a colonial war that tied down half the manpower
of its armed forces was also a source of concern to its North American Treaty Organization (NATO) allies. In a
September 1959 statement, de Gaulle dramatically reversed his stand and uttered the words "self-determination," which
he envisioned as leading to majority rule in an Algeria formally associated with France. In Tunis, Abbas acknowledged
that de Gaulle's statement might be accepted as a basis for settlement, but the French government refused to recognize
the GPRA as the representative of Algeria's Muslim community.

Claiming that de Gaulle had betrayed them, the colons, backed by units of the army, staged an insurrection in Algiers in
January 1960 that won mass support in Europe. As the police and army stood by, rioting colons threw up barricades in
the streets and seized government buildings. In Paris, de Gaulle called on the army to remain loyal and rallied popular
support for his Algeria policy in a televised address. Most of the army heeded his call, and in Algiers General Challe
quickly defused the insurrection. The failure of the colon uprising and the loss of many ultra leaders who were
imprisoned or transferred to other areas did not deter the militant colons. Highly organized and well-armed vigilante
groups stepped up their terrorist activities, which were directed against both Muslims and progovernment Europeans,
as the move toward negotiated settlement of the war and self-determination gained momentum. To the FLN rebellion
against France were added civil wars between extremists in the two communities and between the ultras and the French
government in Algeria.

Data as of December 1993

From the Library of Congress Archives:

http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+dz0041)