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"Act Utilitarianism and Cooperative Utilitarianism"

Abstract

             David Gauthier is the preeminent defender of modern Hobbesian contractarianism.  Gauthier recognizes contractarianism's need to demonstrate both that it is rational to be moral (i.e., to answer Hobbes' Foole), and that morality is distinct from rationality (functioning as a constraint on self-interest).  To answer the Foole, Gauthier employs the controversial revisionist theory of rationality.  This theory (even if it were true) creates more problems than it solves.  First I argue that the orthodox theory of rationality can also answer the Foole, so that the revisionist theory solves no contractarian problems.  Then I argue that the revisionist theory makes morality superfluous because morality will never constrain rationality, and so creates a problem.  This highlights a fundamental contractarian dilemma of showing that morality is based on rationality and nevertheless functions as a constraint upon it.  The orthodox theory allows us to escape both horns of the dilemma.
 

            One might object to act consequentialism (AC) that even apart from our inability to accurately calculate the consequences of our actions, agents who subscribe to AC will fail to maximize utility because they are untrustworthy (i.e., they cannot be resolute).  So, AC fails on its own terms.  Rule consequentialism (RC) might be thought to solve this problem. I argue that AC agents can be trustworthy, and so can maximize utility at least as well as RC agents.  Indeed, AC agents actually do better than RC agents in certain circumstances, for reasons that have not previously been recognized.  In showing this I also demonstrate that even the most basic form of RC is genuinely distinct from AC, and I argue that for an agent to form an intention of perform an action it is not necessary that the agent believe that there is any good reason to perform that action.

            Supreme Court Justice Scalia is a vocal defender of strict constructionism as a theory of constitutional interpretation (i.e., the words in the constitution mean what they meant when they were written).  According to Scalia, this implies that the question of whether the death penalty is unconstitutionally cruel is downright silly because there is no question that the authors of constitution (and those of that time) believed that it was not cruel.  Ronald Dworkin has argued that even if one accepts the strict constructionist theory, it still may be the case that the death penalty is unconstitutionally cruel because there is no reason to accept that the authors of the constitution were infallible regarding the application of the term "cruel".  So, if we now believe we have a better understanding of the cruelty, then we can reasonably claim that the constitution prohibits certain punishments that the authors didn't expect it to.  Scalia's underappreciated response to this appeals to the function of a constitution as a safeguard, and he points out that under Dworkin's approach the constitution cannot provide a safeguard against new interpreters that are more barbarous than the authors.  I argue that Scalia is largely correct about the function of a constitution as a safeguard, but that he is mistaken in concluding that it should not be allowed to be reinterpreted at all in light of a better understanding of concepts like cruelty.  Dworkin's theory would allow a constitution to be reinterpreted in such a way that it either increases or decreases the protection of individual rights, and this is why it can provide no effective safeguard.  But Scalia's theory allows for neither increased nor decreased protection, and so fails to allow for progress.  I argue that a proper understanding of the function of a constitution as a strategic device for the maximization of utility implies that the courts should be permitted to reinterpret the constitution so as to increase the protection of individual rights, but not be allowed to decrease their protection below the level envisioned by the authors.

            Weakness of will is typically seen as an impediment to rational action and to our control.  I argue that we should distinguish between two kinds of weakness, controlled and uncontrolled -- and that controlled weakness is actually helpful in increasing control and is rational for one to cultivate.  Controlled weakness is habitual action that is cultivated by an agent for the specific purpose of overcoming particular strategic problems in achieving her ends.  For example, a rational agent may wish to cultivate the habit of trustworthiness to increase her chances of being included in beneficial cooperative ventures.  The habit of trustworthiness counts as controlled weakness because it is a disposition to do what one has agreed to do even under circumstances where it is no longer in one's long term interest to do so.  In other words, when one acts out of the habit of trustworthiness, one is doing what one knows will be worse (by whatever standards the agent wishes to employ);  and so this is a kind of weakness of will.  But it is also a beneficial trait (a virtue) that it is rational to acquire and which increases control.  I go on to argue that this distinction allows one to see crucial flaws in the common arguments used to support some revisionist theories of rationality and morality (e.g., rule utilitarianism).

A significant percentage of women with breast cancer choose to undergo bone marrow transplants, which are much more costly and painful than the more traditional treatment of radical mastectomy, but there is no good scientific evidence that the bone marrow transplants are more effective.  This trend has increased over more than a decade, and there is little prospect for gathering evidence on the merits of these bone marrow transplants because patients are unwilling to submit to the randomized clinical trials which are necessary to gain reliable data.  I argue that this is properly understood as a coordination problem and that the government is justified in restricting the availability of bone marrow transplants (for breast cancer treatment) to those patients willing to enter randomized clinical trials.  I argue that the short term costs in the restriction of individual liberty are outweighed by the long term benefits gained through the increased knowledge.  Moreover, I argue that this does not dangerously infringe on individuals' rights because there is no right to medical treatments whose effectiveness is seriously in question.  This conclusion is compatible with my conclusions regarding medical marijuana, and the apparent contrast is informative about the proper limits of government regulation.

The surprise test paradox is among the most troubling paradoxes, and it is perhaps the one about which the fewest sensible things have been said.  My goal in this paper is first to formulate a version of the paradox that is immune to the answers that others have offered.  I then use a game theoretic framework to understand how the student's reasoning goes awry and to identify a decision procedure that the teacher can employ as a winning strategy.  This will identify a limitation on the use of recursive reasoning and perhaps demonstrate that rationality has a essential element of vagueness or unpredictability.
 
 
 

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