Children at an Internally Displaced People (IDP) camp waiting for food.
The child in the picture on the left is one of two remaining children of
eight.
By mid-1991, neighboring countries made attempts to organize peace conferences in Djibouti in order to create a coalition within Somalia that would foster peace and stability, but to no avail. In early 1992, the United Nations finally decided that action needed to be taken in order to respond to the political vacuum that had been created when Siad Barre was forced out (Samatar 32). In March of that year, moderate success was made when a cease-fire was agreed upon among major factional leaders in Mogadishu. How long officials expected the cease-fire to last was not known, but efforts to "broaden the cease-fire into an effective process to promote political reconciliation and institutional rehabilitation" were not capitalized upon or exploited. The United States, in August of 1992, sponsored an airlift of relief supplies to Somalia (Samatar 27). While the cease-fire lasted, relief aid from the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) moved more freely than it had prior to the cease-fire agreement. However, the amount of aid that was able to reach the Somalis who needed it was limited because the aid became the subject of the emerging economy of banditry as warlords withheld relief aid. Learning this, President Bush announced that U.S. military aircraft would be allocated to transport the food relief to speed up the deliveries to remote towns. It seemed he did this in order to circumvent Mogadishu's bandit-infested harbor.
In his December 4, 1992, address to the nation officially announcing Operation Restore Hope, President Bush stressed both the humanitarian purpose and the limited nature of the U.S. military intervention in Somalia:
“Our mission has a limited objective-to open the supply routes, to get the food moving, and to prepare the way for a U.N. peace-keeping force to keep it moving. This operation is not open-ended. We will not stay longer than is absolutely necessary” (Maren 86).
The U.S. Center for Disease Control and Prevention verified that mortality rights were “among the highest ever documented b y a population survey among famine-affected civilians” (Clarke 47). Andrew Natsios, who at the time headed the U.S. Agency for International Development's Office of Foreign Assistance, testified before Congress in late January 1992 that Somalia was "the greatest humanitarian emergency in the world." (30, Samatar). Understanding the severity of Natsios’s comment, the U.S., fearing the growth of its financial obligations, insisted the United Nations water down Resolution 733 “so that it did not call for peacekeeping” (Samatar 56).
In the same month, the UN stated that it was “gravely alarmed at the rapid deterioration of the situation in Somalia and the heavy loss of human life and widespread material damage resulting from the conflict in the country and aware of its consequences on the stability and peace in the region”(30 Samatar). And so, the Security Council invoked Chapter VII of the UN Charter which stated that a threat to international peace existed and based this decision on primarily internal conditions. As a result of this statement, the UN imposed an arms embargo on Somalia. For the first time a UN force under the direction of then Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali would be deployed for peace-making rather than only peace-keeping roles, since it was the violence which was partly directed to the exploitation of the aid that was continuing when force had been committed to the region. On November 21 1992, the National Security Council’s deputies committee met to consider its options in Somalia. Although Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell, among others, were adamant that forces not be sent to the country without a clear mandate. After having just lost his bid for re-election, President Bush offered to send U.S. troops to lead a U.N. action, which the U.N. quickly accepted. On December 3 1992, the Security Council passed Resolution 794 which approved the use of "all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia" (Clarke 145) This resolution clearly saw that "UNOSOM's existing course would not in present circumstances be adequate to respond to the tragedy in Somalia" and that "it has become necessary to review the basic premises and principles of the United Nations effort in Somalia." (Clarke 145)
On the same day, the first of 30,000 US troops landed in Mogadishu. Their
mission, as part of UNITAF (United Task Force) was to take control of the
ports in Mogadishu and Kismayo in order to ensure the passage of relief
supplies (Sahnoun 238). Initially, there was some success as far as the
delivery of the relief aid was concerned, but the political problems continued.
UNITAF completed its operation and departed on May 1, 1993 when UNOSOM
II took over. This operation, which had more ambitious goals, lacked a
viable and coherent political strategy. Within weeks, UNOSOM II forces
were unable to leave their quarters, and in their unsuccessful attempts
to capture Aideed, US helicopter gun ships were deployed. This led to the
deaths of over 40 UN forces and 300 Somalis. With more American and Somali
deaths to come in later months, President Bill Clinton put a time limit
on restoring peace, promoting disarmament, and delivering aid at March
of 1994. After this date, all American troops were to leave Somalia and
return home. UN troops were withdrawn a year later. Leaving behind continued
skirmishes between the warring factions. This intervention was historical
because it was the first time that the U.N had ever intervened without
permission in the affairs of an independent nation.